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Op-ed | International Aid as a Line of Defence: What Happens to Human Security Without Soft Power?

Article by Anna Chernova

April 24, 2026

Op-ed | International Aid as a Line of Defence: What Happens to Human Security Without Soft Power?

Securitisation of foreign (and domestic) policy is leading to a prioritisation of hard power approaches over civilian-led, soft power approaches, leaving many wondering about the future. As Europe rearms in response to the Russian threat to its collective security, and as the US proves itself an unreliable security partner, the UK finds itself repositioning within a fractured Euro-Atlantic alliance. This raises a broader question: how to de-securitise and return to “normal” politics?[1]

 

If militarism shapes the next generation’s approach to public policy, what are the prospects for addressing the root causes of violence that are driving the skyrocketing humanitarian needs and record levels of forced displacement? The impact of armed conflict is increasingly more severe and violence is becoming the new normal, while political solutions are de-funded and militarised approaches take precedence.[2]

 

As the UK and many other democratic states reduce investment into peacebuilding and other soft power efforts, resource constraints are affecting the very institutions that help prevent and mitigate conflict, support collective security, and promote diplomatic solutions.

 

Today, the international community marks the importance of multilateralism and diplomacy for peace.

 

This takes place in a context of increasing global arms transfers, the proliferation of non-state armed groups, a resurgence of international armed conflicts, and systematic violations of the UN Charter across continents.[3] The low cost of entry into conflict for both state and non-state actors (in part enabled by globalisation, including access to technology, finance, and information), combined with social, economic and environmental factors, is undermining peace and other development goals. In a globalised order, military escalations in one region risk pushing millions into poverty, including in already conflict-affected contexts.[4]

 

This dynamic is also unfolding alongside increasing inequalities and restrictions on civic space. Democratic backsliding has reduced agency for civil society, including humanitarian actors, women’s rights groups, LGBTQI+ movements and many others relying on a rights-based, rules-based international world order – particularly in contexts where the states are unwilling or unable to adhere to a viable social contract. Without multilateral spaces, civil society voices risk further marginalisation and isolation in the face of expanding authoritarianism.[5] Without civic space, the positive peace agenda is undermined.

 

At the same time, significant reductions in aid are reshaping the UN and the multilateral architecture underpinning diplomacy for peace. Regional and global multilateral institutions and their civil society partners are grappling with a steadily increasing wave of violence and militarism with dwindling resources. The private sector, philanthropy, and new donors (e.g. in the Gulf) seem willing to meaningfully engage in ways that come close to replacing USAID’s contribution to pathways for peace, and the wider Nexus approach that brings together Humanitarian Development and Peace.[6]

 

Human Development progress, particularly around Women, Peace and Security and gender justice, are stalling and regressing. These trends point to the continued importance of investment in soft power, including support for democracy, human rights, gender equality, the rule of law, and security sector reform. While the UK has historically positioned itself as a leader in this area and continues to recognise its importance, current policy choices suggest a growing gap between this recognition and the protection of funding for peacebuilding, development and humanitarian relief.[7]

 

Where does this leave the UK role in the wider European neighbourhood and globally?

A renewed focus on human security is needed. A purely state-centric approach, driven by self-interest among a growing number of undemocratic and unequal states is likely to lead to a more violent world order that will not yield the desired collective human development dividends. The UK’s historic role in championing human security approaches in institutions like NATO, and reflected in its approaches at the UN Security Council is more needed than ever.  In a shifting global order, where collaboration among middle powers around shared geographic or sectoral interests and values is becoming critical, the UK’s track record on human security lends value regionally and globally.

 

The UK’s Ministry of Defence review of strategic trends flagged important human security dimensions, outlining risks around inequalities and other socio-economic factors that are likely to drive instability and diminish UK’s global role and its national security.[8] Yet despite the availability of such detailed and well-considered analysis,  foreign policy and national security decision-makers continue to defund the human security agenda, and inadvertently make the world (and the country) less safe.

 

With civic space narrowing, citizens and states must be represented in regional and global dialogues, as well as in the institutions that underpin them. While the UK prides itself on a long historic track record of soft power, particularly through its academic institutions, think tanks, vibrant media, and civil society – these all require public investment. Without a well-resourced and stable civil service to help deliver on these objectives, this historic soft power asset risks weakening, with implications for peacebuilding outcomes.

 

Holding the pen, and running out of paper: what happens to penholding at the UN Security Council?

A major factor in the UK’s global security positioning is in the power of its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The UK holds the pen on some key thematic and geographic files, convening peace and security conversations across a wide range of diverse states.

 

For a post-Brexit middle-power, the UK retains an impressive amount of influence in these soft power spaces. However, much of the political credit goes to historic investments by DFID and  the Foreign Office in regional institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN aid systems, and the Human Security agenda within NATO. Without sustained investment in these spaces, including in the civil service staff and structures, the UK’s soft power positioning will not be sustainable and it will not be able to build on its impressive historic track record of conflict resolution and peacebuilding through collective security and human security approaches.

 

Without diplomacy and resources to civilian-led processes, military solutions will be increasingly seen as “normal” and viable. A growing share of the population, particularly younger generations coming of age in a renewed period of geopolitical competition, may come to view conflict as an inevitable feature of international relations. Without diplomacy, there will be more bullets.[9]

 

 

Anna Chernova has a background in foreign policy and international development, with a focus on human rights, conflict resolution and humanitarian action. She has worked in diplomatic and non-governmental sectors in Eurasia and West Asia. At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, she led work on human rights and democracy, including parliamentary diplomacy efforts in conflict resolution, election observation and inquiries. Prior to joining the OSCE, Anna managed large-scale humanitarian operations in Russia’s North Caucasus at the close of the second Chechen war, and had worked on refugee issues with the UN in Bulgaria. Since 2014, she has been advising humanitarian organisations on foreign policy analysis, political risk and transnational threats. Her research and policy work focuses on gender and conflict, human security, counter-terrorism and human rights. She is particularly interested in conflict prevention and addressing root causes of violence driving humanitarian crises, such as extreme inequalities and authoritarianism. Anna’s academic background is in International Studies, Russia/Eastern Europe and Global Security. She is a US Fulbright Research and IREX Public Service Fellow, and is based in the UK.

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

 

[1] Jonathan Luke Austin, Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard, “(De)securitisation dilemmas: Theorising the simultaneous enaction of securitisation and descuritisation,” Review of International Studies (2017) https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/desecuritisation-dilemmas-theorising-the-simultaneous-enaction-of-securitisation-and-desecuritisation/FE45D2C1D20870EC0E74DF54FA487C06

[2] ACLED Conflict Watchlist 2026, “What is driving conflict today? A review of global trends,” (2025) https://acleddata.com/report/whats-driving-conflict-today-review-global-trends

[3] ICRC https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/challenges-report_ihl-and-non-state-armed-groups.pdf; SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2025

[4] UNDP, “Military escalation in the Middle East could push more than 30 million people into poverty worldwide,” (2026) https://www.undp.org/press-releases/military-escalation-middle-east-could-push-more-30-million-people-poverty-worldwide-un-development-programme-warns

[5] Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2026, “The Growing Shadow of Autocracy,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2026/growing-shadow-autocracy

[6] World Bank Group, “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” (2018) https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/pathways-for-peace-inclusive-approaches-to-preventing-violent-conflict

[7] International Development Committee, “Future of UK aid and development assistance: interim report, Government Response,” https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/52758/documents/293937/default/

[8] Ministry of Defence, “Global Strategic Trends out to 2055,” 7th edition (2024) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68dba439dadf7616351e4bf8/GST_7_Final_post_pic_change_WEB.pdf

[9] Forbes, “Heed General Mattis’ Warning, D.C.: Less Diplomacy Means ‘More Ammunition’”, June 2025https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewtisch/2025/06/18/heed-general-mattis-warning-dc-less-diplomacy-means-more-ammunition/

Footnotes
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    Op-ed | A Symptom and a Catalyst: Orbán, Ukraine and the Institutional Remaking of the European Security Order

    Article by Mayank Sethi, Tamzin-Lily Trigg, and Stefan Wolff

    April 1, 2026

    Op-ed | A Symptom and a Catalyst: Orbán, Ukraine and the Institutional Remaking of the European Security Order

    When Hungarians head to the polls on 12th April 2026, there will be more at stake than whether the country’s current Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, wins another term. The outcome of the elections will reverberate well beyond Hungary, particularly in relation to the dynamics surrounding the Russian war against Ukraine.[1] As a member of both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the next Hungarian government will have significant influence over a range of major, and closely connected geopolitical issues, especially Russia’s ongoing  war in Ukraine and the future of the transatlantic alliance.

     

    The current Hungarian government, and Orbán personally, have had strong pro-Kremlin leanings for years.[2] This has on many occasions delayed crucial EU support for Ukraine and the imposition of further sanctions on Russia.[3] At the time of writing, Hungary is holding up the disbursement of an already agreed €90 billion loan to Ukraine over a dispute about the delivery of Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline that crosses Ukraine. The pipeline was damaged by a Russian strike in late January, and Hungary alleges that Ukraine is deliberately dragging its feet in repairing it.[4] EU leaders, in turn, have accused Hungary of blackmail over the issue; but despite their collective outrage, they have so far failed to release the funds because of the Hungarian veto, which Orbán has also turned into a key campaign issue.[5]

     

    While Orbán’s defeat could mean progress on this specific issue, it would hardly shift the dial on two other related issues. One is the Hungarian dependence on Russian oil: with the opposition candidate, and Orbán’s main challenger, Peter Magyar,  already stating  that there is no short-term alternative to the continued imports of Russian oil.[6] This potentially sets up a new battle between Budapest and Brussels, as the EU is firmly committed to ending Russian oil and gas imports.[7] A proposal to legally ban any imports of Russian oil into the EU may be currently on hold, but is hardly off the agenda.[8]

     

    The second issue is that this is not only a ‘Hungarian problem’ for the EU. Orbán’s stance on the loan to Ukraine has also been backed by the leaders of Slovakia (another Russian oil customer) and the Czech Republic, Robert Fico and Andrej Babiš respectively.[9] Both have expressed similar EU- and Ukraine-sceptic views as Orbán, and are likely to continue acting as a thorn in the side of other EU member states and the institutions in Brussels that are more supportive of Ukraine. They also share Orbán’s framing of Ukraine as an economic burden and a security threat, which has been one of the dominant themes of the Hungarian election campaign.[10]

     

    To complicate matters further, Magyar takes a very similar line and is likely to uphold Hungary’s veto on Ukraine’s fast-track EU accession.[11] Orbán’s election defeat, if it were to happen, might be welcomed in Brussels and other European capitals,–but as others have already commented Magyar’s “victory would not signal an overnight thaw in ties with Kyiv”[12]. Nor would it be an end to divisions within the EU over how to support Ukraine and deal with Russia.

     

    There is also an important transatlantic angle. Orbán has received strong endorsements from US President Donald Trump and his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, with the latter telling him that “your success is our success”.[13] This underlines Orbán’s role in the broader global alliance of illiberal populists, ranging from Trump’s MAGA movement in the US to the far right parties the National Rally in France and the AfD in Germany, as well as the Hungarian Prime Minister’s  Czech and Slovak allies.[14] The concept  of ‘the West’ pushed by this alliance sits comfortably with Trump’s vision of a new world order, as articulated by Rubio at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year.[15] However, it is fundamentally at odds with the hitherto prevailing European vision of a rules-based international order.

     

    This order of old is now under threat from both Russia and the US. A win for Orbán would therefore clearly be as much a setback from a European perspective as it would be celebrated in the White House, as the endorsement of an illiberal Christian nationalist vision of the West. It would potentially boost other ideological allies of the Trump administration in upcoming elections elsewhere in Europe, such as in France and Poland next year (for which the Hungarian elections could be an important bellwether); as well as  further fragment and disrupt what is left of the once solid Euro-Atlantic alliance that underpinned the rules-based international order.

     

    Despite the setbacks that can be expected, a win for Orbán will not necessarily spell the complete end of a liberal democratic model anchored in the EU. Yet the space within which this model can survive will be a shrinking one in need of allies.

     

    The Hungarian elections crystallise both the fragility of the EU consensus on Ukraine and the rupture in the transatlantic alliance. Regardless of their outcome, they are a symptom of, and a catalyst for, the further acceleration of the institutional remaking of the European security order, especially around the core of EU and NATO members that have come together in the ‘coalition of the willing’. Such a core, once it has become more firmly established, could also become a more effective counterweight to the undoing of the rules-based order and the unmaking of the West. It would not preserve the liberal order that has already been eroded, but might anchor a new order that is less illiberal than that envisaged by Orbán and his transatlantic and Eurasian supporters and allies.

     

     

    Mayank Sethi is a final year Master’s student in International Relations from the University of Birmingham. Mayank has previously served with the Embassy of Denmark in India and other diplomatic missions in Delhi. He has been an active debater and has participated in national and international debates. He actively participates in forums and policy events in London which are hosted by Embassies and think tanks.

     

    Tamzin Trigg is an MA International Security student at the University of Birmingham, with a BA in Law with Humanities. She is currently a Research Intern at the State Capture Accountability Project.

     

    Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

     

     

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

     

    Image: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán addresses the plenary on the priorities of the Hungarian Council Presidency © European Union 2024 – EP  

     

    [1] Donatienne Ruy and Maria Snegovaya, What Is at Stake in Hungary’s Election?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-stake-hungarys-election.

    [2] Jamie Dettmer, How Viktor Orbán became Vladimir Putin’s best friend in the EU, Politico, March 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-vladimir-putin-eu-hungary-russia/.

    [3] Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, EU agrees €90 billion loan to Ukraine, but squabbles over frozen Russian assets expose the bloc’s deep divisions, The Conversation, December 2025, https://theconversation.com/eu-agrees-90-billion-loan-to-ukraine-but-squabbles-over-frozen-russian-assets-expose-the-blocs-deep-divisions-272095.

    [4] Nick Thorpe and Vitaliy Shevchenko, Ukraine-Hungary oil pipeline row threatens EU loan, BBC, March 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cr71rkeg7xxo.

    [5] Alys Davies, Hungary’s Orbán accused of disloyalty and blackmail over Ukraine loan veto, BBC, March 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq6jrvgqeejo.

    [6] Pablo Gorondi and Ray Furlong, Hungarian Opposition Leader Magyar Tells RFE/RL No Quick End To Russian Energy Imports, RFE/RL, October 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/hungarian-opposition-leader-magyar-russia-energy-imports/33559475.html

    [7] European Council, Timeline – Ending Russian energy imports, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ending-russian-energy-imports/timeline-ending-russian-energy-imports/.

    [8] Lili Bayer and Kate Abnett, EU to propose permanent ban on Russian oil after Hungary election, document shows, Reuters, February 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-propose-permanent-ban-russian-oil-after-hungary-election-document-shows-2026-02-24/ and Kate Abnett, EU delays April 15 proposal to permanently ban Russian oil imports, Reuters, March 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-delays-april-15-proposal-permanently-ban-russian-oil-imports-2026-03-24/

    [9] Alex Stezhensky, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia refuse to join €90 billion EU loan program for Ukraine, The New Voice of Ukraine, December 2025, https://english.nv.ua/nation/hungary-czech-republic-slovakia-opt-out-of-eu-s-90b-loan-plan-to-support-ukraine-in-2026-2027-50569771.html

    [10] Flora Garamvolgyi and Ashifa Kassam, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán seeking to drum up votes by doing down Ukraine, The Guardian, February 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/27/hungarys-viktor-orban-seeking-to-drum-up-votes-by-doing-down-ukraine. Hungarian (and/or Czech and Slovak) opposition to Ukrainian EU accession could also impede the prospects of neighbouring Moldova and cause further delay to EU enlargement in the Western Balkans.

    [11] Bohdan Babaiev, Orbán’s top rival shocks with mixed message on Ukraine and Russia, RBC Ukraine, July 2025, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/orb-n-s-top-rival-shocks-with-mixed-message-1753550644.html

    [12] Max Griera, Zoya Sheftalovich and Nicholas Vinocur, Orbán’s gambit to revive his election hopes: A battle against the EU, Politico, February 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-viktor-orban-gambit-to-revive-his-election-hopes-a-battle-against-the-eu/

    [13] Ellen O’Regan, “Trump affirms ‘total endorsement’ of Orbán ahead of Hungary election”, Politico, 21 February 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-affirms-complete-and-total-endorsement-of-orban-amid-clash-with-eu/; Milena Wälde, “‘Golden age’: Rubio praises Orbán ahead of Hungary election”, Reuters, 16 February 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/golden-age-marco-rubio-gushes-over-viktor-orban-pre-election-meeting/

    [14] Gellert Tamas, The global authoritarian right loves Orbán – and that could cost him in Hungary’s elections, The Guardian, March 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/mar/24/viktor-orban-hungary-elections-global-authoritarian-right.

    [15] Felicia Schwartz, Rubio calls on Europe to join Trump’s new world order, Politico,  February 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/marco-rubio-msc-europe-we-belong-together/

    Footnotes
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      Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

      Article by Prof Stefan Wolff

      February 20, 2026

      Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

      The 25th Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly should be a moment of celebration and reflection on past successes in advancing the organisation’s broader goals of comprehensive and collective security. Yet, much like the 50th anniversary of the organisation in 2025, it will be anything but. The OSCE continues to be in a deep crisis.

       

      Triggered by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this is first and foremost a crisis of paralysis, with meaningful dialogue and decision-making among participating States in Vienna largely stalled. The OSCE continues to function operationally, with at least some meaningful and substantive business being conducted in the organisation’s specialised institutions – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media – as well as in its eleven field operations in eastern and southeastern Europe and Central Asia.

       

      The existing crisis of paralysis is further compounded by the wider crisis of multilateralism and the deliberate dismantling of the rules-based international order, which did not begin with, but has significantly accelerated since the return of Donald Trump to the White House 13 months ago. The implications for the OSCE became particularly evident at the Ministerial Council in Vienna on 4 December 2025, when a representative of the US State Department called for “a reduction of at least €15 million in the annual budget by December 2026”, a shift in priorities away from politically contentious issues, and renewed engagement with Russia. Implied, if not explicitly stated, was the threat of US withdrawal from the OSCE: “If the OSCE continues on its current path, the United States will continue to assess our participation and support.”[1]

       

      As with previous periods of institutional strain, the key question that arises from it is not new: can participating States reform the organisation and help it find a way back to being an effective contributor to security across its vast geographic area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok? And perhaps more importantly, should they?

       

      The priorities of this year’s Swiss Chairpersonship under the theme “Dialogue – Trust – Security” certainly suggest that a serious attempt will be made. Key objectives include safeguarding the OSCE’s operational capacity (“preserve the basic instruments … and to ensure their financing”) and revitalising multilateral diplomacy (“foster an open dialogue on security”, “maintain channels of communication on security, including between States in conflict”).[2]

       

      Another priority – to work for lasting peace on the basis of the Helsinki principles (enshrined in the organisation’s 1975 founding act) – envisages that “the OSCE is mobilising its instruments across all three dimensions to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. Not only does this naturally align with the very purpose of the organisation but it also could give the OSCE a new lease of life in light of recent developments in the war against Ukraine.

       

      The prospect of elections, a referendum, and a possible peace deal could give the OSCE and its participating States an opportunity to bring to bear its experience and expertise in election observation, ceasefire monitoring, demining, on-the-ground mediation, and post-conflict institution building.

       

      However, not all of the OSCE’s past experiences in these areas were stellar successes. Getting the organisation into a position where it could meaningfully contribute to a lasting peace in Ukraine will require pain-staking, detail-oriented work in the corridors of the OSCE secretariat and the Hofburg in Vienna, not the megaphone diplomacy that tends to take place in the meetings of the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation.

       

      For the UK, the OSCE – notwithstanding the organisation’s ongoing crisis – still represents an important forum to articulate and pursue its national interests. While just one among several minilateralisms that have recently emerged – including the ‘coalition of the willing’, the European Political Community, the Ukraine Defence Contact (or Ramstein) Group – it is unique in the sense that it is one of the few remaining fora where direct dialogue with Russia is not just possible but embedded in the organisation’s founding purpose.

       

      Such dialogue must, however, serve a concrete purpose and it needs to be based on clear principles. As Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation in the last trimester of 2026, and as a member of the Forum’s Troika in the preceding and subsequent trimesters, the UK is well positioned to support the Swiss Chairpersonship’s reform agenda and to contribute to restoring the OSCE’s operational effectiveness. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE, Ambassador Neil Holland, will also continue in his role as Chair of the Security Committee, one of the informal subsidiary bodies of the Permanent Council, specifically charged with discussing politico-military issues and supporting the preparation of the Annual Security Review Conference, which provides participating States with an opportunity to discuss regional security issues in plenary form.

       

      The UK’s long-standing experience in multilateral diplomacy, its role as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and its still pivotal role at the nexus of Euro-Atlantic security create a unique opportunity for making a lasting contribution to making the OSCE relevant again as a forum for dialogue among all its participating States. This will not be easy and success will not be guaranteed, but it will be a worthwhile investment of UK

       

       

      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

       

       

      Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

       

      Image Credit: © OSCE

       

      [1] United States Mission to the OSCE, “Plenary Statement 32nd OSCE Ministerial Council Vienna, Austria, December 4, 2025”, December 2025, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2025/12/mcdel0056%20usa.pdf

      [2] OSCE, Programme and priorities of Switzerland’s OSCE Chairpersonship 2026, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/2026/01/OSCE2026_Broschuere_Faltkarte_EN_Web%20%282%29.pdf.

      Footnotes
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        Op-ed | Patterns of History in Transatlantic Relations

        Article by David Harley

        January 30, 2026

        Op-ed | Patterns of History in Transatlantic Relations

        In this op-ed, David Harley, FPC Advisory Council member and former EU diplomat, offers an insider perspective on the historical continuities in US foreign policy and their implications for the future of transatlantic relations.

         

        The slogan ‘America First’ has a long history. Often used by President Donald Trump, the phrase was first coined by President Woodrow Wilson during his 1916 presidential campaign, when he pledged to keep the United States (US) out of the First World War. The US nevertheless entered the war in April 1917. The non-intervention movement in America remained strong during the inter-war years, personified by the pro-Nazi stance taken by Joseph P. Kennedy, the US ambassador to the UK from 1938 to 1940 and father of John F. Kennedy. 

         

        Despite strong pleading from Winston Churchill, President Franklin Roosevelt would not commit the US to enter the Second World War after the start of hostilities in September 1939. It was only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 that Congress, at Roosevelt’s bidding, unanimously voted to declare war. Six days later, in conditions of utmost secrecy, Churchill set sail for America in the battleship Duke of York. At Roosevelt’s invitation, he was to stay for three weeks in the White House: from their conversations, often until long into the night, the special relationship was born and an alliance forged with the ultimate goal of defeating Nazi Germany and restoring freedom to Western Europe.

         

        Transatlantic relations today are, in many respects, very different, yet with certain similarities. Trump 2.0 and the machinations of the President himself represent and greatly accentuate a deep-seated historical trend of US foreign policy. Once again, Britain and Europe are under threat of war, this time from Russia, but Trump is clearly no Roosevelt, and clear, decisive leadership on the European side is notably absent. Moreover the scourge of populist nationalism is on the rise, on both sides of the Atlantic. The strong likelihood is that the US under President Trump will disengage from Europe and NATO. 

         

        Not since the Suez crisis in 1956 has an American president treated Britain with such disdain as the current incumbent. A particularly low point was reached by Trump’s remarks at Davos regarding British soldiers who lost their lives in Afghanistan. These comments have intensified concerns about the future of the transatlantic partnership. The British government now faces an urgent strategic question: how did the UK reach this position, and what should its next course of action be? The current British government’s line of refusing to choose between the US and the EU is becoming increasingly less tenable. 

         

        As a senior EU official, I witnessed at first hand, at various meetings in Washington and New York, the continued trend of ruthlessly promoting American interests as they defined them. This was evident both under President Clinton and President George W. Bush. In the case of Iraq, both administrations used unproven allegations of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) held by Sadam Hussein as justification for first bombing and then waging war. The Blair government seemed to swallow the American line unquestioningly.

         

        President Trump’s recently stated objective of taking over Venezuela’s oil reserves echoes words spoken by Vice-President Dick Cheney at a meeting I attended at the White House in July 2002. Cheney made clear that the primary US concern about Iraq was that ‘Saddam is sitting on 10% of the world’s oil reserves, which it cannot allow to fall into the hands of a rogue state or a murderous dictator who refuses to cooperate with the international community’. At the time, Cheney had recently served as CEO of the oil and gas company Haliburton (1995-2000), and as Vice-President he still retained significant stock options. 

         

        At a meeting later that day with Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser to President Bush, she began with a little joke that policy differences between Europe and the US had always existed, ever since American independence and even to the burning of the White House by British Forces in 1814. She went on to state forcefully the US’s ‘profound reservations’ about ever submitting to judgments of the International Criminal Court. Rice made it abundantly clear that the US would only recognise or cooperate with international institutions ‘such as the UN or even the EU if and when it served their national interest’. 

         

        Although Britain backed the Bush administration over Iraq, other political leaders in mainland Europe were not blind to these long-standing features of US foreign policy and took a very different view. During a lunch I attended in June 2003 at the Élysée Palace, President Jacques Chirac launched into a furious diatribe against US policy. I discreetly noted down the President’s words as follows: ‘Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe has no longer been strategically important for the US. The Balkans conflict masked this change. The main objective of US foreign policy is to break up Europe.’

         

        If Chirac’s analysis may have sounded exaggerated at the time, over 20 years later his words have proved prescient. The warnings from the patterns of history were there but we – Britain and Europe – chose to ignore them. We must hope that it is not too late to change course as we face the dual threat of Russian expansion and American withdrawal. As Mark Carney memorably said earlier this month in Davos nostalgia is not a strategy.’ In today’s turbulent times, nor is the special relationship.

         

        David Harley is a former EU diplomat, political communications consultant, and author. Posts held include Deputy Secretary-General of the European Parliament and Senior Advisor at the Brussels public affairs agency Burson Cohn & Wolfe. He holds a degree in Modern Languages from the University of Cambridge and a Diploma in Creative Writing from the University of East Anglia. In 2021 David published the transcription of his political diaries in ‘ Matters of Record – Inside European Politics’ and in 2022 co-edited ‘The Forgotten Tribe – British MEPs 1979-2020’. He is currently a member of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Advisory Board, and is a regular speaker and commentator on UK-EU relations.

         

        Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

        Footnotes
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          Expert Look | Venezuela in Focus: Human Rights, Geopolitical Dilemmas, and International Law

          Article by Foreign Policy Centre

          January 19, 2026

          Expert Look | Venezuela in Focus: Human Rights, Geopolitical Dilemmas, and International Law

          The capture of Nicolás Maduro by the US military has triggered an immediate and polarised international debate. Questions of sovereignty, legality, and precedent have rightly come to the fore, reviving anxieties about the erosion of the rules-based international order and the risks of unilateral military action.

           

          However, Venezuela’s collapse did not begin on the night of the intervention. It is the result of decades of institutional dismantling, systematic repression, and the hollowing out of democratic accountability. Over time, this internal erosion became entangled with external interests, regional power dynamics, and repeated failures of international engagement. The result is a crisis that is at once legal, political, humanitarian, and geopolitical, and one that resists explanation through any single analytical lens.

           

          This expert analysis brings together four perspectives that speak to different, but interconnected, dimensions of the Venezuelan crisis. Laura Vidal, digital rights researcher and civil society observer, centres the human rights reality inside Venezuela, highlighting that legal debates detached from lived experience risk normalising repression and compounding victimisation. Andrew Gawthorpe, FPC Senior Fellow, analyses the emerging US strategy towards Venezuela, arguing that Washington is moving away from ‘regime change’ towards a more coercive model of ‘regime management’, with uncertain leverage and destabilising consequences. Dame Audrey Glover, FPC’s Chair of Trustees, sets out the international legal implications of the US operation, underscoring the dangers posed by selective adherence to foundational legal norms. Stefan Wolff, FPC Senior Fellow, examines the dilemmas facing Europe as it seeks to reconcile its commitment to a rules-based order with alliance politics and shifting power realities.

           

          Taken together, these contributions expose the risks of selective concern: invoking international law only at moments of crisis, privileging geopolitical stability over accountability, or debating legality while disregarding human suffering. If Venezuela is to be understood and addressed in a meaningful way, these dimensions need to be held together, not treated as competing narratives.

           

          The Human Rights Dimension of Venezuela’s Crisis

          By Laura Vidal

           

          Any assessment of Venezuela’s current crisis that sidelines human rights is necessarily incomplete. The most visible entry point remains the situation of political prisoners.[1] Detentions continue to function as a revolving door: individuals are arrested, released under opaque conditions, and replaced by new detainees.[2] Deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and prolonged incommunicado detention remain documented practices.[3] Torture centers continue to operate, and releases are often negotiated, partial, or discretionary rather than grounded in due process or judicial review. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, even as new arrests routinely follow moments of political tension, reinforcing a system based on fear rather than accountability.

           

          This pattern, however, represents only one layer of a much longer process of deterioration. Venezuela’s human rights crisis has unfolded over years through the systematic dismantling of institutions, the erosion of checks and balances, and the capture of the justice system. The result is a complex humanitarian emergency that predates recent geopolitical escalations. Nearly a third of the population has left the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation, abuse, and trafficking networks along migration routes. Those who remain face chronic shortages of basic services, including healthcare, electricity, and access to potable water.[4]

           

          The media landscape has been progressively constrained through closures, licensing pressures, legal harassment, and digital censorship. Accessing information online increasingly requires the use of circumvention tools, exposing users to heightened risks of surveillance and criminalisation. Reporting, documentation, and civic organising have consequently become high-risk activities.[5]

           

          This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectoral sanctions were imposed. Framing the crisis exclusively through sanctions obscures its structural roots and diverts attention from long-standing patterns of repression, impunity, and state failure.[6] Human rights violations in Venezuela are not episodic; they are systemic, cumulative, and deeply embedded in the country’s governance model.

           

          From Regime Change to Regime Management

          By Andrew Gawthorpe

           

          The US military operation against Nicolas Maduro represents a novel approach to foreign policy. “Regime change” is out and “regime management” is in. The Trump administration’s intention appears to be to leave the current Venezuelan government formally in place, while coercing it into adopting policies that will benefit US security and economic interests. Washington’s main demands for the government in Caracas include opening up the country’s oil wealth to American investment and control, severing friendly relations with China and Russia, and ending support for the government in Cuba.

           

          Trump’s methods are nakedly imperial – a throwback to the “gunboat diplomacy” of the nineteenth century. It is notable that they even lack the justification, common in previous US military interventions, with the familiar claim that intervention will liberate the Venezuelan people from a dictatorial government. Instead, Washington is proposing to work with that dictatorial government in order to deliver profits for American oil companies.

           

          From the perspective of the Trump administration, this strategy has obvious appeal. It lacks the commitment of resources and potentially lives to a long-term military occupation designed to transform Venezuela’s government, as was attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, it remains unclear whether this approach gives the US enough leverage over the government in Venezuela to achieve its goals.

           

          Venezuela’s new leader, Delcy Rodríguez, has to avoid angering nationalist opinion at home – not least in her country’s military. She cannot go too far in appeasing the US. For their part, American oil companies also have little interest in investing in Venezuela, particularly while the current government remains in place. Meanwhile, President Trump’s attention seems to have wandered, with him now threatening new military action against Iran. As a result, what’s coming next in Venezuela remains highly unclear.

           

          International Law and the Erosion of Legal Restraint

          By Dame Audrey Glover

           

          Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states:

          “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

           

          This article, part of the foundation of the post-Second World War international rules-based order, establishes a core principle against aggression, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions: self-defence and UN Security Council authorisation. This provision is binding on all States, regardless of whether they are members of the United Nations.

           

          The action of US Forces entering Venezuela uninvited at night to detain President Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and place them in custody in the US to await trial, constitutes a breach of Article 2(4). Under International law, only an assault on another country by military means qualifies as a trigger for self-defence.

           

          The consequence of the US operation is therefore a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, contrary to International Law. Furthermore, the intervention has not resulted in an attempt to restore democratic governance in the country. Maduro has been replaced by his Deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, without an election or consultation of the electorate and opposition– particularly significant given that Maduro himself overturned a prior electoral outcome to retain power. Her appointment undermines any argument that the intervention was undertaken in pursuit of democratic principles.

           

          For his part, President Trump has said he will ‘run’ Venezuela remotely, a proposition that raises serious questions about both feasibility and legitimacy. It also prompts broader concerns regarding regional security and the future of Venezuela’s oil sector, including how it might be rebuilt and governed under such circumstances.

           

          Stephen Miller, an adviser to President Trump, has said: “Forget international law. We live in a world that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power”. Such rhetoric reflects an explicit rejection of the legal norms that underpin international stability.

           

          Recent events including the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, have further imperilled the rules-based international order at the core of which are the principles of individual liberty, intellectual and religious freedom, constitutional democracy and free trade. The most damaging has been the rejection of the principles of international law that the US helped to create. Venezuela stands as the latest example of this deterioration. The time has come to save these principles from extinction.

           

          Europe and the Dilemmas of the Rules-Based Order

          by Stefan Wolff

           

          The apprehension of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by the US military on the night of 3rd January is the first time in over three decades that the White House has conducted such an operation. The operation reflects Washington’s new national security strategy and its emphasis on hemispheric dominance, even as it sits in clear tension with international law. For Europe, the operation, and how to respond to it, poses multiple dilemmas.

           

          The first dilemma concerns how to reconcile hitherto unwavering European support for a rules-based international order with the need to preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance. This includes American security guarantees for European allies and continuing support for Ukraine’s war effort. The display of American capability and the meek reactions not only by Europe but also by Russia and China also demonstrated that for all the talk of a multipolar world order, Moscow and Beijing have few credible options to respond to American assertions of power. From a European perspective, this reality is in some respects reassuring, especially in the context of the Kremlin’s apparently insatiable revisionism in eastern Europe.

           

          Closely related is a second dilemma: US ambitions for absolute dominance in the western hemisphere have revived Trump’s designs for Greenland, returning them to the transatlantic agenda where they spell potential for disruption—both in the sense of distracting attention from the actual threat of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Moscow’s broader hybrid campaign elsewhere on the continent, and of potentially diverting critical resources away from deterring further Russian adventurism in Europe towards Arctic security, an area long neglected by both Europe and the United States.

           

          The third dilemma is that the removal of Maduro from power is in line with long-stated European preferences for a democratic transition in the country, and as such should be welcomed. However, what seems to have resulted from the US operation is at best a face lift at the top of the Venezuelan regime, followed by internal power consolidation and increased external subservience to the demands of the mercurial incumbent of the White House. This dilemma also has wider implications. Europe may lack the hard power to effect regime change, but not the desire to do so. With probably more than half an eye on the situation in Iran, there are likely some figures in Europe’s political class who would not object too loudly or strongly if the US and/or Israel were adopting a more proactive stance on supporting protesters in Tehran and dozens of other cities. Yet externally driven regime change is hardly ever cost- or consequence-free, as the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, among others, vividly demonstrate.

           

          European equivocation and prevarication in response to the US military operation against Maduro reflects the difficulty of navigating these dilemmas. Such ambivalence is neither a long-term solution nor will it allow Europeans to avoid discussing two equally unpalatable options: submitting to the whims of Trump, or an attempt to act independently in an increasingly hostile and lawless world. As so often, Europe is likely to fall back on muddling through: seeking to placate and flatter President Trump while ignoring the flaws and dangers of his foreign policy, and simultaneously trying to build towards the mythical promise of strategic autonomy. This approach rests on the hope that unconstrained, illiberal great power dominance within distinct spheres of influence does not become the new normal – one in which Europe is permanently downgraded to Washington’s, let alone Moscow’s or Beijing’s vassal.

           


           

          For a comprehensive examination of the decades-long institutional erosion, systemic human rights abuses, and profound humanitarian crisis that have shaped contemporary Venezuela, see Laura Vidal’s Op-Ed: International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern, which situates the country’s current situation within a broader history of democratic decay, international inaction, and the human cost.

           

          Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

           

          [1] Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Political Prisoners Cut Off From the World, September 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/22/venezuela-political-prisoners-cut-off-from-the-world

          [2] Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s

          [3] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565

          [4] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela

          [5] Puyosa, Azpúrua, Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/; VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2025-03-12-reporte-elecciones-presidenciales/

          [6] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, IDB, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw

          Footnotes
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