Four Years On: Europe’s Strategic Test in Ukraine

February 24, 2026

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict remains unresolved and the strategic landscape increasingly complex. In this analysis, Stefan Wolff, FPC’s Senior Research Fellow, examines the evolving diplomatic scenarios, the limits of US-led negotiations, and the choices confronting the UK and its European partners as the war enters a fifth year.

As Ukraine heads into a fifth year of defending itself against the unprovoked Russian full-scale invasion, the prospects of a just and sustainable peace agreement remain distant. On the ground, the land war continues to be in a stalemate, with the pace of Russian territorial gains now slower than some of the most protracted battles of trench warfare during the First World War.

In the air war, Moscow has demonstrated a ruthless and brutal efficiency in destroying much of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The repeated destruction of power generation and distribution facilities has taken a serious toll on the Ukrainian population and economy. Yet beyond inflicting hardship, these strikes have not had the kind of strategic effect Russia needs to achieve in order to turn the military tables decisively on Ukraine.

All in all, the Kremlin narrative of inevitable victory looks more like Soviet-style propaganda than a reflection of battlefield reality. President Vladimir Putin, however, is not the only world leader guilty of wishful thinking. His American counterpart, President Donald Trump, at times, also appears to make policy untethered from the real world. First, there was his claim on the campaign trail that he could end the fighting in Ukraine within 24 hours. Upon returning to the White House, Trump issued multiple ceasefire demands and associated deadlines that Putin simply ignored without incurring any cost. The latest plan from Washington is for a peace deal to be concluded between Moscow and Kyiv, approved by a Ukrainian referendum, and followed by national elections — all before June.

Scenarios for a US-Mediated Settlement

The timeline for the American plan aside, a US-mediated deal between Russia and Ukraine remains possible. However, It is unlikely that it will take the form of the just and sustainable settlement that Kyiv and its European allies demand. If it comes to pass as a result of the ongoing trilateral negotiations currently underway, it is highly probable that Ukraine will have to make significant concessions on territory in exchange for US-backed security guarantees and a mostly European-financed package of post-war reconstruction measures.

An additional bitter pill to swallow for Ukraine and Europe would be an unashamed US-Russia rapprochement with a simultaneous end to American sanctions on Russia, a flurry of economic deals between the two countries, and pressure on Ukraine’s other allies to follow suit, at least on sanctions relief and possibly on the release and return of Russian frozen assets.

The other — and more likely — possibility is that not even a bad deal will be forthcoming. The Russian side has given no indication that it is willing to make any significant concessions. Moscow’s position is that Kyiv should relinquish control over the entirety of the Donbas, including territory in Ukraine’s fortress belt that Moscow has so far been unable to take by military force. In return, or under the terms of what Russia refers to as the ‘Anchorage formula’ allegedly agreed between Putin and Trump at their Alaska summit in August 2025, the Kremlin is apparently willing to freeze the current frontlines elsewhere along the more than 1,000 km long line of contact.

Even at the very remote possibility that this was acceptable, or that Ukraine would be pressured into agreeing to such a deal, this would hardly seal a settlement, given that Russia continues to oppose the security guarantees currently on the table between Kyiv and its Western partners. Without them, territorial concessions make no sense for Ukraine, especially as there is no imminent danger of a collapse of Ukrainian defences.

The Hungarian blockage of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine — likely instigated by the country’s Prime Minister, Victor Orbán, at the behest of both Trump, whose Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, had visited the country just before the announcement, and Putin, with whom Orban has had close ties for a long time — is not going to change Kyiv’s calculations significantly. Not only is the EU surely going to find a work-around to deal with this blockage but Orban’s days as Ukraine’s principal foe inside the EU might be numbered given that he is trailing in opinion polls ahead of April’s parliamentary elections. As any embrace of and by Trump and Putin is unlikely to improve Orban’s prospects for another term, the Hungarian blockage might ultimately prove temporary regardless of the outcome of April’s elections.

If, as is therefore likely, Trump’s latest deadline passes without a deal being reached, the question arises what next? Trump could simply walk away from the war. He threatened to do so in the past but a likely mix of ego and the prospect of economic deals in the event of peace prevented him from doing so. Nothing suggests at the moment that this time will be different. There might be some angry exchanges and finger pointing, but after that, the current, deeply flawed negotiation process is likely to resume in some form because the alternatives are worse for all sides, Trump included.

The US President could walk away and finally realise that Putin is simply not interested in peace, no matter what is on offer. But this will not lead Trump to ramp up pressure on Russia in a significant way. He has had reason and opportunity to do so on multiple occasions since returning to the White House in January 2025. He has not done so then, and there is no reason to believe that he would do so now.

Trump could then instead pursue a bilateral deal with Russia. But without European participation, such a deal will be of limited benefit to both sides. The bulk of Russian foreign assets remain frozen in Europe, and would very likely stay so in the absence of coordinated transatlantic action. Russia has little of value to export to the US and lacks the market conditions to make it an attractive destination for US foreign direct investment. Some US companies might return or expand their still existing operations in the country, but these will hardly be the trillion-dollar deals that Trump, and possibly Putin, envisage.

Even if any such separate US-Russia deal would be of limited economic value, it would still be politically damaging, especially to transatlantic relations. That, however, also makes it less likely to happen. By June, primaries in the United States ahead of the November midterm elections will largely have concluded and Republican candidates will be less susceptible to pressure from the White House. As was already obvious in the context of Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, if necessary by force, there remains a segment of foreign policy realists among congressional Republicans who, unshackled from the leverage Trump may have held over them in the primaries, are likely to push back more against his most disruptive foreign policy stances, including when it comes to any dealing with Russia reached at the expense of the transatlantic alliance.

What Europe Must Do Now

All of these scenarios, and a likely myriad of more or less minor variations of them, contain the ingredients of a British and European strategy for what is probably another year of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The first is the utmost importance of unity behind Ukraine’s defence efforts. Across the multiple overlapping multi- and mini-lateral formats of EU, NATO, coalition of the willing, etc., there needs to be a clear message to Russia, the US, and Ukraine alike: Russia’s aggression is also Europe’s problem and will be treated as such for as long as the threat from Moscow — not just against Ukraine but against the fundamental tenets of the European security order as such — remains credible.

This means, second, that Ukraine needs to be supported materially with military economic aid and politically when it comes to pushing back against both American and Russian designs for a deal to serve the interests of the current incumbents of the White House and the Kremlin first. For a more effective political pushback, Europe needs to cultivate relations with those in the US foreign policy establishment who continue to see value in established alliance structures, especially if they reflect more balanced burden-sharing.

Third, the UK and its European allies also need to think beyond Ukraine — because this is what Russia is doing as well, despite the demands of its war of aggression. Though it need not be limited to the EU-Russia borderlands, this is where the focus needs to remain for the foreseeable future.

Moldova, for example, remains particularly vulnerable to Russian interference, notwithstanding the success of pro-European forces in the country in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 and 2025. Moscow still retains multiple channels of influence, including through the unresolved conflict in the Transnistrian region, which, if left to fester, could significantly impede Moldova’s EU accession process and provide opportunities for renewed destabilisation.

Similarly, parliamentary elections in Armenia in June will create an opportunity for the Kremlin to destabilise another of its neighbours that has increasingly turned away from Moscow and towards Brussels. Given the role of the US, and of Trump personally, in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this also offers an opportunity to cooperate with Washington in working towards constraining Russian influence in the South Caucasus region as a whole.

A fourth and final ingredient in an evolving British and European strategy is a focus on becoming a credible player in the emerging new international order. This requires a certain amount of realism and modesty in aspirations and messaging. The UK is not pursuing a fast track to rejoining the EU, but closer alignment and cooperation across the English Channel is essential.

Equally important is that declarations of intent, be they about a UK-EU reset or an expanding coalition of the willing, are followed with concrete action — especially on investment in defence and a more credible European deterrence posture. This means both a more capable defence industrial base and doctrine for the kind of war being fought in Ukraine and improved defence readiness and resilience at the level of society.

A reconstituted European alliance, with a coalition at its heart that is not just willing but also capable of deterring Russia, is not beyond the reach of the UK and Europe. It may not be, nor ever become, a traditional great power, but by continuing to back Ukraine today and integrating it tomorrow, it will feel, and be, less vulnerable to the whims of the current or any future mercurial leader in the White House or the Kremlin. Crucially, it preserves the opportunity to rebuild the transatlantic alliance in the future, and to do so on stronger European foundations.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

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Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

Article by Prof Stefan Wolff

February 20, 2026

Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

The 25th Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly should be a moment of celebration and reflection on past successes in advancing the organisation’s broader goals of comprehensive and collective security. Yet, much like the 50th anniversary of the organisation in 2025, it will be anything but. The OSCE continues to be in a deep crisis.

Triggered by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this is first and foremost a crisis of paralysis, with meaningful dialogue and decision-making among participating States in Vienna largely stalled. The OSCE continues to function operationally, with at least some meaningful and substantive business being conducted in the organisation’s specialised institutions – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media – as well as in its eleven field operations in eastern and southeastern Europe and Central Asia.

The existing crisis of paralysis is further compounded by the wider crisis of multilateralism and the deliberate dismantling of the rules-based international order, which did not begin with, but has significantly accelerated since the return of Donald Trump to the White House 13 months ago. The implications for the OSCE became particularly evident at the Ministerial Council in Vienna on 4 December 2025, when a representative of the US State Department called for “a reduction of at least €15 million in the annual budget by December 2026”, a shift in priorities away from politically contentious issues, and renewed engagement with Russia. Implied, if not explicitly stated, was the threat of US withdrawal from the OSCE: “If the OSCE continues on its current path, the United States will continue to assess our participation and support.”^[1]

As with previous periods of institutional strain, the key question that arises from it is not new: can participating States reform the organisation and help it find a way back to being an effective contributor to security across its vast geographic area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok? And perhaps more importantly, should they?

The priorities of this year’s Swiss Chairpersonship under the theme “Dialogue – Trust – Security” certainly suggest that a serious attempt will be made. Key objectives include safeguarding the OSCE’s operational capacity (“preserve the basic instruments … and to ensure their financing”) and revitalising multilateral diplomacy (“foster an open dialogue on security”, “maintain channels of communication on security, including between States in conflict”).^[2]

Another priority – to work for lasting peace on the basis of the Helsinki principles (enshrined in the organisation’s 1975 founding act) – envisages that “the OSCE is mobilising its instruments across all three dimensions to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. Not only does this naturally align with the very purpose of the organisation but it also could give the OSCE a new lease of life in light of recent developments in the war against Ukraine.

The prospect of elections, a referendum, and a possible peace deal could give the OSCE and its participating States an opportunity to bring to bear its experience and expertise in election observation, ceasefire monitoring, demining, on-the-ground mediation, and post-conflict institution building.

However, not all of the OSCE’s past experiences in these areas were stellar successes. Getting the organisation into a position where it could meaningfully contribute to a lasting peace in Ukraine will require pain-staking, detail-oriented work in the corridors of the OSCE secretariat and the Hofburg in Vienna, not the megaphone diplomacy that tends to take place in the meetings of the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation.

For the UK, the OSCE – notwithstanding the organisation’s ongoing crisis – still represents an important forum to articulate and pursue its national interests. While just one among several minilateralisms that have recently emerged – including the ‘coalition of the willing’, the European Political Community, the Ukraine Defence Contact (or Ramstein) Group – it is unique in the sense that it is one of the few remaining fora where direct dialogue with Russia is not just possible but embedded in the organisation’s founding purpose.

Such dialogue must, however, serve a concrete purpose and it needs to be based on clear principles. As Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation in the last trimester of 2026, and as a member of the Forum’s Troika in the preceding and subsequent trimesters, the UK is well positioned to support the Swiss Chairpersonship’s reform agenda and to contribute to restoring the OSCE’s operational effectiveness. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE, Ambassador Neil Holland, will also continue in his role as Chair of the Security Committee, one of the informal subsidiary bodies of the Permanent Council, specifically charged with discussing politico-military issues and supporting the preparation of the Annual Security Review Conference, which provides participating States with an opportunity to discuss regional security issues in plenary form.

The UK’s long-standing experience in multilateral diplomacy, its role as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and its still pivotal role at the nexus of Euro-Atlantic security create a unique opportunity for making a lasting contribution to making the OSCE relevant again as a forum for dialogue among all its participating States. This will not be easy and success will not be guaranteed, but it will be a worthwhile investment of UK

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

Image Credit: © OSCE

[1] United States Mission to the OSCE, “Plenary Statement 32nd OSCE Ministerial Council Vienna, Austria, December 4, 2025”, December 2025, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2025/12/mcdel0056%20usa.pdf

[2] OSCE, Programme and priorities of Switzerland’s OSCE Chairpersonship 2026, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/2026/01/OSCE2026_Broschuere_Faltkarte_EN_Web%20%282%29.pdf.

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Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

Article by Rachel Herring

February 5, 2026

Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

The German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) has been at the centre of countless controversies since its formation in 2013, not least regarding its foreign policy. From AfD politicians’ downplaying of Nazi crimes to suspected links to the Russian and Chinese governments, the party is a source of disruption and debate in the media and in the German parliament itself.^[1] This article analyses the AfD’s foreign policy outlook and considers its implications in the context of emerging foreign policy challenges.

Why the AfD’s foreign policy matters

Having entered parliament in 2017 and secured the second-highest share of votes in the 2025 federal election, the AfD has rapidly established itself in the German political landscape, and indeed the foreign policy landscape. Regardless of whether the party gains power or remains in opposition in the coming years, it will undoubtedly remain part of the foreign policy conversation in Germany and beyond.

Identifying the party’s core positions and vision of Germany’s role in the world is therefore important, not only to understand the possible foreign policy implications of the AfD being in government, but also to understand how it is already shaping Germany’s relations with partner countries and institutions.

Historical (re)interpretation

Foreign policy is inseparable from national history, and there is no better example of this than Germany. For decades, the dominant interpretations shaping German foreign policy have been rooted in guilt, responsibility, and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. The AfD, however, both downplays such narratives and selectively invokes history to offer competing interpretations. For example, AfD parliamentary speeches on Israel and the conflict in Gaza appropriate narratives of historical responsibility to legitimise the party’s anti-Islam agenda. This kind of rhetoric fundamentally disrupts the relative consensus on key foreign policy pillars, challenging other parliamentarians to defend their positions and creating a divide between political elites who uphold existing pillars and those (primarily the AfD) who openly question them.

At the international level, the AfD’s controversial historical interpretations have not gone unnoticed. In Germany’s bilateral relationship with Poland, a central partner and neighbour where historical debates are ongoing, the AfD has the potential to be a highly problematic force. In late 2025, Polish historian and adviser to President Nawrocki, Andrzej Nowak, accepted an invitation from the AfD to speak in the German Bundestag, stating that his aim was to warn AfD politicians against naive positions towards Russia.^[2] Just a few months later, AfD politician Kay Gottschalk stated on X that his first act as Minister for Finance would be to demand 1.3 billion euros in reparations from Poland in response to the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022.^[3] Uncoincidentally, this is the same sum President Nawrocki has demanded from Germany in war reparations.^[4] Such interactions have the potential to significantly sour relations, particularly given the AfD’s ongoing popularity.

Questioning established cooperation

The subversion of historical narratives is part of a wider challenge posed by the AfD to long-standing German partnerships and alliances. This is perhaps most evident – and most subversive – when it comes to the AfD’s stance towards the EU. Membership of the EU and European integration are fundamental pillars of German foreign policy, deeply intertwined with bilateral relations with other member states. While the other German political parties naturally differ regarding specific policy preferences, they are united in the position that EU membership is not only beneficial to Germany, but central to its identity and role in the world.

In contrast, and in line with the populist radical right tendency towards anti-globalisation and anti-establishment views, the AfD accuses the EU of being technocratic, elitist, and threatening to German interests and sovereignty. Following the 2024 European elections, which showed a clear shift to the right, the 14 AfD Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) formed a new far-right parliamentary group named Europe of Sovereign Nations, together with 11 representatives from seven different countries.^[5] The result indicated that the AfD’s scepticism towards the EU and championing of sovereignty over liberal institutionalism resonates beyond the national level.

These positions reflect a wider worldview held by many AfD politicians, in which the international system is understood primarily in terms of power politics and pragmatism. The AfD frequently attacks arguments in favour of interdependence and common values in the German parliament, dismissing these as ideologically driven or detached from political reality. Instead, AfD politicians favour a non-aligned position which resists external influence, even from traditional allies such as the US. A particular source of controversy in this regard is the AfD’s position on Putin’s war against Ukraine, which emphasises the negative impact of sanctions on the German economy, and calls for negotiations with Putin. Such positions are met with widespread rejection in the German parliament and again have the effect of uniting the other parties in their rhetorical commitment to defending international law and the European peace order.

Same positions, new context

The AfD’s status as a disruptive force within the German foreign policy discourse is unlikely to diminish as long as it remains in opposition. Whether it would significantly adapt its foreign policy positions if it were to enter government remains uncertain. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine and President Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy pose ongoing dilemmas for ruling and opposition parties alike.

In recent years, right-wing populists across Europe and the US have tended to uphold similar foreign policy positions and attitudes towards global security, including the pragmatic prioritisation of national interest, a non-aligned approach towards Russia and China, and a scepticism towards liberal institutions like the EU.^[6] It has also been characteristic of these political actors to cultivate transnational networks of political support. President Trump has frequently served as a point of reference in this regard, from the friendly relationship between Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Elon Musk’s public backing of the AfD.^[7]

However, Trump’s recent aggressive foreign policy moves towards Venezuela and Greenland may signal the beginning of the decline of this era. Along with other European right-wing parties, AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla condemned Trump’s foreign policy in January 2026.^[8] These developments pose important questions regarding the direction of the AfD’s foreign policy. Will the German right increasingly distance itself from its previously friendly stance towards the Trump administration? And how will AfD advocates of a non-aligned, pragmatic approach respond to attempts to uphold liberal institutions and diversify global cooperation, such as the recent EU trade deals with Mercosur and India?^[9]

The AfD’s stance towards the international system not only has implications for German and European foreign policy. It also resonates within broader debates about the future of the so-called liberal international order. At the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed this discourse, arguing that the so-called rules-based order, and in particular American hegemony, had constructed a myth which has now been ‘ruptured.’^[10] He went on to argue that the solution is not a ‘world of fortresses’ but ‘collective investments in resilience.’ While many parties and governments are rallying around liberal institutions and alliances, the AfD’s foreign policy discourse to date clearly indicates a preference for a ‘world of fortresses.’

This article is based on a recently published original paper by Maximilian Tkocz and Rachel Herring, which can be found here.

Rachel Herring is a PhD researcher at Aston University and the University of Birmingham. Her research focuses on German foreign policy, Germany’s relations with Central Europe, and the role of civil society actors in foreign relations. She was the Think Visegrad Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague in 2024 and is currently a visiting researcher at the Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Deutsche Welle, AfD chief downplays Nazi era as ‘bird shit’, Deutsche Welle, February 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/afds-gauland-plays-down-nazi-era-as-a-bird-shit-in-german-history/a-44055213; Der Spiegel, Maik Baumgärtner et al, How the AfD Became the Long Arm of Russia and China, May 2024, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-spionageaffaere-russland-und-china-im-fokus-neue-enthuellungen-belasten-die-partei-1714480876-a-a1c05e64-b6bc-4c6b-844e-a78a32ec4f91

^[2] Jan Sternberg, Neue Annäherung zwischen der AfD und der polnischen Rechten, October 2025, https://www.rnd.de/politik/neue-annaeherung-zwischen-afd-und-der-polnischen-rechten-JRUDLEPR45FAZFVVCIEXQWCSKU.html

^[3] Welt, „Wer zuletzt lacht, lacht am besten“ – AfD-Politiker fordert 1,3 Billionen Euro von Polen, January 2026, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6974fbce707d4aa2075800bf/reparationszahlung-wer-zuletzt-lacht-lacht-am-besten-afd-politiker-fordert-1-3-billionen-euro-von-polen.html

^[4] Tagesschau, Deutschland lehnt Reparationsforderungen erneut ab, September 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/merz-steinmeier-polen-reparationen-100.html

^[5] Francois Hublet, 10 Key Lessons of the 2024 European Parliament Election, 2024, https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/10-key-lessons-of-the-2024-european-parliament-election/

^[6] Jeremy Cliffe et al, Rise to the challengers: Europe’s populist parties and its foreign policy future, June 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/rise-to-the-challengers-europes-populist-parties-and-its-foreign-policy-future/

^[7] Jacek Lepiarz, What does Poland’s president hope to achieve in Washington?, February 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-karol-nawrocki-washington-visit-donald-trump-nato-v2/a-73851111; Jessica Parker, Musk interviews German far-right frontwoman, January 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7errxp5jmo

^[8] Sarah Marsh and Elizabeth Pineau, Europe’s far right and populists distance themselves from Trump over Greenland, January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europes-far-right-populists-distance-themselves-trump-over-greenland-2026-01-21/; Die Zeit, AfD-Spitze geht auf Distanz zu Trumps Außenpolitik, January 2026, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-01/afd-weidel-chrupalla-aussenpolitik-usa

^[9] European Commission, The EU-Mercosur trade agreement, 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/; Roshni Majumdar and Shakeel Sobhan, EU, India clinch historic free trade deal, January 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/india-eu-trade-deal-reached-modi-says/live-75669574

^[10] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

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Germany

Op-ed | One Year into Trump 2.0: Domestic Instability and Foreign Policy Disruption

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

February 3, 2026

Op-ed | One Year into Trump 2.0: Domestic Instability and Foreign Policy Disruption

Over the past month, President Donald Trump has proven that he still has the capacity to shock the world. On 3 January, he ordered the US military to capture Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. A few days later, he renewed his threats to forcibly annex Greenland. This prompted one of the most severe crises in the history of transatlantic relations – before Trump abruptly backed off in a speech at Davos. Trump then authorised a substantial military build-up to take place around Iran, in what may be a precursor to an attempt to overthrow the country’s government – or just another negotiating ploy.

At the same time, domestic tensions escalated sharply during what some have called the ‘Battle of Minneapolis’ – the most intense confrontation between the federal government and local citizens in modern American memory.^[1] The struggle eventually left two people dead and called into question whether the Trump administration could continue implementing its immigration agenda so aggressively.

In many ways, January 2026 has been a microcosm of Trump’s first year back in office. His foreign policy has been alternatively aggressive, flexible, and – to many allies – just plain confusing. Domestically, he has sought to implement a radical version of his nationalistic and frequently openly racist ‘Make America Great Again’ agenda. In doing so, Trump appears to have gone beyond what most of the public support, causing a huge electoral headache for his party ahead of the midterm elections later this year.

Domestic woes

Trump won the 2024 election extremely narrowly. His victory in the popular vote was by a margin of just 0.6%, 7.5 times smaller than Joe Biden’s margin in 2020.

Although this narrow victory was mostly driven by voter concern over high inflation, since his inauguration Trump has governed as if he had received a broad-based mandate to pursue a radical version of his MAGA agenda.^[2] He has attempted to persecute his political opponents and pursue a deportation campaign which has involved flagrant abuses of the rights of countless citizens and residents. When confronted by judges or disapproving members of Congress, he has branded their resistance as a betrayal.^[3] At every step, he has sought to sow division rather than unite the nation.

Americans do not appear to be enjoying the spectacle much. In a recent poll, Trump’s approval rating stood at just 37%, not far from its all-time low.^[4] Voters are particularly frustrated that the President has done little to reduce the cost of living, which remains extremely high.^[5] With Trump so unpopular, even members of his own party are becoming more willing to criticise him, and they only become more so as the midterms approach.

Trump’s signature domestic policy initiative of mass deportation has received the most attention. Over the past year, the White House has fundamentally changed how immigration enforcement works. Gone are targeted raids on known undocumented persons with criminal records. Instead, immigration agents have taken to aggressively patrolling urban areas, demanding to see the papers of anyone whose skin colour raises their suspicion. This campaign has involved violations of constitutional rights on a massive scale.^[6] It has been justified by openly racist rhetoric from Trump himself, who has referred to the members of some communities as “garbage” who come from “hellholes”.^[7]

Voters have been souring on Trump’s deportation campaign for some time, but events in Minneapolis over the past month led the dam to burst. For weeks, protesters in the city resisted attempts by immigration agents to arrest their neighbours, creating scenes that sapped support for the administration’s aggressive approach. After federal agents then killed two citizens – one a young mother, Renee Nicole Good, and the other a nurse at a veterans’ hospital, Alex Pretti – the nationwide backlash was extreme. In response, Trump removed Greg Bovino, the deputy in charge of the deportation campaign, and signalled a change of course. What comes next is unclear, but now even Trump’s signature domestic policy initiative is being challenged.

Foreign adventures

It is common for leaders who face frustration at home to instead look for achievements abroad. American presidents are remarkably free to chart their own course in foreign policy, with few formal requirements to consult Congress or civil servants. Trump has taken full advantage of this freedom, with the result that his foreign policy has been characterised by wild swings, ambitious goals, and little attention paid to practical implementation.

Perhaps the biggest change from Trump’s first term has been his increased comfort with using military force. Both the capture of Maduro and the bombing of Iran showed that Trump is now looking to the military to score quick wins. Even Greenland became the subject of explicit military threats, prompting alarm among NATO allies. In each and every case, what seems to be missing is any long-term plan for what happens after the military action or threat is over. It rarely seems like Trump is engaging in a rational calculation of means and ends.

The Greenland affair is a good example. Almost everything that Trump says he wants from Greenland – an increased military presence and mineral mining rights – could be accomplished with simple negotiations and no change of ownership. Instead, he threatened to seize the island outright, doing perhaps irreparable damage to the transatlantic alliance in the progress. He then retreated from his position, indicating that a negotiated arrangement within the existing territorial framework would suffice. All the damage, it seemed, was for nothing.^[8]

Another feature of Trump’s second-term foreign policy is its expansive scope. Trump is sometimes called an isolationist, but if he is then it is hard to explain why he took the time to try to broker peace between Thailand and Cambodia or Azerbaijan and Armenia. He often boasts that he has ended eight wars.^[9] Even if his real impact on these conflicts has usually been temporary and marginal, his desire to play global peacemaker is another sign that he is trying to rack up wins on the world stage. It may also be an attempt to distract from his failure to end the war in Ukraine.

Many European leaders entered the second Trump administration thinking that the main threat facing them was an American withdrawal. But over the last year, it has become increasingly apparent that the more immediate challenge may be something different: focused and hostile intervention in European affairs. From his threats to seize Greenland to his administration’s sustained criticism against European migration policy and liberal values, Trump seems to reshape Europe more than he wants to abandon it.

For Europeans, this is an uncomfortable and dangerous place to be in. Since the dawn of American global power a century or so ago, every region of the world except Europe has been subject to Washington’s capricious and often destructive power. The alliances and bonds of affection that seemed to shield Europe from these attentions are fraying, and it is natural for Europeans to wonder what awaits them.

It would be unwise for European leaders to assume that Trump’s domestic problems will constrain his international agenda. In fact, the harder things get at home, the more his gaze might shift abroad – with unpredictable consequences for us all.

Andrew Gawthorpe is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and a specialist in U.S. politics and foreign policy at Leiden University. He also writes a newsletter called America Explained.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Ryan Cooper, The Battle of Minneapolis is Not Over, Prospect, January 2026, https://prospect.org/2026/01/29/ice-trump-minneapolis-alex-pretti-border-protection-kristi-noem-stephen-miller/

[2] Oxford Economics, Inflation was the Main Driver for Trump Victory, November 2024, https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/resource/inflation-was-the-main-driver-for-trump-victory/

[3] Kevin Frey and Mychael Schnell, Trump Suggests Some Democrats should be Hanged – and Some Republicans Rush to his Defence, MS NOW, November 2025, https://www.ms.now/news/trump-calls-democrats-seditious-traitors-republicans-rcna245028; Dan Maurer, ‘On Treason and Traitors’, Lawfare, June 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/on-treason-and-traitors

[4] Hannah Hartig and Jocelyn Kiley, Confidence in Trump Dips, and Fewer Now Say They Support his Policies and Plans, Pew Research, January 2026, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2026/01/29/confidence-in-trump-dips-and-fewer-now-say-they-support-his-policies-and-plans/.

[5] Kathryn Palmer, How is Trump on Affordability? What Most Voters Said in New Poll, USA Today, January 2026, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2026/01/22/trump-worse-affordability-new-poll/88302812007/

[6] Kyle Cheney, Judges Across the Country Rebuke ICE for Defying Court Orders, Politico, January 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/30/ice-immigration-court-orders-00757894; Walter Olsen, In Minnesota, ICE is Assaulting the Constitutional Rights of Citizens, Cato Institute, January 2026, https://www.cato.org/blog/ice-versus-fourth-amendment

[7] Melissa Hellmann, Donald Trump in his Own Words – the Year in Racism and Misogyny, The Guardian, December 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/29/donald-trump-racism-dei-misogyny-2025-review

[8] Katya Adler, Confronted over Greenland, Europe is Ditching its Softly-Softly Approach to Trump, BBC News, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0lx7j1lrwro

[9] Jake Horton and Nike Beake, How Many Wars has President Trump Really Ended?, BBC News, October 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y3599gx4qo

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