International Affairs in the Disinformation Age

May 31, 2019

In April 2017, I was sitting in an office with Syrian rights activists watching, in real time, as the Syrian regime and Russia manipulated a second US president.

The current discussion about disinformation is focused very firmly on Trump’s election and the Brexit referendum. As critical as both issues are to the future of international stability, the emotion vested in both topics obscures rather than illuminates the impact disinformation has on the way influence is being wielded on the global stage.

Somewhere between the United States (US)-led invasion of Iraq and the Arab uprisings against dictatorial rule, something fundamental in the way global audiences receive and react to information changed. Political insurgents had long been watching, waiting for a chance to challenge the established power of their enemies. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two at the time, famously declared in the early years of the 21^st century that “more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media”. [1] As a Middle East reporter, I saw the effort the group put into trying to circumvent traditional media and reach its intended audiences directly.

Russia had also been watching. From 2013 to 2017, I worked with Syrian activists hoping to remove the corrupt and abusive regime in Damascus. My time working on Syria was bookended by highly sophisticated disinformation campaigns that melded diplomatic, media and military activity in order to achieve real-world outcomes. Examining the techniques used by Russia (and adopted by other actors since) raises questions about the measures policy makers are hoping will return us to a simpler era.

The two most sophisticated Russian disinformation operations I observed came in response to the Damascus regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians. Russia’s efforts in both cases is not surprising when you consider that the Kremlin’s investment in the Assad regime was most seriously threatened – not by the military or political efforts of its adversaries – but by international blowback to its ally’s use of poison gas.

Between 2013 and 2017, Russia had hugely developed its techniques in line with changes in the global media environment. Earlier efforts focused on manipulating established media outlets, or at least leaning on their credibility, while the later campaign largely bypassed established media in favour of fringe outlets and social media networks. In both cases, however, the underlying strategic approach displayed a keen understanding that Western decision makers will ultimately be constrained by popular opinion; while the implementation plan recognised that Western media systems can be gamed or bypassed.

On the morning of the 21^st August 2013, I was told by distraught Syrian colleagues that the regime had used poison gas on sleeping civilians in an area besieged by government forces and the Lebanese militia, Hezbollah. The Syrian opposition, advised by individuals, such as myself, with backgrounds in journalism or political lobbying, called on locals to send through videos showing proof of the regime’s actions, which were forwarded on to journalists covering the story. The Kremlin was quick to establish an alternative depiction of events. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told journalists the rebels had used the weapons on their own families in the hope of provoking a Western military response. [2] Russia’s effort seemed doomed to failure. Responding to the weight of facts emerging from the ground, most media outlets concluded the regime was guilty. A Western military response seemed inevitable.

When I first noticed photos and comments purporting to be from ordinary Americans calling on their government not to come to the “aid of Al Qaeda in Syria”, I wasn’t unduly concerned. [3] However, the posts seemed to become more numerous as the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) House of Commons geared up for a vote on military action against the regime. On the morning of the vote, journalists, political analysts and even political figures started mentioning they had heard that respected US news agency Associated Press (AP) was reporting that the rebels were actually responsible. In several public statements, Lavrov coolly questioned the Western focus on military action when the “evidence is not something revolutionary. It’s available on the internet”. [4]

It was days after the government of David Cameron lost the Commons vote and the Obama administration climbed down from the threat of military action that we were able to understand what was happening. AP had not found that the rebels were responsible for killing their own sleeping children. Instead, a little-known outlet called Mint Press operating from the US with assistance from a supporter of the regime had printed an article from a stringer who had travelled to Syria and repeated claims he had heard whilst there. As an Arabic speaker, he asked a friend – who also sometimes freelanced for the AP – to help with copy editing. Mint Press very prominently played up the tenuous connection, and other outlets, online trolls and regime supporters obscured the issue further until social media Chinese whispers transformed a rumour into a popularly-believed ‘fact’.

Of course, it’s not possible to determine what part any specific manipulative technique played in the final outcome of the situation. What is clear, however, is that the Kremlin had realised winning the battle for popular perceptions meant winning wars. It was also clear that Russia had been able to game Western news media through a very sophisticated understanding of how stringers work, how to pitch to editors and the way information moves between outlets – morphing slightly as it does so according to the editorial policy of individual websites, newspapers and channels. For context, it is important to understand that Russia had developed and successfully exploited an intimate understanding of the weaknesses of free media – of which it has little domestic experience of itself.

The second time Russia needed to bail out the Syrian regime from the possibility of direct and catastrophic Western military intervention, the White House had a new occupant and the news environment looked radically different. Russia’s experience seeding narratives and moving them between different information eco-systems was put to good use.

On the morning of the 4^th April 2017, Syrian social media networks exploded with harrowing photos and videos of men, women and children choking to death as they convulsed on the ground. Western journalists raced to uncover what had happened, much as they did four years previously. Similarly, Syrian activists raced to find them footage and eye witnesses in the hope they would be able to prove beyond doubt what was happening on the ground. Activists expected to have to counter spurious claims on news media. However, the Russian playbook had evolved. It now didn’t need traditional media.

On the afternoon of the day of the attack, Al Masdar News (AMN), an English-language outlet run by the Syrian regime, published an article that presented several arguments that suggested claims the regime carried out the attack were false. The arguments used techniques such as ‘foreknowledging’, to misrepresent time stamps on social media posts as ‘proof’ timelines did not add up, as well as claiming various online comments by a collection of unrelated actors ‘proved’ the mainstream narrative was false. Ordinarily, such an article would be lost amongst the cacophony of online argument. However, the initial article was not meant to achieve the desired impact itself. It was merely a seed.

The next day, the AMN article was reprinted, quoted heavily or copied without attribution across a number of conspiracy-orientated ‘news’ sites such as Global Research, 21^st Century Wire and Russophile’s Blog. Amongst the sites that used information from the AMN article without attribution was the infamous InfoWars. By the time the alternative narrative had reached the Alex Jones-fronted outlet, it had developed into an anti-Soros conspiracy.

InfoWars is itself highly influential in the US right-wing news eco-system. Data analysis based on link sharing in 2016 shows it is more often quoted in US right-wing networks than the Washington Post and NBC News are in centrist or left-wing circles. However, InfoWars was not the ultimate aim. Rather the outlet was a gateway into far more pervasive and influential networks – the right-wing US social-media sphere. InfoWars and Alex Jones himself (or someone running his account) tweeted the article. [5] The article was then picked up and amplified by bots – automated Twitter accounts – using a shared hashtag. Many retweeted the article hundreds of times in a two-day period. The final step of the strategy involved high-profile right-wing figures – the American equivalents of UK’s Katie Hopkins – retweeting the article, but also – crucially – repeating the arguments and talking points during their many appearances on traditional media platforms. Ultimately, the idea that a huge conspiracy involving Al Qaeda, George Soros and Western governments acting in unison became a plausible counter argument and was treated with equal weight to facts being checked by international organisations and trustworthy news organisations.

The impact of the campaign can be gauged by the fact that Donald Trump’s instinctive reaction to punish the Syrian regime through airstrikes led to members of his own base protesting outside the White House and threatening to withdraw their support on right-wing media platforms. [6]

The difference in tactics used in 2013 and 2017 shows that the ongoing rise of socially distributed and consumed news and the fall in influence of traditional news outlets has made it easier to influence events by manipulating the information key audiences consume. In 2013, it was still felt necessary to lean on AP’s credibility, to engage a real-life journalist and persuade him of the merits of publishing an incredulous story. In 2017, bots and pliable news outlets were enough. There was no need to risk engaging established organisations or to work around their editorial policies. There was also little need to deploy expensive Facebook advertising of the sort examined in recent inquiries in the UK and US.

Like other sorts of arms races, these techniques are being closely watched by other actors. Recent tension between Gulf countries and Iran has resulted in an explosion of fake accounts and coordinated hashtag promotion in Arabic. [7] Facebook also recently closed down ‘inauthentic’ accounts it said were being used by India and Pakistan in their own political tussles. [8]

Disinformation works because it fits within the grain of a new reality. Two key underlying factors in its success are the increased relative importance of mass groups of individuals, and the need to understand the world through the lens of those individuals. Recognising both these factors is vital for any organisation wishing to have any sort of influence. So far, we have seen malign actors recognise these factors and put them to use. The question for those working to lift living standards, increase the remit of international human rights, and achieve other positive outcomes is how to ethically and morally adapt their methods to the same new reality.

Amil Khan, an associate fellow at Chatham House, is a former Reuters journalist and government adviser. He now runs Valent Projects, an agency focused on the challenge posed by the new information environment.

Photo by Randall Munroe, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

[1] David Esnor, Al Qaeda letter called ‘chilling’ – Al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi: Prepare for U.S. to leave Iraq soon, CNN World, October 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/11/alqaeda.letter/

[2] William Echols, Lavrov Sounds False Alarm Over ‘Staged’ Syria Strikes, Polygraph, September 2018, https://www.polygraph.info/a/lavrov-syria-chemical-weapons-warning/29513470.html

[3] Paul Szoldra, Some US Troops Appear To Be Posting Photos In Protest of Syrian Intervention, Business Insider, September 2013, https://www.businessinsider.com/troops-protest-syria-military-strike-2013-9?r=US&IR=T

[4] Ibid.

[5] Alex Jones’ twitter account has been suspended so his archive of tweets is no longer live on the platform. However, reference to his tweets from the time are recorded on other sites. Joshua Gillin, Conspiracy claims that Syrian gas attacks was false flag’ are unproven, Politifact, April 2017, https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/apr/07/unproven-online-theories-doubting-syrian-gas-attac/

[6] Maxwell Tani, Some of Trump’s more hardline online supporters are slamming him over striking Syria, Business Insider, April 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/trump-syria-srike-media-supporters-split-2017-4

[7] Marc Jones and Alexei Abrahams, A plague of Twitter bots is roiling the Middle East, The Washington Post, June 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/05/fighting-the-weaponization-of-social-media-in-the-middle-east/?utm_term=.928397c5e364

[8] Aditya Kalra and Saad Sayeed, Facebook deletes accounts linked to India’s Congress party, Pakistan military, Reuters, April 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/facebook-accounts-india/facebook-deletes-accounts-linked-to-indias-congress-party-pakistan-military-idUSKCN1RD1R2

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Media and Online Freedom

Regions

Middle East and North Africa

Syria

The Strategic Role of the Fezzan Region for European Security

Article by Paolo Zucconi

May 30, 2019

The Strategic Role of the Fezzan Region for European Security

The Fezzan is a strategic southwestern region of Libya. Its stability is vital for Europe’s security and that of the wider Mediterranean area. The region is home to two of the most important oil fields of North Africa and is a hub for human smuggling and organised crime, whose networks extend to Mali, Niger, Chad and southern Europe. While most of the international community’s attention is on the current conflict between Tripoli’s militias and the Libyan National Army (LNA), the Fezzan region’s role in the wider geopolitics is underestimated. It is often represented as a zone of systemic insecurity, far and disconnected from the political issues in northern Libya. Its importance, however, is crucial for national stabilisation and regional security in Sahel as Fezzan has become a key hub for transnational migrant smuggling networks, as well as oil, weapons, drug and gold trafficking across Africa and the Middle East.

A Precarious Social and Economic Condition

Since the 2011 revolution, the Fezzan region has suffered from a lack of central authorities with the capability to impose order and develop licit economies. Tribal fights have impeded the development of any state authority and, until last January when the LNA occupied the region peacefully, militias based in Tripolitania and Cirenaica had been unable to take control over the area. Members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Daesh have exploited the increasing lawlessness to develop their strongholds and logistical hubs in southern Libya.

Post-2011 revolution, security issues which have affected the northern parts of the country have involved the South as well. Institutional weakness, lack of municipal governance and few sources for local economic growth are some of the South’s most pressing challenges. There are also ethnic-based conflicts which involve identity, authenticity and citizenship. These conflicts are due in part to the legacy of Qaddafi’s divide-and-rule policies, as well as tribal rivalries. Qaddafi cynically manipulated the ‘right to citizenship’ to garner the support of southern tribes like the Tebu, one of the most important tribes in Libya, which has suffered systematic marginalisation as a non-Arab community. In particular, Qaddafi promised the Tebu full citizenship in exchange for service in his security forces, but he never kept the promise. Since 2014, the tribe has been attempting to reclaim citizenship. [1]

Combined with significant structural economic issues and the collapse of the institutional order, this legacy of conflict between the southern tribes in Libya has proven to be a key driver of conflict. Furthermore, the rivalries fostered by Qaddafi have made these tribes adverse to any central authority, especially one based in Tripoli.

The Role of Sabha and Ubari

Despite the localised conflicts and social tensions in many parts of the South, two main cities have developed to play key roles in the region. This is in part due to their capabilities to draw in social and political actors from across the wider region. These cities are: Sabha and Ubari. Both places are ethnically and tribally diverse, and both are affected by the lack of a centralised governance, especially when it comes to security and justice. The local economies of these two cities are mostly based on smuggling routes and oil fields.

Sabha is a strategically very important city, not only because it is the provincial capital of the South but also because it is a historic hub in North-South supply routes. Post-2011 revolution it plays a huge role in migrant smuggling. The city also represents the emblem of porosity of the southern border. It is a hub of black market labour in which Sahelian migrants stay before moving northward. Migrants work as day labourers in impoverished neighbourhoods like Ghurda, where they are accommodated by the dozens into single room, trying to save 30 dinars to be able to move northward; migrants from other regions and countries cannot avoid forced labour or prostitution. Once they can move to the next step of their journey, they are packed into cargo trucks; facing violent abuse, sexual assault and abandonment; ‘If you faint or fall off, they leave you. The drivers beat us with long wooden sticks.’ [2, 3]

Ubari is another strategic city located near the Algerian-Nigerien border and has major oil fields. Most of the population are Arabised Africans, the so-called ‘Ahali’, who descend from sub-Saharan slaves. The Tuareg are the second largest group while the Tebu are a minority. The revolution’s aftermath devastated the local economy. Local competition over power, assets, and alternative livelihoods emerged, increasing discontent among the town’s impoverished and disenfranchised communities and cross-border smuggling increased.

When it comes to border control with Niger and Chad, this has always been problematic. Qaddafi could not exercise full control over the area because he wanted to secure the tribes’ support. To gain the support this meant letting lucrative smuggling routes flourish and for the governance of the city to be held by the local tribes. As the money generated from licit economies was not enough to provide sufficient local income, illicit trade from and to Niger and Chad became a structural feature of the Ubari’s socioeconomic framework just like in other parts of the region. The South’s security actors are often involved in these illicit trade routes, and other attempts to fight it often fail because of a lack of equipment and trained personnel. This situation has created two types of smuggling. One related to arms, narcotics and militants, which are sometimes intercepted, and fuel, subsidised food, cigarettes and illegal migrants, which pass through by paying a fee.

The international community is incapable to implement strategies for countering organised crime and smuggling in South Libya because local municipalities share power with informal security providers and criminalised power structures.

Overall the international community continues to underestimate the Fezzan. Efforts for stabilisation are focused on North Libya where most of the urbanisation and economic activities are. However, without stabilising the Fezzan, no peace process can fully take place. Factions competing for national control (the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army) are supported by militias and tribes, some more than others, involved in smuggling. Drugs, weapons, oil and human trafficking operations come from Niger and Chad, and due to porous borders enter South Libya, and have established strategic hubs in Sabha and Ubari. This represents a profitable business for the major Libyan local actors and they are not willing to change that. Breaking the nexus between organised crime and instability must be a priority for the international community. Otherwise no peace plan can be successful.

The international community should support more common dialogue in the region. It is crucial to avoid a Somalisation of Libya, which could bring about long-term violence. Although the Fezzan has very complex tribal dynamics usually impeding foreign efforts for stabilisation, the Italian government and the Italian Sant’Egidio community have started a mediation dialogue with local tribes to find local solutions to the main problems. [4] This initiative is hard to implement but necessary and the international community should support it rather than diverging on how to deal with Libya. If local actors are given the opportunity to negotiate to find solutions to their own problems, this could be the first step for local reconciliation. However, the dialogue needs to be structured so that past tribal conflicts are not obstacles and so they can also be focused on redistribution of oil revenues.

Tribes, who control routes and hubs for smuggling, are unlikely to agree to fight profitable criminal activities and to develop licit economies, unless there is an equally profitable source of income. Redistribution of oil revenues could be this source of income, and be the economic foundation for reconciliation, the development of licit economies and the restoration of public basic services. In order to reduce corruption, redistribution should be supervised by international financial institutions. Currently, oil revenues go from the National Oil Company to the Central Bank of Libya, instead of being redistributed across local municipalities and this enables dirty money to be the main source of income.

Porous Border Control

According to Frederic Wehrey, the Fezzan region is characterised by key border-control deficiencies stemming from a lack of municipal governance capacity. But there are no particular capacity building initiatives in place to face this problem. It is too dangerous and logistically difficult to deploy capacity building missions in the Fezzan. What the international community should do is to implement common dialogue among tribes (including discussions on the redistribution of oil revenue) along with capacity building initiatives in Chad and Niger, where there is a safer and securer environment, and where important transnational criminal hubs are located. France and Italy have started missions in those countries (i.e. MISIN) to train local security forces, but the effectiveness of these missions is debated among experts. Training security forces and developing border police forces can be a good start in fighting criminal networks and break the nexus between criminality and instability. However, the presence of further elements of instability (i.e. terrorism, climate change) have a deep impact on efforts for stabilisation in Sahel.

The city of Ghat is a key example of border control deficiency. Ghat’s local leadership controls the Libyan border from Algeria to Niger. After the closure of the Algerian border, Ghat became isolated with no supply chains and got involved in clashes with neighbouring city Ubari. The leader of a local border armed group, Katiba 411, declared that ‘he was forced to patrol a 230-kilometre stretch of border with Algeria with just 230 men.’ [5] Since the Algerian border closed, smuggling has moved to the Nigerien border and into Gatrun, exploiting a Tebu-controlled route. Ghat’s leaders have often and unsuccessfully requested the support of the Government of National Accord and the EU for direct assistance in reinstating Algerian cross-border trade routes for Libya’s border towns. “We asked the Europeans to pressure Algeria to open the border to relieve our suffering” a municipal council member referred, criticising the fact that the Tuareg, living in the area, did not have access to medical care and basic goods coming from Algeria. [6] However, the EU did not intervene on this.

The situation in Ghat is just one example amongst many. As long as local institutions and neighbouring governments, with the support of regional and international actors, will not face illicit trafficking properly black economies will remain the most important source of local income, and any law enforcement, technical and bureaucratic improvements will probably fail.

The Government of Niger has begun to work on the issue and has introduced ‘more stringent document control, vehicle search and seizure’, along with repressive measures ‘for those caught smuggling, resulting in a net decrease in migration out flow’. [7] Although these actions are a step forward in the right direction, it is not enough.

The smuggling routes and the struggle for resources are part of deeper socioeconomic issues. [8] Recently, the EU has started to address some of these problems in the Fezzan and across the border with Chad, providing funds to local councils to build migrant detention centres for the councils to manage the flow of migration. However, many mayors rejected the plan because it does not address the key and structural features of migrant flows and smuggling (i.e. the absence of a licit local economy). Moreover, due to the lack of strong governance and supervision, human rights violations by local militias and managers of such facilities could easily take place.

The role of the EU in addressing security and insurgency issues in the Fezzan is limited due to internal divisions among the EU member states in dealing with the Libyan conflict. Italy supports Al-Sarraj’s government in Tripoli, while France supports Haftar’s Libyan National Army in Benghazi. As the two most important EU member states in the Mediterranean diverge, it is difficult for the EU to act as a bloc and find a common approach to stabilise Libya.

The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), a civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy, is aimed at supporting the Tripoli-based authorities disrupting organised criminal networks, like human trafficking, drug and oil smuggling, and terrorism. One of the task is developing the security of the country’s borders. However, EUBAM presence in the Fezzan is very limited, if it even exists. Also, due to fragmentation of power and the lack of inclusive military command structure, national police and armed forces are no longer operational since the 2011 revolution. Diverse armed actors have become integral to security arrangements, mostly informal, and have basically acquired the legitimate status as local authorities need protection. This has affected the effectiveness of the EU integrated border management assistance mission in Libya.

Conclusion

Despite the recent LNA occupation of the region, and ongoing ceasefire arrangements between groups once at war, Fezzan remains affected by social, economic, political and security issues.

Regional and international actors support diverging and opposing sides (Italy, the UN, Qatar and Turkey support Al-Sarraj, while France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Russia support Haftar). All of them have different and competing interests. For example, the main French oil company Total competes with the main Italian oil company ENI to gain control over key oil fields in Libya. Since 2017, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have no diplomatic relations after the embargo against Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh and Doha are financing two opposing sides in the Libyan conflict. These diverging interests intersect with very complex local dynamics and impede the international community from adopting a common strategy to solve the conflict As a consequence, the fight against criminal networks is minimal and restoring the circulation of clean money remains a distant long-term objective. Informal economies have spread across southern Libya and, just like in other regions, it affects efforts for stabilisation. As the local economies mostly consist of smuggling and trafficking, tribes and militias in the region will remain involved because it is a lucrative market.

Although a national peace and capacity building program aimed at restoring basic services and security forces to fight criminalised power structures would be necessary, there are not the conditions on-the-ground to implement such a program. Italy has tried to promote dialogue between the southern tribes but this is not enough. The recent LNA occupation of the Fezzan and the current fight to occupy Tripoli have changed the political landscape, a common approach that takes this into account, as well as the complex context in the Fezzan, needs to be adopted by the international community.

Paolo Zucconi is a Research Fellow at the Global Center for Security Studies in Brussels. He is an independent geopolitical analyst and contributor for The Journal of International Security (Intersec), Global Security Review, and Geopolitical Monitor. He writes for journals and reviews based in the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and Italy on topics related to the MENA region’s security and geopolitical affairs.

Photo by Franzfoto, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

[1] Ben Lamma M. 2017. ‘The Tribal Structure in Libya: Factor for fragmentation or cohesion?’. Observatoire du Monde Arabo-Musulman et du Sahel.

[2] F. Wehrey. 2017. ‘Insecurity and Governance Challenges in Shouthern Libya’. Carnegie Endowement for International Peace: Washington D.C.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Comunità di Sant’Egidio. 2016. ‘Libia, Accordo a Sant’Egidio fra le Tribù del Sud per la Pacificazione dela città di Sebha’. Sant’Egidio Website News.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] International Organization for Migration. 2016. ‘Migration Crisis Operational Framework 2017-2019’. Libya Country Office.

[8] I. Kohl. 2015. ‘Terminal Sahara: Sub-Saharan Migrants and Tuareg Stuck in the Desert’. Stichproben: Vienna Journal of African Studies 28, no. 15, 55–81

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Energy, Environment and Resources

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

Middle East and North Africa

Far from a pro-Russian dove, Volodymyr Zelensky enters office a Russia hawk

Article by Lincoln Pigman

May 20, 2019

Far from a pro-Russian dove, Volodymyr Zelensky enters office a Russia hawk

With his inauguration today, the presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky is upon us. Zelensky, a political outsider who ran on an explicitly anti-establishment platform and ousted incumbent President Petro Poroshenko in a second round of voting that saw Zelensky receive nearly three-quarters of the national vote, has been inaugurated and is likely to set about making major policy and personnel changes upon assuming control of the Bankova. That certainty has the showman’s critics concerned, not least because of its implications for the country’s Russia policy.

After all, Zelensky’s detractors spent the final weeks of the presidential race charging that he was at best too weak and inexperienced to stand up to Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, and at worst on the same page as Putin on key issues and possibly in the pocket of the Kremlin. Poroshenko and his allies redirected their attacks toward Zelensky following the elimination of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in the first round of voting, distributing anti-Zelensky campaign materials that warned of a Russian ‘revanche’ in the event of a Zelensky victory and depicted the April 21^st vote as ‘a decisive choice’ between Putin and Poroshenko. [1, 2] Poroshenko personally declared that Zelensky’s election would turn Ukraine into a Russian colony and threaten ‘the existence of the state’, while his ministers reportedly rushed to ‘safeguard NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration’ lest Zelensky attempt to turn back the clock if elected. [3, 4, 5]

Zelensky has sought to defy his opponents’ claims by taking a hawkish turn and adopting a highly confrontational stance toward Russia. Having initially emphasised the necessity of direct talks with Putin, Zelensky challenged Poroshenko and his much-vaunted national security credentials from the right when the two candidates debated each other in Kiev’s Olympic Stadium on April 19^th. [6] He charged Poroshenko with mismanaging the war effort and failing to bring the conflict to an end in his five years in office, and assailed him for being too friendly with Moscow where a more dovish candidate might have called for diplomacy and engagement with Russia and possibly even the separatist authorities – options backed by 75 percent and 55.4 percent of Ukrainians, respectively. [7]

Zelensky scrutinised and questioned Poroshenko’s interactions with Putin and implied that it was Poroshenko’s business ties to Russia, rather than Zelensky’s, that presented a liability. This, at a time when many Russian political analysts welcomed a Poroshenko defeat on the grounds that the incumbent president was impossible for the Kremlin to negotiate with. [8] Zelensky was also the first candidate to mention Putin in the debate, and Poroshenko – widely seen and sometimes derided as the war candidate to Zelensky’s peace candidate – found himself having to assert his toughness on Russia. Finally, Zelensky made sure to repeatedly praise Ukraine’s military, and while he caught flak from the military for referring to Russian-backed separatists as ‘rebels’ during the debate, voters appeared to meet Poroshenko’s repeated references to Zelensky’s alleged draft-dodging with indifference. [9] All in all, the Zelensky of the second round of voting looked nothing like the dove described by his detractors, and voters took notice.

Zelensky faced his first test as a statesman – and a Russia hawk – well before taking the reins of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Soon after his electoral triumph, the Kremlin, which declined to congratulate Zelensky, declared that it would be simplifying access to Russian citizenship for citizens of Eastern Ukraine’s two separatist republics. In comments to the Guardian, an adviser to Kremlin official Vladislav Surkov said that the announcement had been postponed until after the April 21^st vote so as to not give Poroshenko ammunition. [10] Moscow then doubled down, openly contemplating extending its controversial offer to all Ukrainian citizens. [11] In response, Zelensky targeted Moscow where it hurts: regime security. In a Facebook post written in Russian as well as Ukrainian, Zelensky, who commands considerably more good will among Russians than his predecessor, attacked the Kremlin’s domestic legitimacy, sarcastically listing the advantages of Russian citizenship: ‘the right to be arrested for peaceful protest’ and ‘the right to not have free and competitive elections’, like the one he had just won. [12]

He added that his administration would offer all post-Soviet dissidents, not just Russians, asylum and even citizenship. Whether or not Zelensky ultimately delivers on that promise, his talk of Ukraine’s ‘mission to serve as an example of democracy for post-Soviet countries’ and ‘provide protection, asylum, and Ukrainian citizenship to all those who are prepared to fight for freedom’ and ‘battle side by side with us for our freedom and yours’ surely captured the attention of the region’s authoritarians, both inside and beyond the Kremlin. To be sure, Ukraine granted asylum and citizenship to some Russian dissidents under Poroshenko, who made one of his final acts as president the granting of citizenship to the exiled Russian lawmaker Ilya Ponomarev. [13] Still, his promotion of a particular vision of Ukrainian national identity at home limited Kiev’s soft power reach in Russia. That is likely to change under Zelensky, especially if what is effectively a democracy promotion effort continues upon his inauguration.

In this endeavour, Zelensky is certain to benefit from the fact that he appears to favour a vision of Ukrainian national identity that is markedly more inclusive than that of his predecessor and which seems to eschew the memory and other culture wars that escalated on Poroshenko’s watch. ‘When we name so many streets [and] bridges by the same name, this is not quite right’, Zelensky recently said in reference to Stepan Bandera, adding that the reverence of some Ukrainians for the nationalist leader and World War II partisan ‘is a normal and cool thing’. [14] Zelensky’s balanced approach to questions of history and identity was on full display when he celebrated Victory Day by sharing a photo of himself with two UPA and Red Army veterans, locked in a symbolic handshake. [15] Similarly, Zelensky, who has declined to unambiguously align himself with the Kiev Patriarchate’s Ukrainian Orthodox Church as Poroshenko did after its establishment last December, recently met with the heads of Ukraine’s rival Orthodox churches and arranged for Ukraine’s religious leaders to send a joint ‘message of peace’ to the residents of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. [16, 17]

Indeed, Zelensky and his advisers have signalled that some of the most divisive cultural issues pressed by Poroshenko and his allies should be put to the side in favour of more pressing – and tangible – problems like corruption. [18] That could mute at least some of the internal differences on which Moscow has capitalised in its efforts to discredit Kiev. Zelensky has also proposed targeting the hearts and minds of those living under separatist rule and ensuring that they ‘understan[d] that they are Ukrainians’ through ‘an information war’ involving the creation of an internationally broadcast Russian-language television channel. [19] That would constitute a marked departure from the Poroshenko administration’s failure to undertake ‘a serious outreach effort to those caught behind LNR and DNR lines, to make them feel that they would be fully welcomed back as citizens of Ukraine once Ukrainian sovereignty was restored’, as former US ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer described it in 2017. [20]

It is possible that internal and external pressures will cause Zelensky to change course on Russia upon entering office. Zelensky must capture the Rada in upcoming parliamentary elections while dealing with the continuing challenge from Poroshenko, who has said he will run in Ukraine’s 2024 presidential election; meanwhile, the actions of Russia and Ukraine’s Western partners will shape how he navigates Kiev’s confrontation with Moscow. In any case, Zelensky is unlikely to take a sharp turn for the dovish, with his hawkish turn since the March 31^st vote a far cry from the nightmare scenario that Zelensky sceptics painted on the campaign trail and reason enough to rethink Zelensky and his emerging Russia policy.

Photo by The Presidential Administration of Ukraine, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

[1] Obozrevatel, ‘In Kiev, the police detained a guy for leaflets against Zelensky: the net is seething’, April 2019 https://www.obozrevatel.com/kiyany/crime/v-kieve-politsiya-zaderzhala-parnya-za-listovki-protiv-zelenskogo-set-kipit.htm.

[2] Christopher Miller, ‘Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s new campaign posters for the second-round runoff election suggest it’s a choice between the incumbent and … Putin. “April 21 – a decisive choice”’, Twitter, April 2019, https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1115659308983881728.

[3] Simon Ostrovsky, ‘Poroshenko speaking on Maidan, at perhaps his last rally there as president, warns supporters that a Zelensky presidency would mean Ukraine being a colony of Russia’, Twitter, April 2019, https://twitter.com/SimonOstrovsky/status/1119207843863744512.

[4] Michael Colborne, ‘OK. In an interview, Poroshenko says that his defeat in the elections April 21 would carry “extreme risks” and would be “a threat to the existence of the state.”’, Twitter, April 2019, https://twitter.com/ColborneMichael/status/1116019112948457473.

[5] Jack Laurenson, ‘Deputy prime minister: Cabinet moving to safeguard NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration’, Kyiv Post, April 2019, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/deputy-prime-minister-cabinet-moving-to-safeguard-nato-and-euro-atlantic-integration.html.

[6] Bermet Talant, ‘Zelenskiy reveals plans to end war with Russia, fight corruption’, Kyiv Post, April 2019, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/zelenskiy-reveals-plans-to-end-war-with-russia-fight-corruption.html.

[7] Sociological Group ‘Rating’, ‘Ukraine today: challenges and prospects’, May 2019, http://ratinggroup.ua/ru/research/ukraine/ukraina_segodnya_vyzovy_i_perspektivy.html.

[8] Svetlana Bocharova, Elena Mukhametshina, and Varvara Podrugina, ‘Whose victory in Ukraine’s presidential election would Russia benefit from? The opinions of political scientists’, Vedomosti, March 2019, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2019/03/29/797676-prezidenta-ukraini-vigodna-rossii.

[9] General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces‏, ‘«We do not have «rebels». We have Russian aggression» – reminder of the President of Ukraine – Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Armed Forces of Ukraine will not forget and will not forgive about that. Never!!!’, Twitter, April 2019, https://twitter.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1119343936261193728.

[10] Andrew Roth, ‘Russia tests Ukraine’s new president with passports for breakaway regions’, The Guardian, April 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/24/russia-passports-ukrainians-breakaway-regions-decree-ukraine.

[11] The Moscow Times, ‘Putin says Russians and Ukrainians would benefit from shared citizenship’, April 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/29/putin-says-russians-and-ukrainians-would-benefit-from-shared-citizenship-a65424.

[12] Volodymyr Zelensky, Facebook post, April 2019,https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=2236347569948940&id=100007211555008.

[13] Ilya Ponomarev, ‘Нарешті, це трапилось! Сьогодні, чинний президент України – Петро Порошенко, в останній робочий день своєї каденції, підписав указ про надання мені українського громадянства, згідно державного інтересу. Я сказав… https://www.facebook.com/iponomarev/posts/10157301964690802 …’, Twitter, May 2019, https://twitter.com/iponomarev/status/1129376237355524096.

[14] Sam Sokol, ‘With two Jews in the country’s top jobs, what is next for Ukraine?’, The Jewish Chronicle, April 2019, https://www.thejc.com/comment/analysis/with-two-jews-in-the-country-s-top-jobs-what-is-next-for-ukraine-zelensky-groysman-poroshenko-1.483338.

[15] Yaroslav Trofimov, ‘Ukrainian President-elect Zelensky uses quite an image for his Victory Day message: a Soviet WWII veteran whose only grandson was killed by the Russians in Donbas and a former clandestine member of the Ukrainian Insurgent Armey that was targeting Soviet troops in the 1940s.’, Twitter, May 2019,https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1126207425642672134.

[16] Fabrice Deprez, ‘President-elect Zelensky met with the head of the former Kyiv Patriarchate, the leader of the newly founded Ukrainian orthodox Church but also with the head of the Moscow Patriarchate. Another indication Zelensky is looking to distance himself from Poroshenko’s governing style’, Twitter, May 2019, https://twitter.com/fabrice_deprez/status/1123509794562818048.

[17] Volodymyr Zelensky, Facebook post, May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/zelenskiy95/videos/vb.100007211555008/2246423268941370.

[18] Unian, ‘Advisor to Zelensky names president-elect’s priorities for first 100 days in office’, May 2019, https://www.unian.info/politics/10545822-advisor-to-zelensky-names-president-elect-s-priorities-for-first-100-days-in-office.html.

[19] Interfax Ukraine, ‘Zelensky suggests waging information “war” for Donbas, launching special intl Russian-language channel’, March 2019, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/574963.html.

[20] Steven Pifer, ‘Deepening division in Donbas’, Brookings Institution, May 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/02/deepening-division-in-donbas/.

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

FPC Briefing: Exploiting an idyll – US, Indian and Japanese efforts to counterbalance China in Sri Lanka

Article by Sarosh Bana

May 17, 2019

FPC Briefing: Exploiting an idyll – US, Indian and Japanese efforts to counterbalance China in Sri Lanka

The grisly terror onslaught against Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday that took 253 lives could well have been avoided if a deeply divided government had not failed to act on intelligence provided by the United States (US) and India. [1]

Tragically for this idyllic island nation, the political rift has also made it vulnerable to external influences. The terror strikes were perpetrated against the backdrop of superpower rivalry where the Indo-Pacific powers of the US, India and Japan are striving to counterbalance the overarching dominance that China has gained over the island and the region. The three partner countries have been increasingly concerned by China’s enlarging presence in the maritime proximity to India and its new-found access to a crucial commercial and military waterway that has deepened its influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The series of eight coordinated suicide bomb blasts by radical Islamists tragically brought the spectre of strife and unrest back to Sri Lanka that was to have celebrated a decade of peace on 18 May. That day in 2009 had marked the end of the 26-year civil war by the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that is estimated to have taken a toll of over 100,000 civilians and 50,000 fighters. [2]

The Easter Sunday attacks could well have been the route to derail this path to peace and to bring ethnic strife back to centre-stage in this ‘Emerald Isle of Asia’, also known as the Land of Spices and Tea. Already, fearing further attacks, the government has declared a state of emergency that empowers the police and military to detain and interrogate suspects without court orders. Armed pickets have been deployed outside churches, mosques, hotels and other public spaces, suspects have been rounded up and radical literature and explosive material seized in a series of raids as Sri Lankans hunker down to a looming period of uncertainty.

US and Indian intelligence agencies had repeatedly warned Colombo about weapons, explosives and detonators being stockpiled, with moves afoot to target churches and even the Indian High Commission. Among the 39 foreign tourists from at least 12 countries who perished in the blasts in three churches and three luxury hotels were 11 Indians and four Americans, as also one Japanese and one Chinese. [3]

This grievous lapse in acting on credible intelligence inputs betrays the political divide in Sri Lanka. The 25,330 square mile teardrop-shaped country of 22 million was plunged into turmoil last October when President Maithripala Sirisena ousted his former political ally and sitting Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe “because of his arrogance”, and replaced him with his rival-turned-friend and ex-President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The consequent power struggle virtually shut the government down. Sirisena discounted two confidence votes Wickremesinghe won in Parliament, acquiescing only seven weeks later when the Supreme Court rebuked him and sought Wickremesinghe’s reinstatement.

However, in a message fraught with grim forebodings, Sirisena said there was no change in his “personal position” that he would not work with Wickremesinghe even if all 225 Parliament members backed him. Thus, a divided government overlooked the warnings on the Easter offensive, with both the President and Prime Minister astonishingly and separately informing their countrymen that they were not privy to the incoming intelligence.

The fallout between Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa has also reflected menacingly on national developments where the former has been disposed towards India, while Rajapaksa has toed the Chinese line.

Strategically-located Sri Lanka lies off the southeastern tip of India just across the 33-mile wide Palk Strait. Its vantage location accords it strategic access to the Indian Ocean, which is the third largest ocean on earth, after the Pacific and Atlantic, and which covers a fifth of the total ocean area of the planet, drawing its boundaries with Asia to its north, Africa to its west, Australia to its east and Southern Ocean (or Antarctic or Austral Ocean) to its south.

Together, the Indian and Pacific Oceans cover two-thirds of the earth’s total water surface, and an increasingly assertive China’s economic and military rise has been having a profound impact on the balance of power in this maritime region.

While the US has provided some $2 billion in total assistance to Sri Lanka in areas such as agriculture, energy and natural resources, education, healthcare and humanitarian activities, Chinese companies completed infrastructure projects there worth $15 billion by the end of 2017. [4, 5] As part of its Bay of Bengal Initiative, the US has also granted $39 million to Sri Lanka to support maritime security, freedom of navigation, and maritime domain awareness. [6]

In 2016, China overtook India as Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner, with its $4.43 billion worth of bilateral trade surpassing India-Sri Lanka’s $4.37 billion, according to one study. [7] Both India and China enjoy vast trade surpluses with Sri Lanka, but the US has a gross deficit. The study notes that the US is Sri Lanka’s foremost export destination, accounting for a quarter of all its exports in the 2012-16 period, and India, the third largest destination with a 5.6 percent share. China was, however, only the 10^th largest destination, with a 1.8 percent share. Moreover, while China finances its projects in Sri Lanka largely through repayable loans, India’s financial aid to Sri Lanka is normally in a ratio of 70 percent loans to 30 percent outright grants. Japan too had a three-fourth trade surplus with Sri Lanka in their bilateral trade worth $1 billion in 2016.

Beijing’s strategic outreach into the IOR and its claims of sovereignty over almost the entire South China and East China seas have unsettled the Indo-Pacific littoral. This has not been lost on the US, which had historically been the security guarantor for this expanse and beyond. But while Washington is keen on retaining, and reclaiming, its presence across the critical sea lanes, it now finds worth in forging regional partnerships in this pursuit with other like-minded countries like India and Japan in an effort to cut down costs and delegate responsibility.

A critical question that arises is whether this policy shift in American strategy has actually been a policy drift and has fallen behind China’s sharply focused overseas infrastructure investment and lending program called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, previously, One Belt One Road, or OBOR) that was kick started in 2013. BRI, also known as the maritime silk route, is a $1 trillion sequence of infrastructure projects spanning 70 countries. [8]

Though Beijing insists the BRI is largely a commercial rather than a military initiative, naval basing appears very much part of an unspoken agenda. Releasing the National Security Strategy last December, US President Donald Trump described a new era of “great power competition” where “foreign nations” have begun to “reassert their influence regionally and globally” and contest “[America’s] geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.” He, however, revealed the US’s new approach to China that is grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect for sovereignty.

China has lavished generous loans on many countries as part of the BRI enterprise, only to assume control over the infrastructure created by it by way of compensation in case of defaults on repayments. Speaking on his administration’s policy towards China at the Hudson Institute in October 2018, US Vice President Mike Pence blamed Beijing for using “debt diplomacy” to expand its influence, leaving opaque the terms of its loans so that benefits flow overwhelmingly to it. [9] “Just ask Sri Lanka, which took on massive debt to let Chinese state companies build a port with questionable commercial value,” he noted. “Two years ago, that country could no longer afford its payments – so Beijing pressured Sri Lanka to deliver the new port directly into Chinese hands. It may soon become a forward military base for China’s growing blue-water navy.”

When Sri Lanka defaulted on its $1.12 billion deal with China to develop its southern seaport of Hambantota, Beijing deemed it more opportune to take over the port it created rather than relax the repayment norms that Colombo pleaded for. [10] Consequently, in December 2017, Colombo handed over the port to Beijing on a 99-year lease. [11] Though China insists it has solely commercial interest in Hambantota, Sri Lankan authorities reportedly indicated that intelligence and strategic possibilities of the port’s location had been part of the negotiations. Indeed, within weeks of Sri Lanka’s announcement in June 2018 that it would be shifting its southern naval headquarters to Hambantota port, Beijing declared it would be donating a frigate to the Sri Lankan Navy. [12] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also creating facilities at the Sri Lanka Military Academy, the country’s premier army training establishment.

Speaking at the Pathfinder Panel Discussion in Colombo in February, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Vajda felt that transactions based on “naked commercial self-interest and hidden agendas that mortgage the future” undermine the long-term stability of the region. [13]

In Sri Lanka, China is expanding from Hambantota to the Colombo port as well. In the single largest ever Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Sri Lanka, China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), a subsidiary of state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), is creating the $1.4 billion Colombo International Financial City (CIFC) on 269 hectares or 660 acres of land reclaimed from the sea. [14]

This ‘city-within-the-city’ is expected to be a major financial hub rivalling Singapore and Dubai that will boost the economy and maritime trade of the island country. The project was launched in 2014 by Chinese President Xi Jinping and then Sri Lanka’s President Rajapaksa, its marine part, including construction of the breakwater, to be commissioned in June 2019. China is also investing $1 billion in constructing three 60-storey buildings at this site adjacent to the country’s main port of Colombo, the deepest container terminal in South Asia. [15]

India is particularly stressed by these developments in its vicinity, having had tumultuous encounters with China along its northern frontiers where both countries maintain high military vigil. When the current Wickremasinghe government came to power in January 2015, New Delhi managed to convince it to halt the project, but CCCC pressed for an agreement renewal and work resumed in August 2016, much to India’s chagrin.

Washington too is disquieted by these happenings, especially as the Hambantota issue came to a head in 2018 that happened to be the 70^th anniversary year of US-Sri Lankan diplomatic relations. While unveiling additional financial help for the Indo-Pacific region late last year, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said: “We’re convinced that American engagement in the Indo-Pacific benefits all the nations in that region. [16] We want it to be free, we want it to be open. We’re not looking for dominance. We’re looking for partnerships.”

Testifying at the February hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), maintained that the transfer last year of an excess US Coast Guard cutter, along with additional platforms from Japan and India, have augmented the maritime domain awareness of the Sri Lankan Navy, which is a well-trained and professional force with the potential to contribute to multilateral maritime interoperability in the Indian Ocean. [17]

Terming Sri Lanka “a significant strategic opportunity in the Indian Ocean”, Davidson said that increasing the bilateral navy-to-navy engagement will be a USINDOPACOM focus in 2019. Indicating that the US’s other regional partners like India, Japan, France, Australia and New Zealand share a common aspiration for a free and open Indo-Pacific, he noted, “USINDOPACOM depends upon the collective capabilities of our allies and partners to address the challenges to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

Home to half of the 20 fastest growing economies that account for over a third of global GDP, the Indo-Pacific will have unrivaled purchasing power when 65 percent of the world’s middle class will be inhabiting the region by 2030. [18] In 2017 and 2018 alone, American businesses invested $61 billion in more than 1,500 projects across the region, according to US Ambassador to Vietnam Daniel Kritenbrink. [19] “US total investment in the Indo-Pacific is now more than $1.4 trillion, which is more than that from China, Japan and South Korea combined,” he added.

However, China’s grand strategy for the Indo-Pacific envisages its foray into the IOR through its ‘string of pearls’ blueprint. Alongside Hambantota and Colombo, the blueprint delineates a chain of ports through Sonadia, in Bangladesh, Kyaukpyu, in Myanmar, and Laamu Atoll, in the Maldives. The Sonadia deal was to be signed during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s China visit in 2014, but was aborted on speculation that the initiative was blocked by India. However, it could be revived, with Hasina lauding China for being “a key-development partner” with Bangladesh’s 2017 purchase of two Chinese-made Type 035G Ming Class submarines worth $204 million that upgraded its navy into a “three-dimensional force.” [20]

To heighten its presence in the Bay of Bengal on India’s eastern seaboard, China concluded a $1.3 billion (initial phase) deal with Myanmar last November to develop a deep-sea port in Kyaukpyu in the western state of Rakhine. [21] Part of a special economic zone (SEZ), the port will lie across the Bay where India is developing a nuclear submarine base codenamed Project Varsha near the Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam. The project was initially worth $7 billion, but was reduced appreciably following Myanmar’s fears of a debt-trap. [22]

As with Sri Lanka, where China friend Rajapaksa signed the Hambantota and other deals with Beijing before being succeeded by India friend Wickremesinghe, the Maldives was drawn to China under former President Abdulla Yameen, while Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, who succeeded him in November 2018, is inclined towards India. The Yameen government had in March 2018 admitted that China had expressed interest in building a port in Laamu Atoll to the south. It had also borrowed heavily from China to build bridges and housing as part of Beijing’s BRI initiative and reportedly even handed over some islands to China. [23]

A month after Solih assumed power, India, evidently anxious to forestall any Chinese naval bases on this Indian Ocean island territory 623 km or 388 miles off its southernmost tip of Kanyakumari, offered $1.4 billion aid to the Maldives to help it pay off its debt to China on condition that it distances itself from Beijing. [24] As part of its policy of ‘Neighborhood First’ to support the island country’s socio-economic development, New Delhi also sought stronger security ties with Male that would involve permanent deployment of Indian military personnel.

China, however, is hemming India in with another of its overseas ports, this time in Pakistan, India’s longstanding foe across the border with which it has gone to war four times, in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. The Gwadar port it is building in Pakistan’s largest province of Baluchistan will link to Kashgar in China’s far western region of Xinjiang via the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that both the partners hail as the “great monument of Pakistan-China friendship” and which is now a flagship component of the BRI. [25] Gwadar will gain China a maritime gateway to the Arabian Sea on India’s west and on to the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and the gulfs of Oman and Aden.

India opposes the CPEC, as the project runs through Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) that are disputed by India. The CPEC incidentally obliges Pakistan to pay $40 billion to China over 20 years by way of debt repayments and dividends. [26] India has also snubbed China twice on the BRI issue, when it boycotted the BRI Forum meetings held in Beijing in 2017 and last April.

Ironically, while China helps the Islamic Republic of Pakistan – which, with a population of over 200 million Muslims, designates Islam as its state religion and is also referred to as the ‘global center of political Islam’ – in Xinjiang, the Communist Party has imprisoned a million native Muslim Uyghurs in government camps. [27] Survivors recount being indoctrinated in these camps in an authoritarian effort to subjugate Uyghur culture and quash the Muslim faith in China.

China may prospectively use Gwadar, and Hambantota, as PLA Navy bases, in order to bolster its maritime profile in the Indo-Pacific. In August 2017, Pakistan announced the purchase from China of four modified Type 041 Yuan Class SSKs and technology transfer for the assembly of four more in the port city of Karachi, in a deal estimated at $5 billion. [28] The first four submarines were to be delivered by 2023, and the succeeding four, by 2028, this fleet designated to form the core of Pakistan’s offshore nuclear second-strike triad.

With regard to the Colombo port, New Delhi is anxious about Beijing’s influence over it. The port is considered vital for India, which lacks a transshipment port. Colombo fulfils that requirement, handling a staggering 48 percent of India’s international cargo. [29] The two other regional transshipment hubs for India fall far behind Colombo, with Singapore accounting for 22 percent and Malaysia’s Port Klang, 10 percent of India’s international cargo. [30, 31]

The US has hitherto sought to safeguard the Colombo port. Its Customs and Border Protection Agency, through its Container Security Initiative, has worked alongside the Sri Lankan Customs Central Intelligence Unit since 2005 to jointly target high-risk shipments destined for the US. The port also participates in the Department of Energy’s second line of defense Megaport Initiative that helps Sri Lanka detect radiological materials so as to prevent the spread of radiological weapons.

Sri Lanka has tried to compensate India for the Colombo and Hambantota ports coming under Chinese control by offering a controlling stake to the Airports Authority of India in Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA), located 15 km from Hambantota. Opened in 2013, at a cost of $210 million and funded through high interest Chinese commercial loans, MRIA is Sri Lanka’s second international airport after Colombo’s Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). [32] It is, however, running into losses owing to low demand for which it has been dubbed ‘the world’s emptiest airport’ and it is perhaps because of this that there has been no progress on the proposal with India. [33]

The Indian government has, however, extended financial assistance of over $45 million for upgrading Kankesanthurai harbour in the Jaffna district to a full-fledged commercial port towards Sri Lanka’s efforts to become a regional maritime hub. [34] The harbour and its berthing piers had been wrecked by the tsunami in 2004 and cyclone Nisha in 2008.

Also, in a stunning move that challenges China and smothers its hitherto single largest FDI into Sri Lanka (of the $1.4 billion Colombo financial city), India’s Accord Group recently signed a $3.8 billion deal with the Sultanate of Oman’s Ministry of Oil and Gas to build an oil refinery in Sri Lanka. [35] Ironically, the 585-acre facility will come up close to the Hambantota port from where it will be exporting the 9 million tonnes of refined products it will be producing annually upon its commissioning in 44 months. While the Chennai-based Accord Group will control 70 percent of the joint venture, the Omani ministry will hold the rest. However, Oman’s oil ministry subsequently denied its participation, leading Sri Lankan Board of Investment Director General Champika Malalgoda to reportedly affirm that the deal was “still going ahead”. [36]

Reacting to the media’s question on the proposed refinery, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang maintained that Beijing had an “open attitude” regarding India’s investments in the island nation. [37] “While we make our contribution to the development of Sri Lanka, China is not as narrow minded as you thought,” he added.

Colombo and New Delhi have also agreed to a 50-year lease agreement to jointly operate a strategic World War II-era oil facility in the Trincomalee harbour. It has been widely reported – but debunked officially – that the US, Japan and India are seeking to jointly develop Trincomalee port – which had been an Indian Ocean base for the Allied Forces – as a logistics hub for South Asia so as to counterbalance China’s presence in Hambantota and Colombo. [38] All three countries have sent ships to the Trincomalee harbor, in north-eastern Sri Lanka, on goodwill visits and India has stationed a naval officer there.

It will actually be a collaborative effort between Japan, India and Sri Lanka to expand this strategically-located port, at a cost between $90 million and $117 million. [39] Trincomalee is one of the three regional ports – the others being Dawei in Myanmar and Matarbari in Bangladesh – that Japan plans to develop, through yen loans, as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’.

A Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer was in the Trincomalee harbor when Japan’s Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera was visiting it, in what was the first such visit to Sri Lanka by a Japanese defense minister, and this was soon followed by USS Anchorage and embarked MEU. Sri Lanka’s navy also participated last August for the first time in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the world’s largest US Pacific Fleet-led international maritime warfare exercise, while Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), which too is conducted by the US Pacific Fleet, was held at Trincomalee also for the first time in October 2017. [40, 41]

It has been reported that 450 naval vessels from 28 countries have called on Sri Lanka between 2008 and 2017, with Indian warships topping the list with 90 visits, followed by 65 from Japan and 30 from China. [42]

The US Navy has conducted three iterations aimed at promoting Sri Lanka as a regional hub for logistics and commerce. [43] Following two such initiatives at Colombo’s Bandaranaike airport and at Trincomalee last August, and at the airport last December, the US Navy performed the third such iteration for over a week last December at the Bandaranaike airport. Washington paid about $140,000 for the last cargo transfer. [44]

The iterations involve several US naval aircraft bringing in a variety of non-lethal supplies to the commercial airport. January saw the supplies being transferred between planes and then flown to the nuclear-powered supercarrier, USS John C. Stennis, at sea. These operations ensure that no cargo, military equipment or personnel remain in Sri Lanka after the completion of the cargo transfers.

A subsequent statement by the 7^th Fleet maintained: “Taking advantage of a growing naval partnership with Sri Lanka, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis established a logistics hub in Sri Lanka to receive support, supplies and services at sea. [45] A C-2 Greyhound carrier onboard delivery aircraft accessed the hub’s strategic location before bringing supplies to John C. Stennis. Established on a temporary basis in the island nation, the hub provides logistics support to US Navy ships operating in the Indian Ocean.”

Lt. Bryan Ortiz, John C. Stennis’ stock control division officer, pointed out that the primary purpose of the operation was to provide mission-critical supplies and services to US Navy ships transiting through and operating in the Indian Ocean. “The secondary purpose is to demonstrate the US Navy’s ability to establish a temporary logistics hub ashore where no enduring US Navy logistics footprint exists,” he added.

In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Davidson mentioned that USINDOPACOM would “regain the advantage” by positioning theater infrastructure that supported expeditionary capability that was agile and resilient and would serve as dynamic basing for the US maritime and air forces. [46]

Questions have been raised in Sri Lanka’s Parliament on the security impact of the use of the country’s commercial ports to conduct cargo transfers by the US military. An MP asked whether Colombo was contemplating signing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Washington. [47] There were also references to the US’s $480 million grant assistance to Sri Lanka from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for infrastructure development projects. [48] Both the US Embassy in Colombo and the Sri Lankan government have, however, specified that the two countries had not indicated any “interest, wish or desire to establish a base in Trincomalee, the Eastern Province, or any other part of Sri Lanka”. [49]

The developments in Sri Lanka and the littoral underscore the economic, political and strategic significance of the IOR that is traversed by major maritime trade routes that stretch from the Strait of Hormuz to the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east and freight a third of the world’s maritime cargo, two thirds of global oil and half the world’s container traffic. [50]

Over half the world’s oil and gas deposits are said to be located in this maritime expanse, which also accounts for all of India’s sea-borne trade, 80 percent of Japan’s oil supplies and 60 percent of China’s. [51] A US Naval War College-sponsored study cited IOR replacing the North Atlantic as the central artery of world commerce. [52] The region is also replete with nuclear-powered states, failed states, as well as those wracked by poverty, piracy, terrorism and fundamentalism.

Sri Lanka’s worth in this region is exemplified by Bethesda-based Small Wars Journal that cites its location as the most central maritime route between the Persian Gulf and Indonesia. [53] The country is additionally ideally positioned to access troubled spots throughout the IOR, as it can readily support operations in the Middle East, Afghanistan or South East Asia; evidenced by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in South Asia choosing Sri Lanka to locate his headquarters during World War II. The island nation, now weakened by terrorism and the unfortunate political divide, continues to sustain global interest, a victim of its own strategic allure.

Sarosh Bana is the Executive Editor of India’s oldest and most widely read national fortnightly on business, Business India, published out of Mumbai. He writes extensively on defense and security, policy, strategy, politics, foreign affairs, cyber security, space, energy, environment, food and agriculture, shipping and ports, and urban and rural development. He is also a frequent speaker on defense and security, foreign affairs and strategy, and his writings have been published in some of the leading publications, journals and think tanks across the world.

Photo by Dan Lundberg, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

[1] BBC Asia, ‘Sri Lanka attacks: Death toll revised down by “about 100”’, BBC, April 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48059328

[2] Sri Lankan Civil War, ‘Casualties of the Sri Lankan civil war’, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_Civil_War

[3] a. Press Trust of India, ‘Sri Lanka terror attacks: 11 Indians dead, Colombo confirms; number of deceased foreigners rises to 36’, Firstpost, April 2019, https://www.firstpost.com/india/sri-lanka-terror-attacks-11-indians-dead-colombo-confirms-number-of-deceased-foreigners-rises-to-36-6517511.html; b. Lee Brown, ‘Four Americans confirmed dead in Sri Lanka terrorist attack’, New York Post, April 2019, https://nypost.com/2019/04/22/four-americans-confirmed-dead-in-sri-lanka-terrorist-attacks/; c. AP News, ‘The Latest: Japan confirms 1 fatality in Sri Lankan blasts, AP News, April 2019 https://www.apnews.com/fabb6b93861a46d1b7cef4983450ffb3

[4] Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, ‘U.S. Relations With Sri Lanka’, U.S. Department of State, January 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm

[5] Shakthi De Silva, ‘Sri Lanka: Caught in an Indo-China “Great Game”?’, The Diplomat, February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/sri-lanka-caught-in-an-indo-china-great-game/

[6] Heather Nauert, ‘Indo-Pacific Funding Announcement’, U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka, August 2018, https://lk.usembassy.gov/indo-pacific-funding-announcement/

[7] P.K. Balachandran, ‘China Overtakes India as Sri Lanka’s Largest Trading Partner’, The Citizen, December 2017, https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/5/12511/China-Overtakes-India-as-Sri-Lankas-Largest-Trading-Partner

[8] Public Policy, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price is Too High’, Knowledge at Wharton, April 2019, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/

[9] Vice President Mike Pence, ‘Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Towards China’, Hudson Institute, October 2018, https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018

[10, 11] PTI, ‘China holds back Hambantota Port deal’s final tranche of $586 million to Sri Lanka’, The Economic Times, June 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-holds-back-hambantota-port-deals-final-tranche-of-585-million-to-sri-lanka/articleshow/64532449.cms

[12] Reuters, ‘Sri Lanka shift naval base to China-controlled port city’, Channel News Asia, July 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/sri-lanka-to-shift-naval-base-to-china-controlled-port-city-10492872

[13] Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary State Thomas J. Vajda, ‘Opening Statement of Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas J. Vajda at Pathfinder Panel Discussion’, U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka, February 2019, https://lk.usembassy.gov/opening-statement-of-acting-principal-deputy-assistant-secretary-of-state-thomas-j-vajda-at-pathfinder-panel-discussion/

[14] P.K. Balachandran, ‘Call to probe Lanka’s trade with Singapore and UAE for black money transactions’, FT, December 2017, http://www.ft.lk/columns/Call-to-probe-Lanka-s-trade-with-Singapore-and-UAE-for-black-money-transactions/4-645300

[15] Daily News Sri Lanka, ‘China to invest & 1 billion in three 60-storey Port city buildings’, Daily News Sri Lanka, January 2018, http://www.dailynews.lk/2018/01/22/business/140557/china-invest-1-billion-three-60-storey-port-city-buildings

[16] PTI, ‘US looking for partnership not dominance in Indo-Pacific: Pompeo’, The Week, July 2018, https://www.theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2018/07/31/us-looking-for-partnership-not-dominance-in-indo-pacific-pompeo.html

[17] Admiral Philip S. Davidson, ‘Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before The Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture 12 February 2019’, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf

[18] Homi Kharas, ‘The Unprecedented Expansion of the Global Middle Class’, Global Econoy & Development Working Paper 100, February 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/global_20170228_global-middle-class.pdf

[19] Speakers at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue, ‘US ambassador wants “free and open” Asia’, Viet Nam News, December 2018, http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/481642/us-ambassador-wants-free-and-open-asia.html

[20] PTI, ‘Bangladeshi PM defends decision to buy two Chinese submarines’, The Tribune, July 2017 https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/bangladeshi-pm-defends-decision-to-buy-two-chinese-submarines/436039.html

[21] MAREX, ‘China and Myanmar Agree to $1.3 Billion Port Project’, The Maritime Executive, November 2018, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-and-myanmar-agree-to-1-3-billion-port-project

[22] Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘Too close for comfort: China to build port in Myanmar, 3^rd in India’s vicinity’, Hindustan Times, November 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-myanmar-ink-deal-for-port-on-bay-of-bengal-third-in-india-s-vicinity/story-Lbm4IwOMuqrNvXGv4ewuYJ.html

[23] Yuji Kuronuma, ‘India offers Maldives $1bn in loans to help repay China debt’, Nikkei Asian Review, November 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/India-offers-Maldives-1bn-in-loans-to-help-repay-China-debt

[24] HT Correspondent, ‘Burdened by Chinese debt, Maldives gets $1.4bn aid from India’, Hindustan Times, December 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/burdened-by-chinese-debt-maldives-gets-1-4bn-aid-from-india/story-Pkj50rC9NPZJMUDpjQWkoI.html

[25] Rajat Pandit, ‘India expresses strong opposition to China Pakistan Economic Corridor, says challenges Indian sovereignty’, The Economic Times, July 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-expresses-strong-opposition-to-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-says-challenges-indian-sovereignty/articleshow/57664537.cms

[26] Imtiaz Ahmad, ‘Pakistan to repay China $40 billion for CPEC projects: Report’, Hindustan Times, December 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-to-repay-china-40-billion-for-cpec-projects-says-report/story-2NquR90EzRtyTj2DZ0l7GP.html

[27] Khaled A. Beydoun, ‘China holds one million Uighur Muslims in concentration camps’, Al Jazeera, September 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/china-holds-million-uighur-muslims-concentration-camps-180912105738481.html

[28] Military, ‘Hangor New Submarines – Type 041 Yuan-class’, Global Security, October 2016, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/ss-new.htm

[29, 30, 31] M.K. Venu and Noor Mohammad, ‘Modi Wants India to be a Transshipment Hub. But can it Beat Sri Lanka and Singapore?’, The Wire International, June 2018, https://thewire.in/economy/modi-wants-india-to-be-a-trans-shipment-hub-but-can-it-beat-sri-lanka-and-singapore

[32, 33] Press Trust of India, ‘Sri Lanka reworking MoU to hand over world’s emptiest airport to India’, Business Standard, August 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/lanka-reworking-mou-to-hand-over-world-s-emptiest-airport-to-india-report-118080500478_1.html

[34] Business, ‘SL, India sign deal for $ 45 m financial assistance to develop Kankesanthurai Harbour’, FT Sri Lanka, January 2018, http://www.ft.lk/business/SL–India-sign-deal-for—45-m-financial-assistance-to-develop-Kankesanthurai-Harbour/34-647113

[35, 36] Nidhi Verma, ‘Oman denies it has agreed to invest in Sri Lanka oil refinery project’, Reuters, March 2019, https://in.reuters.com/article/sri-lanka-refinery-oman/oman-denies-it-has-agreed-to-invest-in-sri-lanka-oil-refinery-project-idINKCN1R11TK

[37] PTI, ‘China “not narrow minded” to oppose Indian investments in Lanka: Official’, The Economic Times, March 2019, https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/business/china-not-narrow-minded-to-oppose-indian-investments-in-lanka-official/articleshow/68510943.cms

[38] a. Nitin A. Gokhale, ‘With India’s Quiet Support, U.S., Japan Eye Trincomalee Foothold’, Strategic News International, January 2019, https://sniwire.com/neighbours/with-indias-quiet-support-u-s-japan-eye-trincomalee-foothold/; b. P.K. Balachandran, ‘US And Japan Look at Sri Lankan Port to Checkmate China’, The Citizen, August 2018, https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/5/14785/US-And-Japan-Look-at–Sri-Lankan-Port-To-Checkmate-China

[39] Neville Ladduwahetty, ‘Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean’, The Island, June 2018, http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=185557

[40, 41] ColomboPage News Desk, ‘USS Anchorage and 13^th MEU Arrive in Sri Lanka’, ColomboPage, August 2018, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_18B/Aug24_1535114770CH.php

[42] Marwaan Macan-Markar, ‘China and US play the Great Game in South Asia’, Nikkei Asian Review, December 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-and-US-play-the-Great-Game-in-South-Asia

[43, 44] Editor, ‘US Navy has bases in Lanka for non-lethal supplies and cargo transfers’, NewsIn Asia, January 2019, https://newsin.asia/us-navy-gets-bases-in-lanka-for-non-lethal-supplies-and-cargo-transfers/

[45] Grant G. Grady, ‘USS John c. Stennis Leverages Logistics Hub in Sri Lanka’, Commander, U.S. 7^th Fleet, December 2018, https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1706047/uss-john-c-stennis-leverages-logistics-hub-in-sri-lanka/

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ramesh Irugalbandara, ‘Details on secretive US-SL military agreement revealed’, News First, February 2019, https://www.newsfirst.lk/2019/02/22/details-on-secretive-us-sl-military-agreement-revealed/

[48] ColomboPage News Desk, Millennium Challenge Corporation approves $ 480 million grant to Sri Lanka to expand economic opportunities and reduce poverty’, ColomboPage, April 2019, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_19A/Apr26_1556286277CH.php

[49] FT Sri Lanka, ‘Government rejects reports of moves to set up US military base in Sri Lanka’, FT Sri Lanka, January 2019, http://www.ft.lk/front-page/Government-rejects-reports-of-moves-to-set-up-US–military-base-in-Sri-Lanka/44-671699

[50] PTI, ‘Countries in Indian Ocean responsible for its stability: Sushma Swaraj’, The Economic Times, July 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/countries-in-indian-ocean-responsible-for-its-stabilitysushma-swaraj/articleshow/60311911.cms?from=mdr

[51, 53] David A. Anderson and Anton Wijeyesekera, ‘U.S. Naval Basing in Sri Lanka?’, Small Wars Journal, May 2011,https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/us-naval-basing-in-sri-lanka [52] Keith Jones, ‘US moves to harness India to anti-China “pivot”’, World Socialist Web Site, March 2016, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/08/pers-m08.html

Topics

Energy, Environment and Resources

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Asia

East Asia

South Asia

Lessons from Brexit: (Re)balancing Euroscepticism

Article by Louis Cox-Brusseau

April 17, 2019

Lessons from Brexit: (Re)balancing Euroscepticism

As the Brexit process appears to be drawing to an uncertain close, there are still lessons to be learned from the past three years for the United Kingdom and the European Union. The polarisation of political attitudes toward the Union – particularly in the Eurosceptic movement, a phenomenon many now associate exclusively with far-right ideology and nationalism – makes for uneasy reconciliations between opposing viewpoints competing over the Union’s future post-Brexit. But what is Euroscepticism? In the United Kingdom, Euroscepticism now seems to be synonymous with the desire to leave the European Union. However, this was not always the case, nor is it currently the case where Eurosceptic sentiment is concerned elsewhere in the European Union; indeed, the broadening of the term ‘Eurosceptic’ risks lumping together a myriad of distinct political ideologies and (sometimes contrasting) views on European membership, not all of whom are expressly in favour of dissolving or departing the Union, rather reforming it, minimising the centralisation of European government and, crucially, safeguarding Member State sovereignty.[1]

In short, not all Eurosceptic movements need necessarily lead to a departure from the Union; indeed, as this article shall argue, a strand of sensible Euroscepticism may represent a healthy balance for the Union’s political composition. Remembering that the Eurosceptic movement was not always defined by the most extreme voices within it may be the key to reclaiming the ‘middle ground’ – and to encouraging a more moderate form of politics which allow for better international cooperation than before.

2016 was a seminal year in European politics; with the advent of Brexit and a surge of far-right nationalism across Europe, fears abounded in Western European policy circles that the departure of the United Kingdom might herald an existential crisis for the European Union as a whole.[2] Certainly the entire Brexit process has ultimately compelled greater introspection within the European institutions than has previously been the case. With populism and right-wing political parties now firmly entrenched in mainstream European politics, there is now more than ever a clear need for the European Union to improve, for want of a better phrase, its marketability in the eyes of its constituent Member States. Not only must it prove its worth to those Member States where anti-Union sentiments run high, it must acknowledge – and find a means to deal with – the fact that it has not always succeeded in making its citizens feel represented at the highest level. By not doing so, it will continue to (however unwittingly) provide fuel for anti-Union sentiment to grow and develop, and for disinformation to permeate, to the detriment of the Union as a whole.

These are not easy-fix problems with an immediate answer. There are clear lessons to be learned from Brexit, for the European Union, its Member States, and regional allies. The risk, however, is that not all of them are fully understood in time to prevent another membership crisis. In fact, it may take another membership crisis within the Union to fully understand the circumstances which allowed Brexit to unfold as far as it has done. The roots of Brexit lie in the growth of Eurosceptic sentiment within the United Kingdom and the replacement of moderate politics by polarised ideologies vehemently opposed to European integration and fearful of the spectre of overbearing Union interference in domestic policies. So far, the Union has not done much to provide a positive counter-message to these fears; nor has it adequately tackled the surfeit of misinformation fuelling them.[3] As distasteful as such Eurosceptic views may be to the European elite, it is absolutely essential that they are not wholly ignored – many within the Eurosceptic camp (inside and outside the UK) were driven to such extremes of ideology by perceived failures of the Union to adequately assess the mood of its citizens, such as the Union’s tone-deaf response to the European migrant crisis in 2015 and its attempt to enforce migrant quotas upon Member States.[4] A surge in Eurosceptic sentiment in the Central European nations directly followed, and in the governments of Austria and the Visegrad Four, and restricting migration remains fundamental to many political manifestos today.[5]

Although the unpredictable and chaotic way in which Brexit has developed may, by way of example, have discouraged another membership crisis in the short term – as Member States with high levels of Eurosceptic sentiment closely watch how events unfold in Britain – the Union still has some way to go to win back approval in the troubled Central European states, and even still faces significant Eurosceptic sentiment closer to home in France and Italy. Such sentiment seems chiefly to represent a lack of trust in the Union and its intentions, particularly in Central Europe. As of autumn 2018, Eurobarometer notes that negative images of the European Union still persist in Greece, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Italy and France, with a majority of residents of the Visegrad nations (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) displaying a significant lack of trust in the European institutions.[6]

The Danger of Complacency

Although it is unlikely we will see another membership crisis in the near future, there is still a strong argument to tackle Eurosceptic sentiment within the Union more intelligently and constructively than has previously been the case. In the immediate wake of the British referendum in 2016, it was posited that other Member States might follow suit and attempt to depart the Union. ‘Czexit’, ‘Grexit’ and even ‘Frexit’ suddenly became buzzwords stirring up panic in European circles over the potential consequences of British departure, with some fearing a domino effect of Member States queuing to leave.[7] In Danish politics, the Brexit process was keenly observed with a view toward treating it as a blueprint for a similar campaign toward a referendum on Danish membership. Perhaps unsurprisingly in hindsight – given the chaos and uncertainty into which Brexit has now devolved – no such referendum took place in Denmark.[8] Neither did a domino effect across the Union unfold, nor in fact have there been serious rumblings since 2017 of Member States gearing up for the level of internal debate that might result in referenda on Union membership.

One might be forgiven, therefore, for believing that the entire Brexit situation was an aberration, whether brought on by the mishandling of the 2016 referendum by the incumbent government or by domestic party politics and internecine warfare within the Conservative Party in the UK; that it was somehow unique to the United Kingdom and the British way of thinking. Whilst it is true that Brexit, as-is, could only have happened in the UK, it is dangerously out of tune with the reality of political sentiment across broad swathes of Europe over the past three years to dismiss the possibility of another membership crisis occurring elsewhere once the chaos of Brexit has diminished and the severity of the situation has faded over time.

Indeed, one of the prime causes of Brexit is a situation that is closely mirrored elsewhere, particularly in the Central European states where Eurosceptic sentiment traditionally runs highest in the Union. The situation is thus: a perceived disconnect from ‘Europe’ – whether by historical and geographical separation, as is the case in the UK, or by linguistic and political history, as is the case in the Central European states – is then galvanised into stronger sentiments by domestic actors scapegoating internal woes, whether economic or societal, upon interference and overbearing legislation by the European Union’s governing institutions. In the United Kingdom and wider Europe this is readily verifiable by the adoption of increasingly right-wing policies and sentiment in both mainstream and fringe political parties.[9] Similarly, the migration crisis of 2015 and the global financial crisis of 2008 both severely damaged European Union integrity in the eyes of relatively new Member States from the Central European region. The ‘Visegrad Four’ – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary – became particularly united on the issue of migration, fiercely resisting the concept of a compulsory EU-wide mechanism for relocating refugees during the peak of the 2015 crisis.[10] Indeed, resistance to quotas seen widely as being imposed by Brussels became a common theme in Central European national political campaigns and contributed greatly to Central European mistrust of the Union’s governing institutions. Euroscepticism remains a common theme in all four Visegrad nations today, although to varying degrees.[11]

However, attempts thus far to counter the spread of Euroscepticism have been strangely slow and apparently poorly formed. It is telling that in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 UK referendum, nationalism, populism and Euroscepticism were instantly lumped together as a global, seemingly unstoppable phenomenon by those scrambling to unpick the situation.[12] This was a mistake, and one that would be repeated elsewhere; the myriad motivations behind Leave voters in the UK, Front National voters in France in 2017 and (more recently) Matteo Salvini supporters in Italy were not adequately dissected, instead being thrown into the same basket, lumping together themes like racism, nationalism, anti-migration rhetoric, anti-corruption and voter dissatisfaction with mainstream political parties under the blanket term ‘populism’, with those who pandered to such tastes labelled demagogues.[13] An opportunity to correct misinformed voters, counter disinformation campaigns and bring the Union closer to its own citizens was lost by the then-centre ground. Instead, such populist movements and their leaders captured great chunks of dissatisfied voters and shifted the balance of power in European politics; a trend that may well be set to continue in the European Parliamentary elections forthcoming in May 2019. Indeed, with the departure of the United Kingdom from the Union, a much more radical shift to the right may be apparent in the composition of the Parliament.

Retaking the Middle Ground

The way in which Eurosceptic views have been handled in the academic and political worlds therefore leaves much to be desired. Within pro-European academia there is a striking tendency to equate Euroscepticism with far-right political tendencies, a susceptibility to misinformation (intentional or accidental) and nationalism and xenophobia. This is often, although not always, mirrored in political expression. Although it has not perhaps become fully apparent, the danger of ‘lumping together’ mild Euroscepticism with hardline nationalism and far-right ideology is significant.

Why? For two reasons – firstly, politically, that it risks polarising the ‘mild’ Eurosceptics further. By being categorised alongside much more extreme viewpoints, those who hold honest and reasonable doubts over Union membership – benefits for citizens, the accountability of its leaders and fair representation in the European institutions – may feel marginalised and quietly cut off from a means of expressing their concerns, and may therefore be driven into greater extremes of dissatisfaction from which they are vulnerable to far-right demagoguery and targeted disinformation campaigns preying upon existing fears. It is therefore not in the Union’s interest to polarise Eurosceptic sentiment further; the fact that it has so far failed to win over much of this ‘middle ground’ of mild Euroscepticism speaks to its failure in marketing itself adequately to its own citizens. It is no surprise that nationalism and populism has surged across Europe, not just the United Kingdom, in recent years.

Secondly, and subsequently, Euroscepticism may be of value to the Union in a way that has not been fully appreciated. Eurosceptic sentiment, properly represented in the European Parliament by elected Members, should represent a check or balance on the Union’s activities, particularly regarding third countries on the fringes of Union membership or on issues splitting opinion, such as the controversial debate over common European defense. On these issues, it is Eurosceptic sentiment that represents a counterbalance to what may be seen as overbearing or hasty Union behaviour either internally or with foreign powers, and – crucially – mild Eurosceptic politicians have historically been outspoken in arguing for the integrity of Member State sovereignty and the preservation of national competencies. Certainly Eurosceptic politicians are not the only ones to speak in favour of preserving national sovereignties; however, by challenging the establishment of the European institutions and presenting the public face for Member State independence, they are uniquely able to appeal to a voter base which might otherwise be absorbed by more extreme political movements. Were the Eurosceptic voice within the European institutions to be better internalised, therefore, and the issues raised by Eurosceptics tackled by more open engagement of the Union with its citizens, the Union would appear more self-aware and better equipped to respond to concerns and fears held by its own citizens and by third countries wavering between closer orientation with the European Union or alignment with other foreign powers.

Therefore, Eurosceptics may, perhaps counter-intuitively, be of value to the European Union’s future. Theirs may be a difficult voice for pro-federalists to hear but it is one that must be heard nonetheless. Ahead of the elections for the European Parliament in May 2019, the political pendulum may be swinging back to the centre ground, but it will be a centre that has shifted far further to the right than ever before. The battle for European hearts and minds, so to speak, is one that will continue long into the future, and if the Union wishes to adequately represent its citizens’ views and maintain the support of its populace it must take a much longer view of its own future. The European Union needs to respect the Eurosceptic voice – but not pander to it – in order to rebalance itself and ensure its survival into the distant future.

Louis Cox-Brusseau is a political analyst focused on the Visegrad Group of countries.

Photo by Klara ovc, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

[1]Laure Neumayer, ‘Euroscepticism in Central Europe’ Central European History and the European Union, January 2007, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304727668_Euroscepticism_in_Central_Europe

[2] Lianna Brinded, ‘Brexit will be the domino effect for more referendums’ Business Insider, May 2016, https://static2.businessinsider.com/ipsos-mori-eu-referendum-poll-brexit-impact-on-more-referendums-2016-5

[3] Centre for European Reform, ‘What is Europe doing to fight disinformation?’, November 2018, https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2018/what-europe-doing-fight-disinformation

[4] BBC News, ‘Migrant crisis: Opponents furious over new quotas’, September 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34331126 and The Federalist,

‘Why The EU’s Court Win Over Migrant Quotas May Be A Pyrrhic Victory’, September 2017, https://thefederalist.com/2017/09/11/eus-court-win-migrant-quotas-may-pyrrhic-victory/

[5] Visegrad Post, ‘Immigration: Merkel Finally Agrees With The Visegrad Group’, Visegrad Post, February 2019, https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/02/08/immigration-merkel-finally-agrees-with-the-visegrad-group/

[6] ‘Standard Eurobarometer 90: Autumn 2018: Public opinion in the European Union’ European Commission November 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2215

[7] Jon Henley, ‘Could Brexit trigger a domino effect in Europe?’ The Guardian, June 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/10/brexit-domino-effect-europe-eu-referendum-uk

[8] The Local, ‘Danish support for EU at record high’ The Local, January 2019, https://www.thelocal.dk/20190104/danish-eu-support-at-record-high-poll

[9] Ashley Kirk, ‘How the rise of the populist far-Right has swept through Europe in 2017’, The Telegraph, October 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2017/10/24/rise-populist-far-right-has-swept-europe-2017/

[10] Aneta Zachová, Edit Zgut, Karolina Zbytniewska, Michał Strzałkowski and Zuzana Gabrizova, ‘Visegrad nations united against mandatory relocation quotas’ Euractiv, July 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/visegrad-nations-united-against-mandatory-relocation-quotas/

[11] Louis-Cox Brusseau, ‘Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic: A Central European disaster waiting to happen, or hot air?’, Global Risk Insights, August 2018, https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/08/euroscepticism-czech-republic-central-european-disaster-waiting-happen-hot-air/

[12] George Friedman, ‘3 Reasons Brits Voted for Brexit’ Forbes, July 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/07/05/3-reasons-brits-voted-for-brexit/

[13] Ian Bremmer, ‘These 5 Countries Show How the European Far-Right Is Growing in Power’, Time Online, September 2018, http://time.com/5395444/europe-far-right-italy-salvini-sweden-france-germany/

Topics

Brexit

Democracy and Elections

EU Reform

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

EU Institutions

United Kingdom

Decentralisation: learning from the Jordanian Experience

Article by Sarah Hayward

March 15, 2019

Decentralisation: learning from the Jordanian Experience

Decentralisation is now a core part of the development agenda. Moving resources and powers to local government and closer to communities is widely regarded as essential, if developing countries – and their citizens – are to grow and prosper. But adopting decentralising policies at a national level and making them work at a local level are two very different things.

Decentralisation is important for a number of reasons. Local government is generally more trusted than central government, in part due to its proximity to the people it serves. Local government can be more immediately accountable. It can also take and then implement decisions more quickly. All this means that compared to national government, local government can have a more profound impact, more quickly, on the people it serves.

But these benefits should not be taken for granted. The approach taken by different actors to devolving power is key to how successful devolution will be. This is particularly the case in places where there is little or no culture of local political activity, responsibility and accountability.

I have spent the last 18 months working in Jordan as part of a team of experts, organised by Global Partners Governance and funded by the UK Embassy in Amman. We have been supporting councillors, who were elected for the first time in August 2017, to embed a new approach to local government. Prior to these elections, local decisions had been taken by centrally appointed officials who were accountable to Amman not local communities. So, decentralisation was a big change with no guaranteed outcomes.

The first stage of our work concluded successfully in the last few weeks, and it’s worth looking back for lessons that others might find useful when shifting powers and resources from central to local government and communities.

Building new governance structures is hard work and takes time, but people are impatient

Politically motivated people want to change things and they are impatient for change. But building a new organisation, purpose or culture from scratch is a painstaking process that takes time.

In any newly decentralised system, expectations will be high: from the national government who decided to devolve powers; from the people who put themselves forward to be elected locally; and from citizens who have invested in a new structure. But it is unlikely that the any new layer of government can start delivering straight away.

This tension was evident in Jordan from the outset. At a very practical level the councillors inherited their first year’s budget from the officials they were elected to replace. They were, rightly, ambitious for the communities they served and what they could achieve. But they felt strongly they didn’t have the right tools to achieve what they wanted to achieve in a short enough time frame. Helping councillors unpack this tension and understand how to prioritise which issues to tackle in which order is key to embedding decentralisation.

Take the time to understand who decentralisation is for.

Decentralisation isn’t just for the people in the place that powers and resources are devolved to. Understanding who benefits (and who might lose) from any shift of power and resources is key to being able to navigate a new system – both in terms of establishing the structure itself and in delivering outcomes for citizens.

Obviously local people and local politicians, as well as businesses, civil society and institutions could gain or lose from decentralisation. At a strategic level the gains and losses can come from whether decentralisation is done “well” or “badly”. But people and organisations will also gain or lose from individual decisions – in many cases quite directly. This can create an internal pressure for new councillors to “do nothing” in the early stages so they can’t be blamed for adverse decisions. This pressure is particularly acute if they don’t feel in control of key elements of the process, like the budget. Part of any decentralisation has to be helping politicians transition from being campaigners or activists demanding action from the outside, to being accountable decision makers on the inside.

There can be winners and losers beyond the locale as well. Most obviously, the government ministers and departments that have championed and implemented decentralisation. They stand to win if it works and lose if it doesn’t. It is vital to understand the dynamics of this in each decentralising context. In practice, this means identifying allies who can help you succeed and opponents who can stop you in your tracks. In Jordan, decentralisation was championed by the king but responsibility for implementing it was spread among four government ministries, with other subject-specific ministries also having an interest. There were a lot of potential winners and losers to navigate and understand.

There is never enough money or resources.

I know from my own experience that no council ever has enough money or the right powers. Every local politician I’ve ever spoken to anywhere in the world has told me the same – and every one of us blames our national governments!

Understanding this “truth” is invaluable for supporting decentralisation.

I lost count of the number of times the councillors we were supporting complained of their lack of money and power. Frequently the complaint was accompanied by the suggestion that maybe they should wait until they get more money and more power before they take any actions to deliver. In a way this isn’t unreasonable. If you’re new to a job and turn up on the first day and think you don’t have the right tools to do it, then you should go and ask for them. That’s how most jobs work.

But that not how politics works. Politics is built on trust and people don’t hand out money or power until they are confident that it will be used well. In Jordan the councillors have a real case – for example, some of the governates are very large and there’s no help for them to travel. The staffing to support their work isn’t really adequate for the power they already have. But in politics you need to persuade and make a case, not just ask and receive.

Think small while aiming big

There are a significant number of obstacles to starting a process of decentralisation. But these challenges should not mask the fact that even with the most meagre set of formal powers and budgets, change can still be made to happen.

One big thing that newly elected councillors have on their side is a mandate. This ‘soft’ power can have effects far beyond any legislative permissions to act that councillors have. But again, it takes time to understand this power, to realise you have it and to learn to use it. This is why we started small, helping the councillors to run a fact-finding inquiry – what the UK system calls a scrutiny inquiry.

The process of running an inquiry allowed councillors to experience first-hand a good range of their soft and hard power without immediately taking decisions that would be contested. The reports from the inquiries have provided evidence-based recommendations for future action and one of the councils has already made changes to its budget as a result.

Moreover, the process helped demonstrate how the soft leadership power that councillors have can make quite big changes from quite small actions. The councillors used the inquiries to convene local groups around areas of interest and to come up with ideas for action that they can deliver together. This stretches resources much further than if the councillors had acted alone.

And, while a number of the recommendations are relatively small or straightforward, they now fit in to a more strategic approach. Once delivered, the smaller actions will help demonstrate to central government that the councillors can use power and resources responsibly and perhaps make the case for more of both. Small steps really can lead to much bigger change.

Some of this may seem obvious to people used to working with established local government. But if decentralised democratic power is completely new, or returning after a long absence, it is less obvious. If you’ve never done something before, how do you know how to do it? Supporting newly established councils with people who’ve been there and done it is powerful, and potentially transformative.

Photo by Richard Taylor/DFID, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

Topics

Civil Society

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Development

International Relations and Geopolitics

Rule of Law

Regions

Hui Muslims in China’s ‘Little Mecca’: Fusing Islamic and Han Practices

Article by Dr Catherine Owen and Syed Ahmad Ali Shah

March 14, 2019

Hui Muslims in China’s ‘Little Mecca’: Fusing Islamic and Han Practices

There has been much discussion in the global media of China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims in its far western province of Xinjiang. Meanwhile, much less is known about the Hui, China’s other major ethnic group that follows Islam, and which enjoys a considerably more peaceful relationship with Beijing. According to the 2010 census, Uighurs and Huis each constitute almost 0.8% of China’s overall population, but while the Uighurs are concentrated mainly in Xinjiang – in some southern areas constituting up to 90% of the population – the Hui are scattered across China. Unlike the Uighurs, who speak their own Turkic language, the Huis’ native language is Mandarin Chinese (with the occasional Persian or Arabic word thrown in). Nevertheless, while Huis are far more integrated into the dominant Han Chinese culture than Uighurs, centres of Hui culture can be found in China’s northwest regions, including in Xinjiang, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Province, the city of Xi’an in Shaanxi Province and Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu Province.

During a recent trip to Linxia, we had the opportunity to meet local Huis and observe their religious practices. We were particularly struck by the way in which their Islamic practices have fused and blended with practices associated with Buddhism and Taoism, two more of China’s five officially recognised religions, primarily associated with the dominant Han ethnicity. Perhaps this goes some way to accounting for the contrasting relationships between the two ethnoreligious Muslim groups and the Chinese government.

While the dominant form of Islam among Uighurs is Sufism, Hui Islam is split into four sects. The most popular sect is the Gedimu (Qadeemiya in Arabic), who constitute around 70% of Hui Muslims, and are the group in which religious syncretic practices are the most obvious. For instance, Gedimu Imams recite the Quran using a Sinfied Arabic dialect of Arabic, often without understanding the meaning of the text.

The second group, the Ikhwani, emerged during the 19^th Century in Linxia; they criticize the Gedimu’s ritualistic approach and emphasise a return to original Quranic meanings. Hence, religious materials in Chinese are available in Ikhwani mosques. Indeed, the only mosques we found with Qurans in Chinese were in those belonging to Ikhwani. During our visits to the various mosques, we found Qurans published in all corners of the Islamic world – Kuwait, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia – though notably none were published inside China.

Thirdly, many Hui follow two globally prevalent traditions of Sufism, also shared by Uighurs: Qadriya and Naqashbandiya. Within Naqashbandiya, two further sub-sects can be discerned – the Hufia and Jehriya, which are specific to Chinese Islam. As one of the birthplaces of Chinese Sufism, Linxia is the centre for both of these subgroups of Naqashbandiya. Finally, a tiny minority of Hui Muslims are Salafis, or Chinese Wahhabis, who follow a Saudi version of Islam.

Thought to descend from Persian and Arabian traders that came to China along the ancient Silk Road, Chinese-speaking Muslims are known as Dungans in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Over the centuries, Hui cultural practices have blended and fused with the dominant Han culture. In Hui cuisine, for instance, Han recipes such as egg and tomato, spicy cabbage and other dishes are readily available, the only difference being that restaurants are certified Halal, which provides a guarantee that pig fat is not used in the preparation of any dishes. The Hui signature dish, Lanzhou beef noodles (named after the provincial capital of Gansu province), can be eaten in Halal canteens across China and is not markedly different from other types of Chinese noodle soup. By contrast, Uighur restaurants serving its Central Asian cuisine such as the rice and lamb dish, ‘polo’, and round nan breads are extremely rare sight outside of Xinjiang.

Hui women generally, but not always, wear headscarves, with different sects wearing different types. Ikhwani women can be distinguished via the headscarf popular among Western Muslims; Gedimu women tend to wear a hat with a light cloth attached to the back and bottom. Hui men wear three types of round hat, although these are not distinguishable according to sect. Chatting to local Huis, everyone we met had their Chinese name and their informal Muslim name, introducing themselves by their Chinese name, but giving their Muslim name – usually Sinifications of Mariam, Aishah, Bilal or Ibrahim – when we asked them. Hence, Hui practices of Islam, though subtle, are evident if you scratch away the veneer of Han culture.

Thanks to the number of mosques and Sufi shrines in the city, Linxia has gained the moniker of ‘Little Mecca’ among Muslims in China. It is easy to see why – the city’s skyline is scattered with domes, minarets and cupolas, an astonishing sight in a predominantly atheist country. Hui Mosques and Sufi shrines are an interesting blend of Islamic symbolism and Han architecture. Ikhwani and Salafi mosques are usually built with domes and minarets, while Gedimu and Sufi mosques tend to follow the Chinese architecture. Usually just one story high, they have Chinese-style minarets that resemble pagodas: circular structures with the characteristic Chinese upturned eaves. Since it is difficult to distinguish between Buddhist temples and mosques, Gedimu and Sufis attach a crescent moon to the top of the building. The spatial design inside the mosques is broadly similar to mosques elsewhere, comprising a large area for worshippers to kneel, and a place at the front for the Imam to preach.

As the centre of Sufism in China, myriad Sufi shrines are scattered across Linxia and into the adjoining mountains. Known in Chinese as ‘gongbei’, a Sinification of the Persian term ‘gunbed’, the shines are graves belonging to great Sheikhs and Imams, many of whose lineage can be traced back to Muhammed. Indeed, legend has it that the 29^th generation descendent of Muhammed, Khawja Abdullah, introduced Sufism to China at the end of the Qing and beginning of the Ming Dynasty, and is buried at a shrine in north Sichuan Province.

Unlike Uighur Sufism, Hui Qadriyan Sufis have incorporated Buddhist and Taoist practices into rituals at their shrines, and are hence particularly interesting from a religious syncretic perspective. For instance, worshipers and pilgrims burn papers and light incense at the entrance to the shrine, practices which are not mentioned anywhere in the Quran. Similarly, the Chinese characters indicating the name of the shrine are often written from right to left, following Arabic writing tradition, instead of left to right.

Debates among the anthropologists of Hui consider the question of whether the Hui are ‘Muslims in China’ or ‘Chinese Muslims’ – in other words, to what extent have they become embedded with the broader Han culture. The level of Chinese cultural practices exhibited by the Hui suggest to us that unlike the Uighurs the Hui are indeed Chinese Muslims. However, just a small scratch at the surface of Hui culture reveals a complex, vibrant and meaningful Islamic tradition.

Of course, the most important factor in the troubled relationship between Xinjiang’s Uighurs and the central government concerns the region’s dense Uighur population and consequent concerns regarding separatism. Scattered across China, the Hui have no pretensions towards separatism. Yet, another important reason why Hui Muslims have managed to exist more harmoniously within China’s atheist state is the way in which they have Sinified Islam. Our visit to Linxia revealed to us the numerous ways in which these two very different cultural worlds have fused together.

Catherine Owen is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Exeter and a FPC Research Fellow; Syed Ahmad Ali Shah is completing his PhD on Pakistanis in China at Shaanxi Normal University, and is about to begin a book project on Hui Muslims in China.

Topics

Civil Society

Freedom of Religion

Human Rights

Minority Rights

Regions

Asia

East Asia

The state of Islamic threat in Central Asia: assessing the threat of terrorism from Central Asia

Article by Dr Saipira Furstenberg

March 11, 2019

The state of Islamic threat in Central Asia: assessing the threat of terrorism from Central Asia

As Islamic State faces its demise as a territorial unit in the Middle East it is worth considering why it was so attractive to so many Central Asians

The spate of attacks by Central Asians overseas in 2017 and the spectre of ISIS emerging in the region after the attack on four foreign cyclists in Tajikistan in July 2018, have generated alarm about Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) and other jihadist groups in a region with historically very low levels of terrorist attacks. Analysts have sought to identify ‘root causes’ in the region such as the rise of radical or non-traditional Islam, increasing poverty since the end of the Soviet Union coupled with domestic authoritarianism and repression. However, such observations although important need be to unpacked as the reality is more complex.

Conditions for radicalization: routes not roots

A report from the International Crisis Group in 2015 argued that state repression alongside poverty leads to radicalisation.[1] While these factors may offer a foil for explaining why many of Central Asia’s extremists have left the region for Iraq and Syria, they fail to take into account a range of other conditions that explain radicalisation, both psychological and social.

Assessing the psychological processes of the individual might help to shed light on their motivations to terrorist involvements. As seen in the terror attacks in Stockholm and New York, the perpetrators left the country a decade ago.[2] None of them showed tendencies towards extremist or religious behaviours in their home countries. It appears, instead, that they developed such views whilst being abroad. Available research suggests that the large majority of fighters who decide to travel to Syria are labour migrants in Russia and have often been recruited by Chechens in Moscow.[3]

This means that we need to look beyond domestic political and economic grievances and look more in-depth into the personal stories of the individuals to understand why Central Asians become terrorists. In Central Asia local and regional identities are more important than national identities. As pointed out by many experts such as Ed Lemon and Noah Tucker, when individuals leave their local communities to travel to Russia for work purposes, they are often cut-off from their familiar communities and network. Disassociated to some degree from home their transcendent identity as Muslims comes to the fore,[4] and may be hardened by the experience of discrimination.[5]

When Central Asian migrants move to Russia, they are often faced with socio-economic struggles such as poor living conditions, exploitation, uncertainty regarding their documentation, and physical and racial abuse. Faced with these difficulties, some individuals experience personal crisis and are drawn to the margins of society, becoming more vulnerable to the external influences of terrorist recruiters. Extremist groups recognised this opportunity. As Noah Tuckers highlights, ‘it is clear that both AQ-affiliated groups and ISIS devoted specific recruiting resources to ethnic Uzbeks working in Russia, both online and in real life’.

The role of Islam: more complex than one might think

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 hugely accelerated an ongoing process of the revival of Islam in the region. The reinvention and restriction of Islam in the late Soviet period, also meant that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the level of Islamic literacy in the region was very low. The switch from Arabic script in 1926 made Central Asian scholars lose their ability to read the Arabic religious scripts and isolated the region from the Muslim world.

The rebirth of Islam in the region offers new opportunities, but also creates new risks. The new connections with the Islamic world brought more extreme interpretations of the faith from abroad, such as Salafism from the Middle East and the North Caucasus. Moreover, Islam has often been viewed as an important social mobilising force challenging the region’s authoritarian leadership. In this regard, radical Islamist activism is perceived as a serious threat to the internal stability of these countries and to the survival of Central Asian secular regimes.

The Soviet legacy of atheism means that the new generation of Central Asians didn’t grow up with strong religious traditional education that could form a counterweight to extremism. Yet as argued by Heathershaw and Montgomery there is little evidence that socially conservative Muslims are more likely to be politically radical than more secularised Muslims.[6] As the profile of Akbarjon Jalilov, the suspect in the St Petersburg terrorist attack demonstrates, few Central Asian terrorists are pious or followed a religious education. Most of the Central Asian perpetrators adopted religion (discovered Islam) while being abroad often in a very short period of time.

Such observations point out that religion perhaps has little to do with the suicidal attacks but rather is the specific narrative framework within which the recruits could identify and fulfil their aspirations that matter. In this sense, as observed by Oliver Roy, while reflecting in the case of the European jihadists recruits to Islamic State, ‘terrorism does not arise from the radicalisation of Islam, but from the Islamisation of radicalisation’, religious ideology plays very little role here.[7]

The response from state authorities: potential cure or proximate cause?

In response to terrorist threats, Central Asian governments adopted a series of counterterrorism programs and laws to combat terrorism and religious extremism, often curtailing human rights and the rule of law. Central Asian governments have also been taking advantage of the perceived security threats posed by Muslim radicals to enforce repressive policies domestically. States have repeatedly played the ‘Islamic terrorism’ card to reinforce and legitimate their repressive measures against actors presumed to be a terrorist menace.

In Tajikistan the regime banned the only legal Islamic political party (IRPT), in Central Asia in September 2015, naming them as a ‘terrorist organization’. Similarly, in Kazakhstan the regime has designated Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, a political opposition movement led by former regime insider, Mukhtar Ablyazov, as an extremist organization.[8] Further as the Central Asia Political Exiles Database demonstrates, the regimes target political enemies by labelling them as ‘terrorists’.[9] A similar rationale is applied in the regime’s abuse of the Interpol’s notice system to persecute national human rights defenders, moderate Islamic believers, civil society activists and critical journalists.

Under the pretext of religious extremism, states have further portrayed violence linked to local political struggles as ‘terrorists’ attacks. The incidents in Aktobe, in the Western oil rich part of Kazakhstan in 2011 and 2016 have revealed the rising socioeconomic grievances among the population against the government.[10]Both incidents targeted law enforcement agencies. As the incidents demonstrate, the government’s failure to respond to political and economic injustices have affected citizens’ inclination to commit violent acts as protests against the government’s policies. The START Database further validates these observations.[11] As the data below illustrates, most of the attacks in Central Asia are targeting government and law enforcement agencies.

START Database 2000-2017 Central Asian Terrorist target attacks (%)[12 ]

The terrorist threat in Central Asia needs to be taken seriously and demands broader engagement in the region. However, as the article illustrates, in Central Asia the ‘threat’ has often been manipulated and exaggerated by state actors to pursue strategic domestic policies and increase regime’s legitimacy. We need to reflect more in-depth on the contested and political nature of terrorism in Central Asia.

[1] International Crisis Group, Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia, January 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/syria-calling-radicalisation-central-asia

[2] David Gauthier-Villars and Drew Hinshaw, Stockholm Attack Puts Focus on Terrorists From Central Asia, Wall Street Journal, April 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/stockholm-attack-puts-focus-on-terrorists-from-central-asia-1491764083 and BBC, New York truck attack: Sayfullo Saipov pleads not guilty, November 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42161549?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cggpe1p9dwqt/new-york-truck-attack&link_location=live-reporting-story

[3] Daniil Turovsky, How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria, Guardian, May 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-extremism

[4] Noah Tucker, What Happens When Your Town Becomes an ISIS Recruiting Ground?, Central Asia Program, July 2018, http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Tucker-CAP-Paper-July-2018.pdf

[5] Arne Seifert, The problems of Central Asian migration to Russia, January 2018, https://doc-research.org/2018/01/the-problems-of-central-asian-migration-to-russia/

[6] John Heathershaw and David W Montgomery, The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics, Chatham House, November 2014, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/myth-post-soviet-muslim-radicalization-central-asian-republics

[7] Olivier Roy, Who are the new jihadis?, The Guardian, April 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis

[8] Eurasianet, Kazakhstan: Court Dubs Opposition Movement Extremist, March 2013, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-court-dubs-opposition-movement-extremist

[9] For more on the Central Asian Political Exiles Database see here: https://excas.net/projects/political-exiles/

[10] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 – Kazakhstan, July 2017, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e43413.html

[11] The Global Terrorism Database (START) https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

[12] Based on author’s own calculation

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Rethinking Refugee Support: Responding to the Crisis in South East Europe

Article by Dr Gemma Bird, Dr Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, Dr Amanda Russell Beattie, Dr Patrycja Rozbicka

February 22, 2019

Rethinking Refugee Support: Responding to the Crisis in South East Europe

This report finds that recent changes in EU border management have limited refugees’ movement across Europe, and as such, have resulted in outsourcing of refugee settlement and care to states previously described as ‘transit’ countries along the Balkan Route(s): Serbia, Greece and Bosnia. This report analyses the problems related to refugee provisions and accommodation in these countries and along the Balkan Route(s) towards Western Europe. It highlights the disparity of refugee services, housing and living conditions across the region, and acute and ongoing humanitarian crises. The report discusses the key factors affecting poor living conditions for refugees, including: overcrowding, fragmentation of services along the routes, and a lack of consistency in camp management. Subsequently, the report discusses a range of other refugee housing options existing in transit countries – including informal and makeshift camps, squats, hotels and UN-supported housing schemes known as ‘urban shelters’ – and notes the strengths and weaknesses of each. The findings are based on the authors’ field research in Serbia, mainland Greece and the islands of Lesvos, Samos, Chios and Kos, between 2017 and 2019.

A number of key conclusions can be drawn from the report:

(1) Population size and levels of overcrowding are one of the fundamental factors affecting provisions and quality of life in all types of refugee housing. Mainland camps and informal housing provision such as squats, are able to control the number of residents they have whereas island reception centres have far less control.

(2) Relationships between camps, reception centres and third sector provision plays a key role in determining access to healthcare, sanitation, psycho-social support and community spaces and whether these are provided inside or outside of accommodation spaces.

(3) Lack of clarity and transparency surrounding asylum procedures leads to increased anxiety about the process.

(4) Different forms of housing support are dependent on individual circumstances; however, provision lacks flexibility, particularly surrounding vulnerable cases where a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not suitable.

(5) Refugees are driven towards informal housing such as squats and makeshift settlements for two main reasons: poor camp conditions or overcrowding, and uncertainty over the asylum process, including long waits for asylum interviews in Greece.

(6) There is a lack of formal support for people living in informal accommodation, particularly healthcare, food and sanitation.

The report makes a number of recommendations for policy change:

(1) The urgent need to manage the numbers of people living in the island reception centres, by increasing the number of transfers to mainland Greece or elsewhere in Europe; and improving mainland living conditions and provision.

(2) The need for greater transparency and increased dialogue between some reception centres and third sector provision.

(3) Urgent increase in capacity to process asylum registrations in Greece and thus reduce current waiting times and overcrowding in reception centres. More, and better quality of information provided to refugees in the early stages of the asylum process, about each stage, predicted waiting times and what each stage means; to reduce anxiety for people living in reception centres.

(4) Greater flexibility is required in the provision of housing, especially for vulnerable cases where the needs of individuals differ greatly. To achieve this greater resource is required.

(5) Increased funding and support for the UN ‘Urban Shelter’ scheme which transfers refugees from camps and settles them in apartments. Increased capacity of non-camp housing, and creation of incentives for local authorities reluctant to cooperate with the scheme.

Introduction

This report focuses on refugee housing and welfare provision along the key hotspots along the Balkan Route(s). The report draws on field research[1] carried out between 2017 and 2019 in:

Belgrade
Thessaloniki
Athens
The Aegean Islands:
- Lesvos
- Chios
- Samos
- Kos

The report assesses the current welfare and housing provision for refugees in this geographical region, analysing the strengths and weaknesses of both formal (municipality, state and international) and informal (NGO and informal collectives) provision and highlighting key areas for improvement. It also makes reference to funding usage and the gaps in the system (including, but not exclusively: treatment of vulnerable people and minors). It is broken down into four key themes to highlight specific areas of concern in the region:

The disparity of refugee accommodation and provision along the route
The limited continuity of provision and availability of information between geographical regions
Squats, informal housing, and makeshift camps
‘Urban shelters’ and apartments

Each area is further broken down into three sections. First, a problem is identified and described. The problem is then situated in the findings. Finally, a recommendation is given.

This report is based on the work of four researchers:

Dr Amanda Russell Beattie (Aston University)
Dr Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik (Aston University)
Dr Patrycja Rozbicka (Aston University)
Dr Gemma Bird (The University of Liverpool).

The report’s findings are based on primary research including: interviews with NGOs and their beneficiaries, European Union officials, local and national government staff dealing with migration (Serbia, Greece), informal and formal housing providers, social workers, housing officers, aid organisations (MSF and UNHCR), as well as insights gained from longer periods of time spent in the region working with the third sector.

The disparity in accommodation and service quality across transit regions

The main differences in reception centre or camp conditions are caused by 4 identifiable variables:

Camp management
The physical space repurposed into a camp
Population size relative to number of spaces available
Presence of third-sector providers

Type of Space

The conditions in Reception Centres (RICs) on the islands of Lesvos, Chios and Samos vary considerably from the rest of the region. All three reception centres visited are re-purposed military bases and struggle to adequately deal with the current influx of refugees. A majority of the RICs are overcrowded with a disproportional number of refugees living outside the Centre’s delimited borders. The ad hoc accommodation is provided in containers, tents, and makeshift shelters, which are not suitable for the local weather conditions (too hot in summer and not providing enough protection from the cold and rain in winter). They are permeable and rain, snow, and vermin easily penetrate the fabric of the makeshift homes.

For example, on the island of Samos, there are currently (January 2019) over 4000 refugees accommodated in Vathy RIC with an official capacity of 700 and an overflow space referred to as ‘The Jungle’. Similarly, on Lesvos Moria RIC which has its own overflow space, ‘The Olive Grove’. In July 2017, the population of the RIC plus the ‘Olive Grove’ was approximately 7467 individuals, rising to 9000 in 2018 (New York Times, 2018). In January 2019 a single tent, housing 50 individuals, burnt down. While no one was killed in this incident it did reveal the unsuitable nature of the ad hoc shelters resulting from overcrowding (AYS Daily Digest 2019).

Third Sector Provision/Support

The support offered by the third sector differs between the various areas investigated, as does the relationships between camp or reception centre officials, local and national government, and third sector providers. For instance, MSF had a strong presence on Lesvos and Chios. In November 2018 they undertook a vaccination program for all children in the RICs. However, their involvement on Samos is limited as they are unable to carry out these programmes inside the RIC. Whilst the vaccination programme will go ahead it happens outside of the RIC on Samos. Their lack of access to the RIC limits them to working with and supporting volunteer networks and providing funding to smaller grassroots NGOs.

The variations in service availability and quality is evident when comparing Lesvos and Samos. There are more than 40 NGOs working on Lesvos to support the refugee population with some having access to Moria RIC and others working in the neighbouring town of Mytilene and with nearby Kera Tepe and Pikpa camps. Conversely, on Samos, there were until recently fewer than 10 registered NGOs. Against a backdrop of a rapid increase in the size of the refugee population on Samos and a clear need for additional support for provision of basic needs and services (i.e. access to toilets, medical attention, laundry and legal support) this number is increasing. For example, between 2 January – 24 January 2019 the NGO Refugees 4 Refugees set up a distribution centre for women and children while Attika Human Support began distributing clothing to men.

Similar variations in NGOs’ access to official camps exist across the Balkan Route(s). Two official reception centres in the vicinity of Belgrade have completely different arrangements with NGOs. Whilst the Krnjaca Reception Centre hosts multiple local and international NGOs providing a range of services, the Obrenovac Reception Centre with a much larger population, allows access to far fewer NGOs. Authorities claim that access is controlled so as to avoid duplication of services. However, NGOs do also act as watchdogs of camp conditions. Across the region, there is evidence that third party access seems to be more restricted in camps known for poorer conditions.

NGOs need to remain flexible and responsive to changing needs. NGO Samos Volunteers, for instance, is facing over-crowding in its social centre and their basic English language classes have waiting lists. They are not granted access to the RIC. They support the refugee population within ‘The Jungle’. Interviews with Reception and Identification Service officials suggest the reticence for a strong working relationship with NGOs is to ensure that the refugee population are not provided with false hopes from the NGO/volunteer sector about the asylum process. Yet this message is not consistent with those of refugee camps in Athens, for example, which rely on NGO support to deliver mother and baby spaces, community centres, sewing rooms and English lessons.

NGO and support networks are in constant flux, partly as they rely on volunteers. For instance, in July 2018, the voluntary support network on Kos had disintegrated. In January 2019, a number of NGOs including groups from Chios, Lesvos and even further afield in Calais, have put out calls for additional volunteers, since refugees continue to arrive but organisations tend to be understaffed in winter and spring, with most volunteers arriving in the summer.

Population Size

There are significant differences in living conditions in overcrowded camps, as compared to those functioning at or below capacity. Skaramagas, a refugee camp just outside Athens, and the Krnjaca centre in Serbia are seen by residents and NGOs as ‘better’ than many other camps. In Skaramagas, the containers used for the accommodation have heating and air conditioning and the camp offers a range of support and activities, such as mother and baby sessions. The residents are also able to build chicken coops and sell eggs in the camp. The camp has a population of 2000 with around half being under 18. Similarly, the Krnjaca centre outside Belgrade hosted 300 people in 2018, though it has capacity for around 1000 people. This allows minimum camp standards to be met, services not to be overloaded and stretched, and staff to get know most of the residents personally and respond to issues in a timely and more informed manner. The lower populations of camps in Serbia and mainland Greece are often the result of border management policies which mean that fewer people are managing to leave the islands (whilst arrivals continue) and move northwards, as well as through constant changes in the route. The Krnjaca camp ‘emptied’ as the route moved towards Bosnia. Whilst the Krnjaca camp is under capacity, several thousand people are now living in makeshift camps in Bosnia, particularly around the Croatian border.

RECOMMENDATION: Alleviate overcrowding of island camps by increasing transfers to the mainland. Improve all camp conditions to ensure that minimum standards can be met.

The limited continuity of provision and availability of information between geographical regions

Management of refugee camps and reception centres

One of the most significant factors in camp conditions is management. There is a multitude of actors involved: including the military, private sector companies and municipalities, with overall responsibility for camps as a system delegated to relevant national Ministries. The Moria reception centre is run by the First Reception and Identification Services and the Ministry of Migration Policy. The nearby, Kara Tepe, is a refugee camp housing women, children, and vulnerable people, and is run by the Municipality of Lesvos. Pikpa, a ‘community-based space’, is organised by Lesvos Solidarity and offers an alternative to RIC’s and refugee camps. It is built on the principles of solidarity, empowerment and active participation and provides a variety of activities for residents. Both Pikpa and Kera Tepe are widely thought to offer superior forms of accommodation and support in comparison to the far more overcrowded Moria.

Who runs the camp has a direct impact on the lines of communication within the structure itself. Interviews with RIC officials discussed the confusion of the population surrounding their roles: they manage and are the outward facing representative, of the reception centre, but are also viewed by residents as representing the Asylum Services and the Ministry of Migration. Yet they are unable to communicate the decisions of these bodies and have little impact on them. Consequently, there is confusion on the part of the refugee population stemming from inconsistent information, case scheduling and outcomes, the awarding of open cards, and the cancelling of meetings. This in turn, has contributed to a lack of transparency and accountability within the spaces governed by First Reception.

Limited Lines of Communication

There is a lack of effective and efficient communication within and between governing bodies themselves, between governing bodies and NGOs, as well as NGOs and the wider third sector, and, importantly, to the refugee population, particularly on the islands of Lesvos Chios and Samos. This has consequences for the delivery of refugee support.

Refugees are in a precarious position when waiting for a decision to be reached about their ‘open card’ (document allowing travel off of the island hot spots). In the first instance they are informed that their papers are ineligible for renewal. This means one of two things, a rejection or an open card. The time period for confirmation is variable and generates a high level of uncertainty and fear for those awaiting a decision. A quicker process and clearer information would reduce anxiety.

Once an individual is given an open card, there are also concerns about what happens next. Whilst NGO’s such as refugee.info provide certain amounts of information to populations, they are often underserved by UNHCR and First Reception with regards to information sharing. The time and location of the transfer from the RICs are provided but little else. Refugees rely on social media and formal and informal online resources to learn details of their next location.

There is a heavy reliance on rumours and often unreliable information, compounded by inconsistencies in rules of accommodation in different regions. People given a space in mainland Greek camps lose the space if absent for twenty four hours or more. This is less the case in Serbia where it appears that camp residents do not lose their allocated place due to absence (usually attempts to cross borders) even though rules stipulate this should be done. This is again due to under-capacity, but does have a stabilising effect in that refugees are not left destitute and in a precarious situation once they fail to cross borders and return to Serbia.

Unaccompanied minors

A lack of consistent information has a particular effect on unaccompanied minors (UAM), who grow accustomed to the independence of the RICs. Unaccompanied minors leaving the Aegean Islands are given limited information about the next stages of their journey, other than from third sector organisations. As a result many find themselves leaving the NGO support network of the islands and entering major cities of Athens or Thessaloniki with a limited support package in place. Housing provision for UAMs on the mainland relies on a UNHCR system of shelters and apartments run on the ground by a number of different organisations including Caritas and Praksis; partially funded by the European Union. The influence of multiple organisations means that UAMs often fall through the gaps of a heavily bureaucratic system finding themselves, as interviews suggest, struggling with drugs, prostitution and crime. As of December 2018 there were 552 unaccompanied minors reported as homeless in Greece and a further 203 with no reported location, this is a large percentage of 3741 currently known to be in Greece (EKKA, 2018).

In contrast, in Serbia, UAMs have more stable and regular access to a dedicated social worker than in Greece, even when they arrive into Serbia ‘irregularly’. For instance, the NGO network in Belgrade is able to quickly identify and meet UAMs soon after they arrive, and refer them to social workers contracted specifically for UAM protection, who then see them through the registration ad settlement into a centre. Again, the system works better than in Greece due to smaller numbers but even so, there are gaps in UAM protection (particularly outside of ‘office hours’) and each social worker has a high case load.

RECOMMENDATION: Clearer information provided to those seeking asylum. A transparent system for how to communicate and ask for support from officials to better understand the process.

Squats, informal housing, and makeshift camps

Large numbers of refugees have ended up in informal housing and makeshift camps. Reasons include, but are not limited to: poor camp conditions, difficulty accessing camps, not wishing to register in a transit country, or transiting a country without a functional or adequate camp infrastructure (currently, Bosnia, but also Serbia and Greece in 2015).

Informal housing includes squats (occupied or repurposed derelict buildings, often supported by grassroots networks) and makeshift camps and ‘tent cities’ often along country borders. Informal housing sets up more quickly than formal camps or other NGO initiatives, all of which are subject to multiple levels of regulation and governance. Most makeshift camps and settlements have no facilities and rely on volunteers for basic services, but in some cases, local authorities indirectly support them through a lack of intervention or providing additional services such as waste disposal.

Informal housing allows a degree of flexibility, but there are limitations. Despite some informal housing being relatively well established and tolerated by the authorities particularly in Athens, some services (healthcare, tax) do not accept squat addresses as a ‘proper’ address for registration and access to that service. Residents of squats also have no access to services that refugees would normally have when they are registered with the asylum service, such as financial support for food. Conditions in squats vary but many urban squats have sewage, heating or structural problems, and rely on volunteers or residents with carpentry or plumbing skills to resolve them.

Photo ‘Informal Housing’ here, caption: Informal refugee housing (squat) in central Athens.

Makeshift camps often form out of necessity, but are inadequate. Multiple makeshift camps have formed along the Balkan Route(s) as the route shifted – Idomeni in Greece, camps along the Serbia-Hungary border, and more recently, along the Bosnia-Croatia border. The makeshift camps generally have no running water or electricity, nor adequate shelter, food, waste disposal or facilities of any kind other than aid provided by small volunteer groups – local and national governments tend to discourage aid provision on these sites as they claim it creates a ‘pull factor’. Multiple problems exist: smugglers can sometimes ‘seize’ a makeshift camp, or a part of it, and ‘rent’ it out to refugees. Poor or non-existent infrastructure make it difficult for volunteers to provide services such as hot food, and individuals helping near the sites are criminalised or penalised by local authorities.

Makeshift camps and ad hoc informal support (whether organised by refugees themselves or aid providers) are vulnerable as they are ‘unregulated’ or informal. Authorities can invoke any number of regulations to shut them down: evictions, sanitation inspections, or ad hoc restrictions on volunteers. Restrictions on aid near informal sites are also linked to EU funding: for local authorities in transit countries, funding is channelled primarily to camps, border management and the formal sector, meaning that thousands of refugees living informally outside of it, are entirely reliant on volunteer and NGO aid.

RECOMMENDATION: Recognition of residents of informal spaces when registering for healthcare provision and refugee support. Greater support for NGOs and services they provide in informal housing.

‘Urban shelters’ and apartments

The UNHCR ESTIA programme (Emergency Support To Integration and Accommodation) managed to relocate around 27,000 vulnerable people (as of 31^st December 2018)[2] from camps in to ‘urban shelters’: apartments that are not only located in cities, but also in some rural areas and islands such as Crete. The programme is run a cooperation between UNHCR, municipalities and third sector providers – the overall responsibility is now being transferred to the Greek national authorities.

Once refugees are identified as vulnerable and relocated out of a camp to an apartment, they are assigned a team which includes a social worker, housing officer and translator, and from whom they receive regular visits. The team meets with residents in their home and helps with issues like liaising with landlords or referring residents to relevant services. Each social worker is assigned a group of apartments/cases to look after and they work exclusively in the ESTIA context (not local social services more generally), meaning that they often get to know individual residents well and can respond to their needs.

Whilst some parts of the scheme work well – apartments are well provisioned, for instance, and the social workers are well trained and responsive – there are issues, however, mostly related to resources.

Not all refugees can be relocated out of camps into apartments as there is no capacity for this. There are not enough suitable apartments as not all municipalities in a city sign up to the scheme, or support it. The limited resources also mean that normally, two families or groups of single men/women, have to share a single apartment.
Apartment sharing has proven at times to be problematic when cohabitants are torture victims, traumatised or have psychiatric issues.
Currently the scheme is open only to vulnerable people. UNHCR and camp managers identify who is ‘vulnerable enough’ to be transferred. Consequently the system puts large responsibility on the camp managers who are not always engaged and/or fully aware of individual situations (especially in large, overcrowded camps).

The apartment scheme highlights the complex needs of vulnerable populations. Gathered evidence concludes that this system can only work if it is well resourced and thus able to find appropriate apartments and provide ongoing psychosocial support.

RECOMMENDATION: Increased resource and flexibility in support packages provided by ESTIA programme. Implementation of the scheme across transit countries.

Conclusions

(3) Lack of clarity and transparency surrounding asylum procedures leads to increased anxiety about the process.

(6) There is a lack of formal support for people living in informal accommodation, particularly healthcare, food and sanitation.

Authors:

Gemma Bird, Lecturer in politics and International Relations at The University of Liverpool.

Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Aston University, Birmingham.

Amanda Russell Beattie, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham.

Patrycja Rozbicka, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham.

The report is a part of the authors’ larger project, IR Aesthetics, @IR_Aesthetics, which focuses on refugee journeys across the Balkan Route.

This report is based on primary research carried out by the authors, and funded by the Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University, and a University of Liverpool Early Career Researcher Grant.

[1] Funding for this research has been provided by the Aston Centre for Europe and a University of Liverpool Early Career Researcher Grant (https://www2.aston.ac.uk/lss/research/lss-research/aston-centre-europe/index).

[2] http://estia.unhcr.gr/en/home/

Topics

Asylum and Extradition

Conflict Resolution and Security

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Europe

Greece

The Balkans

Understanding the Romanian Diaspora

Article by Andra-Lucia Martinescu and Rares Burlacu

February 21, 2019

Diasporas have been researched extensively, in both current and historical contexts. This essay is the first in a series that aims to deliver a fresh perspective by focusing on the complex relationship between homelands and diaspora communities. Bureaucratic and institutional practices in the home country have shaped to certain degrees, at times considerably, how diaspora communities interact, associate and organise themselves abroad. In particular, by examining the Romanian diaspora we can glimpse into larger issues of governance and more specifically, into Romania’s fight against corruption.

For over a decade now, the authors of this study have been part of an expansive diaspora. And whilst fully integrated in the societies that have welcomed us and made use of our expertise, we remained committed to bringing about positive change in our home-country. This is precisely what motivated our current project, which explores in-depth how diaspora communities interact, between themselves, with home and/or host country public institutions as well as other entities (i.e. civil society, media and businesses). Moreover, this networked approach (employing Social Network Analysis methodology) helped us visualise the impact and geographical scope of diaspora initiatives worldwide. We believe such an endeavour is relevant in the context of evidence-based policy-making, in both the homeland and countries of residence. By mapping the associative models of diaspora communities, the principles and motivations for their organisation, as well as the scope of their initiatives, the analysis places diasporas at the confluence between the homeland and their host societies. Diasporas should be viewed as a strategic resource, uniquely positioned to benefit from the ever-expanding geographies of interconnectivity, and thus capable of advancing the nation-states’ resources and foreign policy interests, at a transnational level.

This introductory brief examines the Romanian diaspora in light of the more recent political events and the widespread civic mobilisation, which demonstrates a shifting diasporic identity. The study also explores the response of home country institutions and the different strategies of engagement that shape diaspora involvement in policy and decision-making processes at home and abroad. We also focus on the Romanian institutions’ perception of diaspora issues and identity, by examining the strategies and state-sponsorship of diaspora organisations. We argue that civic activism is gradually becoming an organising principle for Romanians abroad, largely in response to the political turmoil affecting the home country.

The Romanian Diaspora. Aspects of civic mobilisation and political activism

Civic mobilisation has been commensurate with a collective perception of the importance of particular issues. In other words, what takes precedence in a nation’s consciousness that makes civic and political activism possible? In the case of Romanians living and working abroad, the fight against corruption at large, or against the constant political meddling in the justice system, has bolstered public dissent and led to widespread civic mobilisation. The impulse to emigrate in the first place is also attributed to the precariousness of home country politics – a lack of stability, of prospects or economic security. Such dynamics are interwoven. On the one hand, Romanians emigrate in search of a stable future, but in most cases, they remain attuned to homeland politics. On the other hand, and quite paradoxically, it has been the same protracted uncertainty of home country politics, public mistrust in institutions, and the past experience of communist dictatorship that made Romanians abroad weary of political involvement and active participation in their host societies.

On the 10^th of August 2018, diaspora communities organised an anti-corruption protest in Bucharest. Participation was wide and not limited to the diaspora: public intellectuals, members of the opposition, civil society organisations, Romanian citizens at large congregated in Victoria Square (where the Romanian Government is headquartered) to voice dissent against a regime that is perceived to encroach on democratic values, particularly the rule of law. The protest made international headlines also in light of the repressive use of force deployed by security forces (the Gendarmerie) to disperse the crowds. The continued lack of accountability for the events that unfolded on the 10^th of August infuriated the court of public opinion, both Romanian and European.

The anatomy of this protest is particularly interesting because it indicates a convergence of interests: Romanians in the home country and those abroad hold similar grievances with regard to Romania’s political trajectory. Moreover, the protest and the exposure it received acted to internationalise home country politics. Those who could not mobilise in Bucharest assembled in European capitals in solidarity with the movement at home. We witness a complex dynamic by which diaspora communities export the sets of communitarian values and good governance principles internalised in host societies back into the home country. Thus, a system of political and civic expectations emerges, at a transnational level. Of course, this is not to idealise host societies in their entirety, but rather to emphasise the context of reflexivity, which diaspora communities experience through livelihoods in more developed societies. Invariably, a comparison is drawn in relation to the homeland and the perceived vulnerabilities or disparities (social, economic, political) that drove the decision to emigrate in the first place. Home politics are therefore internalised, stimulated and reshaped through these new experiences and the perpetual aspirations that arise through migration.[1]

Homeland Institutions and the Romanian Diaspora

Although the mobilisation of Romanians abroad has been significant, particularly in response to the fight against corruption back at home, transnational initiatives^[2] stemming from diaspora organisations are relatively modest. In the same vein, political activism remains sporadic, construed as a reaction to political events in the homeland. Our analysis indicates that diaspora associations are less prone to cooperate, partly due to their limited organisational capacity, and lack of online visibility. To a certain extent, the same mistrust in institutions translates into apathy when it comes to formal organisation. In explaining the weak transnational impact of diaspora initiatives, institutional attitudes towards Romanians abroad, are perhaps the most relevant. The various but largely ineffective engagement policies are characterised by a lack of evidence and publicly available information on the Romanian diaspora. Upon embarking on this research project we became aware of such caveats, particularly the institutional urgency to produce new strategies in absence of an informed basis.

Despite having an institutional framework in place, with a Ministry for Romanians Abroad, Presidential Advisors, as well as substantial European funding available for diaspora associations abroad, little has been achieved in terms of addressing this persistent knowledge gap. Moreover, engagement with the diaspora so far mirrored the patronage practices that largely characterise Romanian politics. Funding allocation, administered by the Ministry for Romanians Abroad has often lacked transparency and failed to address the most pressing issues facing communities abroad and the domestic effects of continued migration. We partly attributed this to a persistent cognitive dissonance in how the Romanian diaspora is perceived inside the very institutions that seek to represent its interests.

Another issue pertaining to institutional attitudes is that diaspora communities are pre-eminently viewed as a financial resource. Although, financial remittances[3] constitute a significant contribution to the country’s economy, the defective administration and distribution of resources towards the public sector (education, healthcare or infrastructure, for instance) render such cross-border flows almost inconsequential for actual domestic growth. To complicate matters further, domestic authorities advanced a bill proposal (April, 2018) requiring Romanians to provide justifying documents when sending back sums exceeding 2000EUR, despite Romania’s heavy reliance on the steady influx of remittances. This largely attests to the politicisation of diaspora issues within Romanian institutions – if the voting preferences of diaspora communities are clearly not favouring the current government, then the vast bureaucratic apparatus is selectively deployed to suppress dissent, wherever it may stem.

The disproportionate funding of events promoting traditions and culture abroad (without any standardised framework of how such events should be organised in the first place) shows that Romanian institutions tend to favour a cultural-populist model for diaspora engagement. Concerning the capacity to access funding, our study shows that many diaspora organisations across different countries are dependent on governmental funding, thus exposing a dynamic by which, associations align their objectives with those elaborated or at times, dictated by Romanian authorities, irrespective of the needs of those communities they aim to serve. This has led to an entrenched patronage system and increased politicisation of diaspora issues. In many cases, these funding patterns led to a mushrooming of diaspora organisations that opportunistically syphon public funding, with the knowledge and tacit consent of domestic public authorities. This is precisely why an evaluation of such practices becomes momentous also within the wider context of anti-corruption measures. We are not completely discarding the role of diasporas in promoting and conducting cultural diplomacy, however, we consider that in the current political and social climate institutional priorities are severely misaligned. More importantly, these state-driven policies had so far negligible impact on strengthening the (political) representation of Romanians abroad, in their homeland and elsewhere.

Similar to other CEE (Central Eastern European) and Balkan countries the Romanian diaspora has a significant demographic presence, not only in Europe but also across the globe. Despite this, its organisational capacity remains precarious and Romanians abroad are poorly represented in their host countries. Political representation seems to be equally poor in Romania. With an official estimate of 3.5 million Romanians living abroad, they are represented by only four deputy mandates in the Parliament’s lower house and two senators. Ever-changing electoral procedures have increasingly hampered diaspora voting. The more recent Romanian Presidential elections (2014) saw innumerable queues forming in front of voting stations across Europe (mainly Romanian Embassies and Consulates), diaspora communities waiting for hours on end to cast their ballot. Apparently, not enough voting stations were made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (tasked with organising the elections) and a great many did not get a chance to exercise their constitutional right. This failure and lack of institutional accountability fomented dissent and led to an almost unprecedented civic mobilisation. To put this into perspective, political participation, particularly diaspora voter turnout, has been low, in the previous elections not exceeding 9% (abroad).

Conclusion

This introductory brief aimed to emphasise the many paradoxes that epitomise the relationship between the Romanian state and its diaspora. Such caveats partly stem from a persistent cognitive dissonance, with institutions consistently failing to build the trust needed for a civic-public partnership. Our research showed that Romanian institutions tended to endorse what was perceived as a benign form of diaspora engagement, centred on promoting a specific ethnic-cultural identity abroad. Current state policies largely, albeit intentionally, ignore the civic dimension of diasporic identity. Despite this, civic and political activism increasingly forms an organising basis for diaspora communities. Common themes such as good governance and the fight against corruption have become rallying points for collective mobilisation, at home and abroad. The following briefs shall expand on the networked approach in studying diasporas, as well as on the associative models pursued by Romanian communities living abroad.

We believe that mapping the Romanian diaspora is a momentous and necessary endeavour. For the homeland it goes to show the political influence that can be harnessed through activism abroad. Unfortunately, we are yet to witness a constructive institutional response, which aligns policies to make use of this vast social capital abroad. For host societies or countries of residence, the study will hopefully highlight the transnational potential of diaspora communities as an alternative source for more effective, future bilateral engagement.

Authors

Andra-Lucia Martinescu is currently pursuing a PhD in International Relations with the University of Cambridge, focusing on geopolitical developments in the Black Sea region. She also completed an Mphil with the same department, analysing the transformation of national security doctrines in the post-Soviet space. She has extensive experience in operational and strategic research having worked for the British Army, RAND Europe and the Royal United Services Institute for Security and Defence (RUSI, London) in various research and analysis capacities. She is currently an independent consultant, focusing on civil society projects, diasporas as well as public policy and good governance. She is an FPC Research Fellow.

Rares Burlacu is a doctoral candidate at the École Nationale d’Administration Publique in Québec (Canada), focusing on Canadian digital diplomacy in relation to the EU and China. From 2009 he has been teaching high-level courses in public diplomacy at ENAP. Rares currently coordinates Romania’s rotating EU Presidency in Canada through diaspora initiatives. His publications can also be accessed on HuffPost Quebec, La Presse and Le Devoir.

[1] Ruxandra Trandafoiu (2013). Diaspora Online. Identity Politics and Romanian Migrants (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books). P.: 17;

[2] By transnational initiatives we refer to those actions that benefit diaspora communities across multiple countries of residence, as well as the homeland. Such initiatives stem from close cooperation/coordination between diaspora organisations and have a transnational impact.

^[3] World Bank reports 4.94 billion USD for 2017 in financial remittances.

Topics

Civil Society

Diaspora

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Development

Regions

Europe

Romania

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