Policy Forum Armenia’s Zaven Kalayjian and Sassoon Kosian present a statistical analysis of voting patterns in the Armenian Presidential Election held on February 18th 2013 that indicates serious irregularities took place , bringing the final result into question.

In this double-headed paper Jason Ralph examines the principles that might inform the kind of foreign policy that might be expected from a Labour government led by Ed Miliband. Ralph focuses on a Fabian Society paper, Labour’s Next Foreign Policy by David Clark, to discuss the historical and theoretical context of Miliband’s approach and to provide a framework for a wider discussion about Labour foreign policy. David Clark then provides a response to Ralph’s analysis in this new format Foreign Policy Conversation Piece briefing paper. It aims to prompt further debate and reflection on the challenges and opportunities facing centre-left foreign policy makers.

This challenging environment not only makes the task of Catherine Ashton’s new European External Action Service more difficult – it means it is more necessary than ever to help the EU make an impact on the increasingly crowded world stage. The Foreign Policy Centre paper Europe in the world: can EU foreign policy make an impact? sets out a range of different expert views about how the union’s outward looking institutions are faring – and some of the key challenges the EU faces in making a difference in the neighbourhood with its key strategic partners.

The two years since the founding of the EEAS have seen the new service get off to a rocky start as it struggled to cope with the logistical challenges of building a cohesive new service out of disparate components in an atmosphere where existing players, such as the European Commission, were keen to ensure they still had a key role to play in external affairs. However, there are signs that the organisational side of the EEAS is now beginning to make some headway as staff and new ways of working begin to bed in.

Given the challenging international environment, the EEAS is rightly focusing on how it improves EU performance with strategic partners such as the BRICS and the United States. Here, it needs to balance the differing needs of member states; assisting the national diplomacy of larger countries and helping the smaller ones get on the radar. To do this, it needs to set a limited number of strategic goals for its own work while providing an effective platform to assist national diplomacy. The second key impact area for European foreign policy is in its neighbourhood, both eastern and southern, where it has an opportunity to take a greater lead; particularly where bilateral interest is weak. There is scope for greater emphasis on ensuring agreements are upheld by partner countries, particularly in respect to human rights and democratic values – where the EU needs a more consistent approach.

The Lisbon reforms and the development of the EEAS had the key goal of enabling the EU to take swifter and more coordinated international action so that it can punch its weight in the world. While some progress has been made there are two key components to further progress. First, getting all the key elements of the union’s machinery facing in the same direction is key. This could mean deepening existing efforts to coordinate activities between the commission and the EEAS, giving Ashton a greater say over the commission’s external decision making – particularly in Europe’s neighbourhood. A formal deputy for Ashton may also help spread the workload and mute complaints when she cannot be in two places at the same time.

The second task is to get all of the member states on the same page. While the idea of certain member states, particularly Britain, giving up their veto over further aspects of foreign policy is unlikely to get very far – developing existing efforts to bring about consensus by cooperation and effective diplomatic work may bear more fruit. Where one or two member states are not onboard with a proposed common foreign and security policy initiative supported by a clear majority of member states, developing the existing powers of abstention may help cut the Gordian knot without resorting to new majority voting powers. Currently a ‘constructive abstention’ binds the hands of member states not to do anything that might be seen to contradict the EU’s actions, creating both a practical problem if member states disagree with the policy and a principal one if they disagree that it is a matter for the union.

Developing a form of non-binding abstention, initially on an informal basis prior to any future treaty change, may help avoid always moving at the speed of the slowest member while protecting national sovereignty. Ultimately, as with a number of EU issues, what can make a real difference is continuing to improve the competence – organisational performance – of the union’s external-facing activities rather than simply providing Europe with more competences or new powers. If Europe wants to make an impact on the world stage, both member states and EU institutions need to work constructively with the EEAS to help it deliver.

This was first published on Public Service Europe

In this briefing Zeynep Dereli sets out some of the key challenges facing Turkey as it looks to expand its role as a regional energy hub, including the complex relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq and access to Caspian gas.

In this briefing Dr Simon Mabon explores the successes and limitations of British Soft-Power. He argues for UK soft-power to be supported by a more normative, values driven approach to foreign policy with particularly reference to the arms trade and the middle east peace process.

The success of the first resolution was not surprising. It accompanied a monitoring report compiled by the two co-rapporteurs of the PACE Monitoring Committee on Azerbaijan, Pedro Agramunt (Spain) and Joseph Debono Grech (Malta) following several visits to the country. Although some – such as Estonian PACE delegate Andres Herkel – argued the report could have been stronger, it was harder-hitting and contained some important recommendations for measures needed to improve the human rights situation in the country.

But the outcome of the vote on the second resolution had been difficult to predict, as it was a long-standing source of controversy within the Council of Europe and had in committee in June 2012. The resolution’s defeat was deeply disappointing to the rapporteur tasked with compiling the report, Christoph Strässer (Germany), and his supporters, who had worked for four years to produce the report and accompanying resolution despite the of the Azerbaijani authorities to issue Strässer a visa to undertake a fact-finding visit to the country in accordance with his mandate.

During the debate, the Azerbaijani delegation’s lobbying strategy became evident: in a seemingly constructive step, they supported the somewhat critical monitoring report, at the same time using it to make the political prisoner report look both biased and unnecessary. The Azerbaijani delegation and their supporters argued that two separate reports were unnecessary as the issue of political prisoners was also included within the monitoring report, which they praised as being balanced and constructive. They in turn criticised Strässer’s report as lacking credibility based on the fact that he had not travelled to the country to conduct research, and some alleged that he had approached the work with a pre-conceived agenda.
Some 50 speakers took the floor during the debate, the majority of whom voiced support for the monitoring report and indicated they would vote against the political prisoner resolution. The tone of the is perhaps best captured by a comment made towards the end by head of the Azerbaijani PACE delegation Samad Seyidov: “I am completely against the approach it takes to Azerbaijan, but I will still be a member of the Assembly because this is not Mr Strässer’s Council of Europe; it is my Council of Europe, just as it is my Azerbaijan, as it will be for ever. I am in favour of the Monitoring Committee report, but I am totally against Mr Strässer’s report”.

Indeed, during the four years leading up to the vote, the balance within the Council of Europe often seemed to be tipped in Azerbaijan’s favour. The Azerbaijani delegation was able to interrupt progress on the report for quite some time by creating a debate within the Council of Europe about the need for a definition of political prisoners before any individual country should be examined, and by questioning why Azerbaijan in particular should be scrutinised while there were political prisoners in other member states. As a result, PACE eventually did adopt a of political prisoners in October 2012, but the Azerbaijani delegation’s attempt to pass an amendment stating that only the European Court of Human Rights could make determinations about political prisoners failed in a highly .

In addition, it remains unclear why the co-rapporteurs’ completion of the monitoring report – which was initially expected to be presented to PACE in October 2011 – was delayed for so long and then suddenly achieved in time for it to be added to the agenda for debate alongside the political prisoner resolution. Whether intentional or not, the timing of the monitoring report’s completion contributed significantly to the defeat of the political prisoner resolution.

International and Azerbaijani civil society activists viewed the negative vote on the political prisoner resolution as a failure by the Council of Europe to hold Azerbaijan accountable for its obligations as a member state at a key opportunity, and more broadly as a signal that the body’s stance on human rights was weakening. Further, sources within the Council of Europe voiced concern that PACE’s failure to take action to address Azerbaijan’s refusal to issue Strässer a visa could set a worrisome precedent for other member states which may not wish to cooperate with special mandates, as now appears to be the case with Russia in relation to Marielouise Beck (Germany), PACE’s rapporteur on IDPs and returnees in the North Caucasus.

Regardless of the outcome, the four-year saga culminating in last week’s vote had positive implications for the political prisoner situation in Azerbaijan, not least of all in ensuring that the issue remained on the international agenda during that time. As pointed out by UK PACE delegate Christopher Chope during the debate, Strässer’s work ensured that the issue of political prisoners was included in the monitoring report, and led to the release of many persons he had identified as potential political prisoners.

In moving forward, PACE should use all available mechanisms to hold Azerbaijan – and all other member states – accountable for their Council of Europe obligations to avoid further damaging the body’s already weakening image as an institution that promotes and protects human rights. A good start would be to ensure effective follow-up to the recommendations contained in the resolution accompanying the monitoring report.