Three Years On: Why all eyes still need to be on Ukraine

Article by Dr. Victoria Vdovychenko

February 24, 2025

Three Years On: Why all eyes still need to be on Ukraine

There was a famous saying that all roads lead to Rome. Now they are leading to Kyiv, in all senses: geopolitical, geo-economic, value-based and rule-based order or at least in the attempt to preserve the rules-based global order.

Despite all the challenges, Ukraine proves to continue functioning, fighting on the ground, having offensive operations and reforming itself. It seems surreal but very much true despite the evidence that in the last two weeks the world order as we knew it has come to an end. The system once based on rules, agreements, and shared values has been under a tsunami of geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges. It was never perfect, but it functioned. Now, its whole existence is under question.

All signs suggest that the United States is disengaging geopolitically from Europe. This growing transatlantic divide was particularly evident at the Munich Security Conference, where the rift proved not only deep but also fundamentally rooted in diverging values.

Moreover, European leaders found themselves directly challenged by US Vice President J.D. Vance, further amplifying the sense of uncertainty. This moment of shock should serve as a wake-up call for Europe, prompting a reassessment of its strategic autonomy and global role.

So, why do all eyes still need to be on Ukraine? Ukraine continues to prove that it can resist multiple challenges as well as reinvent itself in terms of innovations. Whether it is about the successful usage of naval drones, joint production lines in Ukraine under the “Danish model” or some other efforts to produce various unmanned aerial systems, it proves that it is more efficient to use advanced military technologies and localise production. [1]

Ukraine is nearing completion of the roadmaps required to open the first negotiation cluster in its EU accession process. The European Commission’s screening report is almost finalised; however, Hungary is delaying its approval.

A negotiation framework is already in place, containing multiple safeguards that allow for the suspension of the negotiation process if necessary. Ukraine anticipates the official launch of the first negotiation cluster in April or May. Moreover, the government has stated its ambition to open all negotiation clusters by the end of this year.

It is important to emphasise that the negotiation process is not merely a technocratic or bureaucratic exercise. While technical compliance plays a significant role, the process is highly influenced by the political situation within the candidate country.

However, the beginning of the 2025 shapes new waves of Russia’s aggression that has hastened the emergence of a multipolar world, undermined global security, and exposed critical vulnerabilities in the West’s strategic posture. The trajectory is clear: if left unchecked, the war risks escalating into a broader European conflict by 2030, with the prospect of a global confrontation no longer beyond consideration.

Ukraine knows with its history and present resilience that Putin’s demands—whether concerning territory, neutrality, elections, or other conditions—are ultimately irrelevant. These demands merely reflect Russia’s true objectives: to assert control over Ukraine and compel the US and NATO to compromise their principles and interests in favor of a global order that serves Russia’s strategic ambitions.

The US must eliminate any hope Putin may have of achieving these goals—whether through military means or a so-called “peaceful” agreement. This war can only end when Russia understands it cannot secure victory either on the battlefield or through diplomatic manipulation.

The Alliance must seriously reassess its strategic options, including the deployment of ground forces, if Russia’s continued unwillingness to compromise—coupled with Ukraine’s increasing manpower shortages due to the “too little, too late” policy—brings Moscow closer to restoring its former sphere of influence.

Drawing on extensive fieldwork conducted across the Black Sea region, the US in 2025 has multiple avenues to bolster its strategic presence and regional stability. Key initiatives might include strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank through targeted force deployments, expanded arms sales, and increased defense investments to reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression, fostering “minilateral” cooperation—flexible, issue-driven alliances—among regional partners, particularly with Ukraine, to enhance interoperability and security coordination; securing and supporting regional connectivity initiatives that bypass Russian influence, reinforcing economic resilience and strategic independence for Black Sea nations.

This shift in US priorities underscores the urgent need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense—not as a matter of political convenience, but as an imperative for long-term security and stability.

Given the shifting security landscape, investments in Ukraine’s defense industry, joint production ventures, and military innovation are essential. After nearly three years of war, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience, now producing over a third of its battlefield weaponry through domestic innovation.

Strengthening Ukraine’s defense industrial base not only enhances its self-sufficiency in warfare but also fosters long-term partnerships with Western defense sectors. By expanding joint production efforts, allied nations can bolster Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities while also reinforcing Europe’s broader security framework.

Russia, along with its allies, must not be underestimated as a destabilizing force in European security for at least the next decade. Its offensive strategies—combining hard and soft power with hybrid tactics—pose a persistent challenge that demands serious, sustained, and adaptive containment efforts.

As Winston Churchill once warned, “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping it will eat him last.” Failing to confront Russian aggression today will only embolden further destabilization tomorrow.

In this defining moment, Ukraine’s fight is Europe’s fight—and Europe’s security is the world’s security.

Dr. Victoria Vdovychenko is a widely recognized and published expert on the issues of hybrid warfare, strategic communication, with particular emphasis on relations between Ukraine and the European Union as well as NATO. She is working on the challenges of the European Union, Euro-Atlantic integration, hybrid warfare, strategic communication collaborating with such educational institutions as University of Bologna, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, KU Leuven, University Catholic Louvain, Cambridge University. Victoria is currently a Visiting Fellow within the British Academy and a co-lead of the Future of Ukraine Program at the Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

[1] Ukraine and Denmark summarised the results of cooperation under the ‘Danish Model’ of support for the Ukrainian defense industry in 2024. Through this initiative, the Armed Forces of Ukraine received weapons valued at nearly EUR 538 million. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/results-of-the-danish-model-of-support-for-ukraine-s-defense-industry-in-2024-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-received-weapons-valued-at-nearly-538-million

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

Three years on: An end to Europe’s Complacency is Urgent

Article by Stephen Gethins MP

85 years ago, in December 1940, Franklin Roosevelt described the US as the ‘great arsenal of democracy’ in a broadcast made less than a year before the country decisively entered the war against fascism in Europe. That ushered in almost a century where the US could be relied on by European allies.

That security blanket led to complacency and an over reliance on the US by European leaders. The first Trump Presidency and shift in public attitudes towards European security in the US was seen as a blip, but few can have that excuse anymore.

The dangers of these attitudes have been most apparent when it comes to dealing with the threat from the Kremlin. More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 11 years after the war started and a quarter century after Putin came to power, we Europeans are still not taking our collective security seriously enough.

For too many democracies in Western Europe, there has not been the same urgency in dealing with our security as you will find among those bordering Russia. Leadership has shifted away from the old axis of Paris, Berlin and London and has instead come from Warsaw, Tallinn and Helsinki. Although Europe’s democracies have responded with support to Ukraine it has been nowhere near the scale that was needed. It should be a source of shame that North Korea has been able to provide more support to Russia than many European countries have to Ukraine.

That needs to change. Europe needs to step up and take responsibility for its own security. For three long years, and the eight years before then, Ukrainians have defended their fellow Europeans, far too often underequipped and under-resourced as we bicker at home.

This has shown up the weaknesses of the traditional European powers with the rise of the right in France, Germany’s failure to take its security responsibilities seriously and the UK’s indulgent act of self-harm with Brexit holding the rest of Europe back.

The time for complacency was over three years ago and the need for greater European self-reliance on security is now urgent. In supporting Ukraine we support ourselves. It’s time to invest in the defence of European democracy again and a more integrated approach to European defence and security.

Stephen Gethins MP is a member of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Political Council

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

United Kingdom

Op-Ed: Hope amidst the rubble – Syria’s rebirth after Assad

Article by Eleanor Nott

February 4, 2025

Op-Ed: Hope amidst the rubble – Syria’s rebirth after Assad

The rapid disintegration of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad stunned observers. Forces from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and Syrian Free Army converged on Damascus on 8 December 2024, sealing the fall of Ba’athist forces which had ruled Syria since 1971. Eleanor Nott, founder of a development NGO and PhD candidate at King’s College London, travelled to Syria to visit civil society leaders and assess the state of the health system.

Syria, January 2025

We landed early in Beirut and the rising sun illuminated our drive through the mountains to the Jdedeh border crossing into Syria.

The Lebanese border was the familiar experience of uniformed staff checking papers in buildings adorned with the flags of their nation. What I encountered on the other side was different and the first sight of a nation in a state of rebirth. On the first stretch of the road to Damascus, we saw an abandoned checkpoint painted in the faded livery of the fallen regime. Shreds hung where a portrait of former President Bashar al-Assad, the first of many, once looked down. The sheer number of images of Assad and his father, Hafez, was remarkable. On buildings, Bashar’s cold-eyed stare gazed down from posters and in paint, at the entrance to towns, along highways, made of tiles or carved into stone, Assad – both senior and junior – have had their images smashed, torn or scratched out. Bashar in military fatigues; perhaps the final sight of the outside world seen by those entering one of the many notorious mukharbarat sites in Damascus. The footage of liberated Sednaya prison has revealed to the world the torture and degradation meted out by the regime in its cells.

At the Jdedeh crossing there were no uniforms, just a quiet industriousness which set the tone for my forthcoming encounters. A man walked in and proclaimed ‘good morning, welcome to free Syria.’ The men behind the desks asked questions about who I was here to see, wrote things on a piece of paper with biro, conversed among themselves and eventually handed me a form to complete.

In Damascus’ Umayyad Square, the setting for scenes of jubilation in early December as the regime melted away, the tri-star free Syrian flag was draped from buildings and flashed in the windows of passing cars. A group of people were digging up the grass on the roundabout and planting shrubs and flowers. The lobby of the Sheraton hotel was full of activity, the obligatory NGO and UN white Land Cruisers crouched in the car park.

Crossing a bridge to eastern Ghouta, a short drive from the Assads’ palace on the hill and smart international hotels, ranges of shattered apartment blocks loomed in the near distance. This was the scene of the first chemical attack launched by the regime in 2013, when it was on the edge of defeat. American and British red lines evaporated and with a Russian diplomatic sleight of hand, the regime agreed to surrender its chemical weapons – only for them to be used on dozens of further occasions.[1]

The new head of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), Dr Hazem Bakleh, served the organisation for decades before resigning in disgust at the corruption he witnessed, an act which marked him out as a transgressor in the cult of Assad. His predecessor had a security buzzer fitted to control entry to his office but Bakleh operates an open door policy with his team, something he considers vital and in the spirit of the new Syria. Since 2016 the President of the SARC had been Khaled Hboubati – an Assad associate . As Hboubati’s business interests in dried apricots suffered due to the conflict, he was rewarded with a government contract to formalise the Khirbet Ghazaleh crossing in Deraa.

The scale of corruption in Syria has been breathtaking and the aid sector was not exempt from the efforts of the regime to co-opt all resources entering the state. Once the conflict started, a key mechanism for monitoring and controlling the activities of humanitarian agencies within the country was the insistence that aid organisations partner with the SARC. SARC’s role was as a gatekeeper and coordinator of all humanitarian actors in Syria, domestic and international. It was the lead implementing partner of the UN. The inadequacy of the SARC-administered cross-line operations from Damascus into opposition-controlled areas was a spur for UN Security Council Resolution 2165 which authorised cross-border operations in 2014; allowing aid to enter opposition enclaves from Jordan, Iraq and Turkey.

The SARC’s brand is a tarnished one and its new chief is keen to restore trust among both the Syrian people and international donors. Dr Bakleh describes how he instructed the contents of a recent planeload of food aid from the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center, the humanitarian arm of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to be delivered directly to local distribution points, bypassing SARC’s warehouses, to demonstrate the new era of transparency. This was a response to past SARC activity when some staff used to divide the packages in the quiet of the warehouse and sell the high value items on the black market for profit.

In Homs, the consequences of corruption for the health system are apparent. I am told how the cost of a CT scanner would double, from delivery at the airport to arrival at the hospital, as bribes inflated the price in transit, from the government department through the local intelligence branch to a hospital. Hospital authorities are struggling to settle an unpaid bill left over from old times, some $16,000 and counting. The medical electronics company gave up waiting for payment and no longer maintains the scanner, which sits idle.

I have lunch with a group of doctors who tell me about the patient who was hauled off the operating table by the mukhabarat, the surgeon begging to be able to at least stitch closed the open abdomen.[2] One of them says that when the regime was in power, permission would need to be sought for such a gathering as ours – of ten or more people – from the local police. My host has returned to a family home he left fourteen years ago, happy to find it still standing. Many are not, some 60% of Homs’ residential areas bombed by barrels from helicopters or missile payloads courtesy of the Russian air force.[3] Among the casualties was also the Amal hospital, bombed in 2012 and its flattened buildings still standing in ruins today.[4] The ruins of smashed neighbourhoods were left as a reminder of the fate of those who challenged the regime.

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) estimate more than 949 healthcare workers have been killed directly during the conflict, with more than 92 percent killed by the Syrian government and its allies.[5] The assault on health is one of the most striking features of the Syrian conflict. One of the most authoritative investigations was the Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria which used the term ‘weaponisation’ to describe the strategy of violently depriving people of healthcare they need at the cost of hundreds of healthcare workers killed, incarcerated or tortured and scores of healthcare facilities attacked.[6] In addition to denying wounded civilians’ impartial medical treatment, PHR reported about the invasion, attack and misuse of hospitals, impediment and attack of medical transport and detention and torture of doctors.

The new head of the Homs Health Directorate is from Idlib, the quasi-state from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched its lightning offensive in November. The doctor did not know what to expect when he returned home to Homs. To his surprise the standard of healthcare provision he found in government areas was inferior to that in the northwest.

The health system, among other services, in the northwest has been sustained by a range of Syrian charitable and governance organisations. Many were established in the wake of the revolution with strong support from the Syrian diaspora in the Gulf, North America, Europe and the UK. These organisations were able to sustain the functions of the state in the absence of the Damascus government. Financial resources were often modest but well-managed and high standards of probity applied to governance.

The new government faces huge economic, political, and security challenges. HTS has demonstrated itself to be a disciplined force, stopping looting and thus far maintaining its commitment to protecting rights of minorities. In Homs and Damascus, I visited churches where worshippers were attending Mass and the Divine Liturgy as usual. In Homs, a queue snaked around the block of former security personnel handing in their weapons and military identity cards, an early Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) move. There will be a temptation to centralise management and coordination of services. In many of my conversations there was a sense that the civil society activity that sustained the northwest was only for the emergency period and that the right leadership body is central and local government. This would represent a blow to those who strove tirelessly to maintain vital services and whose talents Syria will need to restore the national fabric. Civil society is also a route to political participation and engagement, the call of the revolution, and essential for building peace and stability.

Calls for restoration and resilience over retribution and revenge

The Assad regime sought to project an image of stability which many people were convinced by. Assad had been readmitted to the Arab League, the EU was calibrating an early recovery approach that would fall short of reconstruction, and Italy had re-opened its embassy in Damascus.

It was an illusion. The state was a facade constructed to serve one small section of the population. All economic and political mechanisms were geared toward capturing resources that would sustain the regime and its allies, including international aid.

Civil society organisations sustained the northwest, kept services running and provided a space for the development of associations and grassroots institutions. The new government will need the resources – intellectual, financial and social – of all those who continued to serve their country and nurture the wellspring of institutional life.

Witnessing the condition of Syria, destroyed cityscapes and a state hollowed out by corruption and cynicism; the resilience of the Syrian people is all the more remarkable. I heard calls for justice, not revenge. For restoration, not retribution. This is a resourceful and proud nation. It deserves the best chance of success.

Most of all, there is relief that the regime’s arbitrary and sadistic rule is over. Describing the evaporation of the secret police, my friend said: ‘the shadows that followed us have gone now.’ As have a million Assad portraits, rendered in stone, tile, fabric and paint.

Eleanor Nott is a Senior Adviser and Co-Founder of the David Nott Foundation. Since 2015 the DNF has trained over 2,000 doctors in life and limb-saving surgical skills. Eleanor oversaw the development of the Hostile Environment Surgical Training (HEST) course, a trademarked programme accredited by the Royal College of Surgeons of England and supported by bespoke simulation equipment. Eleanor was recognised with her husband and Co-Founder, Professor David Nott, on Foreign Policy’s Global Thinkers list of 2016 for their work training doctors in conflict areas. She has contributed to The Telegraph, British Medical Journal, IISS Voices, CNN and has appeared on Sky News. Eleanor is also a PhD student in the department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Photographs courtesy of author.

Disclaimer: Eleanor is writing in a personal capacity. The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor the David Nott Foundation.

[1] Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lütkefend, ‘Introduction: The Syrian Regime’s Approach to Chemical Warfare’, GPPi, April 2020, https://chemicalweapons.gppi.net/analysis/introduction/

[2] Mukhabarat is an arabic phrase used to describe intelligence agencies and secret police used to spy on civilians

[3] Marwa al-Sabouni, ‘The Lost Heritage of Homs: From the Destruction of Monuments to the Destruction of Meaning’, Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities, https://www.getty.edu/publications/cultural-heritage-mass-atrocities/part-2/11-al-sabouni/

[4] American Association for the Advancement of Science, ‘Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project: Assessing the status of medical facilities in Syria’, AAAS Centre for Scientific Responsibility and Justice, 14 May 2014, https://www.aaas.org/resources/assessing-status-medical-facilities-syria

[5] Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Medical Personnel Are Targeted in Syria’, March 2024, https://phr.org/our-work/resources/medical-personnel-are-targeted-in-syria/

[6] Fouad M Fouad et al., ‘Health workers and the weaponisation of health care in Syria: a preliminary inquiry for The Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria’, The Lancet, Volum 390, Issue 10111, 02 December 2017, https://www.thelancet.com/article/S0140-6736(17)30741-9/fulltext

Topics

Civil Society

Democracy and Elections

Human Rights

Regions

Syria

Corruption and the critical need for accountability

Article by Susan Coughtrie

January 31, 2025

Corruption and the critical need for accountability

Corruption, as understood to be “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,” is hardly a new phenomenon, however the scale to which it occurs today, especially transnationally, and more often than not with impunity, can be seen to be a key driver of global disorder.^[1]

To a greater or lesser extent corruption happens in every country, and at every level. Over the past decade, however, there has been a succession of large scale investigations, conducted by global networks of journalists, together with civil society, that have exposed an evolving, complex transnational dimension.^[2] Political and business elites as well as organised crime groups from across the world have misused financial and legal systems, usually in multiple jurisdictions, to facilitate the theft of public funds, tax avoidance, money laundering, bribery and other forms of crime and corruption.

Particularly insidious is the abuse of political positions, especially in developing or transitioning countries, to enrich a relatively small group of elites and entrench their power, which is then wielded to shut down independent or critical voices, shifting those countries trajectories in increasingly authoritarian directions. Russia under President Putin’s leadership has been a prime example, but it is far from alone.^[3]

If left unchecked, corruption can impoverish nations, stoke division and violence, exacerbate crises from the environmental to the economic, as well as undermine the rule of law and more broadly the liberal international order.^[4] In short, it creates a distortion or series of them, which untie the fabric of societal norms, through the erosion of public trust and a denigration of a just social contract.^[5]

The global corruption crisis

The scale of corruption worldwide is challenging to quantify. In 2018, the World Bank estimated that $2.6 trillion USD is stolen through corruption annually – a sum equivalent to more than 5 percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and that $1 trillion is paid in bribes every year by businesses and individuals.^[6] In the abstract the figures feel somewhat intangible, but looking at cases provides more insight into the impact of corruption.^[7] Below are six examples from across the globe:

Between 2012-14, the Azerbaijani Laundromat, a complex money laundering scheme funnelled US$2.9 billion out of the country through four shell companies registered in the UK.^[8] These funds were then allegedly used by members of Azerbaijan’s political elite to benefit themselves as well as buy influence in Europe to whitewash the country’s abysmal human rights record in what has been termed ‘Caviar Diplomacy’.^[9]

In 2014, US$1 billion disappeared from three Moldovan banks creating a hole in the country’s public finances equivalent to an eighth of its GDP.^[10] Moldova is often referred to as Europe’s poorest country, where wages average US$200 per month.^[11] The money was stolen via UK and Hong Kong registered companies.^[12] Moldovan banks were also implicated in the Russian Laundromat, a scheme that allegedly laundered US$20+ billion from Russia between 2010-14.^[13]

One Coin, a cryptocurrency scam, whose founder Ruja Ignatova disappeared in 2017 and is on the FBI’s most wanted list, is estimated to have resulted in US$4.5billion being stolen in a pyramid scheme affecting millions around the world, including those in some of the poorest countries.^[14]

In 2021, the ‘Congo is Not for Sale’ coalition estimated that the Democratic Republic of Congo was facing losses of at least US$3.71 billion from suspect mining and oil deals with businessman Dan Gertler.^[15] Corruption allegations, which he has always denied, have followed Gertler for years and lead to him being subject to sanctions.^[16] The DRC is one of the five poorest countries in the world.^[17]

The 1MDB Scandal involved a Malaysian state fund, set up in 2009 to purportedly promote the country’s development through foreign investment and partnerships, being embezzled to the tune of US$4.5 billion to fund lavish lifestyles and even a Hollywood movie.^[18] The then Malaysia prime minister, Najib Razak, the fund’s chairman, was later jailed for his involvement.^[19] The alleged mastermind businessman Jho Low, remains on the run from justice in Malaysia, Singapore and the US.^[20]

The Luanda Leaks, published in 2021, exposed two decades of ‘unscrupulous deals’ made by Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of Angola’s former president and Africa’s wealthiest woman, who according to the UK Government systematically abused her positions at state-run companies to embezzle at least £350 million.^[21] Despite being oil- and diamond-rich Angola, is one of the poorest countries. Dos Santos has been subject to an Interpol Red Notice since November 2022.^[22]

The Impact of Corruption

The impact is felt most directly by the populations in the countries where the wealth is being stolen. Yet there is a ripple effect, including into states that have played a role in facilitating that corruption through their financial and legal systems – among others, this includes the UK and US.

Countries with high levels of corruption will act in the interest of their elites, rather than their people, which distorts both domestic and foreign policy. It is unsurprising that high levels of corruption frequently correlate with the lowest protections for democracy and fundamental rights.^[23] According to the Economist Intelligence 2023 Democracy report “less than 8% of the world’s population live in a full democracy, while almost 40% live under authoritarian rule—a share that has been creeping up in recent years.”^[24] Corruption can feed into several aspects linked to democratic backsliding, including: the spread of disinformation; attacks on fundamental rights, including media freedom and access to information; concerns about political funding and the impact on electoral integrity; all of which affect both individual and national security.

While corruption is routinely exposed by journalists, whistleblowers and civil society, they are more frequently the ones most likely to face direct consequences, as opposed to those whose wrongdoing they expose. The Committee to Protect Journalists has registered 314 journalists confirmed as being murdered for reporting on corruption worldwide since their records began in 1992, 234 of those with impunity.^[25] FPC’s Unsafe for Scrutiny survey, conducted in 2020 with the participation of 63 journalists investigating financial crime and corruption in 41 countries found that over 70% of respondents were subject to some form of threat as a result of their work.^[26] The findings pointed to a growing trend of legal challenges, referred to as SLAPPs (strategic lawsuits against public participation), being used to shut down investigations. Alarmingly, the UK, a notoriously expensive jurisdiction, was identified as respondents as the leading international source of these legal challenges, almost as high as those coming from EU countries and the US combined.

Unsurprisingly those with deep pockets, enriched with illicit funds, are inevitably strongly motivated to find any way to shut down any scrutiny of potential wrongdoing. Dis-and-mis information also plays a critical role in covering up corruption. Wrongdoing can be obfuscated by sowing distrust of independent media and civil society (including through the use of smear campaigns, e.g labelling independent journalists and civil society ‘foreign agents’) and by offering alternative narratives. This can ultimately foster a lack of trust within society of any information.

The impact corruption has on trust, which democratic societies require to function properly, can be significant. In 2018, the then Head of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde blamed corruption for the lack of trust in business. Legarde cited data from that year’s Edelman Trust Barometer, which found the average trust in government, business, NGOs and media was below 50%.^[27] The latest Edelman Trust Barometer report, for 2025, “revealed a profound shift to acceptance of aggressive action, with political polarization and deepening fears giving rise to a widespread sense of grievance…Those with a high sense of grievance distrust all four institutions (business, government, media, and NGOs).”^[28]

In the UK, allegations of ‘chumocracy’ and corruption, particularly around the awarding of COVID contracts, in recent years has caused considerable public outcry. A 2024 report by Transparency International-UK (TI-UK), found that “at least 28 [COVID] contracts worth £4.1 billion… went to those with known political connections to the party of government in Westminster – almost one in ten pounds spent on the pandemic response” and that this had “erod[ed] trust in political institutions.”[29]

Meanwhile a 2024 study into Latin American countries found that in the aftermath of corruption scandals involving those in the highest political office ”support for democracy falls by 0.07, support for authoritarianism rises by 11% and violent protests rise by 70%.^[30] Most revealing though was the study’s finding that corruption damages citizens’ trust in each other.^[31]

All of this is highly detrimental to democracy and exposes a form of corruption that goes beyond just the financial. Measures to combat corruption must therefore not only seek to achieve justice and accountability for the crimes committed, but also to remedy the wider impacts and restore public trust.

Countering corruption

The exposure of corruption has led to high profile resignations; changes to financial regulation; arrests and indictments against criminal figures; as well as the recovery of several billion in fines and seizure of illicit funds.^[32] Yet what is recouped is usually a small percentage of what was lost and, as indicated above, the wider implications are rarely, if ever, effectively addressed.

Countering corruption requires political will and a comprehensive approach. The UK, which has a profile not only as a facilitator of financial crime, a destination for illicit money and the source of a wide range of enablers, has a lack lustre history in this area. In a notable step towards creating some level of accountability, the UK launched ‘Magnitsky style’ sanctions in 2020 (long after the US), but it took Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, to push the issue to the top of the political agenda.^[33] However, action has been slow and as TI-UK notes, despite the introduction of two Economic Crime Acts in 2022-24 “major loopholes remain.”^[34]

While the new Labour Government has recently appointed an anti-corruption champion and launched a new campaign to tackle kleptocracy, it has also been struck with its own challenges. Moreover, the networked nature of corruption also means that no country can address the issue alone. With shifting dynamics within international relations, as well as a new President in the White House who has had his own brushes with corruption allegations, it is likely that any efforts to create positive change will be all the more challenging to realise.

Susan Coughtrie has been Director of the Foreign Policy Centre since January 2023, after previously serving as Deputy Director from July 2022. Susan joined FPC in July 2020 as Project Director for the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which explores the risks and threats facing journalists uncovering financial crime and corruption. The findings of this research led Susan to co-found the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition in January 2021, which she continues to co-chair. She was the lead author of the FPC report ‘London Calling’: The issue of legal intimidation and SLAPPs against media emanating from the United Kingdom, published together with ARTICLE 19 in 2022.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

^[1] Transparency International defines corruption “as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption

^[2] International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ‘About’, https://www.icij.org/about/

^[3] Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, 2023, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023

^[4] The ‘Liberal International Order’ is a term used to describe a set of governing ideals, rooted in WWII, in which nations adhere to multilaterialism (through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc), and subscribe to cooperation on and the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, monetary and trade policies, security, and open markets; for a through analysis and key debates on the nature of this order, see G John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes, eds., Ordering the World? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice, International Affairs special issue 94, 1 (2018).

^[5] Jean-Jacques Rosseau, ‘The Social Contract’, December 2010, https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf

^[6] https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13493.doc.htm

^[7] A good place to start is the projects by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) https://www.occrp.org/en/projects or the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) – https://www.icij.org/investigations/ . Transparency International also have a list (from 2019)

^[8] Organised crime and Reporting Project, ‘The Azerbaijani Laundromat’, 04 September 2017, https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-azerbaijani-laundromat

^[9] European Stability Initiative, ‘Caviar Diplomacy: Why every European should care’, 2024,

https://www.esiweb.org/proposals/caviar-diplomacy

^[10] Paul Radu, Mihai Munteanu, Iggy Ostanin, ‘Grand Theft Moldova’, Organised crime and Reporting Project, 24 July 2015, https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/grand-theft-moldova

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Tim Whewell, ‘The great Moldovan bank robbery’, BBC News, 18 June 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-33166383

^[13] Organised crime and Reporting Project, ‘The Russian Laundromat Exposed’, 20 March 2017, https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-russian-laundromat-exposed/the-russian-laundromat-exposed

^[14] Rob Byrne, ‘Ruja Ignatova: Fugitive ‘‘Cryptoqueen’ hit by asset freeze’, BBC News, 07 august 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9d1y0z4z9no

^[15] Raid UK, ‘Le Congo n’est pas a vendre’ May 2021, https://raid-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Billions-Lost-Final-EN-web.pdf

^[16] Virginia Canter, ‘Lifting DRC Mining Sanctions Would Be a Critical National Security Error’ Just Security, 19 August 2024, https://www.justsecurity.org/98716/gertler-sanctions-national-security/

^[17] World Bank Group, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: The World Bank in the DRC’, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview

^[18] Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘1MDB scandal explained: a tale of Malaysia’s missing billions’, The Guardian, 28 July 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/25/1mdb-scandal-explained-a-tale-of-malaysias-missing-billions

^[19] Ibid

^[20] The Straits Times, ‘ 1MDB fraud mastermind Jho Low reportedly hiding in Macau’, 21 November 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/1mdb-fraud-mastermind-jho-low-hiding-in-macau-says-malaysia-s-anti-corruption-body-in-report

^[21] International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ‘Luanda Leaks’, 2020, https://www.icij.org/investigations/luanda-leaks/;

^[22] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Home Office, The Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP and The Rt Hon David Lammy MP, ‘Press Release: UK cracks down on dirty money with fresh sanctions’, GOV.UK, 21 November 2024,

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-cracks-down-on-dirty-money-with-fresh-sanctions

^[23] Economic Intelligence, ‘EUI Report: Democracy Index 2023’, 2023, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2023/ ; https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023, and Reporters Sans Frontiers, ‘2024 World Press Freedom Index – journalism under political pressure’, 2024, https://rsf.org/en/2024-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-under-political-pressure

^[24] EUI Report: Democracy Index 2023, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2023/

^[25] Committee to protect Journalists, ‘CPJ Data’, 31 January 2025, https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&typeOfDeath%5B%5D=Murder&coverages%5B%5D=Corruption&start_year=1992&end_year=2025&group_by=year

^[26] Susan Coughtrie and Poppy Ogier, ‘Unsafe for Scrutiny: Examining the pressures faced by journalists uncovering financial crimes and corruption around the world’, Foreign Policy Centre, November 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Unsafe-for-Scrutiny-November-2020.pdf

^[27] Christine Lagarde, ‘There’s a reason for the lack of trust in government and business: corruption’, The Guardian, 04 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/04/lack-trust-government-business-corruption-christine-lagarde-imf

^[28] Edelman, ‘2025 Edelman Trust Barometer’, 2025, https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer

[29] Transparency International UK, ‘Behind the Masks: Corruption red flags in COVID-19 public procurement’, 12 September 2024, https://www.transparency.org.uk/sites/default/files/2024-11/Behind%20the%20Masks%20Report%20Final_0.pdf

^[30] Eduardo RiveraEnrique SeiraSaumitra Jha, ‘Democracy Corrupted: Apex Corruption and the Erosion of Democratic Values’, Working Paper No. 4166, May 2024, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/democracy-corrupted-apex-corruption-erosion-democratic-values

^[31] Stanford Report, ‘How corruption at the top erodes support for democracy’, 25 October 2024, https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2024/10/how-corruption-top-erodes-support-democracy

^[32] https://www.occrp.org/en/about-us/impact-to-date

^[33] James Bolton-Jones and Dr Susan Hawley, ‘The first UK sanctions strategy – our analysis’, Spotlight on Corruption, 26 February 2024, https://www.spotlightcorruption.org/the-first-uk-sanctions-strategy/

^[34] Rachel Davies Teka, ‘UK Government announces ‘clamp down on corruption and illicit finance’, Transparency International UK, https://www.transparency.org.uk/news/uk-government-announces-clamp-down-corruption-and-illicit-finance

Topics

Civil Society

Decline in media freedom ‘hand-in-hand’ with democratic backsliding

Article by Mel Bunce

January 29, 2025

Decline in media freedom ‘hand-in-hand’ with democratic backsliding

Media freedom, and access to information, are fundamental rights at the heart of open societies. In 2025, these rights are facing significant and sustained assaults. Governments and political leaders around the world are harassing and attacking journalists, viral disinformation and conspiracy campaigns are polluting information eco-systems, and the journalism business model is failing.

Last year, more than 120 journalists were killed and 500 imprisoned.^[1] Countless more were arbitrarily detained, censored, and targeted with lawsuits and online harassment campaigns, designed to intimidate and silence. Meanwhile, public media organisations have been politicised and influenced by political elites, and had their funding threatened.^[2]

A shocking 80% of the world’s population has less freedom of expression today than they did in 2000.^[3]

As the dust settles on 2024, the bumper ‘year of elections’, we are also seeing a rise in the number of leaders who verbally attack and criticise the media – including in the United States and Europe – historic champions of free speech.^[4]

Famously, during his 2024 Presidential election campaign, Donald Trump said he wanted to jail journalists and close down major news networks. At one rally, he even joked that he “wouldn’t mind” if an assassin shot the journalists standing in front of him.^[5]

These attacks are amplified by new alliances between political elites and technology platforms that increasingly set the rules of engagement for the global public sphere.^[6] Elon Musk, in particular, is using X to criticise the ‘mainstream media’. Meanwhile, Meta has announced that it will cease fact checking on its platforms in the United States, and relax its community regulations.

Declining media freedom is also compounded by the extreme economic pressure facing the news industry. Over the past two decades, the advertising revenue that once supported independent journalism has moved to social media and online platforms, resulting in staggering job cuts and newsroom closures.

In the UK, the revenue for traditional local journalism is today roughly only a quarter what it was in 2007.^[7] While in the United States, there have been so many newsroom closures that an estimated 55 million Americans now live in ‘news deserts’: areas where there is limited or no access to local news at all.^[8]

Why does this matter?

Journalists are the traditional ‘fourth estate’ that hold elites to account. They help to expose corruption and abuses of power, and ensure that civil rights and freedoms are protected.

Research shows that, in ‘news desserts’ without local media, voter turn-out goes down, political partisanship goes up, and local politicians, courts and business are not scrutinised. One study has even shown that, as local newspapers close down, oil and gas plants pollute more.^[9]

Most significantly, declining media freedom goes hand in hand with democratic backsliding. Governments that seize and silence the media face less scrutiny; and it becomes easier to disregard the rights and freedoms of citizens and manipulate election outcomes.

More generally, when elites relentlessly attack and criticise the ‘fake news’ media, they create confusion about what sources of information can be trusted, and this makes populations more vulnerable to propaganda, mis- and disinformation.

This misinformation causes real harm – as seen during the Covid-19 pandemic.^[10] It can also exacerbate crises and conflict, as it has in Ukraine and Syria.^[11] Finally, misinformation can create social division and undermine democratic institutions, including through election interference by foreign actors. A free and critical news media – that is trusted by audiences – helps to insulate society against these harms.

For all these reasons, as the OSCE argues, “There is no security without media freedom”.^[12]

What next?

States have made numerous pledges to protect and promote media freedom – through fora including the United Nations and UNESCO, the OECD, The International Partnership for Information and Democracy, and the US-led Summit for Democracy, to name a few.

Notably, in 2019, then Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt made media freedom the UK’s number one foreign policy priority. He appointed Amal Clooney as the UK’s Special Envoy for Media Freedom, and he launched the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC) with Canada as the co-chair.

As media freedom continues to decline, it is crucial that the UK and its allies follow through on these pledges. There have been endless summits, days, and reports documenting the decline of media freedom. What we need now is action.

This means unequivocally condemning those who attack journalism – be those attacks physical, legal, verbal, or through online harassment. It means going beyond questions of journalism safety to focus on media funding, the regulation of online platforms, media literacy, and methods for countering more subtle forms of influence and control.

The fight for media freedom will require significant political and financial capital.^[13] Yet it could not be more important for democratic survival.

Mel Bunce is Professor of International Journalism and Politics at City St George’s, University of London. Her research examines international news, media freedom, and the relationship between journalism and democracy. She is currently the Deputy Dean of the School of Communication & Creativity at City St George’s, University of London, and she was previously the Head of City’s renowned Department of Journalism. Mel holds a Doctorate in Politics from the University of Oxford, and is a Senior Fellow of the UK’s Higher Education Association.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

^[1] International Federation of Journalists, Press Release: 122 journalists and media workers killed in 2024, says the IFJ, 31 December 2024, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/122-journalists-and-media-workers-killed-in-2024-says-the-ifj.

^[2] Kate Wright, Martin Scott, and Mel Bunce, Capturing News, Capturing Democracy: Trump and the Voice of America, Oxford University Press, 26 September 2024, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/capturing-news-capturing-democracy-9780197768495?lang=en&cc=au.

^[3] Article 19, ‘Explore the state of freedom of expression around the world’, Global Expression Report 2024, 2025, https://www.globalexpressionreport.org/.

^[4] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 2024 World Press Freedom Index – journalism under political pressure, 2024, https://rsf.org/en/2024-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-under-political-pressure.

^[5] Steve Holland, ‘Trump says he wouldn’t mind if someone shot through ‘the fake news’ to get him’, Reuters, 03 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-wouldnt-mind-if-someone-shot-through-the-fake-news-get-him-2024-11-03/

^[6] Julie Posetti, Kaylee Williams and Mel Bunce, Donald Trump, Elon Musk and the threat to press freedom, The Guardian, 04 December 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/04/donald-trump-elon-musk-and-the-threat-to-press-freedom.

^[7] Dominic Ponsford, Colossal decline of UK regional media since 2007 revealed, Press Gazette, https://pressgazette.co.uk/publishers/regional-newspapers/colossal-decline-of-uk-regional-media-since-2007-revealed/.

^[8] Ill Evanston, ‘Medill report shows local news deserts expanding’, Northwestern Medill, 23 October 2024, https://www.medill.northwestern.edu/news/2024/medill-report-shows-local-news-deserts-expanding.html

^[9] Pamela Campa, Press and leaks: Do newspapers reduce toxic emissions?, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 91, September 2018, Pages 184-202, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069616301371.

^[10] Maria Mercedes Ferreira Caceres et al., The impact of misinformation on the COVID-19 pandemic, AIMS Public Health. January 2022, Pages 262–277, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9114791/.

^[11] Mel Bunce, Humanitarian Communication in a Post-Truth World, Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, Volume 1, Issue 1, 01 January 2019, https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/journals/jha/1/1/article-p49.xml.

Cathrin Schaer, ‘How fake news campaigns could push Syria back to civil war’, DW, 03 January 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/syria-civil-war-hts-bashar-assad-regime-fake-news-disinformation-v2/a-71210900

Max Hunter, ‘Russia vs Ukraine: the biggest war of the fake news era’, Reuters, 01 August 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-vs-ukraine-biggest-war-fake-news-era-2024-07-31/.

^[12] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘can there be security without media freedom?’, 25th Anniversary of the Mandate of the OSCE Representative on Freedom on the Media, 2022, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/d/530239.pdf

^[13] William Horsley, Dear foreign secretary, here’s how to protect journalists and press freedom, The Conversation, 5 February 2019, https://theconversation.com/dear-foreign-secretary-heres-how-to-protect-journalists-and-press-freedom-111128.

Topics

Civil Society

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Artificial Intelligence: Driving and Thriving on Global Disorder?

Article by Dr Sasikumar Sundaram

January 27, 2025

Artificial Intelligence: Driving and Thriving on Global Disorder?

In recent years, claims about advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have also promised to revolutionise our worlds.^[1]^[2] Business, finance, healthcare, transportation, education, communication and translation, and customer service among others are under the magic spell of AI.^[3] It should come as no surprise, then, that the AI revolution has generated international competition among states to lead and benefit from the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution.^[4] ^[5] The struggle for capitalising on the AI revolution among states, without a doubt, will change local and international politics.

The West led by the United States, United Kingdom and Europe intends to focus on liberal principles to set the AI standards for innovation and mitigate risks.^[6] The rest, mostly the Global South, is expected to see the benefits of these prudent norms, rules, and principles, if not acquiesce, to make the world a better place.^[7] After all, previous instances of disruptive technologies such as the invention of the telegraph and the telephone or nuclear weapons were managed through multilateral norms and institutions. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) shaped the norms for reliable and equitable use of communication systems globally and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) aimed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promising disarmament whilst promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But the struggle to capitalise on AI or tame it through globally acceptable norms and institutions will not follow past precedents, for the simple reason that the AI revolution is not only a driver of global disorder, but thrives on it.

Global disorder is a way to understand the complex and interlinked chaos and crisis unfolding in our world – everything everywhere all at once. There are endless wars across regions, rising economic inequalities, continuous racial and gendered injustices, predatory capitalism and its impact on the environment, resource wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, callous disregard of international rule of law and multilateral institutions across the political spectrum, societal discontents that feed into radical right-wing ideologies of violence and left-wing visions of revolution. Global disorder has also led to increasing interference of global elites and tech-billionaires in the everyday conduct, not just the broad contours, of politics. These episodes of crisis as individual instances are certainly not new. However, today we live in a world of polycrises.^[8] Our world is interconnected than any time in the past spinning the crises faster.^[9] Policymakers cannot put a band aid on one crisis to resolve another as global disorder forms an intricate web of crises – each influencing and amplifying the other.

AI and Multilateralism

AI is a driver of global disorder in this interconnected world of crises. This is in part due to three reasons. Firstly, multilateral norms and institutions as a solution to stabilise the world from the problems of disruptive technologies are in a deep crisis.^[10] Many stakeholders in AI are led by players in the private sector. A group of influential members in this sector distrust multilateral global institutions and inveigh against attempts to manage AI as regulatory overreach that stifles innovation.^[11] They call for self-regulation instead.^[12] This convergence of distrust of multilateralism is deeply troubling.

For example, in handling the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s invasion of Gaza, both the Western and the Global South policy makers have challenged the liberal international order for addressing the scourge of war.^[13] Many policymakers turned to selfies, smart phones, and propaganda to feed the hungry social media machine with rhetoric about both these wars. More than anything, policymakers discarded an important “qualitative” element of multilateralism: non-discrimination.^[14] The AI world on social media thrived on this rejection of the non-discrimination principle. We find multiple AI curated videos and memes in YouTube, Tiktok, Facebook, and in other social media platforms where actors justify one war whilst rejecting or ignoring many others. Policymakers and the general public found ways to disparage the UN, avoided dialogue with their “enemies,” and lived in media driven realities of these wars. AI has changed the world from modus-vivendi to the world of irreconcilable differences.

In the past, multilateral institutions were avenues to articulate differences through dialogue. For example, US policymakers were wary of state-centric norms of ITU. They pursued power in diplomacy to regulate the internet through the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). They ensured governments took private sector interests seriously.^[15] Similarly, on the NPT, Indian policymakers disagreed on the norms of nuclear haves and have-nots, asserted sovereign equality among states, and developed an independent nuclear programme. India maintained its international non-proliferation credentials and in 2005 Indian policymakers cashed this cheque as a responsible nuclear weapons state against the geopolitical competition between the US and China.^[16] The influence of short-curated videos, pictures, and memes powered by AI and machine learning algorithms have changed such slow pursuit of interest within multilateral norms towards the desires for speedy solutions outside of it.

AI and Global Digital Divide

Secondly, the AI revolution rests on a larger digital divide between the West and the Global South states, and a sharper divide between and within Global South states.^[17] Claims about the promises of AI wrongly predict a fair distribution of its benefits to the world, when in fact advancements in AI perpetuate sharp divisions, hierarchy, and inequalities globally. Digital hierarchy takes many forms. For example, in the West there is thicket of data protection and planned regulation of risks to privacy.^[18] Nevertheless, machine learning algorithms require supply of data. Many tech-companies work closely with governments and non-governmental organisations and focus on democracy to use data from the Global South. For example, “Microsoft partnered with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2022 to expand a training curriculum for investigative journalists on the abuse of state resources in elections.” [19] Piloted in 2022 in Tunisia and Serbia, the training is in high demand, “for safely investigating state abuse of public resources.”[20]

This is not altruism, however. Even relatively strong states from the Global South, who are very much part of the liberal order such as India, Brazil, or South Africa, frequently face the dictates of tech-giants, which many see as digital colonialism.^[21] Similarly, the expertise and the capacity to manufacture advanced semiconductors are concentrated in the West, leading to race for semiconductor supremacy.^[22] Specifically, investing in equal access to advanced semiconductors or universal data protection is antithetical to the AI revolution. China has already sensed a geopolitical struggle in this arena and has its own AI plans that are distinct from the West.^[23] Furthermore, critical minerals and rare earth in Africa and Latin America power AI machines.^[24] Increasingly assertive or even democratic political actors in this part of the world saddles easy access to these resources. Possibly worst of all, many AI stakeholders find struggles in “free market” is better than a regulated supply of these resources. Like a wolf watching over a henhouse, many companies have made promises about voluntary commitments such as safety tests, information sharing, or robust reporting mechanisms to manage risks posed by AI.^[25] The future of global disorder lies in how these promises and commitments unfold in world politics.

AI and Power Politics

Finally, exalted claims of the AI revolution hide the novel power politics that is part of any technological advancements in the world.^[26] With the relative decline of the West, albeit with a militarily powerful United States, and the shift in the bargaining leverage of many other states in the lower rungs of international hierarchy, we are moving from the age of great power geopolitics to widespread power politics of all actors. Increasingly power politics on technology resort to technology for influence. Ambitious policymakers will aim to use AI technology global influence detached from the realities of inequalities in an unequal world. Hyper surveillance, return to techno-nationalism, silencing dissent, relying on technocratic solutions, and a lofty imagination of AI driven warfare will augment global disorder.

Sasikumar Sundaram is a Senior Lecturer in Foreign Policy and Security at the Department of International Politics, City St George’s, University of London. He is currently Vice Chair of the Global South Caucus of the International Studies Association. He completed a PhD in International Relations at Central European University (Budapest / Vienna) and Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil and American University, Washington DC. He is author of forthcoming book Rhetorical Powers: How Rising States Assert Competence in International Politics (New York: Columbia University Press). His work has been published in several leading journals, including International Theory, International Studies Quarterly, and Journal of Global Security Studies.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

^[1] Mustafa Suleyman, Michael Bhaskar, ‘The Coming Wave: AI, Power, and Our Future’, Penguin, 03 October 2024, https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/454199/the-coming-wave-by-bhaskar-mustafa-suleyman-and-michael/9781529923834

^[2] Mustafa Suleyman, ‘How the AI Revolution Will Reshape the World’, Time, 01 September 2023,  https://time.com/6310115/ai-revolution-reshape-the-world/

^[3] Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, ‘AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can’t, and How to Tell the Difference’, Princeton University Press, 24 September 2024, https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691249131/ai-snake-oil?srsltid=AfmBOor515mF4ERoCFTYk0P5B_ePkAuyJzpbo-eT0UYBWN0LadHgrINS

^[4] Sam Winter-Levy, The Emerging Age of AI Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, 28 October 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/emerging-age-ai-diplomacy

^[5] UK Government, ‘Regulation for the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, Policy Paper, 11 June 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulation-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/regulation-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution

^[6] Anu Bradford, ‘The Race to Regulate Artificial Intelligence’, Foreign Affairs, 27 June 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/race-regulate-artificial-intelligence-sam-altman-anu-bradford

^[7] Rachel Adams, ‘AI Is Bad News for the Global South’, Foreign Policy, 17 December 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/17/ai-global-south-inequality/

^[8] Adam Tooze, ‘Welcome to the World of the Polycrisis’, Financial Times, October 28, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/498398e7-11b1-494b-9cd3-6d669dc3de33

^[9] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion’, International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351

^[10] United Nations, ‘Amid Rise in Conflict, Distrust among Nations, Stronger Multilateral System Led by United Nations Needed More than Ever, World Leaders Tell General Assembly’, Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, Seventy-eighth Session, 80th & 81st Meetings, 07 May 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12598.doc.htm

^[11] Financial Times, ‘OpenAI warns over split with Europe as regulation advances’, 25 May 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/5814b408-8111-49a9-8885-8a8434022352

^[12] Taken from a video tweeted by Meet the Press (MTP) whilst interviewing CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, on 13 May 2023, https://x.com/MeetThePress/status/1657778656867909633?mx=2.

^[13] Patrick Wintour, ‘Why US double standards on Israel and Russia play into a dangerous game’, The Guardian, 26 December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/26/why-us-double-standards-on-israel-and-russia-play-into-a-dangerous-game

^[14] John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution, Cambridge University Press, Volume 46, Issue 3 , pp. 561 – 598, 1992, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/multilateralism-the-anatomy-of-an-institution/AB34548F299B16FDF0263E621905E3B5

^[15] See Duncan Hollis and Kal Rustiala, “The Global Governace of the Internet” in Duncan Snidal & Michael N. Barnnett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023)

^[16] US Department of State (Archive), U.S. – India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.html

^[17] United Nations, ‘Widening Digital Gap between Developed, Developing States Threatening to Exclude World’s Poorest from Next Industrial Revolution, Speakers Tell Second Committee’, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Seventy-eighth Session, 10th & 11th Meetings, 06 October 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/gaef3587.doc.htm

^[18] Daniel Spichtinger, ‘New data protection and privacy laws have changed the regulatory landscape for researchers in the Global North’, LSE, 15 April 2024, shttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2024/04/15/new-data-protection-and-privacy-laws-have-changed-the-regulatory-landscape-for-researchers-in-the-global-north/

[19] International Foundation for Electoral Systems, https://www.ifes.org

[20] The original report in the US State Department is US Department of State, ‘Private Sector Commitments to Advance Democracy’, 29 March 2023, https://www.state.gov/private-sector-commitments-to-advance-democracy/ . This report is now removed. See archives: http://web.archive.org/web/20230329182252/https://www.state.gov/private-sector-commitments-to-advance-democracy/

^[21] Toussaint Nothias, ‘How to Fight Digital Colonialism’, Boston Review, 14 November 2022, https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/how-to-fight-digital-colonialism/

^[22] Financial Times, ‘The race for semiconductor supremacy’, 03 October 2023, https://channels.ft.com/en/tech/the-race-for-semiconductor-supremacy/

^[23] Ludovica Meacci and Dr Pia Hüsch, ‘How China and the UK are Seeking to Shape the Global AI Discourse’, RUSI, 25 September 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-china-and-uk-are-seeking-shape-global-ai-discourse

^[24] Kate Crawford, ‘Atlas of AI’, Yale University Press, London, 11 October 2022, https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300264630/atlas-of-ai/

^[25] Kevin Roose, ‘How Do the White House’s A.I. Commitments Stack Up?’, The New York Times, 22 July 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/22/technology/ai-regulation-white-house.html?mc_cid=615f6f367d&mc_eid=808c31b9bc

^[26] Jeffrey Ding, ‘Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition’, Princeton University Press, 20 August 2024, https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691260341/technology-and-the-rise-of-great-powers

Topics

A new world (re)order: Expansion of the BRICS and rise of alternative multilateralism?

Article by Leonardo Ramos

January 23, 2025

A new world (re)order: Expansion of the BRICS and rise of alternative multilateralism?

The recent expansion of the BRICS, an intergovernmental organisation setup in 2009 spearheaded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, can be seen as a key driver, as well as perhaps a symptom, of the global disorder seen today.[1] Emerging middle powers, including the new BRICS members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates – are playing an increasingly important role in the decision-making processes of global economic governance. However, when these powers turn into ‘politically aligned’ blocs, they can also be seen to create more problems than solutions to Liberal International Order (LIO).[2]

The so-called BRICS emerged in the context of the crisis of the legitimacy of the capitalist system and the LIO. The formation of the BRICS gradually created cooperation mechanisms to give a more assertive expression and a joint demand for greater participation of emerging powers in international economic governance. This demand was further expanded to include interests from other countries in the Global South. As such, the BRICS evolved into a political movement that morphed overtime to challenge the status quo of the LIO.

It is in this political context that new horizons of “promotion by invitation” are opening up within the BRICS organisation. Over the course of 2024-5, the BRICS old guards – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – were joined by new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia to become BRICS+.

In recent years, under China’s leadership, a call for a multipolar world – a world where there is a great distribution of power held between more than two states – has emerged as a political movement where BRICS+ members invite other countries to participate in an initiative that can benefit development goals. See, for example, Chinese investments in infrastructure all over the Global South and their impact on the development of such countries. This expansionist effort to widen collaboration between states was made explicit through China’s BRICS plus initiative when they hosted the 2017 summit. Notably, at the 2023 summit, held in South Africa, and the 2024 summit, held in Russia, invitations to join the BRICS organisation were collectively offered to 19 countries, with the aforementioned six states so far taking up membership.^[3]

Many middle powers see the “open doors” policy of BRICS as a great opportunity. The collective group has also portrayed the US as the declining hegemon, giving further credence to the problems of the LIO and the ability to engage in new economic governance beyond the hegemony of the US.[4]

However, the BRICS+ process also triggers an “expansion dilemma,” meaning that there are unresolved questions on the nature of the BRICS as an institutional format, the identity of BRICS, and its role as the “nucleus of the Global South.”[5] In this sense, such an initiative has the potential to establish distinct regional platforms in the areas of trade and investment cooperation, particularly on cooperation in technology and innovation, bringing more significant challenges for established powers such as the US and the UK for a global solution for global problems.

Furthermore, the BRICS+ approach has generated potential problems for the strategic interests of some of its own BRICS members – particularly Brazil, India and South Africa – since it may be in the Chinese interest to incorporate actors that threaten or weaken the leadership and regional interests of these countries.[6] In this case, India’s concern with Pakistan is an important point of attention, for example.

The process of BRICS expansion thus accelerates the multicentric and local characteristics of the international system and the return of bloc politics in the face of a changing geopolitical context. Such movement in this direction occurs under the leadership of China with the relative consensus of the other four members and can be problematic to the LIO and the norms related to it, once such group are not fully supporters of the LIO.

The BRICS+ can be seen to be moving from a condition of minilateral political formation to complex multilateralisation, interconnected both with other initiatives of the multicentric international system such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the China Forums Policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as with institutions and processes of regional cooperation around which BRICS member countries orbit. This presents a complex overlap between bilateralism, minilateralism and multilateralism in a current multicentric system, which could result in a profound transformation of the international order and/or in the coexistence of several international orders simultaneously. Hence, BRICS+ can be seen as a crucial aspect and symptom of global disorder current developments: if we want to understand global disorder paths, we must understand BRICS+ developments.

Leonardo Ramos (Brazilian) is currently an Associate Professor of International Relations at Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), Brazil, and has been a visiting scholar at the Universidad Nacional de Rosario (UNR). His current research topics include BRICS, emerging countries, and the crisis of the international liberal order. His publications include: Caesarism, populism, and the 2018 election in Brazil (2019, Capital & Class); The BRICS International Security Agenda (2009–2019) (2021, Dados—with Pedro Rocha and Danny Zahreddine); The role of declining Brazil and ascending China in the BRICS initiative (2019, In: Li Xing. (Org.). The international political economy of the BRICS. Routledge—with Javier Vadell).

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

[1] BRICS is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The acronym is derived from the founding members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

[2] The ‘Liberal International Order’ is a term used to describe a set of governing ideals, rooted in WWII, in which nations adhere to multilaterialism (through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc), and subscribe to cooperation on and the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, monetary and trade policies, security, and open markets; for a through analysis and key debates on the nature of this order, see G John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes, eds., Ordering the World? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice, International Affairs special issue 94, 1 (2018).

^[3] At the 2023 summit: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; At the 2024 summit: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

[4] Javier Vadell & Leonardo Ramos, ‘The role of declining Brazil and ascending China in the BRICS initiative’, The International Political Economy of BRICS, Routledge, 2019, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429507946-5/role-declining-brazil-ascending-china-brics-initiative-javier-vadell-leonardo-ramos.

Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Jorge Tavares da Silva, and Carlos Rodrigues, The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2024.

Javier Vadell & Leonardo Ramos, ‘World Reordering and the Emergence of BRICS Plus in a Multicentric System’, The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1133-1147, 10 January 2025 (online), https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-97-5640-7_56

[5] ibid

[6] ibid

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Rule of law in crisis: The need for a new approach

Article by Geoffrey Swenson

January 22, 2025

Rule of law in crisis: The need for a new approach

The rule of law is vital for creating and maintaining democracy; providing security; protecting human rights; and promoting economic development.[1] Definitions vary, but fundamentally it demands that all are bound by the same law and that the law protects and holds accountable both the governed and governing.^[2] Promoting the rule of law has been a core policy priority for Western states and international institutions since the 1990s.

A Deepening Challenge

Globally, the rule of law is in crisis today. Many prominent advocates, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have seen the rise of political movements openly antagonistic to its ideals. While President Donald Trump’s first administration did not formally abandon the longstanding official US policy of backing the rule of law abroad, it was not a priority. How the second Trump administration will behave in office remains to be seen. That said, if his rhetoric to date is any indication, at best, a Trump-led United States shows little appetite to be a leading global proponent for the rule of law in the coming years. Within the European Union, longstanding organisational consensus about the rule of law has been shattered with the mainstreaming of far-right politics. In Hungary, for instance, Viktor Orban has entrenched a government that the European Parliament calls a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.”^[3] Powerful revisionist states, such as China and Russia, have tried to recast the rule of law as a means to exercise, but not restrain, authority.

This crisis is further compounded by the chronic failure of costly international efforts to advance the rule of law through the use of force in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, over forty years of technocratic internationally funded foreign aid that equates rule of law promotion with capacity building and material assistance have consistently disappointed.[4] Technocratic rule of law work focuses on building skills and improving legal processes, but largely avoids bigger questions of what makes for a more just society or how to get the government itself to be committed to rule of law ideals. This approach has a certain appeal because judicial training and case management systems, for instance, are easy to monitor and can be pursued regardless of the overarching political order because it does not threaten that order.

It is clear, however, that establishing and sustaining the rule of law is a political process. The rule of law requires a commitment to its ideals by, as noted above, both the governing and the governed. Powerful people, including high-level state officials, who violate its precepts must face at least some prospect of accountability. While not all democratic regimes have the rule of law, research has shown that democratic accountability is essential for both creating and sustaining the rule of law.^[5]

A New Approach

Ultimately, a more promising approach demands both continuity and change. It needs to recognise the rule of law matters as a real foreign policy goal though it is not the only one. Effective foreign policy sometimes requires dealing with unsavoury regimes and tough compromises. Rule of law ideals must sometimes give way to pragmatism. Few people would sensibly argue that Western states should have no dealings with China, a leading economic and global power. Rule of law concerns must be balanced with other vital issues like addressing global challenges like climate change and seeking to maintain key security goals in places like Taiwan while avoiding potentially catastrophic military conflicts.

At the same time, this does not require abandoning the rule of law as an ideal or as a policy priority. Rather, the key is strategically and systematically making incremental improvements when possible and avoiding own goals like unnecessarily strengthening authoritarian rulers or undercutting the rule of law internationally.

While aid still has a role to play, thinking critically about the structure of the aid industry and the organization of government agencies that provide assistance to ensure that building long term, sustainable success lies at the core of their mission. Furthermore, promoting the rule of law comprehensively, as is generally done for transnational security or economic statecraft, can also make a difference.

Justice should also be engaged beyond the state. In countries receiving foreign aid, non-state justice systems rooted in custom or religion generally handle most legal disputes.^[6] This dramatically influences both domestic and international security as it undercuts the state’s claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory. In other words, the state is not always in control even in its own territory. State claims to authority can be highly contentious. It also dramatically impacts the prospects of international rule of law endeavours.^[7] Yet, current efforts overwhelmingly focus on state institutions. More serious and more constructive engagement with non-state justice is essential.^[8]

Even more fundamentally, it is vital to make it clear what the rule of law requires and what it is not. This means pushing back against claims that equate the rule of law with rule by law which renders the law a mere tool of state authority absent any restraint or accountability.

Last but not least, there is a need for states that back the rule of law abroad to try to better uphold those ideas within their own societies. This means following the law both domestically and internationally. Fighting corruption and impunity in society and within the state is vital as is respect for democratic norms and processes. This demonstration is absolutely critical as a seeming lack of commitment to rule of law ideals by its proponents within the international systems has undermined those efforts and provided an opening for authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine the existing global order and legitimize oppression domestically.

In short, strengthening the rule of law, and through it a more rules-based international order, remains not only possible, but essential. Nevertheless, there is no ground for complacency. Real changes and real commitments are vital.

Geoffrey Swenson is a Reader in International Politics at City, University of London, a Trustee of the British International Studies Association, and was previously a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He completed a PhD in International Relations at Oxford as a Clarendon Scholar, an MA from Queen’s University Belfast as a Mitchell Scholar, and a JD from Stanford Law School. He is the author of Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2022), and his work has been published in several leading journals, including International Security, International Studies Quarterly, and World Development.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

[1] Francis Fukuyama, ‘Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy’, London: Profile, 2014.

^[2] Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’, St John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-0082, 13 September 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012051

^[3] Paul Kirby and Nick Thorpe, ‘Who is Viktor Orban, Hungarian PM with 14-year grip on power?’, BBC News, 12 February 2024.

[4] Roland Janse, ‘A Turn to Legal Pluralism in Rule of Law Promotion?’, Erasmus Law Review 6 (3–4): 181–90, 2013.

^[5] Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 32-46, October 2004, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-quality-of-democracy-why-the-rule-of-law-matters/

^[6] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice’, International Studies Review, Volume 20, Issue 3, Pages 438–462, September 2018, https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/20/3/438/4817016

^[7] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law’, Oxford University Press, 20 October 2022, https://academic.oup.com/book/44455?login=false

^[8] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Promoting Law Beyond the State’, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 3, September 2024, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/68/3/sqae102/7708174?login=false

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Trump’s ‘America First’: US predominance as a threat to the liberal international order

Article by Inderjeet Parmar

January 20, 2025

Trump’s ‘America First’: US predominance as a threat to the liberal international order

Donald Trump’s re-election to the American presidency has sparked serious debates over both the United States’ role in world politics and as the leader of the Liberal International Order.^[1] Despite warranted claims about Trump’s unpredictability, volatility and unreliability, he is no “isolationist”. Trump, along with the various forces behind him – corporate, intellectual, and political – remain wedded to US global power but in more unilateralist, nationalist, realist, ways, and are therefore committed to even more aggressive pursuit of US ‘vital interests’.

This means the incoming administration broadly rejects liberals’ methodology of regime change, ‘democracy’ promotion, and a liberal international order. However, even post—Cold War liberals, such as those part of the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations, have been pragmatic, and highly selective, about their commitment to multilateralism and international law. Notably, US military budgets have continued to burgeon throughout the period since 1991.

Trump has therefore intensified, broadened and mainstreamed a tendency that has been long in the making. As a ‘blunt instrument’, whose self-concept and vision has clearly sharpened since 2020, Trump falsely projects himself as the anti-war candidate while simultaneously aiming to further strengthen the US military machine under the banner of “peace through strength”. Hence, the challenges Trump offers to traditional US foreign policy will rattle allies and stir up ‘beltway’ national security elites. His Nixonian era ‘mad man’ approach to global messaging is meant to be unsettling but, ultimately, Trump remains rooted in and loyal to the goal of US global predominance – that of an American empire.

The US foreign policy establishment in crisis – of destruction and reconstruction

With the return of Trump to the White House, the ‘traditional’ US foreign policy establishment is in another one of its periodic crises. However, as Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci noted, crises are moments of destruction and reconstruction.^[2] Hence, anxious establishmentarians’ debates abound in the hallowed halls of the exclusive think tank, Ivy League university, blue-chip Wall Street corporation, bank and law firm, in the mainstream media ecosystem, and in the American state. The US establishment is seemingly besieged by enemies and critics from within and without.

America’s allies worry about what a second Trump administration might do to the G7, NATO, UN, or World Health Organisation. Global South states, particularly China, demand status and recognition, decrying “centuries of [colonial] humiliation”.^[3] At home, that establishment is held responsible for ‘endless’ wars, especially since the 1990s, including seemingly intractable conflicts such as Ukraine’s war with Russia.^[4]

The ‘traditional’ liberal internationalist foreign policy establishment under ‘threat’

The US foreign policy establishment, largely dominant since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, has had 3 major methodological-ideological characteristics that are now in crisis and flux:

Constantly expanding and open markets, broad commitment to freer trade;
Global economic expansionism organised under the umbrella of US-led liberal international order;
Above underpinned by that dominant elite’s ideology – American exceptionalism, historic mission of a chosen people to improve the world.

Those three principal characteristics are now seen as less relevant or even obsolete. They are secondary to the more naked pursuit of unilateral power. The traditional principles and methods of US power in a world system dominated by the US, and its allies, are no longer sufficient to achieve or maintain America’s global primacy, and are being marginalised or thrust aside by Trumpism’s increasing insistence that the United States is not exceptional but in effect another ordinary state, albeit with extraordinary power.^[5]

Trump’s blunt challenge and Republican foreign policy tribes

Appointments in the first Trump administration to high level defence, security, and foreign policy positions, in comparison to those now being appointed and nominated in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s 2024 victory, signal a significant change in the offing. Appointees under the first Trump administration were comparable to those in previous administrations, continuing the Washington, DC, establishment trend, but by 2019 appointees were more consistent with MAGA and America First loyalists.^[6]

By 2024, nominees and appointees appear based on the ‘Fuhrer’ principle: loyal to the leader and saturated in MAGA (‘Make America Great Again’) principles and beliefs: anti-immigration, rejection of globalisation/free trade, denial of the climate crisis and question reckless military interventionism (though support greater military spending to maintain global armed superiority). A large part of this agenda also aligns with the more traditional mainstream support of the Trump-era Republican party as a whole. Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz (Secretary of State and National Security Adviser picks) resemble ‘primacists’ – believers in US global hegemony in which Washington must maintain its global leadership and military dominance, including in terms of NATO, and Ukraine, whilst allies must also provide more for global security. Other pro-Trump loyalists ‘prioritise’ one region over another – such as the Indo-Pacific over Europe, and more specifically Ukraine, while a third group constitute ‘restrainers’ who are more domestically-focused, arguing for military restraint, and have an emphatic focus on China rather than Russia. All three ‘tribes’, however, are pro-Israel, and MAGA-loyalists.^[7]

In conclusion, the second Trump administration will continue to play an aggressive role in world affairs in practically all respects. In part, a more ‘realist’ global strategy is required by the increasingly failing US social fabric – based on the effects of decades of neoliberal globalisation, which fuelled both ‘America First’ and ‘Bidenomics’.^[8] Both main parties have embraced ‘industrial policy’ to strengthen the US economy for intensified geoeconomic and geopolitical competition, mainly with China, but with other emerging states as well as the European Union and Japan.

The US is now more flexible than ever before in how it maintains its global imperium, principally through weaponizing every aspect of its powers. Trump 2.0 presents as ‘disorderly’. It is a blunt force shift in methods and flexibility in observance of the rule of law, at home and abroad. The slow evolution in these directions since the end of the Cold War, presided over by successive Democratic and Republican administrations, was accelerated by Trump’s first term, and appears to be hyper-intensifying under Trump II. Trump is actively and simultaneously disordering and reordering America at home, and the world system, based on overwhelming full spectrum dominance.

We are living in an era of organic crisis and flux – of morbid symptoms, violent solutions, charismatic leaders claiming to restore lost glories – an age of danger.

Inderjeet Parmar is Professor of International Politics at City St George’s, University of London, since 2012, having previously taught at the University of Manchester from 1991-2012. He is Associate Dean (Research) in the School of Policy and Global Affairs, and a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS), and Past president of the British International Studies Association. He is co-editor of a book series, Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy.

Parmar has published 3 research monographs and dozens of articles in academic journals on US elite power politics; his most recent book, Foundations of the American Century: Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power was published in 2012 by Columbia University Press, and translated into Chinese (2018) and Farsi (2021). He is also a columnist at The Wire (http://thewire.in/author/iparmar/), and has published articles on US elections and politics in Newsweek, Fortune, The Hindu, The Conversation.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

[1] The ‘Liberal International Order’ is a term used to describe a set of governing ideals, rooted in WWII, in which nations adhere to multilaterialism (through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc), and subscribe to cooperation on and the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, monetary and trade policies, security, and open markets; for a through analysis and key debates on the nature of this order, see G John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes, eds., Ordering the World? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice, International Affairs special issue 94, 1 (2018).

[2] Stuart Hall: “Gramsci and Us,” Blogpost; 10 February 2017; https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/2448-stuart-hall-gramsci-and-us?srsltid=AfmBOopFSpblrSQS0wA0Q5v5oXosMS93Rw-o7Oe61HAAzgH-ECUIbhI-.

[3] Alison A. Kaufman, “The ‘century of humiliation’ and China’s national narratives,” https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf.

[4] Stephen Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy, Macmillan, 2019.

[5] Giovanni Grevi, “Trump’s America: the ordinary superpower,” European Policy Centre, 13 June 2017, https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Trumps-America-the-ordinary-superpower~20ff44.

[6] Make America Great Again of ‘MAGA’ is the acronym for the political movement synonymous with Donal Trump’s presidential campaign.

[7] Majda Ruge and Jeremy Shapiro, European CFR, 17 November 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/polarised-power-the-three-republican-tribes-that-could-define-americas-relationship-with-the-world/.

[8] America First focused on domestic economy, including trade protectionism and plans for infrastructure programmes, which were implemented and extended by policies followed by the Biden administration, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act, among other legislation; Edward Walden, “Bidenomics is ‘America First’ With a Brain,” Foreign Policy, 18 June 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/18/biden-bidenomics-economy-america-first-trump-trade-supply-chains-industrial-policy-china-reshoring-protectionism/.

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Trump 2.0: What does the future hold for US foreign policy?

Article by Anthony Silberfeld and Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

January 16, 2025

Trump 2.0: What does the future hold for US foreign policy?

On Monday, 20th January, Donald Trump will be inaugurated into his second Presidency. With America, and the world, preparing for the next Trump administration, we turned to US experts, and friends of the FPC, Anthony Silberfeld (Bertelsmann Foundation) and Andrew Gawthorpe (Leiden University) to provide us with insights into what this will mean for foreign policy and global relations.

In this interview, Anthony and Andrew discuss what President Trump’s return to the White House means for the US’s role as the ‘global watchdog’, the impact and importance of this administration’s obsession with both social media and its owners, as well as what the future holds for the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK.

Where will foreign affairs sit on the list of policy priorities for President Trump, and what does this mean for the US’s traditional role as a ‘global watchdog’?

Anthony Silberfeld: The concept of “policy priorities” in a conventional sense did not exist in Donald Trump’s chaotic first term, and should not be expected in his second. Instead, one should view what’s ahead in two tiers of retribution. The first tier will be action taken against domestic threats, focusing specifically on undocumented immigrants and political enemies. Trump’s incoming border czar, Tom Homan, has committed to rounding up and deporting millions of migrants currently residing in the US. Whether this ends up being more theoretical than practical remains to be seen, but the result will have widespread economic and reputational repercussions for the US, not to mention the human toll it will take on these individuals and their families.

The second tier will take aim at foreign actors who, in Trump’s view, “have treated us unfairly.” This would include any country with which the US has a trade deficit, particular venom is reserved for Germany and China, but the punitive response will be widespread. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump threatened a range of tariffs against allies and adversaries alike. Rhetoric is one thing, but higher prices from food, electronics and cars for all Americans is something else. There will surely be announcements of tariffs in the early days of the new administration, but the economic impact of this action may temper much of this initial bluster. Nevertheless, the idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely. This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.

“[The] idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely. This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.”

Andrew Gawthorpe: Foreign policy is high on Trump’s list of policy priorities, but he has a narrower understanding of American goals than many previous presidents and is particularly focused on economic aspects of foreign policy. His planned trade tariffs, even if they are not implemented on as broad of a scale as he has suggested, will quickly become the top bilateral issue between the US and affected countries.

Trump’s presidency is not likely to be one in which the US is active in multilateral fora or seeking new cooperative agreements. He is sceptical of many of the things that previous American presidents have viewed as obligations deriving from international treaties or organisations. Instead, Trump likes to deal with countries bilaterally, a situation in which he feels he can better use American power as leverage against weaker nations.

Looking more closely at the potential foreign policy approaches of the US under a Trump Presidency, how could his policies affect the UK and Europe, particularly with relation to NATO and defence?

Anthony Silberfeld: Let’s start with the good news. I do not see a scenario in which the US withdraws from NATO, or reduces its own defence spending, which currently amounts to approximately two-thirds of the NATO total. Now for the bad news. The Trump administration has already signalled its intent to ask NATO members to increase their defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) beyond their current two percent commitment to as much as five percent. At present, only Poland, Greece and the three Baltic countries are meeting their two percent commitments, so the prospect of all NATO members meeting Trump’s new terms is somewhere between slim and none.

How the president-elect will treat those countries that fall below the spending threshold is the key question, notwithstanding America’s obligations under NATO’s Article 5. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves. The UK’s current status as a laggard in its NATO spending will draw the unwanted attention of the new regime in Washington, and will surely be an additional point of friction that will test the durability of the special relationship.

“…It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their
[NATO] defence spending obligations,
while those that do not are left to fend for themselves.”

Andrew Gawthorpe: While an American withdrawal from NATO remains unlikely, Trump could undercut the credibility of the alliance by refusing to endorse the organization’s mutual defence clause, Article V. However, Trump is likely to push European countries for much higher levels of defence spending and to wind down American support for Ukraine. He is likely to be willing to attempt to impose ceasefire terms that many European governments regard as too generous towards Russia. There is also a chance that his chaotic style of policymaking causes negotiations to collapse, potentially leading to further escalation in the conflict.

Anthony Silberfeld: Despite assurances from Donald Trump during the campaign that he would end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours upon taking office if not sooner, his envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently recalibrated expectations. The new outlook from Washington remains fluid, but aims for a ceasefire of some kind within 100 days of Trump taking office. How much consultation is done with the UK and European allies (let alone Ukraine itself) will not just determine whether an end to the war is viable, but will also provide an early signal for how this administration will work with its allies going forward.

Andrew Gawthorpe: For the UK specifically, Trump’s presidency raises the difficult question of London’s relationship with the European Union. The UK will be much better able to weather both Trump’s trade policy and his impact on the overall strategic situation in Europe through cooperation with the EU. Whereas UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, the incoming administration does not. That requires recalibration and looking to like-minded countries on the continent who share the UK’s goals and values.

“…UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, [but] the incoming administration does not.”

Elon Musk took an active role in the Trump-Vance campaign, utilising his platform on X in particular, and has been rewarded with a role in the Trump Administration. With Musk repeatedly criticised for his comments on UK developments, how large an impact do you anticipate Musk having on foreign policy?

Anthony Silberfeld: Musk’s support for Trump and Republican candidates during the election bought him a seat (and apparently a guest bedroom) at Mar-a-Lago, which he has already used to influence policy and there is no question that Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.

“…there is no question that [Elon] Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.”

Andrew Gawthorpe: Musk’s position inside the Trump administration is hard to determine. His position is unofficial and advisory, and he has many political disagreements with key segments of Trump’s political coalition. For instance, he favours certain forms of immigration, and is relatively close with the Chinese government. His longevity in Trump’s inner circle is hence not assured, particularly given that Trump has been known to turn on people who he perceives as taking the limelight away from him.

However, Musk should be taken seriously. Trump’s “MAGA movement” has often talked about internationalizing its project and trying to support right-wing parties in Europe, but Musk is doing it on a scale unseen in the past. Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home. At its worst, it could appear as de facto foreign intervention in European elections. And Musk can continue to do this, using X and his global bullhorn, even if he parts ways with Trump at some point.

“Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and [Elon] Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home.”

Anthony Silberfeld: The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk. During the transition period there has been a steady parade of corporate CEOs who have made rhetorical, policy and financial contributions to curry favour with the incoming president. Some of the most egregious examples start with Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg scrapping fact-checking on his platforms and contributing one million dollars to Trump’s inaugural fund.

Not to be outdone, Amazon’s executive chairman Jeff Bezos donated one million dollars to the same inaugural fund, and ponied up an additional $40 million to produce a Melania Trump biographical documentary. They are not alone, and in each instance, there is a calculation being made about offensive and defensive engagement with this new administration. In other words, how much does a company have to give to get what it wants, or conversely, how much will it cost to avoid being targeted if it runs afoul of the White House. These are real considerations for business leaders as they consider strategy and tactics in the period ahead.

“The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk.”

Given President Trump’s previous actions, can we expect US foreign policy discourse and decisions to be played out through comments made personally by Trump through non-traditional channels, and how can global leaders respond?

Anthony Silberfeld: I would make a distinction here between discourse and decisions when it comes to Trump’s foreign policy. As he did in the first term, Trump’s reflexive comments made via social media platforms or at impromptu new conferences will shape the policy discourse, and will force everyone else to react. American policymakers will scramble to determine whether Trump’s latest utterance should be taken figuratively, literally, or in jest. The press will (depending on their political orientation) either amplify Trump’s pronouncement or turn the half-baked screed into a policy analysis that is worthy of debate. But there is often a significant gap between Trump’s rhetoric and reality.

Many of the most controversial foreign policy statements made by Trump thus far, such as acquiring the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada, or the imposition of tariffs, will encounter legal, legislative, and public opinion barriers that may prove to be insurmountable. What we found in the first Trump administration is that his interests in policy initiatives were often transient. In those days, the administration was staffed in part with institutional professionals who still ran into roadblocks that curtailed the president’s worst instincts. This time around, the quality of staff in this administration, combined with the desire to gut the federal workforce through layoffs and loyalty tests is unlikely to result in the efficient implementation of the MAGA agenda. It’s going to be a wild ride for all involved. World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.

“World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.”

Andrew Gawthorpe: Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is supposedly going to ensure that the new administration is more focused and less prone to chaotic policymaking than Trump’s first term. However, it’s unlikely she can persuade Trump to give up his social media habit, and that means he will continue to drive the global agenda in part through this type of personal comment. This creates a tricky situation for world leaders. On the one hand, they feel domestic political pressure to stick up for their country. On the other hand, it’s important to not get too bogged down in the weeds. Trump threatens to do things all the time which he has no intention of doing. And he makes policy through personal relationships, meaning that it’s important for leaders to cultivate good relations with him and stay on his good side, so as better to promote their country’s interests. They cannot let those interests get drowned in a tide of tweets, and so it’s often better to not engage.

What does all of this mean for the ‘Special Relationship’ between the US and the UK going forward?

Anthony Silberfeld: The latest version of the special relationship will almost certainly get off to a rocky start since Donald Trump is never one to forget a real or perceived slight. Past comments by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy are going to be difficult for the White House to forgive, in spite of both men’s efforts to walk back those statements.[1] The US is also doing its part to poison the relationship before it begins as Elon Musk, one of President Trump’s closest advisers, is meddling in British domestic politics to undermine the Labour government. Not exactly a recipe for a harmonious marriage, but not all is lost.

Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker. Meeting the elevated NATO defence spending obligations, and highlighting the importance of UK investment in the US will be a good starting point. Unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine a Thatcher-Reagan or even a Blair-Bush relationship to flourish between Starmer and Trump, so London might be best served by spending its energy on cultivating relationships with members of Congress, state governors and mayors.

“Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker.”

Andrew Gawthorpe: The UK government should recognize the importance of personal relationships to Trump and attempt to cultivate ties with people in his inner circle. Then the government needs to use these relationships to put forward the UK’s case for why it is a constructive economic and security actor and not a net drain on American resources. Secondly, the UK also needs to look beyond the “special relationship” and instead think in broader US-European terms. The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore. Europe needs to be prepared to develop its capabilities as a geopolitical actor, and the correct role for the UK is to work alongside Europe in doing that.

“The UK government has to realize that this
second election of Trump means that the world is changing.
American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore.”

Living our values of democracy and the rule of law means having the capabilities to advance and defend them – something which is particularly important when the US is increasingly deviating from those very values.

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

Anthony Silberfeld joined the Bertelsmann Foundation as the Director of Transatlantic Relations in April 2014. His research focuses on democratic innovations in cities, and geopolitical competition in space. Anthony arrived at the Foundation after seven years with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was head of political and public affairs at the British Embassy’s Northern Ireland Bureau in Washington, DC. Prior to his tenure with the British government, Anthony held posts as a foreign policy advisor in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

[1] Albert Toth, From ‘repugnant’ to ‘the closest of allies’: Everything Keir Starmer has said about Donald Trump, The Independent, 06 November 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/us-election-trump-starmer-labour-republican-2024-b2642284.html; Chris Mason and Becky Morton, Lammy dismisses past criticism of Trump as ‘old news’, BBC, 07 November 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm2z1zm1pk3o.

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Trump 2.0: What does the future hold for US foreign policy?

“[The] idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely. This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.”

“…It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their [NATO] defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves.”

“…UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, [but] the incoming administration does not.”

“…there is no question that [Elon] Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.”

“Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and [Elon] Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home.”

“The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk.”

“World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.”

“Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker.”

“The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore.”

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“…It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their
[NATO] defence spending obligations,
while those that do not are left to fend for themselves.”

“The UK government has to realize that this
second election of Trump means that the world is changing.
American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore.”