Three years on: How the power of networking can contribute to a peaceful and democratic future

Article by Maija Paasiaro

February 28, 2025

Three years on: How the power of networking can contribute to a peaceful and democratic future

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine our immediate priority was to support Ukrainian John Smith Fellows in our network. This included amplifying their humanitarian work, showing solidarity and sharing reliable information from the ground.^[1] Our current and former staff and trustees also leveraged their UK networks to mobilise aid, in-kind donations and helped Fellows and their families to find refuge in the UK.

In the longer term, we have had to rethink how we work. The Trust was established in the 1990s to help emerging leaders in the former Soviet Union navigate an anticipated democratic transition. Thirty years on, the context is very different. Democracy is facing a crisis of trust. Authoritarianism and populism are on the rise. Our world is increasingly fragmented and polarised. We are all facing similar challenges and will be better equipped to tackle them if we work together, listening and learning from each other.

Being a small, independent organisation has allowed us to be agile and responsive. Our strength lies in our networks, built through 30 years of running fellowship programmes for exceptional young leaders from Eastern Europe, Russia, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Staying connected with them gives us the insights we need to develop responsive programmes.

As our Ukrainian Fellows’ focus has evolved over the last three years from immediate humanitarian response to long-term transformation, institutional reforms and sustainable development, so too has our programming as we now focus on supporting the capable leaders within Ukraine who are looking for international partners to help drive change. At the same time, we recognise that Ukrainians have a wealth of expertise – from cyber threats to digital transformation and crisis management to civic activism – that can offer valuable learning for counterparts in the UK and elsewhere.

Through our Ukrainian Women’s Leadership Programme, in partnership with the University of Edinburgh Business School, and through our current Scotland-Ukraine Reconstruction and Recovery Leadership Programme, our focus is on fostering collaborative connections between counterparts in both countries.^[2] By developing and sharing expertise together, we can help ensure Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery is sustainable, fair and inclusive.

As we’ve heard time and time again from our network, “Ukraine’s fight has become everyone’s fight” – and that includes the Russian and Belarusian professionals who have been part of our recent leaders in exile programmes.^[3] Unlike other organisations who have opted to exclude all Russians and Belarusians, as aggressor-state passport holders, from their programmes, we have taken a more nuanced approach: we have developed a separate strand of programming for those exiled leaders who are actively working towards an alternative, peaceful and free future for their countries. We think it is more important than ever to engage with Russians and Belarusians who oppose the war and are committed to a peaceful and democratic future for their countries. Not doing so increases Putin and Lukashenka’s power to silence people opposed to their regimes. These programmes support Fellows to develop the insights and skills needed to build the kinds of societies they want to live in in the future. This includes working on shifts needed to break away from authoritarian, imperialistic and patriarchal mindsets.

After everything that Ukrainians have gone through these last three years, they deserve nothing less than a just peace. In the long term, such a peace will only be sustainable if there are leaders on all sides who are willing to listen and learn from each other, who have the skills to debate and disagree with each other respectfully, who can hold difficult conversations about the past and who are motivated and inspired to imagine alternative ways of doing things. The Trust has a history of facilitating discussions and fostering collaborations with people who sometimes have very different backgrounds and points of view. Through our programmes we are creating connections and hope for a brighter future.

Maija has been the Executive Director of the John Smith Trust since 2020. As Executive Director, Maija is responsible for the overall strategic direction of the John Smith Trust. Maija has been with the John Smith Trust since 2017, first as Director of the Central Asia Fellowship Programme and then as Director of Programmes with added responsibility for the Wider Europe Fellowship Programme. Prior to this, she worked for the UK’s leading international conflict prevention and peacebuilding organisation, focusing on governance, peacebuilding processes, security and civil society sector development. Maija has over 20 years of experience in research, analysis and programme development in complex environments, including working in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia in education, media and organisational development. She speaks multiple languages and has an MA in Modern History and Russian from the University of St Andrews and an MSc in Development Studies with special reference to Central Asia from the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine: what our Fellows are doing and how you can help’, 24 May 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/ukraine-what-our-fellows-are-doing-and-how-you-can-help/; John Smith Trust, ‘Fellows in Ukraine fight hard for freedom and democracy’, 18 March 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/fellows-in-ukraine-fight-hard-for-freedom-and-democracy/; and, John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine: efforts to tackle the war’s devastating environmental impact’, 17 June 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/ukraine-efforts-to-tackle-the-wars-devastating-environmental-impact/

^[2] John Smith Trust, ‘Launch of new leadership programme for Ukrainian women in UK’, 08 March 2024, https://johnsmithtrust.org/launch-of-new-leadership-programme-for-ukrainian-women-in-uk/; and, John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Leadership Programme’, 2025, https://johnsmithtrust.org/applications/fellowships-2024-5/ukraine-recovery-and-reconstrustion-leadership-programme/

^[3] John Smith Trust, ‘Leaders in Exile: ‘Future of Belarus’ Fellowship’, 2024, https://johnsmithtrust.org/applications/belarus/.

Topics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

Three years on: What peace should be

Article by Ostap Kryvdyk

February 27, 2025

The call between President Trump and President Putin on 12 February 2025, left millions of Ukrainians in a state of silent disbelief, shock, and even grief. Along with the comments of US Secretary of Defense Hegseth at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group the same day, it gives us a rather clear frame for the future negotiations, which will define the destiny of Ukraine, Europe – and the whole world.^[1]

Let me stress the conceptual faults of the intended outcome called ‘peace’. So what does peace really mean and what is missing in a contemporary high level discussion about it?

Peace is when war does not happen again. But the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war have not been resolved. Putin did not reverse his vision of the Russian world. Russia did not recognise Ukraine’s right to exist and to join NATO. Crimea and part of Donbas are not given back, and the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are not excluded from the Russian constitution.

Europe cannot deter Russia alone

There is no power balance. The USA is openly declaring that it is leaving European security to the Europeans, denying help to Ukraine to secure its future. NATO membership for Ukraine or any NATO commitment is not happening: no one is risking war to defend Ukraine. Conversely, getting a ‘neutral’ Ukraine fully ready – with massive anti-ballistic missile defense, long-range strike capability, matching air force and fleet, and artillery power – is not on the table either.

Europe cannot deter Russia alone, neither by nuclear, conventional, or hybrid means. Regional powers like the UK or France will not tackle emboldened Russia strengthened by the global network of allies. And prosperity without security – Ukraine’s potential EU membership in the coming decade – is not going to bring investment, development, and reconstruction, because war will come again.

Putin gets ‘neutral’ Ukraine with no security guarantees and shuts us out of NATO. He achieved all his war aims but the change of regime in Kyiv and full control over the rest of the Ukrainian territory (this can wait a bit, and be delivered either through political warfare or during his next stage of aggression).

Democracy and human rights are becoming irrelevant

Peace is when there is justice and dignity. But instead of this the perpetrator is being equalised with the victim in intent, actions, consequences – and moral posture. The aggressor is to be rewarded. International law, along with the values of sovereignty, democracy and human rights are being made irrelevant.

Evidence of genocidal intent is ongoing – Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian identity is being erased in the occupied territories. Rape and mass murders stay unpunished, and arrests and tortures continue as we read this text. Mass mobilisation in the occupied territories is ongoing, and these Ukrainians will be killed in battles against their own.

Irresponsibility for war crimes – be it mass murders, replacement of population, deeming civilians as ‘cannon fodder’, use of chemical weapons, weaponization of frost and hunger – will solidify them as legitimate and efficient means of war.

Denying Ukraine EU membership will be next

Peace is when there is freedom. Ukraine’s war for independence is being devalued into ‘something that should never have happened’. Its heroes will become victims. Those remembering our victories might be labelled radicals, nationalists and war-mongers.

Future elections in Ukraine may become an opposite of itself: an orgy of psychological warfare, toxic social networks and political AI manipulations, massive Russian interference, including terror unconstrained by any moral or legal rules. Much cheaper, much more deniable, and extremely efficient.

Putin continues to deny Ukraine’s access to NATO. The predator will not release its prey.

Is the USA really backing Russia?

Peace should be sustainable. This current framing of peace is not. Setting the precedent of the legalised partitioning of Ukraine will next invite the redrawing of borders in Africa, Latin America, Asia – and in Europe. The example of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine will set the precedent for generations; anything short of nuclear weapons in stock will invite aggression.

Sacrificing Ukraine for avoiding nuclear conflict and for stopping active combat will simply delay the next act. All of this is prolonging Russia’s agony for the next wars to come, instead of finishing the collapse of the USSR and Russian empire. Is the West, and specifically the USA, backing Russia again?

President Trump potentially standing in Moscow next to Putin for his own “victory-against-Ukraine” parade on 9 May is not peace. It looks like the new ‘Yalta accords’, discussing Ukraine’s forced submission and disengagement rules in a Russia-created reality – and the next war coming very soon.^[2]

Ostap Kryvdyk is the Chair of the Ukrainian Strategic Initiative for the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine and is also a Fellow for the John Smith Trust.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Pete Hegseth, ‘’Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered)’, US Department of Defense, 12 February 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4064113/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact/

^[2] Department of State, United States of America, ‘The Yalta Conference, 1945’, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf

Topics

Ukraine Conflict

Three years on: What kind of peace?

Article by Andra-Lucia Martinescu

At a recent protest, when asked about the kind of peace he was clamouring for, a participant hesitated briefly before responding emphatically: ‘a peace to end all wars, a peace that would allow us to focus solely on our country, neither in the East nor the West.’[1]

He was referring to Romania, echoing a narrative that grew increasingly potent during the country’s fraught elections after seeding on the fringes of public discourse. Peace may indeed be a universal aspiration. However, when that aspiration is deliberately manipulated to weaken solidarity with those fighting for their sovereignty and existence, peace becomes a weapon wielded in the darkness – isolating the victim while protecting the aggressor.

The strategy lies in distortion by severing the meaning of peace from its context – detaching it from justice and reality so that, when unmoored from the truth, peace becomes a tool of subjugation. Carefully curated to sow fear and distrust, slogans that once lurked in the shadows of conspiracy forums found their way into collective mindsets, nurtured and methodically amplified by hostile external forces.

When Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, Romanians mobilised across the country to offer unwavering support to the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees crossing the borders – the devastating reality of war and displacement, undeniable in its raw immediacy. Solidarity emerged organically and from the grassroots, with families opening their homes and volunteers mustering supplies, each contributing with resolve to a nationwide relief effort. As the war continued to rage just across the border, it was precisely this solidarity that became a target, not just in Romania but throughout Europe and the system of alliances binding democratic communities in what had seemed, not so long ago, a robust pact. Purposefully, the seeds of doubt were planted in familiar soil to incite historical anxieties, institutional mistrust, and the economic insecurities that war inevitably inflamed.

While fragments of Russian drones kept falling from the sky – a reminder that borders do not confine wars – and news showed Ukrainian cities turned to rubble, another campaign, cloaked in the language of patriotism, was being waged surreptitiously from the depths of social media. Flowing unabated through the digital landscape, shifting between geographies, these targeted influence operations adapted seamlessly, infiltrating local contexts from Bucharest to Bratislava and Berlin while serving a discernible objective: to fracture democratic societies from within and undermine the very foundations of Western coalitions that stood resilient against Russian aggression. Both online and offline, a perilous symbiosis emerged between extremist factions, the Kremlin’s siloviki,[2] and tyrannical/authoritarian regimes opportunistically aligned with this vast destabilisation agenda.

Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia, talks of a potential peace were held behind closed doors, ostensibly to expedite an agreement,[3] but deliberately excluding its most essential stakeholders, Ukraine and Europe. In the relentless hybrid warfare of today, narratives have become battlegrounds manipulated with algorithmic precision. While the promise of peace remains alluring for many, there is still hope that its meaning can be reclaimed. At this crucial juncture, a collective effort to defend peace as more than the absence of war is imperative.

Peace cannot be brokered in exclusion, nor can it emerge from capitulation to violent revisionism. It is forged through solidarity, protected by justice, and sustained by the unwavering belief that freedom is indivisible.

Andra-Lucia Martinescu is a Foreign Policy Centre Research Fellow.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Conversation with a supporter of the far-right during a protest in Bucharest (10.01.2025).

[2] The term is associated with Russian security and military personnel.

[3] ‘Paul Kirby, ’Who was at the table at US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia’, BBC, 18 February 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c743jl8k4kko.

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

Three years on: Russia’s War on Ukraine’s Forcibly Displaced Children

Article by Jen Ang

February 26, 2025

Three years on: Russia’s War on Ukraine’s Forcibly Displaced Children

Every war is a war against children. However, in its war in Ukraine, the Russian Government has specifically targeted children as a tool to disrupt Ukrainian communities, and secure long-term dominance in the region – pursuing a cruel and systematic policy of forcibly separating tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from their families and deporting them to Russia or Belarus.^[1]

As of 19 February 2025, Children of War reports that 19,546 children have been forcibly deported in this manner, and only 388 returned to Ukraine, while 596 are known to have died. According to the National Police of Ukraine, 2057 are still missing.^[2]

Some children have been placed in Russian foster and adoptive families and given Russian nationality. More than 6,000 have been transferred to “filtration” and “re-education camps” where they are interrogated, and later, “integrated” and receive a “patriotic education.”^[3]

International human rights law (IHRL) does protect children in conflict. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, which both Russia (1990) and Ukraine (1991) have ratified, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), for example, prohibit the forcible separation and displacement of children.^[4] The fact that Russia ceased to be party to the ECHR in September 2022, six months after its exclusion from the Council of Europe, is perhaps a reminder, however, of the limited reach of IHRL in conflict situations.^[5]

International humanitarian law (IHL) also recognises children as particularly vulnerable during conflict. Under Geneva Convention IV, and Additional Protocol 1, they are recognised as “protected persons” who should be respected, protected and cared for.^[6] The Geneva Conventions prohibit forcible deportation of civilians, including children; and where evacuation is necessary, protect family unity, require state parties to identify and register separated children, and closely regulate the evacuation of children to other states.^[7] Crucially, changing the personal or family status, including nationality or civil status, of children of war is prohibited.^[8]

Finally, Russia’s program of child deportation may also constitute a war crime. On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, who it holds to be allegedly responsible for the “war crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer of [children] from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.”^[9]

So, what does this mean for the future, and specifically, for the protection, return, and reintegration of the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children who have been victims of Russia’s cynical program of “renationalisation”?

It is clear that progress in rectifying these violations has been painfully slow and despite the strong prohibitions in IHRL and IHL, as well as in the intervention of the ICC, there is at present, no real prospect of change on the horizon for Ukrainian children who have been systematically abducted by the Russian state – at least not until peace is negotiated in the region.

On that day, let us hope that the fate of Ukraine’s missing children is brought to the fore of the negotiations between the state parties, and their return, reunification with their families and reintegration into Ukrainian society is prioritised. They are, after all, an important part of Ukraine’s history of this conflict and to its future.

Jen Ang is Founding Director of Lawmanity, a project that aims to tackle inequalities in the law by working with people-led movements to secure positive change. She is an experienced human rights lawyer and activist, qualified to practice in Scotland, England and Wales, and New York State. She is a legal expert on immigration and asylum, violence against women and girls, children’s rights, and on the rights of survivors of torture and trafficking. She is also a Professor in Practice at the University of Glasgow, and believes in making legal education open and accessible to all.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou, ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Forcibly displaced Ukrainian children’, European Parliamentary Research Service: Brussels, February 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747093/EPRS_BRI(2023)747093_EN.pdf

^[2] National Information Bureau of Ukraine Children of War, 2025, https://childrenofwar.gov.ua/en, Accessed on 19 February 2025.

^[3] Yale School of Public Health researchers identified 43 facilities in Russia responsible for systematically re-educating at least 6,000 children, but this is considered to be a conservative estimate. See further, Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., ‘Russia’s Systematic Program for the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children’, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health: New Haven, 14 February 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/humanitarian-research-lab-yale-school-public-health-russias-systematic-program-re-education-adoption-ukraines-children-enruuk

^[4] OHCHR, UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies database, Accessed on 19 February 2025, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CRC&Lang=en

^[5] Council of Europe, ‘Russia ceases to be a party to the European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September 2022’, 23 March 2022, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/russia-ceases-to-be-a-party-to-the-european-convention-of-human-rights-on-16-september-2022

^[6] Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol 1, Article 77, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-77

^[7] Geneva Convention IV, Article 49, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49

^[8] Geneva Convention IV, Article 50, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-50

^[9] International Criminal Court, ‘Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova’, 17 March 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and

Topics

Human Rights

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

Three years on: Ukraine’s stolen children – the silent crisis that threatens the future

Article by Nataliia Bolshova

Right now, thousands of Ukrainian children do not know if their parents are alive. Tens of thousands have been taken to Russia, while hundreds of thousands have been lost in a broken system.

Three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the world has witnessed the forced displacement of millions of Ukrainians, the abduction of thousands of children, and the fragmentation of families on a devastating scale. While international attention has rightly focused on Russia’s war crimes and mass deportations, a parallel crisis is unfolding – one that is less visible but just as devastating: the growing number of Ukrainian children permanently separated from their parents not by missiles, but by a fractured legal system, wartime displacement, and institutional inaction.

The scale of the crisis

The numbers tell a tragic story. More than 2.5 million Ukrainian children have been displaced – many evacuated abroad for safety, others left behind while their parents serve in the Armed Forces.[1]

We know that 30% of children who fled Ukraine with one parent have lost all contact with the other parent who remains in Ukraine.[2]

Meanwhile, 80% of children whose parents serve in the Armed Forces have little or no communication with them.[3]

For more than 20,000 Ukrainian orphans and children who lost their parents in the war the heartbreak did not end there. They have been illegally deported to Russia, where efforts to repatriate them have stalled for three years. Many of those abducted before 2014 have already turned 18 and have been forcibly conscripted into the Russian army to fight against Ukraine.

These are not just numbers – these are children whose futures are being erased.

This problem extends beyond Ukraine’s borders. The breakdown of family ties slows the return of refugees, erodes trust in legal institutions, and weakens post-war recovery.

A system unprepared to reunite families

Ukraine’s legal and social systems were never designed to handle the scale of parental separation caused by war. Cases of parental abduction and alienation existed before the invasion, but the war has multiplied their complexity.

Ukraine’s civil courts, law enforcement agencies, and social services do process these cases, but:

There is no unified system ensuring the protection of children’s rights and the enforcement of court rulings.
Corruption and bureaucratic inertia often render court decisions unenforceable.
Family court proceedings can take 2-4 years, by which time a child’s relationship with the alienated parent may already be irreparably damaged.

The burden of these systemic failures falls entirely on the children. Many suffer profound psychological distress, including anxiety, depression, and, tragically, even suicide.

While these are humanitarian tragedies today, they also pose a long-term challenge for Ukraine’s recovery, demographic stability, and national security.

Without urgent reform, Ukraine risks losing an entire generation.

What needs to happen next

Protecting children’s rights must be a core pillar of Ukraine’s recovery and European integration process. This is not just a moral obligation – it is essential for social stability, national resilience, and Ukraine’s credibility as a democratic state.

Legislative reform and diplomatic engagement

The UK and European partners can play a key role in advocating for urgent reforms in Ukraine’s family law system, ensuring alignment with European human rights standards. International legal expertise and diplomatic support can help ensure that these reforms lead to enforceable protections, not just symbolic commitments.

At the same time, strengthening Ukraine’s legal and social institutions and expanding support programmes for affected children and families is critical to delivering real change.

A generation at risk

Ukraine is fighting for its land, but it must also fight for the generation that will rebuild it.

If we do not act today, Ukraine risks losing not just territory, but its future.

The international community has provided weapons, economic aid, and humanitarian assistance. Now, it must help protect Ukraine’s most vulnerable citizens: its children.

Nataliia is a John Smith Trust Fellow civil rights advocate as well as a committed member of The Child Has a Right, a national initiative dedicated to addressing the escalating crisis of parental alienation and child abduction in Ukraine. Her advocacy is both professional and deeply personal – despite multiple court rulings in her favor, Nataliia has been unable to see her daughter for over 4.5 years. This is due to systemic inefficiencies, an outdated family law framework, and limited enforcement of court decisions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] United Nations, ‘Two million refugee children flee war in Ukraine in search of safety across borders’, Press Release, UNICEF, 30 March 2022, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/two-million-refugee-children-flee-war-ukraine-search-safety-across-borders

[2] Obudsman, ‘deportation of ukrainian children is genocide!’, Ukraine Government, 13 September 2024, https://ombudsman.gov.ua/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/UPF%204.pdf

[3] Maksym Savchuk, ‘From the “Youth Army” to the front: how Russia prepares Ukrainian children under occupation for war against their own country’, Radio Svoboda, 16 November 2024, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-ukrayinski-dity-yunarmiya-viyna/33203644.html

Topics

Human Rights

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

Three years on: Are sanctions finally hitting home in Central Asia?

Article by Dr Aijan Sharshenova

February 25, 2025

Three years on: Are sanctions finally hitting home in Central Asia?

Last year, on the second anniversary of the Russian invasion, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury published yet another list of sanctioned companies and individuals. The list contained only a handful of Central Asian entities.^[1] This handful was a sign that the Western threats of secondary sanctions were finally beginning to materialise.

As we enter the fourth year of the invasion, Central Asian governments are still managing to keep an exterior of relative neutrality while playing a dangerous balancing game between Russia, China and the West. The threat of secondary sanctions by the US, UK, and the EU has been there from the very outset, but over the last year they have finally hit home, albeit to a relatively modest extent.^[2]

After the full scale invasion, Central Asia provided relatively easy routes for dual-use commodities to reach Russia from China and Europe alike thanks to the region’s comparatively open borders, favourable trade laws, and opportunistic intermediaries on the ground.^[3] The signs of booming trade with Russia and a sudden increase in EU exports to Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic (member-states of the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russia-led regional economic integration project) speaks volumes.^[4]^,[5]

Those are not necessarily state-sanctioned activities, but most likely initiatives of profit-driven locals, as well as external exploitation of Central Asian economic regimes, which were designed to attract foreign investment and so-called “digital nomads” – foreign freelancers, who are able to work remotely and spend their money in Central Asian countries. In one of the notorious cases of sanctions evasion, British military technologies were traded through a company set up in Central Asia by a Belarussian Instagram model.^[6]

The Central Asian governments have to deal with the repercussions though. Secondary sanctions affect credibility of the Kyrgyz banking and financial sector, significantly limit Kyrgyz citizens’ ability to use global payment systems, such as Visa and Mastercard, and set a shadow on foreign investment prospects. In addition to these, there are political repercussions too. Russian Prime Minister Mishustin has already attempted to pressurise the Kyrgyz Government for ‘unfairly targeting’ Russian businesses in Kyrgyzstan. The response to this accusation was strong and decisive: no one can be given an unreasonable advantage.^[7]

To what extent the sanctions would and could work remains dubious. Lists of sanctioned entities take time and effort to emerge, while intermediary companies spring up like mushrooms in the region. It finally hits home, but not hard enough to induce any meaningful change.

Dr. Aijan Sharshenova is a Foreign Policy Centre Research Fellow.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Catherine Putz, ‘US puts additional Central Asian companies on Russia sanctions list’, The Diplomat, 28 February 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/us-puts-additional-central-asian-companies-on-russia-sanctions-list/

^[2] Claire Mills, ‘Sanctions against countries supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’, research briefing, House of Commons Library, 17 January 2025,https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10048/

^[3] Samantha Fanger, ‘Central Asia’s Gateway of Dual-Use Technology and Materials to Russia’. Caspian Policy Center, 28 March 2024, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security/central-asias-gateway-of-dual-use-technology-and-materials-to-russia?mc_cid=7751d6b298&mc_eid=221261e860

^[4] Aijan Sharshenova, ‘The Eurasian Economic Union: Pros and cons for smaller member-states’, ISPI Online Dossier, 03 February 2025, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-eurasian-economic-union-pros-and-cons-for-smaller-member-states-199114

^[5] Maxim Chupilkin, BeataJavorcik, and Alexander Plekhanov, ‘The Eurasian roundabout: Trade flows into Russia through the Caucasus and Central Asia’, EBRD Working Paper no.276, https://www.ebrd.com/publications/working-papers/the-eurasian-roundabout

^[6] Angus Crawford and Tony Smith, ‘UK war tech sent to Russia by Insta model’s firm, documents seen by BBC show’, BBC News Investigations, 20 November 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4vzlx1350o

^[7] Eurasianet, ‘Kyrgyzstan resists Russian pressure to give sanctions-busting firms lenient treatment’, Eurasianet News, 04 February 2025, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-resists-russian-pressure-to-give-sanctions-busting-firms-lenient-treatment

Topics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Central Asia

Ukraine

Three years on: The impact of Trump 2.0 on the war in Ukraine

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

In the past few weeks, Europe has been hit with a series of shocks. Firstly, the Trump administration has threatened military force to take control of Greenland, the territory of NATO ally Denmark. Secondly, it began direct talks with Russia over the future of the European security order. Thirdly, the administration escalated its aggressive rhetoric against the European political establishment, with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting that the Trump administration would rather deal with parties of the far right.^[1]

These three issues cannot be separated from one another. Trump views the war in Ukraine as just one part of a bigger picture. He wants to drastically improve US relations with Russia while forcing Europe into a subordinate position. His goal is to make European countries directly serve the interests of the United States, be it by spending more on their own defence, buying more US goods and services, and even proffering up territory which Washington regards as strategically important.

Viewed from this standpoint, the war in Ukraine looks to Trump like an unnecessary irritant. Its continuation harms US relations with Russia while also compelling the United States to dedicate large amounts of resources to European defence. Caring little for Ukraine itself, Trump would rather end the war speedily by making concessions to Russia – and then move onto bigger issues.

Chief among those issues is the long-term future of the European security order. Russia is making demands similar to those that it made at the outset of the war in 2022, including the withdrawal of US troops from NATO’s eastern border and the recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in its near abroad.^[2] For European officials, this idea is terrifyingly compatible with Trump’s own desire to spend fewer American resources ensuring the security of Europe. They fear concessions to Russia on this issue even more than concessions regarding Ukraine itself.^[3]

What happens next for Ukraine is vitally important, not only first of all for the Ukrainian people, but also because it will create the framework in which Europe and Russia must coexist in the years ahead. It seems likely that Ukraine will be forced to give up much of the territory captured by Russia and to forswear any short-term ambitions to join NATO – points that even the Biden administration were willing to concede.^[4] What is still open to question is whether and to what extent the country will receive credible security guarantees against renewed Russian aggression. Yet given that the US has said it will not give any such guarantee, and that European countries lack the means to enforce one, the future looks bleak for Kyiv.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s broader attack on the European political establishment looks set to continue. Trump sees the world as split into spheres of influence in which great powers have the right to coerce and even conquer weaker countries. A Trump administration which is threatening military force to seize Greenland is one which sees Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine as something to emulate, not something to be stopped.

Confronting hostile superpowers to both their east and west, European leaders are faced with their greatest crisis since World War II. This crisis is not just about Ukraine, but the apparent end of the conditions that have made Europe peaceful and prosperous for many decades. It will take a great leap of imagination and concerted political will to find a way out.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] J.D. Vance, ‘JD Vance’s Full Speech on the Fall of Europe’, The Spectator, February 2025, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/jd-vance-what-i-worry-about-is-the-threat-from-within/.

^[2] ‘Kremlin says Ukraine Settlement ‘Impossible’ without Addressing Wider Security Issues’, The Kyiv Post, , February 2025, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/47337.

^[3] ‘Donald Trump Opens the Door to Vladimir Putin’s Grandest Ambitions’, The Financial Times, February 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/2bf263a0-9768-4049-8f7d-239940a49efb.

^[4] Andrew Gawthorpe, ‘The Black Hole at the Heart of America’s Ukraine Strategy’, Atlantische Perspectief, November 2024, https://www.atlcom.nl/artikel-atlantisch-perspectief/the-black-hole-at-the-center-of-americas-ukraine-strategy/.

Topics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

United States and Canada

United States

Ukraine

Three years on: What a US-Brokered Peace Deal for Ukraine Could Mean for China

Article by Dr Catherine Owen

Last week, the Trump administration met with Kremlin representatives in Saudi Arabia for negotiations that could pave the way for an end to Russia’s three-year full-scale war in Ukraine. Already, many words have been spilled on the crisis in European security architecture that this bilateral meeting has laid bare.

Less attention has been paid, however, to the implications of the Russia-US rapprochement evidenced in this meeting for China. Throughout most of the war, it had seemed that Russia needed Chinese political and economic support far more than China needed Russia. Now the tables may be turning.

Many in the West have interpreted Beijing’s refusal both to condemn the war and to comply with Western sanctions against Russia as its backing for the misadventures of its most significant international ally. Inside China, the story is different. While Chinese scholars heatedly debate the causes of the war and where fault and responsibility lie, they generally see their own nation’s position as the latest iteration of its long-standing foreign policy commitment to international peace, political neutrality and opposition to the kind of ‘bloc politics’ embodied in NATO.

Indeed, over the past three years, China has sought to use its external position vis-à-vis the conflict to advance proposals for peace in Ukraine. On the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion, it published a 12-point peace plan that was criticized by Western and Ukrainian commentators for being too vague.[1] In May 2024, China and Brazil published a joint 6-point proposal for peace that was dismissed by Ukrainian president Zelensky for being too Russia-centric. In only the past few days, China has stated that it welcomes peace talks between the US and Russia, while also calling for all stakeholders to be included in the negotiations.[2] However, despite the earlier attempts to act as peace-maker, this meeting demonstrates that China’s role in any peace deal remains marginal. Rather than taking a seat at the top peace-negotiating table, China’s diplomatic activities are more likely to be galvanizing support among Global South countries for relevant UN resolutions.

What does this mean for Russia and China’s “friendship without limits”? Despite their public display of camaraderie (primarily for Western benefit), the Russia-China relationship is by no means free of long-standing tensions, and a peace deal in Ukraine brokered by the Trump administration could have significant consequences for China’s place in the international system. Three immediately stand out.

First, it could make it more difficult for China to resist Trump’s confrontational stance. Already, the new administration has imposed 10% tariffs on Chinese goods; a peace deal favouring Russia could prompt Russia to support US efforts to contain the Chinese economy.

Second, it could complicate Beijing’s approach to the Taiwan issue. While Trump has mooted a trilateral meeting with Xi and Putin to work out ways to reduce defence spending, a simultaneous shift in wording on the US Department website appears to suggest the new administration’s support for Taiwanese independence. Without Russia’s tacit, if not outright, backing of Beijing in such a conflict, an already highly complex military operation would be even more risky.

Finally, it could reduce China’s international influence and global soft power reach more broadly. Russia has already called for a full normalization of relations with the US; if such a transformation were to take place, China will look increasingly isolated, and possibly weakened, on the world stage.

On the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, one thing is clear. While it is unlikely that the US – Russia – China triangle can exist in such a way that satisfies all three powers, what each government appears to share is a lack of regard for a peace in Ukraine considered just by the people who live there.

Dr Catherine Owen is a Foreign Policy Centre Research Fellow.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis’, 24 February 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367485.html

[2] Gov.Br, ‘Brazil and China present joint proposal for peace negotiations with the participation of Russia and Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, Planato, 23 May 2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-china-present-joint-proposal-for-peace-negotiations-with-the-participation-of-russia-and-ukraine.

Topics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

United States and Canada

United States

China

Ukraine

Three years on: The Unyielding Spirit of Ukrainian Journalism

Article by Sergiy Tomilenko

February 24, 2025

Three years on: The Unyielding Spirit of Ukrainian Journalism

On the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the world continues to witness the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Among them, journalists stand on the frontlines of an information war, risking their lives to ensure the truth is heard. Today, I want to highlight the extraordinary courage of Ukrainian journalists, particularly those working in the most dangerous areas—our local newspapers in the frontline and de-occupied territories.

The war has not only destroyed cities and taken lives but has also created an information vacuum in many regions. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians living near the frontlines or in recently liberated areas are cut off from reliable news sources. Electricity and communication networks are often destroyed, leaving people isolated and vulnerable to Russian propaganda. In these areas, local newspapers have become a lifeline, providing not only news but also a sense of connection and hope.

The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU), together with international partners, has worked tirelessly to support these vital publications. Over the past two years, we have helped revive 32 local newspapers in regions like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Sumy and Kharkiv. These newspapers are often the only source of verified information for communities under constant threat.

One such example is the story of Vasyl Myroshnyk, the editor of a newspaper in Zolochiv, Kharkiv region. His weekly journey to deliver newspapers has been called “the most dangerous newspaper route in the world” by British journalists. Despite constant shelling and the threat of drone attacks, Vasyl drives hundreds of kilometers to ensure his readers receive their papers. “In wartime, people need news more than ever,” he says. His dedication is a testament to the unbreakable spirit of Ukrainian journalists.

Similarly, Oleksiy Pasyuha, editor of the Vorskla newspaper in Sumy region, continues to deliver newspapers to the few remaining residents of a border village near Russia. His weekly route is fraught with danger, but he persists, knowing that for many, his newspaper is the only connection to the outside world. “Even if only five people remain here, I will stay,” says a local shopkeeper in one of the villages he serves.

These stories are not just about delivering news; they are about preserving humanity in the face of unimaginable hardship. Local newspapers provide a sense of normalcy and continuity, reminding people that they are not forgotten. They are a symbol of resistance against the Russian aggression that seeks to erase Ukrainian identity and culture.

However, the challenges are immense. Many local newspapers struggle to survive due to a lack of funding and resources. International support, which has been crucial in keeping these publications alive, is now dwindling as the war drags on. The economic devastation caused by the conflict makes it nearly impossible for these newspapers to sustain themselves without external help.

The NUJU has also established six Journalists’ Solidarity Centers across Ukraine, providing journalists with protective equipment, workspace, and psychological support. These centers have become a refuge for hundreds of journalists, both Ukrainian and international, who risk their lives to document the truth.

As the war enters its fourth year, the world must not forget the importance of supporting Ukrainian journalism. The work of our journalists is not just about reporting the news; it is about defending democracy and truth in the face of tyranny. Every newspaper delivered, every story published, is a small victory in the information war.

To our international partners and colleagues, we extend our deepest gratitude. Your solidarity has been a source of strength for us. But the fight is far from over. We urge the global community to continue supporting Ukrainian media, especially local newspapers in frontline areas. They are not just newspapers; they are beacons of hope and resilience.

In the words of Richard Pendlebury, a British journalist who documented Vasyl Myroshnyk’s journey, “The bravery and resilience of Ukrainian journalists should be an inspiration to everyone in our profession.” Indeed, their courage reminds us why journalism matters, especially in times of war.

As we mark this somber anniversary, let us remember that the fight for truth is as important as the fight on the battlefield. Support Ukraine. Support Ukrainian journalists. Because journalists are important.

Postscript: Recently, NUJU convened an international conference that brought together over 130 participants, including leading global press freedom organizations like the Committee to Protect Journalists, European Federation of Journalists, International Press Institute, and Global Forum for Media Development. The resulting Resolution outlines urgent measures needed to support journalists in frontline regions, where they face not only physical threats but also a severe financial crisis due to the war’s economic impact. The document particularly emphasizes the need for emergency funding for local newspapers that maintain crucial information links with their communities, often being the only source of reliable information in areas with limited internet access and electricity. The Resolution also highlights the pressing issue of Ukrainian journalists held captive by Russia, calling for increased international pressure for their release and investigation of crimes against media workers. You can read the full Resolution here: https://nuju.org.ua/standing-with-ukraine-s-media-and-journalists-a-resolution-for-safety-support-and-solidarity/

Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of journalists of Ukraine.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Media and Online Freedom

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

Three Years On: Why all eyes still need to be on Ukraine

Article by Dr. Victoria Vdovychenko

There was a famous saying that all roads lead to Rome. Now they are leading to Kyiv, in all senses: geopolitical, geo-economic, value-based and rule-based order or at least in the attempt to preserve the rules-based global order.

Despite all the challenges, Ukraine proves to continue functioning, fighting on the ground, having offensive operations and reforming itself. It seems surreal but very much true despite the evidence that in the last two weeks the world order as we knew it has come to an end. The system once based on rules, agreements, and shared values has been under a tsunami of geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges. It was never perfect, but it functioned. Now, its whole existence is under question.

All signs suggest that the United States is disengaging geopolitically from Europe. This growing transatlantic divide was particularly evident at the Munich Security Conference, where the rift proved not only deep but also fundamentally rooted in diverging values.

Moreover, European leaders found themselves directly challenged by US Vice President J.D. Vance, further amplifying the sense of uncertainty. This moment of shock should serve as a wake-up call for Europe, prompting a reassessment of its strategic autonomy and global role.

So, why do all eyes still need to be on Ukraine? Ukraine continues to prove that it can resist multiple challenges as well as reinvent itself in terms of innovations. Whether it is about the successful usage of naval drones, joint production lines in Ukraine under the “Danish model” or some other efforts to produce various unmanned aerial systems, it proves that it is more efficient to use advanced military technologies and localise production. [1]

Ukraine is nearing completion of the roadmaps required to open the first negotiation cluster in its EU accession process. The European Commission’s screening report is almost finalised; however, Hungary is delaying its approval.

A negotiation framework is already in place, containing multiple safeguards that allow for the suspension of the negotiation process if necessary. Ukraine anticipates the official launch of the first negotiation cluster in April or May. Moreover, the government has stated its ambition to open all negotiation clusters by the end of this year.

It is important to emphasise that the negotiation process is not merely a technocratic or bureaucratic exercise. While technical compliance plays a significant role, the process is highly influenced by the political situation within the candidate country.

However, the beginning of the 2025 shapes new waves of Russia’s aggression that has hastened the emergence of a multipolar world, undermined global security, and exposed critical vulnerabilities in the West’s strategic posture. The trajectory is clear: if left unchecked, the war risks escalating into a broader European conflict by 2030, with the prospect of a global confrontation no longer beyond consideration.

Ukraine knows with its history and present resilience that Putin’s demands—whether concerning territory, neutrality, elections, or other conditions—are ultimately irrelevant. These demands merely reflect Russia’s true objectives: to assert control over Ukraine and compel the US and NATO to compromise their principles and interests in favor of a global order that serves Russia’s strategic ambitions.

The US must eliminate any hope Putin may have of achieving these goals—whether through military means or a so-called “peaceful” agreement. This war can only end when Russia understands it cannot secure victory either on the battlefield or through diplomatic manipulation.

The Alliance must seriously reassess its strategic options, including the deployment of ground forces, if Russia’s continued unwillingness to compromise—coupled with Ukraine’s increasing manpower shortages due to the “too little, too late” policy—brings Moscow closer to restoring its former sphere of influence.

Drawing on extensive fieldwork conducted across the Black Sea region, the US in 2025 has multiple avenues to bolster its strategic presence and regional stability. Key initiatives might include strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank through targeted force deployments, expanded arms sales, and increased defense investments to reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression, fostering “minilateral” cooperation—flexible, issue-driven alliances—among regional partners, particularly with Ukraine, to enhance interoperability and security coordination; securing and supporting regional connectivity initiatives that bypass Russian influence, reinforcing economic resilience and strategic independence for Black Sea nations.

This shift in US priorities underscores the urgent need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense—not as a matter of political convenience, but as an imperative for long-term security and stability.

Given the shifting security landscape, investments in Ukraine’s defense industry, joint production ventures, and military innovation are essential. After nearly three years of war, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience, now producing over a third of its battlefield weaponry through domestic innovation.

Strengthening Ukraine’s defense industrial base not only enhances its self-sufficiency in warfare but also fosters long-term partnerships with Western defense sectors. By expanding joint production efforts, allied nations can bolster Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities while also reinforcing Europe’s broader security framework.

Russia, along with its allies, must not be underestimated as a destabilizing force in European security for at least the next decade. Its offensive strategies—combining hard and soft power with hybrid tactics—pose a persistent challenge that demands serious, sustained, and adaptive containment efforts.

As Winston Churchill once warned, “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping it will eat him last.” Failing to confront Russian aggression today will only embolden further destabilization tomorrow.

In this defining moment, Ukraine’s fight is Europe’s fight—and Europe’s security is the world’s security.

Dr. Victoria Vdovychenko is a widely recognized and published expert on the issues of hybrid warfare, strategic communication, with particular emphasis on relations between Ukraine and the European Union as well as NATO. She is working on the challenges of the European Union, Euro-Atlantic integration, hybrid warfare, strategic communication collaborating with such educational institutions as University of Bologna, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, KU Leuven, University Catholic Louvain, Cambridge University. Victoria is currently a Visiting Fellow within the British Academy and a co-lead of the Future of Ukraine Program at the Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

[1] Ukraine and Denmark summarised the results of cooperation under the ‘Danish Model’ of support for the Ukrainian defense industry in 2024. Through this initiative, the Armed Forces of Ukraine received weapons valued at nearly EUR 538 million. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/results-of-the-danish-model-of-support-for-ukraine-s-defense-industry-in-2024-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-received-weapons-valued-at-nearly-538-million

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Ukraine

Three years on: How the power of networking can contribute to a peaceful and democratic future

Join our mailing list

Three years on: What peace should be

Join our mailing list

Three years on: What kind of peace?

Join our mailing list

Three years on: Russia’s War on Ukraine’s Forcibly Displaced Children

Join our mailing list

Three years on: Ukraine’s stolen children – the silent crisis that threatens the future

Join our mailing list

Three years on: Are sanctions finally hitting home in Central Asia?

Join our mailing list

Three years on: The impact of Trump 2.0 on the war in Ukraine

Join our mailing list

Three years on: What a US-Brokered Peace Deal for Ukraine Could Mean for China

Join our mailing list

Three years on: The Unyielding Spirit of Ukrainian Journalism

Join our mailing list

Three Years On: Why all eyes still need to be on Ukraine

Join our mailing list

Join our mailing list