The full text of a speech by Mustafa Sarigül, leader of Turkey’s Change Movement, to the Foreign Policy Centre’s A new politics for Turkey? Sarýgül’s challenge to the Turkish political establishment event held at the UK Houses of Parliament on March 22nd 2010.

FPC Research Associate Tim Summers has written a new FPC Briefing that explores China’s response to the shifting dynamics of global power and the implications of this for the rest of the international community.

In the last decade, relations between Turkey and Russia have confidently surpassed their former cold-war hostility and undergone immense economic and geo-political improvement. FPC Research Associate Marc Herzog takes a look at the changing relationship between the old rivals and what it means for them and the wider world.

In the slightly warmer climes of the Balkans the two pillars of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia, are making their own unsteady paths towards EU membership. Just before Christmas Serbia’s pro-European President Boris Tadic formally requested membership, that once signed off by the council will give the green light for the accession process to rumble into action. Alongside the usual requirements for regulatory convergence to meet Serbia has to make progress on two major outstanding issues before it can join the club. Belgrade is still, somewhat unenthusiastically, hunting for two war criminals the former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, former President of the civil war era Republic of Serbian Krajina. Furthermore it has still to reconcile itself to Kosovo’s independence, with Tadic reiterating Belgrade’s position that the country remains an integral part of his nation while celebrating Orthodox Christmas in a church in an area of Western Kosovo dominated by the Serb minority. Nevertheless Belgrade now seems to be in an informal race with Ankara to see which of these challenging but critically important accessions can be completed first. Plainer sailing can now be expected for its northern neighbour Croatia after Slovenia lifted objections last year relating to a still on-going border dispute over the Bay of Piran.

Back in Brussels, as work is underway putting together the new Commission and readjusting the institutional architecture following the creation of Cathy Ashton’s new position of High Rep, Barosso’s new Commission has put together the responsibilities for the neighbourhood away from the Baroness and into the remit of Enlargement Commissioner designate Stefan Füle. As an enthusiastic supporter of both enlargement and greater engagement with the neighbourhood I should welcome this initiative with open arms. Yet it runs the risk of creating new divided loyalties and responsibilities, with staff taking direction from Füle, yet likely to be part of the future European Action Service run by Ashton, when the whole process was supposed to reduce institutional clutter and overlap. Furthermore while there is considerable merit in strengthening neighbourhood policy to a point where participation in the longer term can act as either a staging ground for, or indeed an alternative to, membership for countries whose membership aspirations remain a distant dream such Ukraine and Georgia, it creates a risk. If not managed carefully, creating a direct continuum between neighbourhood and enlargement policy runs the risk of creating a dumping ground where Turkey’s membership aspirations could yet be parked.

Right-wing could break Concertación’s hegemony

Marco Enríquez-Ormini, an independent candidate, gained third position with 20.12%, followed by Leftist Jorge Arrate of Juntos Podemos (Together we can) with 6.12%.
The advantage achieved by Piñera in the first round was possible due to the heavy demands of Concertación’s campaign – the government coalition launched three candidacies –, and Alianza Por Chile’s successful strategy to exploit the left-wing agenda. In order to win middle class votes, Piñera supported the civil union between homosexuals and the distribution of morning-after pills.
The adoption of themes such as these, foreign to the right-wing agenda, reveals one of the key points of Piñera’s new strategy, who was defeated in 2005 by President Michelle Bachelet: to show himself as a candidate with concerns not typical of the conservative discourse.
As he cannot contest the achievements of the Bachelet government – approved by around 80% of Chileans –, Piñera promised to maintain the current social protection programs.
Piñera’s concern for the lower middle class makes sense. This segment has grown in recent years and become crucial in the election.

Although such a strategy may have been effective, the more conservative segments are displeased with Piñera’s movement towards the centre.

Apart from ideological judgments, the fact is that the strategic agenda proposed by the opposition candidate managed to corner Concertación, bringing the right-wing closer to a historical victory in Chile – since the end of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship the conservatives have been out of power.

Final Results

Candidate Party Votes
Sebastião Piñera Alianza Por Chile 44.03%
Eduardo frei Concertación 29.62%
Marco Enríques-Ominami Independent 20.12%
Jorge Arrate Juntos Podemos 6.21%

Strains of Concertación’s campaign has harmed Frei
The strain of twenty years in power is the main obstacle for Concertación candidate Eduardo Frei. The center-left coalition, which has ruled Chile since 1990, is after its 5th consecutive mandate in the presidential election this year.

The strategy adopted by Frei, so as to alleviate the pressure of running the government, was to assume a progressive discourse, seen as audacious by many.
Unlike the 1984 election when he became president, this election he had to moderate his message and make use of numerous resources. However, since Frei is a candidate who doesn’t inspire “passion”, Concertación’s strategy faces obstacles.

A new constitution was the flagship platform proposed by the candidate, which is considered bold for a Christian-democratic politician.

Eduardo Frei’s proposition was elaborated with the intent to relate Sebastián Piñera to Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. In his view, the Magna Carta is the same imposed by the dictator in 1980.

Like Piñera, the government candidate is also investing in the legal recognition of homosexual unions and the free distribution of morning-after pills in the public health system. Furthermore, Frei proposed 17 initiatives concerning human rights.

Frei supports the continuity of Concertación in power for believing it is necessary to expand the country’s democracy and development, concerns characteristic of center-left governments.

Another topic of Eduardo Frei’s discourse is the promise to expand Bachelet’s social programs, which will be suspended, according to him, should Piñera be elected president.
In face of all this we should expect a more aggressive campaign by Frei in the 2nd round against his opponent. Because of the advantage he gained in the 1st round, the Concertación candidate is expected to enter the dispute somewhat weaker.

Bachelet’s popularity unhelpful to Frei

In the mind of Eduardo Frei and his allies, President Michelle Bachelet’s high popularity (80%) was expected to be a point in favor of Concertación. However, the Chilean president could not transfer this same popularity to her candidate.

Although this hasn’t come as a complete surprise – popularity is personal and untransferable – the most confident government supporters believed Bachelet’s presence alongside Frei would help Concertación, which, in fact, did not happen.

At the same time that Michelle Bachelet will end her term as the most popular president in Chilean history, she might have to hand over office to Sebastián Piñera, her political adversary.

Feelings of renewal hampered vote transfer

Even though the Bachelet government was efficient in using social programs to leverage her popularity, the feeling of renewal has helped opposition.

Strains in the government party and the search for “new” politics began within the political system itself. Concertación, which has always united to defeat the Right, came out with three candidacies. Moreover, Marco Enríquez-Onimani, the independent candidate, gained more than 20% of the presidential vote.

These are indicators that Chilean politicians and electorate are after something “new”, a sentiment that was well exploited by Sebastián Piñera and his strategists.
Another factor that harms the government and helps the opposition is the candidacy of Eduardo Frei. In a scenario where the key-word is innovation, the choice of an ex-president – even if with a “new” program – made it easy for Piñera to strengthen his discourse of change.
As he has already been president of Chile and carries the weight of twenty years of Concertación governments, it was easy to label Frei an “old” candidate opposed to innovation.

Frei will try to “glue” his image to Bachelet’s

When Frei hit the final straight in the 1st round he changed his strategy. Instead of defending the achievements of the Concertación governments, he opted to try and “glue” his image to President Michelle Bachelet’s, who was positively evaluated by nearly 80% of Chileans, according to last polls.

According to sources related to Frei’s campaign, Bachelet’s participation in the campaign will be greater in the 2nd round. Besides using the president’s image, Carolina Tohá (secretary of the Interior) and Juan Carvajal (Bachelet’s director of communications) will delegate their functions in order to concentrate fully on the campaign.

Furthermore, Concertación intends to exploit what they classify as the “confusion” Piñera makes between politics and business. One of the criticisms is that in 2006 the presidential candidate used privileged information to buy shares in LAN Airlines.

In an interview with the press, Sebastián Bowen, Frei’s campaign coordinator, said that the strategy for the 2nd round will be combining the defense of Bachelet government with criticism of Piñera.

2nd round: Piñera starts ahead, but dispute will be balanced
Sebastián Piñera, the Alianza por Chile candidate, starts the 2nd round with an advantage of 14.41% over Concertación’s Eduardo Frei. Mathematically a vote swing is still possible for Frei, seeing that the votes for Marco Enríquez-Ominami (20.12%) and Jorge Arrate (6.21%) amount to 26.3%. Also, the voters for both candidates defeated in the 1st round are closer in ideological terms to Concertación.

The problem is that besides the desire for innovation within Chilean society, the center-left coalition is worn out. Added to which is the fact that Piñera’s strategy worked so well in the 1st round. Even being a conservative candidate he leaned towards the center of the ideological spectrum and didn’t hesitate in defending leftist issues.
The electoral battle in the 2nd round will be fierce. Piñera starts with 44.03% against Frei’s 29.62%. What will define the election is where the voters for Marco Enríquez-Ominami and Jorge Arrate migrate to.

By the 1st round logic suggests that Alianza por Chile will win this election, inflicting a historical defeat upon Concertación. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that the voters for Ominami and Arrate are ideologically closer to Concertación and that Michelle Bachelet’s participation in the campaign will be more active.

On account of all these factors, the electoral dispute is expected to be a balanced one. Piñera is favorite to win, but there is room for Frei to shift the trend and take Concertación to a 5th consecutive mandate.

Negotiation with Congress will be crucial to the next government

Irrespective of who the next Chilean president might be – Eduardo Piñera or Eduardo Frei – it will take a lot of negotiation with Congress to obtain parliamentarian majority and implement his agenda. In the House of Representatives Concertación lost its majority in the current legislature. The opposition, however, does not have absolute majority, even though it has grown.

In the Senate, the situation remained balanced. Concertación still has the most chairs even having lost one. The same happened with the opposition.

House of Representatives
Party/coalition Number of chairs in present legislature Number of chairs in next legislature Variation
Alianza por Chile 54 57 +3
Concertación 65 54 -11
Independents 1 1 +3

Senate
Party/coalition Number of chairs in present legislature Number of chairs in next legislature Variation
Alianza por Chile 17 16 -1
Concertación 20 19 -1
Independents 1 4 +3

Chilean election could be a role model for PT and PSDB in Brazil

Keeping it in proportion the Chilean presidential election may provide a role model in terms of electoral strategies for PT and PSDB in Brazil in 2010. In Chile, a government with elevated popularity (Michelle Bachelet) couldn’t transfer its positive indicators to Eduardo Frei. On the other hand, comparing the Concertación governments with Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship failed as a strategy.
All that happened because candidate Sebastián Piñera was clever in “stealing” his opponent’s agenda. While he presented a proposal for innovation, he also managed to adopt issues typically supported by the Chilean Left.

In Brazil, the presidential succession in 2010 might hold some similarities with what we have witnessed in Chile. Here, one of PT’s strategies is to compare the Lula government with that of FHC [acronym for ex-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso]. Furthermore, the Palácio do Planalto (Palace of the Plateau) is investing in vote transfers from President Lula to Minister Dilma Roussef, his candidate.

As far as opposition is concerned, PSDB still lacks a clear-cut strategy. Rumor has it that the tucanos [toucans, as PSDB members are known] will do whatever they can to escape comparisons between the governments of Lula and FHC, which favors PT. Taking advantage of São Paulo governor José Serra’s experience, PSDB might compare his trajectory to Dilma’s.

Even though both electoral processes are different, last Sunday’s election in Chile could be a role model for the Brazilian presidential election. Though it might be tempting to compare presidencies, it is important to come up with new proposals, as the electorate is interested in what they are offered for the future.

In what concerns PT, it is important to keep in mind that defending the Lula government and counting on the transfer of the president’s popularity to Dilma won’t be enough to elect her.

PSDB must find their agenda and, more importantly, convince voters to go for an opposition proposal in a scenario where most are pleased with the social and economic achievements by the Lula government.

In Uruguay, the ex Tupamaro guerrilla, José Mujica, will take office as the new president. He will be responsible maintaining the economical and social achievements inaugurated by the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), through current president Tabaré Vásquez, in 2005. On the other hand, like every change of government, adjustments are expected. There is a silent debate on whether or not to maintain Uruguay’s participation in MERCOSUR. There are important ties amongst Mujica’s allies who defend a Uruguayan posture which is more similar to the Chilean posture: to participate, but to have the power to make commercial partnerships in their interest. With the arrival of Venezuela, there is a feeling that Uruguayan power, which was already minor, will decrease even further. Moreover, the probable politicisation of MERCOSUR does not favour Uruguay.

I believe that 2010 will be one more balanced year in Uruguay. One of the greatest challenges Mujica will face will be to keep the young population inside the country, since the average age of Uruguayans is increasing. The tendency for young Uruguayans is to study in Argentina or in other countries, and this jeopardizes the country’s labor force. Mujica will have to invest so that young people in Uruguay feel they might have similar job opportunities in their own country.

In Chile, after 20 years in power, Concertación (Concertation) – the center-left coalition that has governed the country since 1990 – is at risk of being defeated by the center-right forces, grouped around Sebastian Piñera, of Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile). He will run in the 2nd round against ex-president Eduardo Frei, representative of Concertación, on January 17. Like Uruguay, Chile is on “auto-pilot”. Economical issues are not points of divergence, but rather convergence. With an intelligent campaign, Piñera avoided attacks against Eduardo Frei and preferred to characterize Concertación as the “continuation of the old Chilean policy.” Piñera branded himself as the candidate who will maintain the achievements of Concertación, and make improvements. To reach a larger public, Piñera gave up his conservative posture and now defends homosexual marriage and the distribution of the morning-after pill. This way, even with a popularity rate above 80%, Michelle Bachelet has not been able to pass this popularity on to Eduardo Frei.

In Brazil and Colombia, the political agenda will revolve around the elections. In Brazil, supported by the popularity of president Lula, PT will try to reach the third consecutive mandate with minister Dilma Rousseff. On the opposition, governor of São Paulo, José Serra (PSDB), will try to drive the tucanos (toucans, as PSDB members are known) to power once again. If nothing new happens, the Brazilian election is bound to be polarized between PT and PSDB, a fact that has repeated since 1994. The scoreboard is tied 2×2. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) won in 1994 and 1998. PT had its payback in 2002 and 2006, by electing and re-electing Lula. The candidates’ decision for vice-president will be a big issue. On Dilma’s side, Michel Temer is losing ground daily while Henrique Meirelles is gaining strength. On Serra’s side, Senator Agripino Maia is a name well suited to the position, that’s why he is among those fighting hard to force Governor José Arruda from his party, the Democrats.

In Colombia, the pre-election setting is undefined. President Álvaro Uribe, even though he hasn’t announced it yet, intends to run for a third consecutive mandate. However, he needs the Supreme Court’s approval for a popular referendum. While this issue is not solved, the election chessboard will be incomplete. If Uribe enters as a candidate, he will be the favorite and should be reelected easily. If the president is prevented from running for the second consecutive reelection, “plan B” is ex-minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos. Still, Uribe would be able to elect Juan Manuel Santos. His impressive popularity and the population’s trust in his government, would lead a large part of the population to vote on a candidate chosen by Uribe. However, the real tendency is for Uribe to be the candidate.

In Argentina and Mexico, the focus will be on economic issues. In Argentina, it is estimated that inflation will close 2009 at a rate of 35%. To make things worse, “Kirchnerism” is losing political power.

In 2007, the year in which the president of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, was elected, she had a popularity rate of 55%, and the support of 20 out of 24 governors. She could also count on the majority of the National Congress. In the Chamber of Deputies, 161 of 257 deputies were “Kirchneristas”. In the senate, 47 of 72 senators were part of its base.

Around two years later, the political capital of the Head of State has been seriously affected. In the Chamber of Deputies, “Kirchnerism” has 104 of 257 deputies in its base. In the Senate, 36 of 72 senators support the government. To make things worse, currently, only 10 of 24 governors support Cristina Kirchner.

With so many problems ahead, Casa Rosada can only hope for an economic recovery and that ex-president Néstor Kirchner returns to the command of the Partido Justicialista – PJ (Justicialist Party). Something that is very unlikely to happen.

In Mexico, the expectation for 2010 is that it will be better than 2009. Because of the ties of the country with the American economy, the Mexican Gross Internal Product (GDP) was heavily affected. Apart from crumbling the popularity of Felipe Calderón, the economical juncture catapulted the legendary Partido da Revolução Institucional – PRI (Institutional Revolution Party). With around three more years ahead, Calderón is betting on the recovery of economic activity to help neutralize his two main adversaries: PRI and PRD’s national leader Manuel López Obrador.

In the Bolivarian Block (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) we can expect a growth in the Anti-American speech. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavés will test his popularity and the popularity of the Partido Socialista Unido da Venezuela – PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) in the legislative elections. Different from four years ago, the opposition will not boycott the elections, a fact that should make the elections more competitive. However, the Venezuelan opposition suffers from something very similar to the Bolivian opposition: There is no articulation, there are many internal conflicts and disputes wearing down its strongest names. Thus, in case there is no restructuring in what the opposition is really aiming for, Chavés will see their implosion and will have a relatively calm campaign. On the economic field, the government is placing its bets on the increased value of a barrel of oil in the international market. If this does not happen, the difficulties will be tremendous, because more than 45% of 2010’s budget has been set aside for social spending. Apart from this, the reserve that Chávez stored when the price of the barrel was above US$ 100 is coming to an end. He strongly depends on a rise in the oil barrel price.

In Ecuador, president Rafael Correa’s challenge will be to maintain his popularity (around 58% according to the last surveys). As in Venezuela, the country is expected to face future economical troubles.

Inside the Bolivarian Block, attention has been turned to Bolivia. After the results of the last presidential election, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Socialist Movement) – the party of president Evo Morales – conquered hegemony in the political system. MAS (Socialist Movement Party) not only controls the Chamber of Deputies, but also has the absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, the sum of Morales popularity with the power conquered by MAS should strengthen the nationalist-indigenous project of the Bolivian Head of State. The tendency is that the so called “Bolivian Refoundation”, was barred by the Senate in many opportunities for advancing. Another factor that is helping Evo Morales is the lack of opposition articulation. We can expect a more radical government in Bolivia. This time, Morales will not have so many bureaucratic, political and judicial deadlocks preventing him from implementing changes in the new Constitution.

Domestic politics will develop in 2010 as they did in 2009 in all countries. Continental geopolitics may be confronted by different moves. The conclusion of military acquisitions by Brail (fighter planes, tanks, helicopters and submarines) will stimulate other countries to review their own military programs. Argentina, for example, is awaiting definitions regarding Brazil in order to initiate the process of their Armed Forces’ modernization. Rumor has it that the choice of fighter planes Brazil makes will directly affect the choice the Argentinean Air Force makes. Ecuador is another country expected to modernize its Armed Forces. This does not mean we are living in a worrying moment, but even more worrying are South American countries with scrapped armed forces, which is the current situation. MERCOSUR will enter a new phase in 2010. With the entrance of Venezuela, political themes will naturally be part of the block’s agenda. This may jeopardize the survival of MERCOSUR, as there is already a founding member (Uruguay), whose society is discussing whether participation is worthwhile or not.

It is true that efforts to elect an Afghan President democratically via elections that were fair and free from fraud and intimidation seem to have failed. The UN–backed Electoral Complaints Commission recounted 10 percent of ballot boxes and discounted 600 of them; investigated 600 allegations of fraud; threw out more than 1 million votes for Karzai; and finally awarded Karzai just 49.7% of the vote. No doubt the international community was collectively wringing its hands both before the election, and in the interregnum before the aborted run-off, hoping for a clean, legitimate outcome, and probably, for an Abdullah victory, which would have signalled a new start for Afghanistan, renewed efforts to root out corruption and an improved relationship with the international community. It was perhaps no surprise then that huge international efforts were made to improve security and create an optimal enabling environment for the election. Despite claims of reduced violence and a higher voter turnout in some areas than might have otherwise have been the case though, an Abdullah victory is nothing more than a ‘what if’now.

So, how did Afghan ‘democracy’ end up at this point? In 2001, when US and UK forces invaded, their mission, quickly accomplished, was to oust the Taliban from Kabul, and with it the opportunity for al Qaeda to use the country as a safe haven. It was decided that introducing a Western model of democracy, symbolised by free and fair elections, would be the best route to a Taliban-free and thus an Al Qaeda-free Afghanistan. In the intervening years however, the US and UK’s strategic and resource focus on Iraq has meant that efforts to bring economic development to Afghanistan and to effectively quash the Taliban insurgency have been unsuccessful. As a direct result, the insurgency has grown since 2003 in both strength and depth and al Qaeda have simply decamped over the border into Pakistan.

Despite this, a ‘democratisation’ process, spearheaded by elections, with limited attempts at institution building, has continued since 2001, with very varying degrees of success. Critics observe that, in Afghanistan, as in other countries undergoing democratic transitions, multi-party elections should occur towards the end of a substantial period of democracy-building, rather than the beginning. And key to the successful entrenchment of democratic principles is a sense of national unity and economic development. For a country like Afghanistan, which has, for most of its history, been economically poor, ravaged by war and is characterised by a highly decentralised tribal societal structure, installing a strong government at the centre through the mechanism of elections seems a curious choice of priority. It is perhaps unsurprising then, that democratic processes are sometimes abused by those in power for their own gain. As Paddy Ashdown has asserted, this is not the fault of Karzai, though he may have many faults, but rather that of the international community for attempting to patch onto a society a wholly unsuitable Western model of democracy. Using the recent elections as an accurate ‘measure’ of Afghan ‘democracy’ therefore, seems ill-advised at best. The UK government has been at pains to emphasise recently that the British mission there is not aiming to install democracy. This is almost definitely because of falling UK public support for the mission and to combat accusations of ‘mission creep’. The introduction of this form of democracy however has led, in large part, to the situation which the international community and the Afghan people now find themeslves facing in Afghanistan.

So, what options are there in terms of moving forward?
The first, and starkest, is for the international community to simply withdraw from Afghanistan altogether. You don’t have to look far to find advocates of this view. This argument tends to believe that ‘this is a war we cannot win’and draws on the historical failure of foreign forces in the country. This argument also tends to believe that the presence of foreign forces is heightening levels of insecurity rather than bringing increased security. There are as yet few detailed analyses of the consequences of withdrawal for Afghan democracy, for the region and for the world. This argument also doesn’t often articulate whether political and civilian efforts should also cease, or whether they should continue to the same extent in the absence of a military presence. However, given the UN’s recent abandonment of Kabul citing heightened insecurity, this seems difficult to envisage.

The second option is to ‘carry on as we are’, or at least with a slightly adapted version of our current political and military strategy, but perhaps with an increased number of military troops. This is widely expected to be the main feature of the new strategy soon to be announced by Obama. One thing is certainly clear: the current strategy in all its spheres – military, political and development – does not seem to be working. Not many people would argue therefore that something does need to change and the extent to which Obama’s new strategy appears to differ from the current one will be crucial.

There is a middle ground between these two positions which gives us a third option. According to the FT’s Gideon Rachman, the views of the Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid “are now so widely sought that he has really become a player.” And it is easy to see why – Rashid’s thesis is an interesting and compelling one. According to Rachman, Rashid is “seriously worried that the Americans are having cold feet and will step back – and that Pakistan will be destablised by a resurgence of the Afghan Taliban.” Furthermore, “…he paints a hair-raising picture of what would happen if the US steps away. He forsees a renewed civil war in Afghanistan, with the Afghan Taliban backed by the Pakistani army, battling it out with the forces of Karzai and the Northern Alliance, backed by Iran. Taking a step further back, the Chinese would be standing in the Afghan-Pakistani-Talib corner, while the Indians backed the other side. The Pakistanis meanwhile would find themselves suffering from the Taliban blowback, caused by the very Afghan war they were sponsoring.” Whether or not we accept this premise in its entirety, if withdrawal is not an option, what to do?

Rashid described his ‘minimalist state’ approach in a recent piece for the Washington Post. Prior to 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he says, the country was peaceful, albeit poor, with a subsistence economy but agricultural jobs for everyone. The government, although only a ‘bare-bones’ monarchical structure, worked well because it was strong enough to maintain law and order but did not undermine the autonomy of the tribes. This structure was subsequently destroyed by 30 years of war.

In 2002, Rashid tried to convince the Bush administration that it should be looking to re-build a similar ‘minimalist state’, as it would be strong enough to keep al Qaeda and the Taliban out, whilst at the same time peacefully overseeing the tribes. Back then, Richard Holbrooke estimated that this might cost $5 billion a year over 10 years. Today, Rashid estimates that it would take between $10-15 billion a year and take tens of thousands more troops. As this is unlikely to happen, and knowing the power of public opinion, Rashid suggests that the first thing to be done is for US and European people to be told the truth by their governments: that mistakes have been made in Afghanistan; the minimalist state should have been re-built, but it has not; the terrorist threat has grown and spread throughout Africa and Europe. Second, the minimalist state should be re-built as quickly as possible, focusing on agriculture, job creation and justice. This will take at least 2-3 years. Third, more aid and more time must be given to Pakistan to help fight both the Pakistani and the Afghan Taliban, as well as al Qaeda in the mountainous border areas. Finally, Afghan partners on the ground need to be cultivated for the international community to work with, so they are not viewed as occupying forces. This means, crucially, forcing Karzai to create a government that includes all the leading opposition figures.

Afghanistan is a unique country in an extraordinary position. It is in this context that the international community finds itself trying to finish what it started in 2001. It has, at the very least, a moral obligation, and at most, a security imperative, to finish it. Hopefully Obama’s new strategy will include features of the Rashid thesis and preferably, the end result will reflect the Afghan context and serve the needs of the Afghan people. If it doesn’t, it will be doomed to fail. It is not inconceivable that Afghanistan will remain an ally in the fight against terrorism, even if it does not become a democracy in the Western tradition. It is 8 years since Al Qaeda changed the world on 9/11 and there is now an urgent need for the West to start changing its understandings of how to use democratic principles, if not democratisation itself, to best counter the threat posed by terrorism. Just as urgent, Western leaders also need to start changing the way they communicate with their publics, to find better ways of explaining why this is necessary. Losing the war against terrorism abroad would be catastrophic, but losing the argument at home about how to do it could be fatal.

Brazil’s main objective is to show its commitment to sustainable development and its level of concern about the emission of greenhouse gases. The actions proposed by Brazil are expected to promote a 36.1 to 38.9% reduction on the emissions the country would achieve by 2020 if nothing was done. Of this total, 20% will result from an 80% drop in deforestation of the Amazon. According to estimates by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), Amazon deforestation levels in 2009 will be the lowest in the last 21 years, with a 40% reduction in comparison to last year’s numbers.

Furthermore, an agricultural/ecological zoning system was developed in order to supervise the expansion of sugar-cane crops for the production of Ethanol fuel. The system allowed an increase in the crop’s plantation area, while prohibiting expansion in protected areas like the Amazon and Pantanal.

The Brazilian strategy is becoming quite embarrassing for developed countries that are not environmentally active, forcing them to accept bolder goals for the Copenhagen Protocol. More than that, encouraging them to invest more financial resources to fight climate change in developing countries. The perception behind this change of focus is that Brazil can benefit a great deal from transitioning to a low carbon economy: after all, the country has one of the cleanest energy matrixes in the world, is a world-leader in biofuels and most of its emissions (illegal deforestation) is not linked to economic growth.

Brazil is also in favour of approving regulations that enable and popularize technologies that are still protected by patents, generally owned by wealthy countries. In order to foster technology transfers, the Brazilian government has already proposed the establishment of a multilateral public fund to invest in purchasing licenses for manufacturing products and using patent protected processes and equipment. The Brazilian committee will also argue that the intellectual property regime cannot have the sole objective of protecting the copyrights of inventors.

In Brazil’s view, developing countries should fully explore their national capacities for investments in the climate agenda. However, the country also states that there is a need for an increase in financing and technology transfers. The claim suggests that if these initiatives do not come from developed nations, it will become increasingly harder to face climate change while increasing economic and social development. The contribution from developed countries is not seen as a donation, but as an international obligation.

Changing its posture towards a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, Brazil wants to be the leading name behind an international pact to fight climate change. Even though Brazil’s International Relations seem to be in good shape, the Lula administration still needs the so-called international “big break”. Since 2003, the Brazilian President has been trying a series of diplomatic maneouvres that have not been as successful as expected. In spite of the successful 2016 Olympic bid for Rio de Janeiro, one cannot forget the Honduras episode, in which Deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya took shelter in the Brazilian Embassy, inciting much controversy in international public opinion.

The Brazilian Government’s stand at the 15th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change also has a lot to do with the 2011 presidential elections. Senator Marina Silva, known for her political influence on environmental issues, has left the Labor Party to run for President.

Losing her represented a significant imbalance for the party and the President, as her candidacy makes it harder for the Government to use comparisons between President Lula and ex-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Government as an advantage for reelecting the party.

The presidential elections – though not admitted – influenced Brazil’s current stand in Copenhagen, because if the country’s campaign is successful, it would represent a powerful argument for President Lula’s candidate Dilma Rousseff in her battle against Marina Silva when it comes to environmental issues.

Despite the economic benefit of Venezuela’s presence in Mercosur for Brazilian companies, the personal style of the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, raises cause for concern in the member countries.

Chavez’s political personality is the opposite of Lula’s, which stresses moderation. There are therefore fears that Chavez’s excessive nationalism will bring further challenges to Mercosur.

Venezuela’s conflicts with Colombia, for example, will demand a stance from Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay as soon as Chavez’s country becomes a full member of the regional bloc. There are also fears that Venezuela may prejudice negotiations for establishing a free trade accord between Mercosur and the European Union.

Supporters of Venezuela’s entry to the bloc believe in turn that Venezuelan political circumstances cannot be allowed to impede the entry of another country into Mercosur. Furthermore, they believe that leaving Hugo Chavez isolated would be much worse. Despite these arguments it is unlikely that Chavez will not use Mercosur as yet another political platform, as he has done with Alba (The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) and Unasur (The Union of South American Nations).

In Venezuela, the country’s admission to Mercosur is seen under a positive light. Even the mayor of Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, supports membership. The opposition expects that with the country’s admission to the bloc there will be greater regional pressure for the Chavez government to comply with democratic conditions. Although that pressure will initially be somewhat limited, it is better than allowing the Venezuelan president to act independently.

Despite these political elements, the more important impact of Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur will be economic, especially for Brazil. Last year’s Brazil’s trade balance with Venezuela amounted to US$ 5.7 billion, with a US$ 4.6 billion surplus for Brazil. Since 2007, Brazil has been the country’s second trading partner, behind only the USA, the main consumer of Venezuelan oil. Venezuela imports 70% of what it consumes, mostly from Colombia and the United States. It is therefore possible that Venezuela’s participation in Mercosur will strengthen the bloc’s GDP.

It will also extend the bloc to northern South America, with influence in the Caribbean region and benefits for all States in northern Brazil.

Despite this optimism, Venezuela’s interests in Mercosur will be different from those of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. While those countries expect Venezuela to contribute economically to the bloc, Hugo Chavez must be relying on Mercosur to further strengthen his political influence in the region. These contradictory objectives should lead to Venezuela’s incorporation into Mercosur making little contribution to strengthening the bloc in the short term.

Several analysts and politicians believe that politicisation of the bloc is the great negative aspect that will come with Venezuela’s admission. Despite Mercosur being relatively moribund, achieving much less than had been hoped when it was formed, it is still a commercial bloc. And although weak, Mercosur continues to have a commercial aspect, which prevents certain political disputes from being brought within its ambit. One recent example was the situation involving the Itaipu Plant. In this episode the disagreement between Brazil and Paraguay, together with its resolution – which often displayed aspects that were more political than financial – was confined to dialogue between the two.

Chavez has shown a history of politicising every area. One clear recent example involves relations with Colombia. This long-term trading partnership with Venezuela was gradually set aside through the personal – and above all political – decisions of Chavez. The aim of exchanging food supply from Colombia with Brazilian and Argentine products is, in a way, retaliation against the Alvaro Uribe government for its political disagreement with Chavez. There are clearly in this case “two weights, two measures”. As soon as there is a commercial retaliation against a neighbor due to a politically opposing position (in that case North American bases in Colombia), there is an intervention in the affairs of another country. Foreign intervention is something totally rejected by Chavez.

There is a risk that purely commercial issues become the target of “gentle blackmail” for political will to prevail. It is worth recalling that through its president, Fernando Lugo, Paraguay has an “almost carnal” relationship with Venezuela. Just because the Paraguayan parliament has not yet approved Venezuela’s admission does not mean that Paraguay does not support Chavez. In Argentina, the Kirchners have shown that they “dance according to the tune”, and in this case it is Chavez who is closest to the couple’s hearts.

Within this scenario, should the bloc become politicised, it is possible that Paraguay, Venezuela and Argentina will
always be united. Brazil might join the group or be always isolated with the tiny Uruguay. Another very interesting line of argument says that Venezuela is not Chavez and for that reason the country’s admission will be beneficial for the bloc and for Brazil. Except they have forgotten to tell Chavez, who has created a system in which State and government are fused together around his image. Chavez today represents the Venezuelan state, the Venezuelan government, the Venezuelan people (since he controls the National Assembly), the Armed Forces (since his personal forces are greater than the Army) and the Venezuelan press. There is no way of dealing with Venezuelan institutions without them being 100% infected by the personal wishes of Hugo Chavez.

Yet Venezuela is infinitely greater than Chavez. Its people and its history mean that the country will always be most welcome in any bloc of which Brazil is a member. However, this fusion between an individual who acts according to his mood and antiquated ideology and a country and its institutions brings no benefits to a bloc of which Brazil is a member. Brazil finds itself in interesting international ascendancy, but insists in believing that it can add value with Venezuela and Iran, for example.

Finally, there are those who just look at the figures. Businesspeople who deal directly with Venezuela are more than happy with its admission to Mercosur. Yet one should not just look at the figures to justify admission of a country that violates human rights and freedom of the press. Does balance of trade have more value than the basic foundations of democracy? Should arithmetic ignore violations of democracy in another country? Some say yes, others say no. I do not believe that trade benefits are enough to justify disruption to day-to-day foreign policy and Brazilian trade policy. I believe that Brazil, within its stance towards global politics, should uphold certain basic values of democracy above a growth in balance of trade with a highly unstable country with no firm institutions.

The government, meanwhile, seems to be clutching at straws to retain an impression of its control over the population. This is reflected in recent government orders, which contribute to a growing erosion of civil liberties. But the government is simply taking advantage of a prevailing, army led narrative of Pakistani resolve against the Taliban, using this where it can to restrict citizens. Some of the government’s orders can be seen as an attempt to salvage control in a situation where it is decidedly the supporting act.

Despite earlier opposition to the current anti-Taliban operation in South Waziristan, the army has now committed to it and has apparently had some successes. On October 24 it claimed to have captured the hometown of Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud.

The fact that the operation did not begin until the army was ready, despite repeated government statements that it was imminent, illustrates the long-entrenched dominance of Pakistan’s military. Although there is now an elected civilian government, the country is still adapting after a nine-year spell of military rule under ex-General Pervez Musharraf – the latest in a series of military dictatorships which have taken up much of Pakistan’s 62 year history.

The government has presented a much less well organised approach than the army since the beginning of the operation, and seems almost flighty at times. Following the bombing of the Islamic University in the capital Islamabad on October 20, it ordered the closure of all schools nationwide for the rest of the week. This was possibly an over reaction to the bombing of one large, high-profile university in the federal capital – especially given that it did not order the closure of schools in Swat when a significant proportion of them were being bombed by the Taliban last spring. Madrassas – still governed by independent boards despite the government’s efforts to regulate them – mostly remained open. During the period of closure I visited a madrassa in Karachi, where all seemed to be going on as normal.

The government’s apparent lack of control over the narrative of state action was highlighted by the army’s announcement, through its press wing the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), that state schools would re-open the Monday after the university bombing. The government was at that time still saying that the decision on schools would be taken after it had concluded a security review. In another example a few days later, the local government in Bajaur agency on the Afghan border claimed that two major Taliban commanders had been killed in a US drone attack. The army quickly retorted that they had in fact been killed by the detonation of a truck laden with explosives.

Some of the government’s actions recently have been commendable. For instance, there was news from Karachi last week of a foiled bombing attempt, as bomb disposal personnel found and removed a ‘suspicious device’ attached to a car.

But the schools issue shows a government more ready to make orders than to take action. It has now ordered all schools, when they reopen, to increase the height of their walls to a minimum height and hire guards. It has not said it will provide any help with this.

And some government orders seem likely to be neither effective nor necessary. In mid October some provincial governments imposed a ban on pillion riding on motorbikes in most major cities, apparently to reduce suicide bombings. The ban exempts the disabled and women, who form a large proportion of those riding behind the drivers of motorbikes. Although women bombers are still rare in Pakistan so their exemption may not make the ban completely pointless, it does make it seem a slightly arbitrary measure. The ban did not prevent the drive-by shooting of a high ranking army officer in Islamabad on October 22, by two men on a motorbike.

Like the school closures, the ban is another example of a knee-jerk reaction to single incident by the government, with little evidence of real thought behind it. The pillion riding ban in particular attracted wide criticism because it stripped many people of a cheap or fee means of transport.

But there is a more serious side to such government orders. The order to ban pillion riding was made by imposing Section 144 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which prohibits “joining unlawful assembly armed with a deadly weapon”. Although the exact orders made under this provision in the last few weeks have varied between different district authorities and are sometimes unclear, some news channels have reported that the imposition includes a ban on gatherings of more than 4 people. Section 144 has been used to curtail freedom of assembly before, among the anti-government lawyers’ movement earlier in 2009.

With this more sinister turn, the young civilian government is showing its desperation. Lacking the upper hand in the country’s power stakes, it seems to be cracking down on civil freedoms in an attempt to retain a veneer of control.

Even in this, however, it is subservient to the military. Curfews and other restrictions on movement – not part of Section 144 – are enforced by the army, not civilian officials. And media freedom provides a particularly good illustration of the army’s superior control.

There is currently an overwhelming narrative in the media of Pakistani resolve in an anti-Taliban war, of the population standing behind the army. One manifestation of this is increased xenophobia, with killings of foreign militants (for instance several Uzbeks on October 24) always well reported.

The government has made some strong moves to back up this narrative, with increasing arrests and deportations of civilian foreigners – Afghans featuring prominently among them.

But it is to the military, almost exclusively, that the media looks for its content. The ISPR is virtually the only source quoted on the current fighting in the tribal areas, even in the generally more liberal and critical English language media. It is very difficult for journalists to get to the areas on which the ISPR reports focus and so first-hand accounts are not available to news organisations; but there is very little attempt to include non-military voices, let alone those who are against the war. Commentators and analysts are almost always army or ex-army men, and hardly ever criticise current tactics. The media either does not mention army casualties, or contrasts militants ‘killed’ with soldiers ‘martyred’. There is no mention of civilian casualties inflicted by the army.

The media, whether through censorship or self-censorship, is acquiescent to the army’s messages. But this is not the case as regards the government. There is criticism of the government’s handling of the growing crisis of internally displaced people from the combat areas, for example, with reporters openly discussing the lack of adequate facilities in government IDP camps and the disorganised and insufficient efforts to register IDPs.

It is unlikely that journalists prepared to criticise the government in such as way, would toe the army line so conscientiously if they were not forced to do so. The army is clearly in far better control of the national narrative than the government.

Although the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, has repeatedly pledged to rescue the army from the Musharraf era by not getting involved in politics, he may not have much of a choice. In the face of an army used to rule and a government apparently unable to challenge that attitude, Kayani may be allowing his spokesmen to build up a strong lead over the government.

In the long-militarised environment of Pakistan, a country whose identity revolves around a frequently live conflict with its neighbour India, the current civilian government is clearly struggling to maintain the initiative. In civil liberties and in control of the prevailing narrative, the government is playing second fiddle to the army.