New FPC Research Associate Chris Ogden looks into the future of India’s Hindu nationalist opposition party – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP – Indian People’s Party)- that faces a potentially uncertain and unstable future after its 2009 election defeat. Despite remaining as India’s second largest political force, and indeed the country’s only other national party besides Congress, the BJP faces a period of repackaging for India’s electorate. Given that the BJP’s current head, LK Advani who turns 82 on Sunday 8th November, and has announced his plans to step-down, any re-branding will be underscored by a phase of internal restructuring, most prominently involving the emergence of a new leader.

Regardless of how Manuel Zelaya entered the country, what remains is that he made it happen before the UN’s General Assembly, based on his own schedule. After the coup led by Roberto Micheletti set in, the whole subject seemed to wane week after week, with Zelaya roaming across countries in search of what to do next.

After 86 days, his not so triumphant return (in contrast to the first attempt weeks earlier) took place with Brazil assuming an active role in the entire situation, a role Brazil has longed for in many years as the doorway into the region’s diplomatic spotlight. One cannot doubt, still a hard thing to believe, that Brazil – one of the region’s leading nations – did not know of Zelaya’s return until he pressed the buzzer of the Brazilian embassy in Tegucicalpa. I believe, for sake of our diplomacy, that Brazil had already been informed of the affair before it happened.

It is not difficult to acknowledge Brazil’s refuge of the overthrown president as appropriate and legitimate. Since the Brazilian government recognizes Zelaya as Honduras’ legitimate president, how could the embassy staff tell him to turn around and seek refuge elsewhere? The Brazilian government’s decision in this respect was correct and fortunate. On the other hand, the nation has made a serious mistake that can jeopardize its pursuit of a more active, leading role as global mediator in that it allowed and authorized Zelaya to take hold of a microphone and stir the country’s population right from the embassy’s balcony in Tegucicalpa. At that very minute Brazil switched its stance, ceasing to be a mediator and taking an active, collaborative role in the entire affair. If you take sides with a man who happens to be the enemy of the de facto government (whether or not a legitimate one), it is no surprise if some retaliation will ensue afterwards (such as the cutting off of water, power and phone services.)

Over the years Brazil has seen its importance grow as a regional leader. Some facts are still under considerable shade when contrasted to the country’s power and diplomatic tradition. Argentine journalists have said that Honduras could well be president Lula’s “Waterloo” in the realm of foreign policy. The Colombian media kept asking the one and only question: how come Brazil was not aware of Zelaya’s return?

The emerging picture suggests that it has been a well concocted plan by Hugo Chávez, since the plane that took Zelaya to the border was of Venezuelan nationality and it is the Venezuelan leader, not Lula, with whom Zelaya maintains an almost daily telephone exchange. However, just when the controversy reached its apex, here comes Zelaya knocking at the front door of the Brazilian embassy. Although conceived by a third nation, Venezuela, this situation may well bring some gain and yet a lot of trouble for the image of Brazilian diplomacy.

The Brazilian government is trying to convince Zelaya to take asylum in Brazil. In doing this, tension around the Brazilian embassy might subside and negotiation might emerge as the only way out. Despite talks over the use of violence, this does not seem a feasible alternative at the moment. A significant disruption in the ranks of the country’s military would have to occur for a civil war to ensue. In Honduras, however, the Armed Forces and also the Legislative and Judiciary branches rallied alongside Roberto Michelletti, as well as a significant portion of the country’s population. Zelaya, on the other hand, has insufficient supporters within the military to hope for such rupture. Moreover, supporters of Zelaya are but a minority group within the country’s population.

Micheletti is expected to strain and overcome Zelaya and Brazil with exhaustion. Brazil should try to convince Zelaya to take political asylum. It is unlikely that a different scenario may take place as the situation develops.

Consociational politics have been deliberately established in Lebanon to ensure the protection of minority groups and ensure power sharing. But the politics of sect are not seen as sufficient by the Lebanese and there is a strong desire among civil society actors to change this consociational politics. One method being pushed, in this battle of “bad governance against good,” is electoral reform. Reformers are trying to ensure that in the creation of a new election law for the 2013 elections two mechanisms are introduced: Proportional Representation (PR) and the creation of a Senate.

The June 2009 Election

Reform in Lebanon has been in the air a while; for the election in June important reforms had been passed; the Election Day itself was deemed a great success. The election was successfully held on one day instead of four consecutive weekends and for the first time the monitoring of campaigning and campaign spending was carried out. Further to this, there was a widely publicized push to improve the accuracy and transparency of the voter register. However, away from all these electoral smiles, significant reforms had not been made. All of the crucial reforms recommended by the National Commission for a New Electoral Law (also known as the Boutros Commission) had been ignored: Such as the introduction of proportional representation, the introduction of universal ballots and the creation of an independent electoral commission.

The Current Electoral System

The electoral system and the structure of politics in Lebanon are based the creation of a political safeguard to ensure that domination does not occur between any of the three main religious groups: the Shi’a, Sunni and Christians(2). Half of the seats in parliament are divided among seven Christian denominations, and the other half are reserved for members of four different Muslim sects. In the executive branch, cabinet seats are also parcelled out in confessional allotments, while the three highest posts in the land – President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament – are always held by a Maronite Christian, a Sunni, and a Shiite, respectively(3).

In the electoral system this protection has been translated in establishing a system that uses a first past the post and reserves a certain number of seats in each district for certain religious sects. Beirut, for instance, has three districts. In Beirut District One there are five seats all of which are Christian; each of these five seats is exclusively for a certain denomination (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Greek Catholic and Maronite). In Beirut District Three there are ten seats: three Christian (Greek Orthodox, Evangelical and Minorities) and seven Muslim (five Sunni, one Shi’a and one Druze). The candidate running must be from one of these denominations and will then compete in a first past the post system.

The electoral law used for the June 2009 election made the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics even worse. This fact was noticeably absent in the reporting by the international press. Through increasing the electoral districts from 14 to 26 actually increased the sectarian nature of the elections. An assessment of the electoral law published by Democracy Reporting International (DRI) and the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) concluded the new division of electoral districts essentially created 13 new “mono-confessional” districts(4).

The problem of sectarianism in the political process has not escaped the Lebanese. In Article 22 of the Constitution and the Taif Accord (5) both call for an end to the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics. There is a now a window for reform for the 2013 election to be changed, as the law used for 2009 cannot be used again, due to the fact it is based upon a law created by the Syrians. Many civil society activists believe that through the reform of the electoral and parliamentary system the confessional nature of Lebanese politics can be reduced.

Proportional Representation (PR)

The principal of PR is that the seats in a constituency are divided according to the number of votes for party lists(6). The PR system is explicitly designed to protect the minority voice and as such it is believed that this system would ease political polarization. The Boutros Commission proposed that a PR system be partially introduced. It recommended that 51 representatives be chosen through PR at the governorate level and the other 77 be selected at the smaller district level using the current first past the post system.

The basic idea of using a PR system for Lebanon is that it would remove the dominance of big parties and individuals entrenched in certain areas of the country. PR would break up the supremacy of the major parties and allow independents to come through unaligned to a bloc (7). Political parties who have a large number of supporters in a district but are not the outright majority would be able to get representation; even more importantly those parties that have a large number of supporters around the country and not concentrated in single electoral districts would get represented. The PR system would make the political system more national and hopefully therefore less sectarian. John Stewart Mill, shortly after the idea of PR was created, beautifully summed up the benefits of a PR electoral system:

“It would be impossible any longer to foist upon the electors the first person who presents himself with the catchwords of the party in his mouth, and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket. The majority would insist on having a candidate worthy of their choice, or they would carry their votes somewhere else.”

Apart from the fact that the PR system has the almighty obstacle of having to be introduced into the Lebanese political system by the very people that it is trying to wrestle power from, there are concerns with the PR system itself. PR would stop inter-confessional voting, for example, at the moment if you are in a electoral district where only a Shia can run then as a Sunni or Christian you have to vote for a Shia candidate. This would therefore, increase sectarianism and the homogenization of Lebanese politics. PR could increase the homogenizing sectarian forces in Lebanon. Also taking the experience of Israel and Italy the PR system can create incredibly unstable governments, not something Lebanon needs to import. However, if concomitantly you introduce a Senate, or more importantly a bicameral parliamentary system, with complete PR it is argued that the instability of PR would be overcome.

The Senate

In 1926 the first Constitution established a Senate and an elected Chamber of deputies but the Senate was abolished shortly after its creation. Many Lebanese politicians are also calling for the re-establishment of a Senate, most importantly incumbent President Suleiman. More importantly there is a lively debate on the pros and cons of the creation of a Senate in the Lebanese blogosphere.

Put simply the creation of a Senate aims to: move all the undesirable elements of Lebanese politics, such as sectarianism, away from the executive and place it in a body, much like that House of Lords, with limited powers. This would mean that the legislative body – the parliament – would be free of sectarianism and therefore would be able to operate on the basis of expressing the will of the majority. As political analysts Elias Muhanna, who has been actively promoting the creation of a Senate (8), argues:

“Sequestering confessional interests in a dedicated institution would allow the Chamber of Deputies to be transformed from a marketplace of sectarian bartering into the primary locus of political authority whose constituent was the citizen, irrespective of his or her religion.”

The fear is that adding yet another layer of political apparatus in Lebanon’s political system would create further paralysis in the current system. It is also argued by those against the creation of a Senate that the establishment of an explicitly sectarian body would only entrench sectarian divisions further not remove them. It is unlikely, the opponents of a Senate argue, that the executive would be able to shrug off its sectarian nature and you would just be doubling up the problem.

The Static Reality

The desire to build a stronger internal system of governance is there among the Lebanese; the political good will is not. To articulate the scale of the problem, the rotten core of the Lebanese political elite has meant that even the most simple of reforms, such as the creation of a universal ballot, was unable to pass. The creation of a Senate and a PR system is an unlikely event.

However, a glimmer of light comes from the experience of other countries. The electoral expert Pippa Norris gives some comfort from her research on the role of the public in electoral reform that showed: “Democratic aspirations help to drive institutional changes, even in transitional regimes with a poor record of civil liberties and political rights .” A reminder to all Lebanese civil society activists and international actors pushing for electoral reform: Yes the push for reform can be frustratingly slow and appear to be impossible but public pressure does make a difference. As Paul Salem, the Director of Carnegie Middle East noted, “While Lebanon’s political system is highly dysfunctional, it is actually also quite fragile and ‘impactable’… with the right kind of pressure, you can make an influence on it.”

1.Fridman, T, Ballots Over Bullets, New York Times, June 2009http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/opinion/10friedman.html?_r=1
2. Berti, B, Electoral Reform in Lebanon, Mideast Monitor, August 2009
3. Muhanna, E. Two houses, many mansions, 14 August http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090814/REVIEW/708139987/1008
4.IRIN, Lebanon: Elections entrench sectarian divisions, analysts say, 7 June 2009
5.The agreement that ended the civil war
6.Norris, P, Choosing Electoral Systems http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Acrobat/IPSR%20Choosing%20Electoral%20Systems.pdf
7.Sharp, D, Electoral Reform and Proportional Representation,http://lebelections.blogspot.com/2009/06/electoral-reform-and-proportional.html#comments
8.See: http://lebanonsenate.org/

In what marks a significant turnaround in relations, not only have the prospects for conflict evaporated but also Damascus and Ankara find themselves in an ever closer integrated relationship with economic, political and even military ties strengthening each year. Similarly, Turkey has been instrumental in Syria’s recent international rehabilitation. Why, then, have relations changed so suddenly and who are the real beneficiaries of this alliance? Moreover, with Turkey’s relationship with Israel tense after the Gaza conflict and Syria’s alliance with Iran under increased western pressure, could this be the first step in a dramatic realignment in Middle East relations?

The roots of Syrian-Turkish animosity are deep. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, suspicion and hostility have been fuelled by historical disagreements over territory and water rights. This was later enhanced by Ankara’s closeness to Israel and Syria’s support for Turkey’s PKK enemies – seemingly the immediate cause behind the military standoff in 1998. Although resolving some of these grievances has aided the recent warming in relations, it would be wrong to see them as previously intractable obstacles whose removal paved the way for a closer alliance. After all, Syria stopped its support for the PKK in 1999 without immediately thawing its ties with Turkey. Similarly, Turkey remains allied to Israel, a position that Syria has made no demands to alter.

A better explanation for this developing friendship comes from new diplomatic strategies adopted by both states in recent years. In light of the slow EU accession process and disappointment at the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey has adopted the arch-realist position of its influential foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu. He argues for “zero problems with neighbours”, whatever their past or current misdeeds. This has allowed the regime to put aside its ideological differences and historical disagreements with Syria, as it has with Greece, Iran and, increasingly, Iraq and Armenia. At the same time Davutoglu advocates increased Turkish “strategic depth” with its neighbours – promoting its cultural, economic and political influence further than in the past. Its stable yet economically under-developed neighbour Syria proves a good test case.

Syria’s shift towards Turkey has emerged out of more desperate circumstances. Frozen out by the US, the EU and the so-called moderate Arab states after the 2003 Iraq war and the 2005 Hariri assassination in Lebanon, Assad was forced to cast his net for new allies. While this drew him closer to Iran and Qatar, it was Turkey that he courted most – making the historic first trip by a Syrian president to Ankara in 2004. Assad was willing to make substantial sacrifices to forge this new friendship, such as finally accepting Turkish sovereignty over the disputed Hatay province in 2005. At the same time he proved a shrewd diplomat, rushing to support Turkey’s incursion against Kurdish rebels in Iraq in 2007, despite international condemnation.

Ostensibly the hard work has paid off, as Turkish support has been instrumental in bringing Syria back in from the cold. Erdogan mediated Israeli-Syrian talks in 2008 that softened Damascus’s negative international image. Not surprisingly, when the French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, eventually broke the international boycott and visited Syria last year, Assad met him accompanied by Erdogan. Economically, the renewed ties have paid dividends, too. Trade between the two states has more than doubled in three years, there has been substantial investment from Turkish companies – particularly in Syria’s second city, Aleppo – and numerous joint infrastructural projects have been commissioned. In April 2009 there was even the first ever Syrian-Turkish joint military exercise.

Despite these obvious benefits, there are downsides for Syria. The free trade agreement signed in 2007 has already put out of business old Syrian manufacturing families that couldn’t compete with superior Turkish imports. Moreover, Syria remains very much the junior partner to Turkey in this relationship, and Erdogan has been flexing his diplomatic muscle recently by encouraging a reluctant Assad to pay a visit to Saudi Arabia. Strong links with Turkey form one of the linchpins of Assad’s economic strategy, which could make Syria increasingly dependent on Turkey’s will.

In contrast, there seem few negatives for Turkey. Supporting pro-Palestinian Syria seems to be popular domestically and increased cross-border trade can help regenerate the economically deprived Turkish south. Neutralising Syria has made resolving its Kurdish problem more likely and Syria’s support will increase security on Turkey’s long and volatile border. Diplomatically, the relationship increases Turkish influence in the Arab world, and close ties to Syria make Turkey even more valuable to its Nato allies as mediator to unsavoury regimes.

This new friendship is therefore inherently unbalanced. Syria remains only one strand (admittedly a useful one) of a wider realist Turkish foreign policy – as seen by visa-free agreements with Iran and Iraq. Turkey, in contrast, is an essential ingredient in Syria’s plans for international rehabilitation and economic recovery. It is highly unlikely that any major strategic realignment will take place as Turkey can get all it wants from a willing Syria without having to commit itself to a defensive alliance and an abrogation of its ties with Israel.

Nor is there likely to be much pressure from Erdogan on Assad to either reform internally or internationally, as this would be out of line with the “zero problems with neighbours” strategy. Turkey is trying to pursue an ambitious new foreign policy in the Middle East, and Syria is enjoying being along for the ride – at least for now.

Still missing a technical report, Rafale (French fighter aircrafts) was not FAB’s (Brazilian Air Force) favorite. The engineers apparently prefer the Swedish plane Gripen NG, while pilots show a preference for the Super Hornet F-18, from the USA. Informally, Lula made Sarkozy’s job easier when argued that Rafale fighters could be chosen because this agreement would also include “transferring technology”. In the FX-2 program, technology transfer is a qualifying condition since the beginning of the bidding process. Each of the three current competitors presented solid technology transfer proposals.

Regardless of the merit of finding the best or worst choice for Brazil, Lula created a serious problem. Competition has become a relatively simple target for lawyers who would like to legally paralyze FX-2. The deal is only expected to be closed in October, but Lula ignored FAB’s opinion and created a diplomatic situation with the USA and Sweden. In Latin America, repercussion was immediate. The Colombian press, for instance, wants to find out whether there will be a dispute for influence among the USA, France and Russia in South America. According to Colombians, the rationale will take place through the full support of the USA concerning the Colombian cause against FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia), the relationship between Chávez and Russia and now the possibility Brazil has to buy everything at once.

Sovereignty, a word repeated time and again by the Brazilian Government, is in a dubious situation: depending on only one country for strategic weapons, as well as their parts and know-how. This same sovereignty was the theme on each Argentinean trendsetters decided to argue about. Will Brazil really take a dominant global position, or does the country want to speed up this process by getting stuck to a aligned country? For Argentineans, the purchase of Brazilian weapons is extremely important. In some occasions, they make it clear that, as far as the fighters are concerned, Argentina could follow Brazil’s choice. However, considering Rafale’s astronomic value, which even reduced will continue high if compared to the other two competitors, Argentina will not afford a complete squad. As part of the seduction package offered by Sarkozy, Brazil will be the exclusive vendor of Rafales in Latin America. Nevertheless, which neighbour country can pay for such plane?

In Mexico, they set a tone of irony. Formally the purchase of Brazilian weapons was little discussed, but according to talks with Mexican government sources, they believe Brazil is about to close a complicated deal with France in case it really buys the Rafale fighters. It is even considered that this plane could not be sold outside France. There were 14 lost biding processes and a great deal of confusion. There is no doubt that this is an excellent fighter, but which runs the risk of having Brazil and Libya as its sole purchasers.

New FPC Research Associate Tim Summers gives us his take on China’s past, present and possible future as the People’s Republic approaches its 60th Anniversary.

The move is part of a wider western strategy to tempt Syria away from Iran and continue its co-operation in Iraq and Lebanon, but are we witnessing another example of human rights and democracy being sacrificed for political expediency?

The ENP aims to build relationships with Europe’s neighbours based “upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development)”.

Ostensibly, Syria has not made any such commitment since talks about joining the ENP were frozen in 2005. Human rights violations continue and the ruling regime has shown no serious moves towards democratisation. Similarly, there has been no renunciation of chemical weapons – a demand that Britain had previously made during negotiations in 2004 and has now dropped.

Those in favour of a Syrian association agreement argue that the long term political benefits for the EU outweigh this oversight of principle. Syria expert Joshua Landis argues that US sanctions and international isolation have not worked, so a new approach should be tried. The proposed EU agreement, he suggests, would tie Syria into the global economy and discourage it from siding with those that undermine the global order, notably Iran. Similarly, the economic benefits of such a pact would help develop a larger Syrian middle class who would, in turn, promote greater international co-operation, as has happened in China.

Some supporters go further and argue that there is no compromise of principle as this pact could aid internal liberalisation. Syrian reformers suggest that economic openness could prompt greater social liberalism, as seen in the Asian tiger economies. This view is clearly shared by Britain and France, who claim a clause in the treaty will facilitate greater dialogue on issues such as human rights.

Yet both proposals fall short on closer inspection. The human rights argument doesn’t stand up to scrutiny when considering the other members of the ENP. Several of Syria’s neighbours – Jordan, Israel and Egypt – signed EU association agreements between 2000 and 2006, yet numerous human rights abuses continue. Similarly, while some Asian tiger economies have liberalised internally in the wake of economic opening-up, China has provided Arab states with a model in which western investment need not coincide with moves towards human rights or democratisation.

Similarly, Landis’s analysis implies that by joining the ENP, Syria will automatically see widespread positive economic development. Yet the country is still subject to crippling public and private monopolies that economists admit will need to be reformed for the economy to truly flourish, with or without the ENP. Furthermore, though Syria’s economy is currently growing, it is already showing the same signs of disproportionate wealth distribution seen in Egypt where development has remained lopsided since it joined the ENP. The gap between rich and poor has continued to grow in Egypt, spurring greater instability from the urban poor, who do not perceive any benefit from the ENP. In Syria, with the rich-poor gap also growing, the ENP could further exacerbate the situation rather than promoting the middle class stability that Landis predicts.

That said, Landis is right to highlight how limited the west’s policy of isolation has been in affecting Syria’s behaviour in the past four years. Moreover, the reasons to exclude Syria are tenuous. Past precedents for inviting countries into the ENP suggest political and economic rather than conscientious motives. Ever since the policy’s foundation, Brussels’ criteria for accession have been riddled with inconsistencies. Syria was denied entry in 2004 for not renouncing its WMD, while Israel acceded in 2000 with no mention of its undeclared nuclear arsenal. Likewise, Egypt continues to receive huge sums of development money from the ENP despite failing to live up to its commitments on human rights, good governance and democracy.

A Syrian-EU treaty would therefore be consistent with the ENP’s past subordination of its founding principles to the political priorities of the day. European attempts to woo Syria from Iran and minimise its influence in Lebanon are the primary motives for this treaty, not promoting good governance, human rights or democracy. Rather than making Syria an example of how the EU can promote its lofty principles, leaders should take this opportunity to reflect on the failings of the ENP in its current guise. Despite being the major trade partner with Middle Eastern states, the EU has been unable to promote the kind of domestic liberal political reforms so swiftly adopted in eastern Europe after 1989. It’s time to work out a better way to turn that economic clout into leverage.

In 2007 the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU swelled it to 27 members. Before its 60th birthday, the early accession of Balkan states including Croatia and FYR Macedonia, alongside, perhaps Turkey, should see it break the 30-member barrier. The Union has gone through a period of rapid growth and consolidation in the last 10 years greater, arguably, than during any of its previous 40 or so. It has also, arguably, failed fully to think through and qualify its expansion in terms of its implications for the Union’s ethical standards and political aspirations.

The Copenhagen Criteria have since 1993 laid down benchmarks for accession in typical triplicate: free markets, desire for integration, and most crucially, the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. These have been the keystone of the EU’s Neighbourhood and Enlargement policy; the Directorate-General’s statement that “any European country which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union,” doesn’t adequately convey the degree of proselytising engagement that has motivated EU growth, particularly behind the drawn Iron Curtain.

But the process has been so fast, compounded by the urgent impetus added to the process by NATO’s expansion and worsening relations with Putin’s Russia, that questions were raised even as 25 became 27 about whether Bulgaria and Romania really were fit and ready. The University of London’s Dr Bernd Rechel, for instance, accused the expanding EU of only superficial monitoring of minority treatment in candidate states, as well as showing a simple lack of concern for human rights, particularly as a question of public attitudes. Internal standards were insufficiently codified, and outward-looking expertise was absent. Bulgarian judicial corruption worried democrats. Inadequate aircraft safety standards drew threats to pen-in their planes. But above all, Romania’s ambiguity about its poor record of protecting the Roma minority challenged the integrity of one of the EU’s very pillars – a human rights-respecting common Foreign and Security Policy. Yet Brussels had already drawn up its treaties, and accession could take place on either 1st January 2007, or 1st January 2008 – no later.

Rightly, the EU has trumpeted the huge benefits membership of its club is already bringing to member states which, as they joined, had average salaries below 20% of the EU average, but among the highest GDP growth rates on the continent. The EU claims to be about more than growth, though. Which Romanians and Bulgarians, or Turks and Croatians, will benefit from growth if we fail to be strict in our expectations of their governments’ social policy standards? Will the Roma? Which Bosnians will trust Brussels if the EU lets Serbia accede before it has delivered on its promise to deliver Mladic.

The Neighbourhood and Enlargement Directorate-General talks of the “mutual trust needed for EU membership”. Quite right. But it would be a more effective stick against candidate countries were so many existing members not routinely betraying that trust on precisely the issues most pressing in the EU’s back yard. In November 2006, weeks before the advent of the EU-27, The Guardian reported on the terrorizing of a group of Roma living in Ambrus, Slovenia. This year, Berlusconi’s government in Italy has required the fingerprinting of all Roma, while he has welcomed the neo-fascist supporters of Alessandra Mussolini into his new Popolo della Libertà. Dr Rechel’s suggestion that the EU’s internal standards may be as lacking as its neighbourhood negotiations has never looked truer, at least on Roma relations.

Yet the EU is right to cling to the unique potential its promise of membership has to reform and reshape the whole of Europe into the most just and advanced community on earth. Even now, as Turkish membership approaches, but remains wholly unsecured, the healing balm of the EU ointment is at work in wounded Cyprus.

Serbia’s obligation to render justice to its fellow Yugoslavs by turning-in Mladic; may seem a simple box to tick. It in fact, of course, goes with a range of requirements relating to minority rights and the rule of law in the Balkan patchwork, especially regarding newborn Kosovo and the consolidation of a permanent peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But Mladic’s capture is the minimum standard – the test of Serbia’s seriousness. The encouraging pro-EU government of President Boris Tadic; may protest that it was not in power during most of Mladic’s fugitive years, but what faith can we have in its ability to enact and enforce the Copenhagen standards if he still roams free in its elegant capital? The intransigence of Tadic; on Kosovo’s independence will, in any case, be a far bigger obstacle to overcome.

The EU must be sincere, and prepared to wait, when it requires stringent standards of its invitees. There is no rush – we are 52 years young. We have more than enough to fix internally, anyway, as Roma rights, the sleepy Treaty of Lisbon, and 43% turnout in the Parliamentary elections prove. Until Mladic; is at The Hague, Serbian accession negotiations should not even begin.