The competitive scrutiny to which the organising committees of great serial sporting events, and above all the Olympics, are increasingly subjected exists with good reason. On one hand, worldwide commitment to progressive cooperation in areas such as minority rights and climate change proposes obvious criteria by which to measure these major meetings. On the other, as the right to host complex occasions is shared increasingly with developing countries and cities too, the potential for failure and the need to protect against regression is acutely felt.

For these growing states, the chance to host the world for a week or two is a huge boost to their development. But it is a greater priority than ever among Western nations to ensure that this development is sustainable – a term encompassing a broad range of environmental, economic and social concerns.

As in debates about global carbon reductions however, this focus on development may even detract attention from the responsibilities of the advanced economies to meet difficult sustainability standards themselves.

The Foreign Policy Centre has marked the UK’s emergence as Olympic host in a project reflecting on London’s experience so far and its opportunities still to forge a sustainability-led Games. The insights produced have been consolidated and preserved in a Sustainability Charter for the organisers of international sporting events, which we hope may offer some direction both to London and its successors, while anticipating the challenges facing developing country hosts.

Anxiety about the capacity of even fast-developing economies to host the Olympiad has seen scores of bids for the 2016 games cancelled already from countries including Kenya, Qatar and India. Rio de Janeiro remains the only emerging economy candidate city for autumn’s IOC selection.

But South Africa is already preparing to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which it inherits from Germany. The festival of football will be the first truly global sporting event ever held in Africa, with only the same country’s 1995 Rugby World Cup offering anything approaching a similar preparatory experience.

Delhi meanwhile is to stage the 2010 Commonwealth Games, to follow Melbourne’s production in 2006. Young India, in so many sectors battling to maintain its green and democratic credentials during its rapid ascent into the world’s top rank economies, has managed to produce a blueprint for a sustainable sporting gathering of pioneering ambition.

The seal on its commitment came with the Organising Committee’s decision to sign a partnership deal with the United Nations Environment Project to ‘Green the Games’. A series of initiatives in areas from water conservation to promoting cycling are planned, while the Games’ website has a dedicated ‘Green Games’ microsite detailing their sustainability vision and including a carbon footprint calculator.

For Delhi, the chance to practice sustainability in sport at the 2008 Commonwealth Youth Games in Pune was formative. The experimental launch pad proved a chance to explore green issues, and in particular to focus on rallying diverse communities and groups to a common but unfamiliar cause.

The UNEP has also secured a standing agreement for cooperation with the International Olympic Committee, and holds a biennial Global Forum for Sport and the Environment. But the practical planning and development challenges of any major sporting event must necessarily be borne largely by hosts and organising committees themselves, as they respond to echoed but unique local demands and contexts. London 2012 has yet to sign a bilateral UNEP agreement.

A panel discussion on 15 July at the Houses of Parliament chaired by FPC director, Stephen Twigg, explored the persistent and the unpredictable elements in ensuring sustainability at sporting events. It featured speakers: Rt Hon Tessa Jowell MP, Minister for the Olympics; Jo Willacy, Eurotunnel Director of Shuttle Services; Tim Yeo MP, Chair of the Environmental Audit Committee; Kulveer Ranger, Director of Transport Policy for the Mayor of London; and Fiona Harvey, Environment Correspondent at the Financial Times. The seminar reflected the concerns of the FPC’s preparatory research in identifying a complex and extensive constellation of sustainability flashpoints among the arrangements surrounding major sporting events.

The green agenda naturally dominates sustainable thinking on international games, but extends beyond the obvious concern to construct and grow infrastructure with minimum environmental impact, to embrace the low-carbon legacy of these developments. Public awareness of the ‘greening’ process and of national responsibilities for sustainability should also be actively pursued.

And the sustainability of such a major undertaking in human and material terms must mean more than recycling and carbon efficiency. The impact of developments on local communities is critical among the considerations of a sustainable process, especially where, as in London, the very closest communities tend to be deeply deprived. Grand events cannot be simply a showcase for political and bureaucratic virtuosity, but must actively include groups physically involved as well as culturally implicated, if they are to foster in the first place any improvements in wellbeing to be sustained.

The dimensions of the pragmatic, long-term and cultural planning for international sporting events, then, seem to lie in key areas of inclusivity and access as well as greenness. These three themes accordingly shape the FPC’s Sustainability Charter for the development of international sporting events, and each includes objectives diverse in means and ends.

The Charter’s proposals range from quotidian travelling safety to generating a mindset shift in local communities’ attitudes. But its final provisions stand for its ambitions: to prevent regression by drawing all host nations and all events onto a continuous cooperative path to improvement; and to place the sustainable care of our planet at the heart of the excitement and expectations that light up these great games.

Since Manuel Zelaya, the overthrown President of Honduras, was arrested and extradited, we could identify how important players in the continent started to find their position. Hugo Chávez, from Venezuela, was the first to stand up for the use of force so that his ally, Zelaya, could rule again. Much more used to rhetoric than to practice, Chávez gave a deadline to Micheletti accept Zelaya’s return, or he would have to “face the consequences of the use of force”. As we could expect from Chávez, the deadline came and nothing happened. The USA’s government attitude – and particularly Obama’s – was a nightmare for Chávez. Obama agrees that Zelaya should come back and that Micheletti must leave the government immediately, i.e., the antagonism Chávez has been growing for years with the USA government did not take place in this specific and highly important fact. As the Venezuelan ruler’s speech feeds from the confrontation with the USA, a situation in which both are in the same side is no good for the maintenance of the Bolivarian speech.

Meanwhile, the situation in Honduras drags on. The overthrown President does not have the popular support he would like to enjoy; thus, there is no public pressure for his return. At the same time, the new government does not seem to care about any kind of sanction. As there are no leaders inconsequent enough to engage in an armed conflict against Honduras, the situation is totally in the hands of the coupists. The most likely scenario for this situation would be Zelaya’s return with the promise of anticipated elections. Thus, it is more likely that a third political force, non-linked to Zelaya or Micheletti, arises with sufficient strength to win.

Because of what happened in Honduras, conspiracy theories blossom. Strong rumors indicate that military coup d’états won’t stop after the isolated fact that took place in Honduras. Some people believe and some would bet that Paraguay would be the next. As Venezuela was partially immobilized in this case, thanks to the North-American attitude of sharing the same opinion regarding the military overthrow, people’s attention turned to a curious fact in the continent. The recent announcement that the USA would build three military bases in Colombia was everything Chávez needed. He got lucky because this fact took place at the same time in which Venezuelan weapons made in Sweden were found with the FARC, obviously weapons donated to terrorists. American bases, a more relevant issue, veiled the confirmation of another tie between the Venezuelan government and the FARC.

As usual, Chávez took his ambassador out of Bogotá and immediately denounced a plan of an American invasion against his country. Colombia, just like the USA, preferred to remain silent. However, the South American community in general was upset. Lula demonstrated his concern over the continent militarization process, while Chile’s President, Michelle Bachelet, said the same.

Behind the scenes, the Venezuelan response will be stronger that simply using the old rhetoric and taking their ambassador out of their neighbor country. The Russian government was offered the opportunity of placing military bases in Venezuela. In the talks between the two countries, however, Russia made it clear they have no interest whatsoever in having military bases in South America. There are more strategic points in Asia for Russia to build bases. Yet, the Venezuelan counterproposal was really interesting for the Russians: the building of a Russian military base for the manufacturing of weapons where the main buyer would be the very Venezuelan government. With the ongoing negotiations involving, above all, business, we can foresee another series of controversies between Venezuela and Colombia. If there is a clear concern regarding the American bases that are to be built in Colombia, the Venezuelan response shows that it is not interesting to solve the case, but disturb the “opponent” more and more.

The Brazilian response, via Palácio do Itamaraty, was to reject the militarization in the continent. There couldn’t be another response from a country that, given its size, is the leader in the continent. This “arms race” certainly turns our continent into a more interesting place, but the huge quantity of irresponsible leaders turns it into a more dangerous place as well. But the uncertainty of Brazil regarding the building of bases or the purchase of weapons can be considered a little hypocritical. In the middle of the purchase of nuclear submarines, combat helicopters and fourth generation fighter planes, Brazil is arousing the need to buy weapons also in Argentina, Peru and Equator.

On the other hand, Brazil must strengthen their Armed Forces in order to comply with another global power requirement. The curious fact is that, in the case of Brazil, the sovereignty expected from technology transfers, which encompass contracts under negotiation to buy helicopters, submarines and aircrafts, can end up in the hands of a sole supplier, France. Sovereignty would be masked under the fact that just one country would “control” the strategic weaponry supply for the most important country in South America.

What is the importance of it all? While governments in Brazil, Chile and other countries criticize the militarization process in the continent, we have been watching Latin America become the stage of a dispute for gaining influence involving three political superpowers in the world geopolitical scenario: USA, France and Russia. As we already know, France has military bases in the French Guiana, Russia will possibly establish one in Venezuela, besides the three bases the USA is building in Colombia. This strip of land, in the North of the South American continent, will become one of the most important points in the planet, not only because it is so close to the Amazon, but also due to the tension created by one man (Chávez), the terrorist guerilla in Colombia (FARC, AUC) and the military modernization process undergone by the biggest country in South America, i.e. Brazil.

If Brazil criticizes this arms race, they should set the example, to prevent the creation of a stage for geopolitical disputes in the continent. Buying strategic weaponry from only one country justifies, at least a little, the concern of our neighbors to go through a process of military modernisation.

New FPC Associate Mark Herzog gives an FPC briefing on the influence of Turkey’s new Foreign Minister, Professor Ahmet Davutoðlu. The briefing looks at his influence behind the scenes in developing a new perspective for Turkish foreign policy based on his idea of Strategic Depth. Herzog examines Turkey’s increasingly active role in the Middle East in addition to the development of long standing ties to Central Asia that he believes will help rather than hinder Turkey’s long-term relationship with the EU.

Amid all the hoopla of cabinet resignations, alleged plots and general infighting that threatened to unseat Gordon Brown, the actual results of the European Elections somehow seemed something of an afterthought. The lowest share of the vote for the Labour Party since Keir Hardy was in short trousers was duly noted alongside real anger, though not surprise, at the election of BNP MEPs for the first time. What the result means for the UK’s relationship with Europe has been mostly overlooked in the commentary.

The election campaign by the main parties was perhaps most notable for its almost complete lack of European content with occasional Conservative attacks on the government’s decision not to hold a referendum on the Lisbon treaty the only issue gaining significant coverage. John Prescott, not the most devout of pro-Europeans, was stinging in his attack on the government’s ‘non-campaign’ saying it lacked a clear message. The retreat from making a positive case for Europe by the Labour Party, although perhaps for tactical reasons at this election, is part of a longer term trend that leaves the way open for a strategic defeat for pro-Europeans at the hands of Eurosceptic media and parties.

Even before the first vote was counted the Conservatives’ decision to leave the EPP-ED to create a new Eurosceptic group ‘European Conservatives and Reformists’ meant it was always likely that Britain’s delegation for the first time would have a clear majority of MEPs (43 MEPs) sitting in explicitly Eurosceptic groupings in the Parliament. The actual result gave the Eurosceptic camp 43 members and with 29 UK MEPs remaining in the main groupings or smaller pro-European coalitions. The Tories move from the EPP is likely to preclude them from gaining high ranking positions in the Parliament’s Committees, reducing their ability to directly influence legislation. When the poor result for Labour and the PES across Europe that reduced their bargaining power for committee posts is taken into account it is clear that the UK will have considerably less clout in the new Parliament than it has previously been able to exercise.

While the corrosive effect of the drip drip revelations on MPs expenses clearly helped to depress both the turnout and support for the main three parties, the scandal simply added to an anti-establishment sentiment seen in several European Countries. In Western Europe the hard right strengthened its position in some countries including the Freedom Party in the Netherlands led by recently banned from the UK Geert Wilders, the True Finns Party in Finland and the Freedom Party in Austria. On a more positive note the Front National fell back in France from 7 to 3 seats while the German far right failed to make a breakthrough.

The trend was perhaps most pronounced in Eastern Europe, where the economic crisis hit hardest, seeing a significant rise in support for anti-EU parties and large falls in turnout in many countries, amid complaints that the EU is not doing enough to assist them. Among them include the anti-Roma Hungarian nationalist JOBBIK party achieved 3 MEPs and 14.8 per cent of the vote, while the Greater Romanian Party whose pet hates include ethnic Hungarians will join them in Brussels after also gaining 3 seats.

While commentators have pointed out that the elections were a bad day for Europe’s Centre-Left, looking at the relative successes and failures it seems that the overall trend in the election may be seen as a setback for openness and internationalism rather than a post-crunch endorsement of free market values in the face of a socialist critique. The election saw call for greater economic nationalism, protectionism, restrictions on immigration and opposition to Turkish accession grow louder. However for the most part the parties of the right were able to respond to the economic crisis by co-opt the criticisms of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ capitalism, arguing that they had always preferred a more continental capitalism with an activist, regulating state.

The challenge across Europe is to reverse this nationalist, insular trend while holding a measured debate about the EU’s future economic direction. However here in the UK there is a pressing need for pro-Europeans to start making the case about why we benefit from EU membership and the damage a diminished relationship with other European partners or withdrawal would do to Britain.

The pro-European camp in the UK has been without a focus for several years lacking an issue such as Euro membership to unite behind and since the decline of the ‘Britain in Europe’ campaign. There is a clear need to re-establish a broad based coalition in favour of the European Union, not for any new grand projet, but to reassert the importance of the European Union for the UK’s long-term economic prosperity and its status as a key player on the world stage. Politicians of all parties, business, trade unions, NGOs and grass roots activists must unite to make the case that only by working together with our European partners can we effectively address the cross-border challenges we face such as climate change and repairing the global economy.

One by one the diplomats are returning to Damascus. In the wake of Barack Obama’s decision to appoint a new ambassador to Syria, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has followed suit. However, a new Saudi ambassador represents more than a mirroring of western rapprochement with the Ba’athist regime – it is an olive branch between two states that have been locked in opposition for the last four years.

While Washington seemingly steps up its attempts to woo President Bashar al-Assad away from Iran, Saudi Arabia is working in conjunction to lure him into the so-called moderate Arab camp. With King Abdullah himself expected to visit Syria soon, could this ambassadorial appointment mark the first step in ending the latest round of the Arab cold war?

Malcolm Kerr described the 1950s and 1960s in the Middle East as an “Arab cold war” pitting Nasser’s Egypt and allies against conservative Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Though the actors and ideologies have changed, some form of cold war in the Arab world has remained ever since, whether Cairo’s temporary exclusion after making peace with Israel in 1979, or Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian collusion with the US against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991. Its latest embodiment is well known: Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, under the patronage of Iran, face allies of the US in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. While verbal attacks have dominated, with the “moderates” stoking fears of a “Shia Crescent” challenging Arab Sunni hegemony and the “radicals” lambasting Egypt’s inaction during the Gaza war, violence has erupted too, notably when Saudi and Syria’s proxies fought gun battles in Beirut last year.

So why is Saudi, arguably the bitterest of Syria’s Arab rivals, extending a hand to end this cold conflict now? Riyadh has three priorities that promote reconciliation with Damascus. Firstly, it wishes to contain Syria’s close ally, Iran, and particularly fears its nuclear programme. The Sunday Times recently reported a green light from Riyadh for an Israeli attack on Iran through Saudi airspace. Though this has not been confirmed, it is fair to say Riyadh would shed no tears over an Israeli strike. However, it would fear a domestic backlash should Hezbollah and Syria retaliate against Israel, and prying Assad from Ahmadinejad’s embrace seems the best way to avoid this. The uncertainty in Tehran following the recent post-election protests has catalysed Saudi’s renewed effort to detach Syria from Iran.

Another key factor is Lebanon. Saudi has long backed Saad Hariri and his supporters in the “March 14” group who emerged victorious in June’s elections. Yet despite their victory Syria’s allies – Hezbollah and the “March 8” group – remain powerful and some kind of compromise is needed if a functioning government is to be formed in Lebanon. Having already tried and failed to neutralise the opposition by military force, when Saudi-backed Sunni militants were swiftly defeated by Shia gunmen in May 2008, Riyadh understands it must enter dialogue with Damascus to keep the peace with Hezbollah and consolidate Hariri’s electoral victory.

The final and arguably greatest priority for Riyadh is to toe Washington’s line. Under George Bush, when the US’s tone was confrontational, Saudi was similarly demanding of Syria. In contrast, following Obama’s less antagonistic approach, Saudi and other Arab allies are softening their stance. King Abdullah of Jordan, the inventor of the “Shia Crescent” theory, has been in Damascus recently trying to sell Obama’s peace initiative to Assad. Egypt has similarly invited Syria to help moderate Palestinian reconciliation talks, while Saudi’s new ambassadorial appointment is the latest of several gestures of reconciliation during 2009.

So will these measures win over Syria and end the latest Arab cold war? Ostensibly Damascus is weak and in need of allies: Hezbollah is still reeling from electoral defeat and Iran is subdued domestically and isolated internationally. Moreover, US sanctions are starting to have an impact on the Syrian economy, and Obama’s support is crucial if the long-occupied Golan Heights are to be recovered. Surely ditching Iran and embracing the Arab moderates is the best way to ensure the dual goals of economic development and returning territory?

Yet from a position of seeming weakness Assad is proving to be increasingly shrewd in foreign relations. He has turned the Lebanese defeat to his advantage by emphasising Syria’s lack of interference – something that has won plaudits from the French president Nicolas Sarkozy among others. Similarly, a recent interview on western television has helped his British-born wife Asma present a more positive view of the country. Yet, at the same time as promoting western and Arab rapprochement, Assad has shored up the Iranian alliance by being the first leader to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his re-election.

Contrary to American and Saudi wishful thinking, it is the Iranian alliance that has given Syria its regional importance and allowed it to confront the moderate Arab states despite military and economic weakness. Assad has spoken of a desire to be the bridge or back-channel for the west to Tehran – and for this he needs to retain the alliance, not abandon it in some grand bargain for diplomatic realignment and economic investment. While his strategy of playing both sides to maximise gains for Syria might include welcoming Saudi’s advances, this won’t permanently end the latest Arab cold war and may ultimately make it slightly colder.

Andrew Monaghan argues that NATO should exgage constructively with Moscow’s proposals for strategic reform

FPC Global Fellow Andrew Monaghan argues that NATO should be wary of becoming too involved in European gas disputes.

The downturn provides invaluable opportunities for the UK, especially in the context of the recent G20 summit, to drive action on three fronts – social protection, IMF reform and tax justice – that will benefit poor countries.

At the summit, Gordon Brown led global leaders to commit to a $1,100bn programme of support; with resources for the IMF trebling to $750bn. Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals by earmarking almost 5 percent ($50bn) of the overall package to low income countries.

OECD data suggests that the UK was one of just a handful of countries to provide the largest aid increases in 2008. In his 2009 Budget address the Chancellor, Alistair Darling, resisted the temptation to profit from the fact that the UK’s original aid commitments were based on higher economic growth predictions. Recognising that merely honouring these original targets could lead to significant falls in actual aid flows – due to the devaluation of sterling and its impact on the international purchasing power of UK aid – Her Majesty’s Treasury dug deep. The UK Government remains on track to reach the UN 0.7 percent of gross national income target by 2013.

Aid can never be regarded as a panacea to address all development challenges. It can, however, be used to provide a rapid response by implementing social protection programmes – essential during adverse economic times. With support from DfID, social protection schemes already provide regular transfers of income or assets to the poor in countries like Ghana, Kenya and Zambia.

The colossal G20 increase in IMF resources, without a clear commitment to reform either governance or conditionality is troubling. Since 1997, IMF reform has been a longstanding ambition of the Labour government. Yet some 12 years later, little has changed. The UK has the opportunity to use its IMF executive board seat to push for reform. As well as providing a greater voice and presence for low income countries, the IMF needs to end the much discredited austerity measures that often accompany IMF bailouts. In addition, as floated by Lord Meghnad Desai, a reformed IMF has the potential to develop a new role in an emerging world order, where the US dollar is no longer the global reserve currency. As a global central bank, it could help recycle and invest surplus global savings, eliminating absurdly cheap credit during times of prosperity.

The G20 communiqué agreed to strengthen the global financial system by tackling offshore financial centres, end banking secrecy, improve the quality of global accounting standards and protect public finance. Today’s crisis has accelerated a momentum to secure a “new global deal on tax.” With London as a global financial hub, the UK is best placed to lead this.

World Bank figures suggest that total tax losses from developing countries exceed the £28-42 billion required annually to meet the MDGs by 2015. ActionAid, a UK NGO estimates that 60% of global trade occurs between different parts of a single company. Yet, through low-priced export and high-priced import transactions, between these business entities, real profit levels are masked resulting in minimal tax contributions. Another NGO, Christian Aid, suggests that in 2006 developing countries lost between $858.6bn and $1,060bn in illicit capital flight. The UK can take decisive action to determine who pays what, where, and promote fairer and more transparent tax policies and administrations.

There is growing domestic and international support to protect the vulnerable during times of crisis, to reform obsolete financial institutions and secure a fairer deal on tax. The time to act is now.

Analysis 1: The Coup in Honduras can be explained by divergences among the local elite

After many years, Latin America again experiences an institutional rupture. Such is the case in Honduras. The political crisis was generated by then President Manuel Zelaya’s decision to remove the head of the Armed Forces, Romeo Vasquez, from his position.

Zelaya made the controversial decision after Congress and the Supreme Court deemed a plebiscite that could open the door for a Constituent Assembly, illegal. According to critics, the maneuver had as its goal the approval of a reelection – prohibited by the current Magna Carta.

Vasquez was relieved of his duties for refusing to provide logistical support to Zelaya’s proposal, who was eventually deposed by Congress. Roberto Micheletti took his place as interim-President.

Though many believe that Zelaya’s ousting is due to external motivations – namely, Honduras’ participation in ALBA – the Honduran crisis is primarily a domestic affair.

Until now, Honduras’ fragile government was held by an elite took alternate turns at power. Something along the lines of a pact between the National and Liberal parties, the two main political parties in the country. Politically, both are centrists that lean to the right.

Though he is the son of a farmer and belongs to the Liberal Party, Manuel Zelaya has grown close with the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, drifting away from his traditional base. He has become closer with the unions and the indigenous movement.

Taking advantage of an average economic growth of 5.5%, Zelaya increased the minimum wage by 60% and strengthened relations with groups without political representation.

The drifting away from the traditional parties that polarized Honduran politics since 1981 and the low capability of mobilization of the groups Zelaya has approached, left him in a fragile position. To make things worse, the Armed forces turned against him.

The Two Scenarios

Given the diagnostic presented in Analysis 1, it is possible to delineate the following scenarios:

Scenario 1

Manuel Zelaya cannot return to the country and Honduras becomes isolated. In addition to lacking political support among Latin American governments, it will experience serious economic difficulties. For example, because of the Coup, the World Bank froze US$270 million in credit destined for the country. The Inter-American Development Bank suspended a US$200 million repass. To make matters worse, the USA – traditionally an ally to Honduras in Central America – condemned the institutional rupture through the words of its president, Barack Obama. The only positive aspect of Zelaya’s departure from power is that the provisional government will enjoy more support from the political system to govern and establish consensuses.

Scenario 2

Without support from the media and the political system, only strong external pressure exercised by the USA, OAS, UN, IADB, IBRD, etc. can make Manuel Zelaya’s return to power viable. Even if that is the case, he will have to negotiate a deal to govern. Without the support of Congress and with a fragile social base, it will be difficult for Zelaya to maintain power solely through international support.

Analysis 2: Honduran Crisis points to a new scenario in Latin America

The approximation that the president of the United States, Barack Obama, has been attempting with Latin America indicates that the region is entering a new political moment. In the 90’s, there was the emergence of the liberal experiences driven by parties and governments of the right and center-right. In the 2000’s, it was the left that rose to power, through leaders like Lula, Michelle Bachelet, Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, etc.

Now, a new scenario emerges. Intent on containing anti-Americanism in the region, Obama has been adopting the correct strategic positioning. Instead of confronting countries that declare themselves adversaries and “enemies” of the United States, he proposes a dialogue. This limits the rhetoric employed by leaders like Chavez, Morales and Correa. Meanwhile, the economic problems of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and others, intensify.

Another change in the North American Head of State’s foreign policy concerning Latin American regards the White House’s preferential partner. In the Bush administration it was Alvaro Uribe’s Colombia. Now, Obama is turning to Lula’s Brasil.

This new moment that the Latin American continent is experiencing can be seen in the Honduran political crisis. In the wake of Barack Obama’s condemnation of the coup against Manuel Zelaya, Hugo Chavez – the US’s biggest rival in the region – was left without rhetoric. Unlike previous instances, the Venezuelan leader’s actions were restricted to a condemnation of what occurred in Honduras.

There are clear signs that anti-Americanism in Latin America will be reduced in the upcoming years.

Another important lesson to be learned from the Honduran crisis regards the Bolivarian Revolution championed by Chavez. Despite the constitutional alterations that occurred in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, this model cannot be transposed to any situation, as evidenced by Manuel Zelaya’s failed attempt to consult the population.

The view from Damascus has improved recently. The twilight years of the Bush administration saw European and American politicians gradually end the White House’s diplomatic boycott to court President al-Asad. At the same time, indirect negotiations with the departing Israeli government of Ehud Olmert signalled that peace talks with Tel Aviv could soon be revived. Finally, on assuming power in January, Barack Obama spoke of engaging with pariah states and indicated a desire to promote a regional multi-lateral peace, perhaps in the shape of the 2002 Arab peace initiative. There were whispers in Damascus that a reengagement with the US and peace talks with Israel were a real possibility.

Unfortunately, the Israeli electorate did not read the script. The right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu elected in February, though stating its willingness to negotiate with Syria, has already ruled out returning the Golan Heights – Asad’s precondition for talks. The Syrian President has long wanted to tie any Israeli talks with a renewed engagement with the US, and waited for a compliant US administration to mediate peace negotiations. However, with Asad now facing an uncompromising partner in Tel Aviv and President Obama already showing more contempt for Israeli procrastination and inaction than his predecessors, this article considers how the Syrian-US-Israeli triangular relationship is changing and the consequences for peace negotiations.

Syria’s relevance to US Middle East policy since 9/11 has been curiously paradoxical, becoming both weaker and more important. Ostensibly, the Ba’ath regime has less regional power under Bashar than under his father, Hafez al-Asad. The armed forces have continued to decline following the collapse of their Soviet sponsor and are no longer anywhere near the ‘strategic parity’ with Israel that Hafez once dreamed of – a position emphasised by Israel’s unchallenged recent air raids deep into Syrian territory. Internationally, Syria was forced out of Lebanon in 2005 and has only recently circumnavigated the subsequent diplomatic boycott from Western powers. Financially, market reforms have been limited and, aided by US sanctions, the economy has developed sluggishly.

Yet in its relative isolation, Syria has found new levers to ensure it remains too great an irritation for Washington to ignore – a situation compounded by America’s increased involvement in the region. Now that containing Iran has emerged as a US priority, Damascus’ three-decade-long alliance with Tehran has become a useful bargaining chip for Asad. As Obama tries to stabilise and exit the Iraq quagmire, the extent to which Syria tightens its border to prevent the passage of insurgents has become another lever of negotiation. The degree of intervention in Lebanese politics since the 2005 withdrawal has similarly emerged as a bone of contention with Washington. Whilst continuing to press for an end to Syrian support of Hamas and Hezbollah remains a priority, Obama finds himself needing to engage with Damascus on a myriad of issues away from the exclusively Israeli track.

The shift in the international climate has prompted a change in priorities in Damascus as well. Whilst the return of Golan and the need for a ‘just peace’ with Israel remain a fundamental concern for the regime, immediate worries are economic. A limited embrace of the free market has failed to counter the impact on Syria’s economy of either the present economic crisis or US imposed sanctions. Whilst the orthodox view in Damascus has previously been that a peace with Israel would eventually bring an economic windfall from the US – though more in terms of investment than Jordan and Egypt’s direct aid – regime figures are now suggesting immediate capital with or without an Israeli peace is essential. Deputy Prime Minister and economic planner Abdullah Dardari recently admitted in an interview to Reuters that sanctions were having an impact and that the economy was not growing at the anticipated rate. With almost 20% unemployment, a bloated inefficient bureaucracy, and decaying infrastructure, Syrian policy planners seem now to recognise that mending ties with the US and the investment and ending of sanctions that comes with it, is of greater priority than negotiating with Tel Aviv.

Conversely, were Damascus able to secure US goodwill in the short term without negotiating with Tel Aviv, it might suit the regime domestically. Whilst the return of the Golan Heights will never cease to be a priority for the government, its continued absence provides an excuse to maintain authoritarian rule. The ‘war’ with Israel is used to justify the continued state of Emergency since 1963, the suspension of the rule of law and the delay in Bashar’s promised political liberalisation. Having promised ‘bread before freedom’ on coming to power in 2000, if US rapprochement and investment can secure greater material wealth, the status quo with Israel might prove a useful way of avoiding calls for domestic reform.

Much hangs on the approach taken by the new White House. Though Washington recently extended sanctions on Damascus for a further year, much to the dismay of pro-Obama figures such as Dardari, diplomatic contact is becoming more regular. Hillary Clinton and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair John Kerry have made several recent phone calls to Damascus, and Special Envoy George Mitchell is rumoured to be visiting soon. At the same time, whilst the administration seems more willing to force Tel Aviv into action than past US governments, pressure thus far seems to be limited to settlements and engaging with the Palestinians rather than the Syrians.

In the Syrians’ favour it seems that the administration is willing to renew contact and enter dialogue with Damascus without relating it to a renewal of talks with Israel. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the strong anti-Syrian pro-Israeli voices on Capitol Hill will allow sanctions to end without linking it to peace talks with Tel Aviv. Obama might be willing to overrule such critics and fully restore economic and diplomatic ties with Damascus anyway. Alternatively, he might adopt the same strong-arm approach to pressure Israel into negotiations with Syria as he seems to be adopting with their settlements in the West Bank. Yet to do so he will want something in return. Syria has successfully acquired a decent arsenal of bargaining chips with Washington in recent years. If negotiations are to progress with either Israel or the US, it needs to start playing them.