Historically, as an extension of Europe in the New World, Latin America became commercially (and several times politically) tied to the USA and Europe. Also in an important scale, countries depended on their neighbors to keep certain strategic sectors of their economies actively functioning.

The economic success the last decade brought to some countries, like Brazil, Chile, Peru and Colombia, among others, has enlarged the commercial view of each one of these countries. Previously, the economic dependence on the USA and Europe would restrict and decrease the negotiation power of any Latin American country. That was the main “fuel” to turn the useless rhetoric that “we are exploited by the imperialist yanks and colonizers Europeans” into something permanent among the pseudo-intellectuals that did not recognize the incapacity of our negotiators, but only the advantage foreigners took from us.

Today, this situation is pretty different. The world has diversified its production capacity and its group of consumers. Brazil, for instance, has increased its sale of products (and diversified the set of exported products) in Latin America, maintained the USA and Europe as important consumers and has China as a potential “customer” with capacity of causing a com a tsunami in the Brazilian trade balance.

Commercially and economically all of us already know about the benefits brought by the market diversification and how this generates a sensational potential of production growth. Politically, the coming of new players changes a bit the geopolitical perspectives in Latin America:

1. The coming of a new player increases the production demand, maintaining the economic growth in a virtuous circle that is in expansion;

2. The Latin American countries’ capacity to bargain with older buyers increases, since a new buyer is the guarantee that product can leave a destination and find another;

3. Thus, the USA will need to check their negotiation policies with countries like Brazil and Peru, for example, for they demand interesting counterproposals so that this continues to be the destination of choice for certain products;

4. Trade negotiations, such as the Doha Round, for instance, have a new dynamics, once viable and interesting alternatives may come without the presence of big economies, such as the USA and Europe.

Naturally, the biggest of these players is China. Still weak in terms of perception, but statistically giant, the presence of the Chinese in Latin America offers an alternative that implies a total change of conduct by those Latin American countries that wish to have strong ties with China. The region, particularly Brazil, may abundantly provide vital items for the survival of a country throughout this century: food, energy and water.

The food issue is already pretty active. Brazil exports a considerable quantity of rice, soy, corn and other products to China. Peru and Argentina are also increasing their exports to the East. If previously the big markets were divided between the USA, Europe and national market, a country with the population and appetite of China completely changes the perspective of negotiations. We already see the Chinese interest in buying land in Latin America to manage a production here and, little by little, take hold of shipment logistics to China. This is both dangerous and counterproductive for Latin Americans. The logistic chain must always be in the hands of local governments, so that the negotiation power is not lost.

Energy is still as important as food for the Chinese. This may be a great opportunity to attract direct investments for the infrastructure of each country. It is worth remembering that the “energy” issue has put Latin America in the map of the global geopolitics, both by the positive points, such as the pre-salt and Hugo Chavez’s adventures financed by petrodollars. In this sector, we will see a stronger and more evident Chinese presence. China will present projects of plants and companies to explore oil and natural gas fields. Once again, if the logistic process is lost and stays totally in the hands of the Chinese, the China of tomorrow will be interpreted as the USA of yesterday in Latin America. Biofuel is the “apple” of the Brazilian Government’s eyes and, if properly used, it will be the main object of bargain and negotiation Brazil will have to obtain what is convenient not only from China, but also from the USA and Europe. For this, there must be a domestic regulation, which should be transparent from production to distribution to the end customer abroad. Only by doing this there will be trust and foreign mass investment in the area.

Finally, water is a sensitive and highly strategic point. However, this is a sector that will have a dominant role in the future. The world recognizes the need for drinkable water grows by the day, but it is not enough to actively act in the political relations among countries yet.

Nevertheless, the protection of the environment and ecosystems where this asset is found is far from being well done. Thus, the world does not trust Latin America as a safe region to manage this resource in the next years.

Relations with China must be carefully considered. If there is a total opening for the coming of the Chinese in form of investments, physical presence of companies and specially control of the strategic logistics in some sectors, we run the risk of regressing and become dependents on one country once again. We must give China and other countries the opportunity to invest in the country, as partners and never as vital players. Thus, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia may diversify and increase their productions and have as their vital buyers not only the Chinese, but also the North Americans, Europeans, Russians and Indians.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s eagerly anticipated first meeting with Barack Obama in mid-May proved less dramatic than expected. Whilst many analysts thought the encounter would give greater definition to the new administration’s peace programme and direct the Israelis more forcefully to the negotiating table, the results proved ambiguous. Obama couldn’t quite strong-arm Bibi into endorsing a two-state solution whilst Netanyahu was similarly unsuccessful in tying any resolution to curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Yet whilst Palestine and Iran dominated the talks a notable absence from the leaders’ subsequent press conference was the once salient issue of Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. Though some in Washington had initially proposed the Syrian track as potentially the most straight-forward deal to broker, the momentum on this issue seems to have waned in recent months. Indeed, Netanyahu’s statements before his American trip suggest he has already ruled out returning the Golan Heights – Syria’s key demand for peace negotiations. This article considers the likelihood of Israel reviving talks with its northern neighbour.

Superficially, analysts see the Syrian track as the simplest of Israel’s conflicts to address. Damascus has long stated its willingness to accept a land for peace deal that sees the Golan Heights returned for a full peace agreement. Moreover, the Ba’ath party’s monopoly on power and arms make them a more straightforward negotiating partner than the factionalised Palestinians and Lebanese. Unlike in the West Bank, there are fewer controversies surrounding Israeli settlement evacuation. Whilst Palestinian territories now host over 450,000 settlers, the Golan houses barely 18,000 who many expect will prove easier to coax away than their more religiously motivated counterparts further south. With Damascus stating within weeks of Netanyahu’s election that they are willing to open talks, and indirect contact already made by the previous Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the prospects for progress seemed likely.

So why has Netanyahu seemingly killed the negotiations before they begin by refusing to consider Syria’s primary demand? Several reasons present themselves. Firstly, unlike past negotiators like Ehud Barak or Olmert, Netanyahu has political capital invested in keeping Golan as part of Israel. When Prime Minister in 1996-9, he adopted the slogan of ‘the three No’s’: no to ceding Golan, no to partitioning Jerusalem, and no to negotiations under preconditions – illustrating that he ranked Golan as important a territory as Jerusalem. Similarly, in opposition he was one of the strongest supporters of a new law introduced by the Knesset in 2008 insisting that a referendum be called before any government handed the region back to Syria. To symbolise this steadfast position, Bibi opened his 2009 election campaign by planting a tree on the occupied heights.

Several other factors suggest that the new government wish to avoid Syrian negotiations. For one thing, Likud’s coalition partners on the right are against ceding territory. Yisrael Beitnu leader Avigdor Lieberman said recently that he had no problem with negotiating with Syria, as long as they dropped the return of Golan as a fundamental demand. Similarly, Bashar Asad’s public determination to maintain his alliance with Iran in spite of a potential deal with Israel presents Netanyahu with the uncomfortable prospect of handing territory to his main enemy’s ally. Furthermore, the new Premier has publically questioned whether Syria would honour any agreement declaring that, “Remaining on the Golan will ensure Israel has a strategic advantage in cases of military conflict with Syria.” Finally, as Syria expert Joshua Landis suggests, Bibi might be avoiding dealing with the Syria front because it is too straightforward. Whilst the various complexities of the West Bank situation allow for various delays and procrastination that might enable Israel to minimise the land it cedes, Golan is a more open-shut case.

The fate of negotiations between Syria and Israel therefore seems in the hands of Barack Obama and whether he can persuade or coerce Netanyahu into changing his stance on Golan. Though the issue’s absence from the Washington agenda was a blow to those hoping for a swift resumption of talks, the signs remain promising. The US President spoke positively about the Arab Peace Initiative that would see all the Arab states recognise Israel were it to return to its pre-1967 borders, including evacuating Golan. Following his meeting with the US President in March, King Abdullah of Jordan confirmed this stance by speaking of America promoting a ’57-state’ solution that entailed all the Muslim states accepting the Jewish state were it to give up occupied territory. Speaking to The Times in early May, Abdullah spoke of the White House taking a ‘regional approach’ that would see not just the Palestinians, but also the Syrians and Lebanese at the negotiating table.

Yet Obama’s preferred multilateral approach flies in the face not only of Netanyahu’s preferences, but also Israel’s past precedent. With the exception of the Madrid conference in 1991, which George H. Bush had to drag Yitzhak Shamir to by threatening to withhold aid, Israel has always preferred to deal with Arab states bilaterally. This has ensured they faced no combined front of tough negotiators in the past and allowed a divide and rule strategy. Nothing in Netanyahu’s past actions imply he will break tradition by embracing a multilateral plan and take the lead in negotiations. His behaviour in Washington suggests he will instead attempt to manoeuvre around Obama’s demands, carefully playing his bargaining chips to ensure maximum gain. In this scenario the future of Syria-Israel negotiations depends on two factors. Firstly, how important does Bibi really consider Golan compared to his other priorities of disarming Iran, keeping East Jerusalem and settlements and secondly, how hard is Barack Obama willing to push the Israeli Premier to achieve a multilateral peace?

All this aside however, the last few months of the war have become the most deadly for those trapped between the government forces and rebel fighters. Now the most immediate concern is the displaced people of the north, who are being sheltered at government-run welfare camps in Vavuniya. Their plight over the last few weeks has been argued by Jonathan Steele of the Guardian as ‘being worse than that of those living in Gaza’ during the most recent conflict at the end of last year. This is because, unlike those in Gaza, those displaced in the north of Sri Lanka have been trapped on a tiny stretch of beach, with no access to water, food or medical supplies. On top of this, they have had to live with repeated shelling by government forces in an area that had been designated a ‘no-fire zone’.. Had they decided to flee (as some did), the Tigers themselves would have shot them. Reports of the number killed during the final months of the government’s offensive on this 2.5 square mile stretch of land are impossible to verify as reporters are banned from the former conflict zone. However, the UN estimates that over 8,000 have been killed since January alone. It is now essential that the government takes urgent action on helping those left in this region and that it does this as quickly as possible. In order to stop grievances from the Tamils themselves, the government must open these camps up to the UN, international aid agencies and the media. This would not only allow those caught up to receive better treatment and care, but would also hold the government to account by checking it is, as it claims, only keeping displaced people there to weed out suspected Tiger rebels who fled with the rest of the civilians. Clearly in a war such as this, where Tiger fighters can easily assimilate back into the civilian population, the government has limited choices. But keeping innocent civilians who have been caught up in the conflict for up to a year for ‘re-education’ is not only absurd, but will only make the government’s attempts at reconciliation even more difficult then they already are.

In addition, the government may have won the war, but it faces a challenge that it has not been able to settle for decades – a political solution for the Tamils within the country. The last time the government had a chance to do this was 22 years ago where a real opportunity for devolution came about. Repeated failings by the government to implement this proposal have led many Tamils to lose all faith with promises of a solution. Now is the best chance in decades for President Rajapakse to prove these doubters wrong. By switching to Tamil in his victory speech, he is showing progress which he must now build upon. Ultimately, it is also of great importance that the international community should play a role in helping Sri Lanka, but it must do this when results are seen both on the ground and politically. First, the international community should ensure that the government commits to opening up the camps as quickly as possible. Second, they should ensure that aid is directed towards reconstructing the north and east following the latest phase of the war. And lastly, a political solution should be reached as quickly as possible. If President Rajapakse can genuinely build on his victory speech, declaring an end to ethnic and religious divisions, grant the Tamils some devolved power to Tamil self-government and create an inclusive state for Sri Lanka’s ethnicities then at last Sri Lanka could live in peace. If he fails, and Tamils continue to find themselves persecuted, restricted to camps and excluded from having a say in the decisions that affect their lives, then it is only a matter of time before Tamil dissent erupts once again. For the sake the millions of Sri Lankans at home and abroad who have already lived with this war for most of their lives, the coming weeks and months may finally turn a page on their bitter history. Asia’s longest war has indeed come to an end, but there are still significant difficulties to be overcome in creating a lasting peace.

Regarding Latin America, Obama seems to have elected an efficient strategy, different from that practiced by his predecessor. The natural choice of Lula as Obama’s “partner” in the continent, widely recognized as a praiseworthy choice, was no surprise. The Department of State acknowledged that Latin America has been neglected by the USA as a low priority region throughout the decade of 2000. It is easy to understand why. September 11, and the USA’s many actions in the Middle East and Asia all greatly limited Latin American inclusion on the country’s foreign agenda. At the same time, Latin America has been experiencing a boom period in its regional geopolitics. Countries which used to only consider their domestic issues, working hard to solve problems like economic instability, lack of institutional solidity and serious crises of corruption have now managed to find a balance, giving way to a “rebirth of regional geopolitics”. This rebirth allowed Venezuela to use a new national energy policy to become a regional player in an attempt to create a realm of political influence. Most regional leaders have come to understand that their energy sources are the key to accessing neighbor countries.

Thus, Bolivia began to take advantage of its status as a natural gas supplier in order to renegotiate its international and domestic contracts, as well as its relation with Argentina and Brazil. Not only that, but highly important political matters in the country, such as the exit to the Pacific Ocean, may be considered null and void as a component of the energy supply strategy. Ironically, Chávez’ Venezuela benefited from the much criticized war in the Middle East, by seeing its oil reserves raise a good amount of capital, thereby allowing it to intervene in policies of other countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina and Nicaragua. Paraguay also realized that they could take advantage of the “energy geopolitics” trend and demanded a renegotiation of its Itaipu Treaty with Brazil. Chile, suffering from a lack of natural gas, sees in the Pacific Ocean a possible solution for its problems. And Argentina, with its industry almost ruined by a lack of energy infrastructure, is scrambling to find suppliers at any cost.

In this scenario, Brazil is a standout once again with its pre-salt discovery. Obama knows that in order for the United States to regain its respect and a certain degree of influence in Latin America, he must appoint a strong, well-respected “representative”. Approaching Lula is a strategic move, just like other decisions that the Department of State has made.

My remarks concerning the USA’s political behavior and these signs of change, as well as the USA’s understanding of the current moment, bring us to several conclusions:

1. Differently from what had been expected, Brazil’s relationship with the continent’s “radical” leftist countries did not evolve to a level of fraternity;

2. The Gasoduto do Sul (South Gas Pipeline), Unasul and other ideas of partnership involving strong political ties did not go forward, showing that Brazil is following its own agenda;

3. Anti-Americanism is concentrated in the Andean region. The oil production crisis and stagnation faced by Venezuela should be enough to prevent such feelings from thriving; Obama believes that it may be the right time to change this situation;

4. Brazil needs an ambassador who is more politically than commercially talented; Tom Shannon is one of the possible choices;

5. The USA government is intensifying its contacts with Brazilian analysts in an attempt to understand the scenario as a whole in time to design strategies, instead of acting only in matters in which the country is specifically involved;

6. Brazil can and must lead initiatives to help the USA to regain prestige in the region.

These remarks will lead to some short, middle and long term changes in the relation with Brazil and consequently with the region:

Short Term
1. Ambassador with political skills;
2. Visits from high ranking government officials to Brazil;
3. Implementation of a continuous prospective view in the Brazilian and Latin-American political environment (instead of a factual view);
4. Dialogue strategy with opinion makers outside the government sphere.

Medium Term
1. Technological cooperation (to generate solid ties for the development of technological research);
2. Better acceptance of certain Brazilian products in the USA (like ethanol);
3. Monitoring of a contact network in the Brazilian Congress, civil society and the press;
4. Development of a Positive Agenda with the Brazilian Government.

Long Term
1. Potential support to Latin America in trade battles against the European Union;
2. Acceptance of the role as a viable and profitable alternative for future LA-China and LA-India partnerships;
3. Constant dialogue following a Positive Agenda, solid since its implementation.

All of this follows a basic rationale: for many years Latin America depended on the US and European markets to serve as the backbone of its raw material export platform. This always gave Europe and the USA the advantage in negotiations. Today, stable growth in Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Chile and other countries has provided Latin Americans with the powerful alternative of the domestic market. Besides, China, India and Russia have become the customers LA has always asked for. Thus, Europe and USA will have to adapt to a different reality at the negotiation table, where they are no longer the only alternatives for the Latin-American export market.

Having been in Iraq a few days before it all kicked off, I witnessed at first hand the logistical and security nightmare it caused for the British Department for International Development. On the Iraqi side, Salar Ameen, vice-chairman of the Iraqi National Investment Commission, bore the complaints and continuous calls from Iraqi companies wanting a place on the flight to London. Sitting in his Baghdad office, I saw him meet within a few hours six foreign business delegations from Turks to Americans to the Japanese, all wanting to do business in Iraq. Ameen, who speaks English as well as all the regional languages, told me this was actually a quiet day for him. “I sometimes see more than 10 delegations a day,” he said.

The frenzy of activity might suggest that pounds and dollars will effortlessly start pouring into a country where decades of authoritarian rule, UN sanctions, and countless wars have left a fragile infrastructure in need of rapid regeneration. Not quite.

Iraq is a country of painful paradox. Iraqis are now optimistic about the future but at the same time uncertain about it. At the American University of Iraq, based in Kurdish Sulaimani and founded by Dr Barham Salih, I spoke to a group of Iraqi friends from Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and Turkomen backgrounds. Yet despite integration within the country’s diverse communities there is still insufficient political reconciliation.

Investment in Iraq is no different. There is huge potential but an ambiguous regulatory and legal framework. Concerns raised at the London conference include an investment law that fails to stipulate in reassuring terms how foreigners will be protected. For example, Article 11 (1) of the Investment Law 2006 states that investors can transfer abroad any profit incurred during the course of business. However, banks do not open accounts in the name of foreigners, while Companies House in Iraq does not register shares to foreigners. Government agencies and ministries do not always act in accordance with the same law, making the whole notion of investment doomed at the outset.

As it stands, foreign investors in Iraq are unable to purchase land – although land may be leased for 50 years – and face an unreliable environment where, despite recent improvements, the security factor still looms large.

In the Kurdistan region, foreigners can purchase land, enjoy tax breaks as in the rest of Iraq, and can withdraw revenue and profits in their entirety. The region is secure and can act as a gateway to the rest of the country. Both the Kurdish north and the rest of Iraq, however, are still plagued with the problems of bureaucracy and corruption. In 2008 Iraq was rated as one of the world’s most corrupt countries – ahead of only Somalia and Burma – and its key ministries of oil and trade have been cited as some of the most corrupt.

Despite these obstacles, there are serious opportunities for investors. The Iraqi National Investment Commission presented more than 500 investment projects across the various sectors, while $10bn worth of British and international investment deals are currently on the table (it is unclear how many of these will be realised). Investment by British firms in Iraq so far amounts to £600m and in 2008 the UK exported £156m worth of goods to the country.

Among the sectors being assessed at the conference, from telecommunications to transport, it was the housing sector that stood out as the most attractive. Iraq needs more than 3.5m residential units within the next 10 years at a rate of 350,000 per year. The attraction for cautious investors is that newly built units can be sold, marking the end of a fruitful project. In other sectors, decades of continuous effort and commitment are required in a volatile political, economic and security environment. Housing by itself will also help to revitalise other sectors because it requires cement plants, steel mills and labour, among other things.

The call for foreign investment and strengthening of the private sector has become louder since the fall in oil prices forced the government to cut its overall budget by nearly a quarter to about $60bn (the country expects to get 86% of its revenue from oil in the coming year). In short, Iraq cannot yet fund its own reconstruction. Although the Trade Bank of Iraq has seen its assets rise to $10bn from $2.8bn in 2006, the country requires at least $400bn worth of investment to meet the basic needs of its population. The investment commission itself admits that it cannot pay for the projects directly and that it will instead guarantee payment at a later date.

The decayed oil industry, with its poor equipment and maintenance, also needs investment. Iraq has a 119bn-barrel oil reserve, making it the third largest in the world. But oil is a murky issue given that the country is yet to pass a law that shares the country’s resources among its provinces. Oil minister Hussain Shahristani maintained that this impediment would be circumvented by individually ratifying any contract that depended on the law. This, however, was a weak attempt to allay concerns, given that such a manoeuvre would be subject to endless constitutional challenges.

Private foreign investment in Iraq comes predominantly from the Gulf states and the Middle East. Elsewhere, the cautious will wait and see, while the brave will enter, adapt and possibly reap the benefits – at what cost no one knows. With almost every question in the conference audience coming from Iraqis themselves rather than foreign investors, it seems that at this stage it is about dispelling unease and uncertainty; it is about giving impetus to the idea of investing in Iraq and preparing the ground for the flood of investors hesitating to penetrate a market plagued for so long, but yet still very rich.

This article was originally published on Comment is Free at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/09/iraq-invest-conference

Three false analyses dominate Washington’s view of the Syria-Iran relationship. Firstly, Israeli scholar Eyal Zisser’s claim that during the Bush years the Ba’ath regime has, ‘essentially made itself a client state of Iran,’ and is dependent on Tehran. This has led advocates of the ‘flipping’ strategy such as former US secretary of State James Baker to believe that Washington could provide economic and diplomatic incentives to ‘wean them from Iran’, as he told Newsweek in January 2009. In the same interview Baker espoused the second fallacy that the alliance is merely a ‘marriage of convenience’. This realist approach suggests the two regimes’ ideologies are incompatible and their closeness derives from shared enemies rather than shared views. The final hypothesis originates from America’s Sunni Arab allies in Egypt, Saudi and Jordan who claim the basis of the relationship is the ruling elites’ shared Shiism. Jordan’s King Abdullah II famously denounced the alliance between Asad’s Shia Alawis and the Islamic Republic as forming a ‘Shia crescent’ which will envelope Lebanon and Iraq to threaten traditional Sunni hegemony in the region.

In considering the first analysis, Syria cannot be seen as Iran’s client state as it is neither economically, militarily nor politically dependent on Tehran. Economically, whilst new oil refineries and car plants have been built using Iranian money, trade between the states is insignificant. Syria’s main trade partners are Saudi, Iraq, Lebanon, China and the EU, with barely 4.3% of imports and a negligible amount of exports coming from Iran. Similarly, whilst the Ayatollahs have eagerly funded several Ba’athist military programs, Damascus’ principal arms dealer is Russia, who recently supplied Asad with a new arsenal of missiles following public loyalty during the 2008 Georgia War.

Politically, whilst President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad did provide visible support to the Ba’ath regime at the height of the Bush-led diplomatic boycott, to speak of dependence is a gross exaggeration. Unlike Saddam Hussein, Asad never faced major economic or diplomatic sanctions whilst isolated, with the Arab states, the EU and China refusing to follow America’s lead in recalling ambassadors and stifling trade. Moreover, much of Syria’s recent international rehabilitation has come due to political relationships forged without the assistance of Iran. A new closeness to Turkey facilitated the indirect talks with Israel that softened western views towards Damascus. Similarly, an alliance with Qatar helped ease Syria’s rehabilitation within the Arab world, the former hosting the Doha Agreement in 2008 that resolved tensions in Lebanon to Asad’s advantage. The Iran relationship is therefore one of choice not necessity and not something from which it must be ‘weaned’.

Similarly, the realist thesis, which stems from the confusion over why a Persian theocracy should ally itself with a secular socialist Arab autocracy, doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. This theory argues that the alliance was forged during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 due to common enmity with Saddam Hussein. Similarly, currently sharing enemies in Israel and the US supposedly sustains the alliance. By this logic, now that Saddam is out the picture, if Syria made peace with Israel and improved ties to the US, the reason for this illogical alliance would disappear. Yet this analysis ignores the fact that during the 1990s, when Hafez Asad was in dialogue with the US and Israel, and Saddam’s Iraq was neutralised by sanctions, the Iran relationship remained strong. Whilst a condition of peace with Tel Aviv would probably involve a moderation and disarming of Hezbollah which would inevitably alter the nature of Damascus’ relationship with Tehran, the past precedent is not for Syria to swiftly abandon its ally for more ideologically-similar
regimes.

The final theory, the Shia connection myth, is gaining ground amongst America’s Arab allies. As a state with a Sunni majority, these allies argue Syria would naturally be aligned alongside Egypt, Jordan and Saudi were it not for the ruling Alawi elite who, as a branch of Shiism, prefer their co-religionists in Iran and Hezbollah. The long-marginalised Sunnis within Syria point to the recent growth of Iranian funded Shia mosques in their country, to support fears that Damascus is facilitating a Tehran-led Shia regional expansionism.

However, this religious link is exaggerated. The Ba’ath party and the Alawis in particular remain fiercely secular and continue to suppress Islamists, even if they will allow new mosques to be built in exchange for oil refineries and car plants. Whilst the elite probably do wish to keep the Sunni majority from power, they also depend on other non-Alawi minorities for support such as the Christians, Armenians and Druze. To lead the country down a distinctly Shia path would risk this crucial support. Moreover, whilst their friends in Tehran and Hezbollah are Shia, other equally close allies such as Hamas are Sunni, as are the insurgents Damascus indirectly supported in Iraq, and its new-found friends in Turkey and Qatar.

What all three analyses fail to appreciate is how Syria uses its alliance with Iran to increase its regional importance. By presenting itself as the most moderate of the rejectionist anti-West coalition in the Middle East, Damascus becomes an important port of call for any Western politician looking for dialogue. Bashar al-Asad repeatedly has spoken of his desire to form a bridge between the Islamic Republic and the West whether peace with Israel is secured or not. In short, the Iran connection gives Syria a regional role, allowing it to play the moderate younger brother to temper Tehran’s tantrums. For a state that has always aspired to lead the Arab world, sacrificing this relationship would reduce Syria to a regional insignificance which even the coveted Golan Heights couldn’t recompense. Regional prestige rather than necessity, expediency or religion therefore determines the relationship with Tehran, and it is unlikely that Damascus will see this as open for negotiation.

Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic communications disclaimer: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/secretariat/legal/disclaimer.htm

Although the Taif accord of 1989, which ended the Lebanese civil war, stated that “abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective”, a confessional electoral system remains in place. Parliamentary seats are assigned by religious group and parties are defined by sect rather than political agenda. In the years of Syrian domination after the war (1991-2005), Damascus saw the benefit of reviving this system which allowed them to divide and rule. Even after the Syrian withdrawal, it stayed enshrined in the constitution. The recent decision to enact Taif’s other demand of removing religion from ID cards two decades later than expected cannot disguise the slow progress that has been made.

Ostensibly, the cedar revolution of 2005, which expelled the Syrians and created the current political landscape, also divided along religious lines. The Sunni, Druze and Christian communities supported the anti-Syrian 14 March coalition, while the pro-Syrian 8 March group was largely Shia. Yet recent developments have challenged these alignments. Firstly, the memorandum of understanding in early 2006 saw the Christian Free Patriotic Movement form an unlikely alliance with Hezbollah. With the FPM claiming they had won 70% of Christian support in the 2005 elections, this ensured that 8 March could no longer be seen as a purely Shia bloc. Now, the decision of Armenians, such as the Tashnag party, to join them in the coming elections is further bolstering 8 March’s non-sectarian credentials, producing an opposition that is seemingly united by its politics rather than confession.

A key reason for this drift into non-religious blocs is the question over Syrian influence after their withdrawal in 2005, which presents Lebanese voters with a political rather than a sectarian issue around which to align. While the Maronite Christian and now Armenian communities appear more equally split between the two camps than other groups, there are also minority Shia parties in the government and Sunni and Druze representatives in the opposition. Moreover, issues unrelated to Syria are emerging to define the camps’ agendas; 8 March presents itself as anti-corruption, while 14 March claims to be the defender of economic stability. Could these political platforms eventually come to outstrip creed in setting the civic agenda?

Sectarianism won’t be washed away in one election though, and powerful forces support its continuation. Christian, Druze and Sunni political dynasties that have created parties to continue a regional dominance of their tribe and sect stretching back generations do not want to alter a system that has historically given them power. Similarly, external actors promote divisions. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt have tried to whip up hostility in recent years by presenting Hezbollah as part of a wider Iranian-led Shia threat to Sunnis in the region, while Iran and Syria have made little effort to dispel such accusations.

Despite pursuing a non-sectarian agenda, even the opposition can be seen as endorsing the status quo. Many see the FPM’s alliance with Hezbollah as merely an expedient way for its leader, Michael Aoun, to find political space as the only major Christian figure in the opposition, rather than carving out a permanent political alliance. His importance to 8 March is that he brings parliamentary seats that can only be allocated to Christians. In a non-religious electoral system, he would have no role to play. Similarly, the Tashnag party’s conversion could be viewed as an assessment that Armenian interests would best be served under 8 March, rather than a genuine belief in abandoning a structure that guarantees this minority’s political representation.

Lebanon’s confessional constitution damages its democratic credibility and leaves the door open for a return to religious violence in the future. Only last year sectarian militias took to the streets of Beirut and Tripoli , showing that conflict isn’t far from the surface. This is exacerbated by outside powers exaggerating the Sunni-Shia divide to pursue their own regional goals. Twenty years on from the civil war, political power remains in the hands of the same elites and ruling families, with a few new additions, who oversaw the outbreak of hostilities in the first place. Hopes that the younger generation who dominated the cedar revolution might produce new leaders to break this oligarchy soon dwindled as the cause was hijacked by the traditional parties and their political heirs.

Yet even if their motives are more cynical, the emergence of two political rather than religious blocs in Lebanon should still be encouraged. It might be unlikely that these fragile coalitions will be able to wean Lebanon off confessionalism in the current regional climate. However, the more they evolve policy agendas that transcend traditional divisions, the more likely the Taif goal of “abolishing political sectarianism” will prove possible when, and if, regional circumstances allow.

As part of our continuing series of Fresh Insights papers that give younger writers the opportunity to publish, FPC Associate Alexander Jackson gives us his take on the ongoing challenges facing Moldova and Transdniestra.

This, however, hasn’t always been easy to understand by Latin American peoples. As with when the region was under military dictatorships, logic seemed to be overthrown in times of dire economic problems. While the economies of certain dictatorship-led Latin American countries were running solidly and sustainably, political stability was threatened but for a handful freedom fighters. Brazil was a poster child of this era. In the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s the military government cracked down on political activists, which were those with enough education to grasp that certain social values were just as important, or even more important, than certain economic values. The poor, uneducated populace and those living in the backwoods didn’t see a clear distinction between a military regime and any alternative. Elderly people who avoided political involvement in those days now report that cities were safer and the economy worked more or less in order in those years. However, since no establishment will weather economic hardship out, practically every military regime in Latin America collapsed when faced with economic failure and chaos.

After the interlude of the late 1980s, 1990s and beginning of the 2000, many nations managed to “clear the deck” economically-wise. This, of course, was not the case for everyone: many a time we saw Argentina’s inability to keep reins on its own economy, Bolivia’s poor management of issues involving natural gas and the very own case of Venezuela. Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Colombia on the other hand managed to achieve a level of economic stability that afforded these nations a certain “luxury”. Today the populations of these countries are in position to evaluate the course of political affairs. When I say “luxury” I refer to lower-income, low-class population, those who now fare better economically than ever before in their lives. Not only can they now plan and anticipate because of a somewhat more stable economy, they also have the opportunity to get involved in political affairs more directly.

There are odd situations, such as Peru. Here, in spite of the economy’s best performance ever (which may change or plunge because of the crisis), president Alan Garcia faces one of the worst cases of popularity evaluation across the whole region. In Peru we now witness an overt cleavage between economy and politics that hadn’t been seen in Latin America for a while. The thriving economy has taken the Peruvians to unprecedented wealth levels, yet their president isn’t seem as someone capable of inspiring political and institutional stability.

In Brazil things are somewhat different. Both low-income and low-middle-class populations are now entirely catered for by the country’s economy. Since these ranks of Brazil’s population have subscribed to the notion that “politicians are all the same, they all cheat”, there is nothing to be worried about if the economy is in good shape. It isn’t that president Lula’s administration isn’t a reasonable one, but significant political advancements that are yet to be made (the political, tax and labor reforms) hardly affect the vast majority of the country’s population. This vast majority of people is quite content only to be able to plan ahead the purchase of, say, a household appliance in the beginning of the year, knowing exactly how many installments they will have to pay by December.

The Brazilian upper classes are the ones that care about political issues, specially those that affect them directly, i.e. the battles for the end of the CPMF, lower excise tax for cars etc. Issues such as education, health and crime rate are lost in the political limbo. The upper classes in Brazil can afford private schools, health insurance and safe neighborhoods. Because the low-income population is living their best economic moment ever, coupled to the fact that they lack political organization to demand improvements in such critical areas, things more or less are kept going by way of compromise.

Colombia, however, is a clear example of both political and economic advancement. The country’s economy is growing steadily, foreign direct investments increase year by year, industry leaders are constantly attracted by the country’s infra-structure modernization programs. Furthermore, there has been tremendous advancement in regard to Colombia’s worst political nightmare: the FARC. Nowhere has a government managed to reap good economic and political fruits and appraisals because of good seeds sown. However, it is important to acknowledge the mounting risk that this success can be adversely affected if the Colombian president attempts at running for a third term in office.

Except for countries drowning in social issues, such as Bolivia, in Latin America economic issues have an overriding role as far as a country’s stability is concerned. In Brazil, economic issues go hand in hand with everything else for the low-income population. Because for this part of the population, “if economy is right, then everything else is right, too.” In Peru we witness a dissension in opinion, in that “economy is well regardless of the president”, whereas Colombia as a whole, or at large, in any case, including the upper classes, perceives that both economy and politics are going very well.

Partial abandonment, sometimes akin to simple marginalisation but bearing characteristics that suggest statelessness is on the agenda, has threatened Chitralis and other ethnic groups in the country’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) for decades, in the form of a campaign to rename the province after its dominant ethnic group, the Pashtuns or Pakhtuns.

The Pakhtuns are a tribal and linguistic grouping spanning the northern half of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, with significant populations on both sides. The 1981 census of Pakistan recorded some 11 million speakers of the Pukhtun language, Pashto or Pakhto. Their role in allowing the free flow of violent extremists from Pakistani training grounds to Afghan battlegrounds, along with the fact that the overwhelming majority of Taliban are Pakhtuns from both countries, have both been big factors in US pressure on Islamabad to rein in the Pakhtuns. However, this tribal group are one of the most dominant forces in Pakistani politics, occupying positions of influence throughout the upper echelons of the Pakistani army and bureaucracy; and their demands exert significant leverage on Pakistan’s federal government.

Thus, during the last thirty years, there has been an intermittent political movement to rename the British-named province of NWFP – where most Pakhtuns reside and where their influence is even greater – as Pakhtunkhwa, the name historically used by Pakhtuns to refer to their lands in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. First placed on the agenda by President Zia Ul Haq in the early 1980s as a means to gain leverage in war-torn Afghanistan by supporting Pakistani Pakhtuns (as part of a general widening of federal patronage of Pakhtuns which Zia oversaw), the proposal to rename NWFP has repeatedly seemed a good idea to governments trying to either court or appease the powerful Pakhtun tribal chiefs who rule the frontier lands. Thus the idea has been championed by both of Pakistan’s major political parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), over the last ten years. In 1997 the NWFP provincial assembly actually passed a resolution to enact the renaming (with, surprisingly, the only two opposing MPs being Pakhtuns). But the move was abandoned by the central government of PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif, who reneged on his previous commitment to the issue after a fierce backlash from the right wing press and his supporters in Punjab province. The fickle game of Pakistani politics is well illustrated by the fact that when the renaming was again proposed in May 2008, this time by the PPP, the PML-N opposed it “on ethnic grounds” in an attempt to undermine Pakhtun support for its rivals within the shaky coalition in which both parties are (intermittently) engaged.

The PML-N’s ethnic argument shows the other, forgotten side of this debate. The fate of the renaming idea has largely rested on federal politics: the machinations of central governments have mostly ignored the implications of the move for NWFP’s many non-Pakhtun peoples.

The demand has always been tabled by the Awami National Party (ANP), the outgrowth of a progressive and non-violence advocating social movement which began in NWFP in the 1930s. Since its founding in 1986 it has consistently opposed the Taliban, prompting a growth in its popularity both among the people of NWFP and with central government in recent years. In the 2008 elections, to the relief of many the ANP swept to power in NWFP, dethroning the Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) party which had been in power since 2002.

However, despite its stated commitment to equality and lack of discrimination between all the peoples of the province in its 2008 election manifesto, and its espousing of “democratic pluralism, cultural diversity, social justice, [and] non-sectarianism,” the ANP has always been a Pakhtun movement and has thus cemented Pakhtun dominance by its frequent participation in, and now leadership of, the province’s recurrent coalition governments. Its statement of its aim to “fight for the rights of the province and remove the wrong impression of depicting [sic] Pukhtoons as the hard-liners and religious extremists,” along with its cited reason in the 2008 manifesto for renaming NWFP “according to the aspirations of the people and the resolutions of the provincial assembly,” show that in the ANP’s view, Pakhtun identity and the province itself are coterminous.

The ANP is especially keen to push this agenda in the light of the power struggle in Pakistan between Pakhtuns and the country’s other major dominant group, the Punjabis. Clearly evident in Punjabi opposition to the renaming attempt in 1997, this power struggle is further suggested by another of the ANP’s fundamental principles: freedom from external domination. Although this ostensibly refers to Pakistan’s sovereignty against outside intervention (a very live issue in light of current US and Nato activities in the area bordering Afghanistan), this could also be taken to mean Pakhtun freedom from the economically dominant Punjabis and the Punjabi-heavy Islamabad government. In a speech outlining the ANP’s election manifesto for NWFP in December 2007, party leader Asfandyar Wali Khan stated that the party would work for provincial autonomy, and that a major policy would be to retain for the province revenues from tobacco excise duty which at that time went to the federal government. In the context of NWFP’s perceived marginalisation within the wider state, therefore, the renaming movement can be seen as a reaction to this and an assertion of Pakhtun power against the Punjabis.

All this is bad for NWFP’s non-Pakhtuns. Within the province, the ANP’s pro-Pakhtun attitude is built on a strong and unquestioned Pakhtun identity, based on a common language and a unified tribal system (which sees all the Pakhtun tribes as different lineages of the same ancestral tribe) and bolstered by the Taliban’s refusal to adhere to any specific ethnic identity, thus ironically strengthening Pakhtun unity by bypassing existing tribal segmentation within the Pakhtun group. In comparison to this, other ethnic groups – although they have mostly been in the province for much longer than the Pakhtuns, who migrated there from Afghanistan about 150 years ago – do not have well organised and motivated enough leaderships to oppose Pakhtun domination.

The PML-N’s ethnic objection to the renaming motion in May 2008 referred specifically to the Hindko speaking Hazara peoples – whose co-ethnics in Afghanistan have suffered a long history of violence by Pakhtuns and Taliban – as a group who would lose out in the Pakhtun-isation of NWFP. Another group whose lack of political voice closes power to them are the Chitralis. The Chitral region in northern NWFP was not a part of the historic British North West Frontier; only during the twentieth century did it become incorporated into the province. Chitralis speak a language unrelated to Pakhtun, and many of them are also Ishmaili Muslims (a minority and slightly ritually divergent branch of Shi’a Islam), setting them further apart from the mostly Sunni Pakhtuns. Many Chitrali politicians oppose the renaming movement, citing not only their own people but the many Punjabi and Seraiki speakers living in the southeast of the province.

Gohar Khan, a Pakhtun whose grandfather migrated to Chitral, says that the people in the region are not behind the renaming move. It is purely an ANP agenda, he says, and does not really enjoy popular support, especially in Chitral. The Chitralis dislike the Pakhtuns because of the latter’s business skill and hard work, he says, which has led the Pakhtuns to dominate in parts of Chitral too. The Chitralis want the Pakhtuns out of Chitral.

Chitralis and other non-Pakhtun peoples in NWFP are in some senses at risk of being made stateless by the renaming movement. Their example points to the murky badlands where marginalisation meets statelessness, and brings into question whether statelessness itself is restricted to formal withdrawal of citizens’ privileges. It can be much more subtle.

What are the alternative options? Gohar Khan recommends a referendum to determine whether indeed the majority of NWFP’s population are behind the move; but this could simply confirm the power of the Pakhtuns, who are certainly numerically dominant. Another possibility has been recently illustrated by the government of Rajasthan in India in its dealings with the Gujjar people. In June 2008, following protests by Gujjars at their lack of access to employment and education in which over 40 were killed, the Rajasthan government struck a deal with the protesters to award the Gujjar community a special status within their current classification as part of the Other Backward Classes, which allows them greater access to education and provides new job opportunities.

If the Pakistani state can make people within its own boundaries stateless, Rajasthan is an example of how a provincial government can bring people back into the state through particular provisions or types of special status. Even if the ANP’s agenda is once again quashed by a central government wary of Pakhtun influence, Chitralis and others in NWFP may still have watched events in Rajasthan with interest.