It was badly needed – few people have more than the haziest idea of the scope of the Ombudsman’s mandate, or how to go about using the excellent service which he and his staff provide.

Diamandouros revealed that, of more than 3,000 complaints which he receives each year, three quarters are, in effect, sent to the wrong address. Most of these do, in fact refer to alleged breaches of European law, but not by the European institutions (including the Commission, Council, Parliament and Court of Justice) for which he is responsible. National governments and bodies are not included in his mandate, even when they are dealing with European laws.

Of the complaints which he is able to investigate, he finds, on average, that about half are justified, and of these, more than 75 per cent are settled to the satisfaction of the complainant.

The web-site, which is admirably clear and straightforward, attempts to guide people to the proper source for making complaints where the European Ombudsman is unable to act. In many cases this should be the national Ombudsmen in each of the 27 member states.

The website lists all their addresses, as well as those of other bodies who might be able to help. A clear definition of the Ombudsman’s role is given on the site, and in an accompanying free booklet, What can the European Ombudsman do for you? It is to “investigate complaints about maladministration in the institutions and bodies of the European Union (EU)”.

Sensing that this word is likely to be unfamiliar to most people, it is explained that it “means poor or failed administration. This occurs if an institution fails to act in accordance with the law, fails to respect the principles of good administration, or violates human rights”.

Examples given are “administrative irregularities, unfairness, discrimination, abuse of power, failure to reply, refusal of information and unnecessary delay.

As well as investigating individual complaints, the Ombudsman has the right, pioneered by his predecessor, Jacob Söderman, to issue ‘own initiative’ reports, something he often chooses to do when a large number of complaints are received of a similar nature. One of these was on the slowness of payment by the Commission on contracts which it makes with other organisations. The Ombudsman’s report advocated a series of reforms to speed matters up, which the Commission has accepted.434

I asked Mr Diamandouros if his work would be affected by the Lisbon Treaty if it came into effect. He replied that it should expand his role in a number of ways.

Firstly, that the pillars’ structure, dividing European Community matters from inter-governmentalism in Justice and Home Affairs, would be abolished, enabling him to investigate complaints in certain areas at present off-limits.

Secondly, the Fundamental Charter of Human Rights would be given legal effect, which, as it includes in its Article 41 the right to good administration “in a fair way”, could also mean that many more valid complaints would come to his door.

Unfortunately, both the British and Polish governments have opted out of this provision, potentially greatly to the disadvantage of their own citizens.

A close observer and friendly critic of the Ombudsman’s work is Tony Venables, founder and director of the Euro-Citizens’ Action Service (ECAS). He believes that the time has come, with the likely adoption of Lisbon and the arrival this year of a new Commission and a new Parliament, for a thorough re-examination of the means open to EU citizens to complain.

These include the Ombudsman, the Petitions Committee of the European Parliament, the role of individual MEPs and the possibilities of making direct complaints to the Commission, as well as taking action through the Courts.

Venables does not believe that the case has been made out for extending the European Ombudsman’s brief to include complaints against national governments, but thinks the performance levels of national ombudsmen are very variable, and wonders whether the European Ombudsman should be given a stronger co-ordinating role between them.

His most scathing criticism of the present system, however, is its failure to reach beyond educated elite, who nave ready access to the internet and the ability to put this to good use.

The most deprived citizens, particularly immigrants working in other member stages, mostly lack this ability, and for them Venables advocates the development of a series of European citizens’ advice bureaux, funded by the Commission, and available in all the main centres of population, capable of offering face-to-face advice in a variety of Community languages.

ECAS has opened a ‘hotline’ to collect views on these and a host of other suggestions for widening the circle of legitimate complaints. It hopes to publish a report of its own collating these views, in time for the European Parliament elections in June, and for consideration by the incoming Parliament and Commission.

Dick Leonard is author of The Economist Guide to the European Union

When delegates from 55 member parties from across Europe gathered in Stockholm last October to debate and pass the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) manifesto for this June’s European elections, there was genuinely a sense of excitement in the air. This was partly because we were welcoming into the fold several new member parties – some from within the EU, others from the wider Europe – but mainly because the European Liberal family approaches these elections bigger, more united and more enthusiastic about the potential of the European Union in a troubled world than ever before.
Under the stewardship of Graham Watson, LibDem MEP for South West England, the Alliance of Liberal and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) has become the largest ‘third force’ in the Parliament’s history, with over 100 parliamentarians, three-quarters of whom are also members of the ELDR Party, the EU’s first trans-national political grouping. That band will be become even stronger if Ireland’s ruling party, Fianna Fail, succeeds in its current bid to join ELDR. Moreover, 9 out of the 27 present European Commissioners are from the Liberal family.
As neither the Socialists nor the Christian Democrats/Conservatives (EPP) have a majority in the Parliament, ALDE’s support is often essential in securing parliamentary votes. This will become even more rue after the EPP shrinks with the imminent departure of the British Conservatives into the European political wilderness.
The ELDR manifesto that was unanimously passed at Stockholm concentrates on three main areas: the economy and employment; the environment and energy policy; and foreign and security policy – all infused with the leitmotif of civil liberties. European Liberals stress respect for fundamental freedoms within the EU and beyond, notably the freedom of the Press, thought and speech; liberty of association, religion and ownership; and upholding the right of minorities as well as of those of individuals to privacy and protection of their personal data and dignity – something Britain’s New Labour government could usefully learn from.
European Liberals believe that European economic integration has brought tangible benefits for EU citizens and consumers. We would like to see a new ‘fifth freedom’ relating to the single market: the free movement of knowledge and a single market in intellectual property. ELDR also supports the introduction of an EU ‘blue card’, to be administered by each member state, to ensure measured economic migration for the benefit of EU citizens.
The combined challenge of climate change and energy security demands unified action across Europe. The EU must become an efficient low carbon economy, leading the world in energy conservation, renewable energy and creative market instruments that can act as incentives for new jobs. We support the further reduction in the Common Agricultural Policy’s budget after 2013 and actively promote an ambitious reform of the CAP within the multilateral framework of the WTO. This should enable European farmers to compete in a free global market, better to meet increasing global demand for food in an environmentally responsible way, to direct funding for research in renewable energies (including sustainable new generation bio-fuels) and to guarantee long-term food supplies.
In a globalised world, no EU member state can tackle the threats and challenges we are facing today on its own: military and civilian crisis management, securing energy supplies and international trade, arms control and disarmament, the fight against terrorism, organised crime, climate change, world poverty and the violation of human rights. A more united Europe on the world stage will also be able to exert the influence that its economic and trading power merits.
We believe that EU citizens will benefit from the adoption and implementation of the stalled Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty will bring in significant reforms of the European institutions, will enhance transparency, strengthen the Union’s democratic character and equip the EU with the necessary tools for today’s global challenges.
British Liberal Democrats will be fighting the forthcoming European elections on the core issues contained in the ELDR manifesto, crystalised as three main points: the economy, the environment, and cross-border crime and security coupled with safeguarding civil liberties. Closer European cooperation can improve our chances of emerging from the current recession, creating ‘green jobs’, guaranteeing energy security in sustainable ways and providing greater personal security for British citizens. We are stronger together, poorer apart.

Like most Arab states, Lebanon has an expanding young population for whom the future looks bleak. The United Nations Development Programme estimates that 26% of Lebanese aged 15-24 are unemployed – nearly twice the world average. Moreover, many have little say in their future as only 21-year-olds are eligible to vote –the subject of much debate in Beirut at present.

Were Nayla Tueni to be elected, she would be a decade the junior of the next-youngest MP in a parliament dominated by an older generation. Though the Cedar Revolution of 2005 was hailed by many as a breakthrough in the Arab world for youth involvement in politics, the young participants and organisers of the million plus protests subsequently (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4702142.stm) complained that their cause was hijacked by the usual political elites. The result was a rivalry exclusively dominated by the older generation, whilst the young felt ignored.

The situation is worse for Lebanon’s Arab neighbours. Sixty-three per cent of the population of the Middle East is under 29 and a quarter of them are unemployed. The global economic downturn is being felt hard. As well as domestic recession, the rapid decline of the Gulf economies is sending home a new pool of skilled expatriates to flood an already tight job market, further squeezing out the young. While most would demand employment rather than revolution, these authoritarian regimes provide few forums to complain, and even the limited avenues allowed for political expression are geared towards those who are older. In Egypt and Jordan for example, a candidate must be over 30 to become an MP, with the majority well over 40, which excludes over half the population from running. The lack of interest in formal political structures among the youth is therefore hardly surprising, with 67% of Egyptian young people not even bothering to register to vote in 2004 – despite theoretically facing a fine or imprisonment.

Yet Arab youths are far from apathetic. Egypt’s own protests of 2005-06 that saw the Kifaya movement lead public demonstrations against the Mubarak regime with a substantial youth presence. Groups such as Youth for Change emerged to lead protests in universities and coffee shops. Yet, like their Lebanese counterparts, the young grew frustrated at their inability to affect the agendas of the old. Young people working for al-Ghad, Ayman Nour’s liberal opposition party that was prominent in Kifaya, complained of the sidelining of youth issues and the strict age-orientated hierarchical structure.

In contrast, the internet is proving to be a youth-dominated arena for political expression. The vast majority of Arab political bloggers, for example, are young or appeal to a younger audience. Similarly, Samantha Shapiro’s recent article about Facebook in Egypt highlights it as an alternative forum for Arab youth to vent their frustrations. The potential for social networking sites to organise protests and opposition in states where civil society is discouraged or actively suppressed was not lost on the Syrian government which promptly banned the site in 2007. However, even as Damascus set about blocking Facebook, Syrian internet cafes were using proxy sites and alternative networks to maintain their access.

Will these protests be constrained to cyberspace? Recently, just under half of the youths polled in a survey of six Middle Eastern states believed their country wasn’t going in the right direction, highlighting the broad desire for change. With youth unemployment set to rise even further by the end of the year, the potential for social and political unrest is clear. The recent protests over the Gaza war, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood-led demonstrations in Egypt, might prove the shape of things to come. Though prompted by the Israel-Palestine conflict, these youth-dominated marches soon descended into anti-regime anger protesting unemployment and poverty as much as Gaza. If such regimes, and even the liberal opposition, don’t turn their attention to youths’ feelings of disenfranchisement soon, more radical groups could offer an appealing alternative.

Even Ms Tueni, for all her good intentions, does not offer a real solution. Should she win in June, her election would represent more the continuation of her family’s political dynasty than signifying a new youth-friendly era in which less well-connected young Lebanese could follow her into parliament. Rather than celebrating her own youth, it must be hoped that she highlights the need for governments to offer Arab youth a real stake in their economies and polities in Lebanon and beyond.

To comment on this article, please visit: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/20/youngpeople-lebanon

Economic Highlights

The region’s growth streak has come to a halt. Latin American countries experienced solid growth between 2003 and 2008. The economic crisis that broke out in the U.S. did not have a devastating impact (so far, at least) over the region, but it has nevertheless signaled the end of a “Golden Age” in which almost every Latin American country experienced an economic boom.

In numbers, the most successful Latin American economies in 2008 were those of Uruguay and Peru. The growth experienced by Uruguay’s economy last year reached 11.5%, mirroring the strength of Tabaré Vazquez. Mr Vazquez’s administration enjoys the best rapport with the opposition among other administrations in the continent. Building upon a strong coalition and the outstanding ability to negotiate with the opposition, Mr Vazquez leaves office in 2009 with a feeling of “mission accomplished”. The milestone of Uruguay’s economic boom was the modernization of the country’s traditional industries. Arguably, foreign investments channeled to the country’s cellulose factories (the biggest ever seen in Uruguay’s history) were key for the double-digit growth. Beef exports also reported solid figures in 2008 thanks to a retention policy put in place by neighbor Cristina Kirchner, a move that turned out to make more room for Uruguayan beef in the international market.

Another winner in the region’s economic arena of 2008 was Peru.

Boasting a growth of 9.4%, the country hit the jackpot when it saw its Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. enacted before the change in the U.S. administration. By way of comparison, Colombia did not have the same fortune and is unlikely to sign a FTA with the U.S. in the short run. In the case of Peru, solid developments in infra-structure drove the country’s economic upswing. Jobs were also on the rise, which helped improve the economics.

Oddly enough, Peru’s sustained economic growth does not translate into stability or political legitimacy of president Alan García’s administration. Contrary to what runs for Uruguay, where Mr Vazquez’s importance to economic growth in recent times is acknowledged by the population, in Peru the successful economic performance is credited not to Mr García, but in spite of him. The president’s popularity went up to 25% but rejection levels still peak at 70%.

Predictably enough, one can include Brazil among the region’s highlights. Not much because of the country’s growth, which failed to reach desired levels on account of high interest rates hampering the country’s development potential. However, the course of Brazil’s dealings with the economic crisis and the stance of its Central Bank on the matter have put Brazil among the survivors of the 2008 economic arena, at least for the time being. Fears that a crisis of such magnitude would undermine the nation’s economic stability enjoyed since the beginning of Mr Lula’s administration ushered the adoption of preventive measures that have become the envy of other nations. A sign of such successful moves is to be seen in that the Summit of South American Countries to discuss the impact and solutions for the crisis was orchestrated and led by Brazil itself. The summit held in Brasília showed the world that Brazil can and should lead the region in helping neighboring countries survive the hard times.

Political highlights

The Colombia of President Álvaro Uribe comes first to the mind when the subject turns to political victories. In 2008 Uribe reached a peak 85% in popularity. The manner through which the Colombian leader has dealt with the FARC from the beginning of his administration has attained admiration of worldwide leaders, at the same time it brought concern and tired ranting from uninformed leftists who insist in seeing the FARC, a bunch to which the ends justify the means, in shades of romantic leftism. Mr Uribe consolidated himself as a regional leader by relentlessly breaking up the guerillas’ tight grip on the country. In addition to this, his national security policy and the ability to attract foreign direct investments played a crucial part to rally the population’s approval to the crackdown on the FARC.

Mr Uribe’s popularity was such that his partisans sought to rally enough support to promote the idea of a third tenure in office for the president. However not entirely keen on the idea, Uribe allowed this process to run loose for some time to see what would happen. It was but natural that such levels of popularity led to public cries for the president to seek a third term in office.

Despite the fact that the country’s house of representatives issued its “no-go” to a third tenure, this certainly will be a pervasive motif in the next administration: whether he will take part in it or not, Mr Uribe will enjoy tremendous prestige and influence over the nation’s affairs. A third reelection for presidential office has been dismissed, but the stage is set for Uribe’s protégée, whoever it is, begin the campaign to succeed him in office. General Santos, the man directly in charge of the military’s offensive strategies against the FARC, has amassed considerable appeal among the population, particularly after the actions that culminated in the liberation of Ingrid Betancourt. Santos has Uribe’s blessing and support. The transfer of political capital seems inevitable between the two men, prompting the president’s opposition to put up a real fight if they are to prevent Uribe from achieving yet another political victory in 2009.

The impact of the global economic crisis on regional economies

The year of 2008 saw the emergence of a Latin America in much better standing to fend off a crisis of such global magnitude. Although the crisis did not turn out a financial tsunami, certain negative impacts were felt more badly in some sectors than in others. In addition, not all countries in the region were consistently guarded against it. The growth figure for the region should reach 4.6%, thus showing that it has grown for the sixth year in a row. Such growth was largely driven by the improvement of poverty levels and measures against unemployment.

The slowdown in tourism industries was one among many hangover symptoms after the crisis, particularly felt by countries such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Peru and Argentina were the most affected countries in this respect, while Mexico suffered a direct impact because of the American tourists that traditionally cross the border to enjoy Mexican beaches. Peru, traditionally a destination of hundreds of European tourists seeking to visit the country’s historic cities and landmarks, is experimenting a dramatic downturn in the influx of visitors.

In addition to cutting on the revenues from tourism, the crisis is having direct impact over the region’s exports. Demand for raw materials produced by Latin American countries has plunged. Brazil is in a better position to stand, but other countries cannot afford to depend on internal markets to make up for weak export revenue. The bulk and strength of the Brazilian economy may create mechanisms to compensate a lack of demand by foreign offtakers through promotion and increase in consumption of domestic markets.

Furthermore, the lack of external demand for the region’s products leads to a diminished interest of foreign investors in Latin American countries. Barack Obama’s new administration, for instance, should tender its own home market rather than foreign ones. Colombia stands as an example, with the country suffering from decreasing direct foreign investments in the last quarter of 2008. The same should hold true in early 2009 for Brazil, Peru and Chile. As a result, the Chilean government is fostering negotiations to obtain free trade agreements with other markets. Countries such as Japan, Vietnam and Thailand, among others, are soon to be trading with Chile under the auspices of tariff exemption arrangements. This is a positive move, particularly now that traditional investors are fleeing the country.

The hardest part is yet to come. This is not only about fighting the direct impact that such an economic crisis typically has on the economy. To demonstrate confidence and convince a frightened world through such confidence that the situation is relatively under control is certainly the hardest task to accomplish. The mission of Brazil is to serve as the region’s mouthpiece to announce to a frightened world that the impacts of the crisis will be restrained and that the confidence of investors in Latin American nations should remain intact.

The impact of the global economic crisis on regional politics

The economic turmoil did not have direct impacts over regional politics. However, there were individual implications in many countries. Argentina, known for its poor ability to manage severe crises, can be taken as a typical example. The effects of the economic crisis in Argentina are likely to surpass those experienced by other Latin American countries owing to a lack of transparency in economy and politics in the period that preceded the outbreak of the financial turmoil. The export retention policy, enacted to promote the country’s home market, not only tampered with inflation rates but also created such an environment that the country is in to bear the full brunt of the crisis when it finally hits the country.

The situation in Argentina is quite the opposite of Peru, for example, where the population does not mix economy and politics. Cristina Kirchner’s popularity has been falling now that the outcome of poor economic management is being experience by her traditional electoral supporters (lower and lower middle-class). As a result, Mrs. Kirchner is already reaping the bad fruits in the National Congress and even among its own party, the PJ. Mrs. Kirchner’s support in Congress and within her own party is no longer unanimous, and some have begun to question the Kirchner’s leadership. A strong movement has started within the Casa Rosada calling for Nestor Kirchner to take a seat in either the house of representatives or the senate. The idea is that her husband could then personally knit together the congressional support that Mrs. Kirchner needs.

In terms of foreign confidence towards the dealings and affairs of the Argentinean government, the Casa Rosada is not particularly know for the wisest decisions. Some key advisors to Mrs. Kirchner have overtly considered default on payments owed to the Paris Club. Even though no default has been seen, the fact that members of the government’s top echelon have blatantly spoke of such possibility was enough to bring the already low confidence of international observers in Argentina’s government to even lower levels. On top of that one can put the distrust of foreign investors, who are concerned that the country will yet again call for a default on its bond payments.

Latin American geopolitics

BRAZIL
Arguably the year of 2008 saw a lot of sizzling in the continent. Brazil made a series of mistakes in foreign policy. The dispute with the Ecuadorian administration, which decided to inexplicably default on its indebtednesses, only took place due to Brazil’s lax stance toward other countries in the region, the Bolivian situation being the most typical of them all. Following this situation, Paraguay defied Brazil and literally put the continent’s leader on a tight corner. On the other hand, the country achieved an important victory through its leadership in times of economic crisis and by showing how other countries in the region are to collaborate with each other.

Brazil’s foreign policy is widely known for suffering of split personality. On the one hand, decisions on continental matters are rife with ideologies birthed by the mind of Marco Aurélio Garcia. On the other hand, the Itamaraty sees the outdated views of Samuel Pinheiro somewhat shadow some proper decisions of Celso Amorim. The bottom line is that the lack of strategy of our foreign policy has the country acting only to solve emergency issues or “putting down fires”. It is a well known fact that those who only fight fires little or no time to plan ahead.

VENEZUELA
The year of 2008 was not a good one for Venezuela. The government victory in most municipalities is far from representing absolute victory, much in contradiction to what president Hugo Chávez thinks and peddles. A careful observer will notice that strategic states, as well as the municipality of Caracas, ended up in the opposition’s control. For the first time ever the Venezuelan opposition showed signs of organization.

However, it is unlikely that Chávez will be more quiet and responsive in 2009 as he turned out to be in 2008.

Granted, falling oil prices somewhat softened Chávez’s tone of voice both home and out in the continent, but this hardly means that he will cease to brag about as before. It is anticipated that by the end of 2009 or beginning of 2010 a new referendum will be called, by which he will seek to remain in power through perpetual reelections. To cope with the economic crisis, Chávez relies upon a $70-billion fund in hopes to buy himself some time. In addition, the money the country lost that was invested in Lehman Brothers is but another sign of mismanagement and an ideological irony. Chávez, however, has nothing to be worried about; his personal money is invested in bonds of the U.S. government.

BOLIVIA
Bolivia has suffered even more turbulence in 2008 than Venezuela. But contrary to what happened with his neighbour and mentor, Evo Morales managed get out stronger in 2008. Through subtle, efficient negotiations, Mr Morales managed to pacify his seemingly fierce opposition, at least for the time being. By dealing personally with many representatives, Mr Morales managed to obtain from the Congress the approval he needed for his constitutional referendum. For this victory to come to pass, Mr Morales enjoyed key affirmative votes of the opposition itself. This situation caused the Podemos, the main oppositionist party, to crack apart.

All attentions in 2009 will be drawn to the referendum scheduled for the 25th of January, when president Evo Morales will try to enact the country’s new constitution. Mr Morales successfully reversed the trend in support of the opposition and is now anticipated as the winner of the people’s referendum.

After that, the political forces in Bolivia will carry their agendas with a view to the presidential elections of December. Since the country’s political agenda is likely to dwell at political issues, the impact of the financial crisis may pose a serious obstacle.

There has been heightened concern over the crime wave in Croatia, including a series of murders with possible political connections. And Slovenia has raised the temperature in a territorial dispute which needs to be settled before her neighbouring state can be admitted to the Union.

For these and other reasons, EU Foreign Ministers refused to endorse Rehn’s recommended target date at their meeting in December. The Croatians may still pull it off, but it is beginning to look rather optimistic.

The state of play of the negotiations can readily be summarised. Of the 34 substantive chapters, only seven have so far been provisionally closed. These are Science and Research, Education and Culture, Industrial Policy, External Relations, EMU, Intellectual Property Rights and Information Society.

A further 15 chapters have been opened, and on many of these the talks are well advanced. At the last negotiating session, three more chapters – Trans-European Networks, Customs and Company Law – were due to be closed, and nine more opened. This would have left only two chapters – on Competition policy and Judiciary and Fundamental Rights – unopened.

Yet the Slovene government refused to allow any further chapters to be either closed or opened. It is losing patience over its dispute, which concerns both the maritime and the land borders of the Bay of Piran, and a small area of swamp land further north, on the banks of the River Mura. There is also discord over fishing rights, and the operation of a Croatian nuclear power plant near the Slovene border.

This dispute has continued since 1991, and the two governments are still divided over the means of settling it. Slovenia has called for bilateral negotiations, but Croatia wants it referred to the International Court of Justice.

In a scarcely veiled threat, the Slovenes, have publicised the fact that, under their constitution, it would require only the signatures of 40,000 voters to require a referendum to be held on Croatia’s admission to the EU.

Last month, when he visited both Zagreb and Ljubljana, Olli Rehn invited both parties to accept mediation by a committee headed by Nobel Peace Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari. Neither government has yet responded, though a hopeful sign is that the Slovene Parliament voted on 9 February to ratify Croatia’s membership of NATO, which many feared it would hold up. Meanwhile, the two Prime Ministers, Borut Pahor (Slovenia) and Ivo Sanader (Croatia), have agreed to meet each other later this month.

Since the admission of Romania and Bulgaria, in 2007, and the continuing problems of organised crime and corruption in both countries, there has been much greater vigilance on the EU side, with regard to Croatia. Already from the outset of the negotiations, the Croats have had to face an obstacle not imposed on previous candidates – the setting of verifiable ‘benchmarks’ before a chapter might be opened or closed.

The upsurge of Mafia-style murders last October, enhanced the concern of the EU negotiators. These cost the lives of newspapermen Ivo Pukanic and Niko Franjic, as well as Ivana Hodak, the daughter of a leading Zagreb lawyer. He was defending General Vladimir Zagorec, a former Deputy Defence Minister who had been extradited from Austria to face charges of stealing gems used as collateral in illegal arms deals.

The impact of these killings was almost as great as the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djinjic in 2003, and led to Prime Minister Ivo Sanader taking drastic action. He sacked his Interior and Justice Ministers, as well as the Chief of Police, and replaced them with non-political figures of known integrity.

He also announced the setting up of special courts to deal with organised crime and improved witness-protection measures. Dozens of suspects were rounded up, of whom four were later charged with the murder of Mr. Pukanic.

It is not only on the EU side, that there are growing doubts about Croatia’s accession. In Croatia itself, although all the main political parties remain in favour, public opinion is far from unanimous, and is much less united than it had been in other East European countries acceded in 2004 or 2007. The most recent opinion poll revealed only 29 per cent in favour of membership, and 26 per cent against.

The large number of undecideds may well rally round if the negotiations are successfully concluded, but it would be mistake to conclude that Croatia is certain to become the 28th member of the Union.

Dick Leonard is author of ‘The Economist Guide to the European Union.’

An FPC ‘Fresh Insights’ paper

Based on a government vision that he ambiguously defines as “Bolivarian Revolution”, Hugo Chávez, the President of Venezuela, implemented a contemporary version of perpetuation of power in Latin America. Advancing a country project with no expiry date and no intensity in actions, Chávez manages to convince a poorly educated population that his perpetuation in power is vital and democratic. Naturally and understandably, with a population who is helped by the government through punctual government actions, coupled to the need many Latin Americans have of a patriarchal figure, Chávez has done pretty well with his perpetuation strategy.

Although many disagree with Chávez’s government, which includes countless failures and a few successes, one cannot deny that “El Comandante” really believes the project he follows. It is not about misleading the people. Chávez deeply believes that the “Bolivarian Revolution” or the “21st Century Socialism” is the best way to lead a country. However, this project does not assume leaders are chosen and power alternation after a predetermined time interval. Chávez, who considers himself to be a chosen leader, knows and believes that there is no other leader for the country and, thus, through legal mischief, populism and referenda, manages to remain in power in order to carry out something that will hardly ever bring about lasting benefits.

As in Latin America there is great similarity among peoples of different countries, a leader’s deeds easily flow through the borders with other nations in the region. Thus, it is perfectly natural that the neighboring country’s success is a good indication that changes will take place in one’s own country as well. Another important factor is the pervasive poverty in the continent. Even though the situation has improved considerably compared to the past, most of the continent’s countries are still poor and financially unable of performing the necessary reforms.

For such reasons, the perpetuation policy intended by Chávez was easily transferred to other countries in the region – as well as the model to secure perpetuation through democratic ways. The constitutional referendum conceived by the Venezuelan government, which was rejected by a minimum percentage in 2007, served as an example so that Evo Morales, in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa, in Equator, could follow the same path. Legitimization of the process is, for these political leaders, as or more important that the result itself. Legitimization serves as a shield to counter more abrupt and possibly violent actions by an opposition that does not have access to the government machine and consequently to a list of benefits that could be given to the people.

Although Chávez lost the referendum in 2007, because it was a democratic process (in spite of countless suspicions) it prevented more severe actions from the opposition and more negative feedback by the international community.

In fact, this is a major change between the leaders of the past and the leaders today in terms of perpetuation in power. In the past, guns or decrees did what today is done through popular participation. We will not discuss here whether such popular participation is the result of populist manipulation, but it serves as a shield against the arguments of those who accuse the government of being antidemocratic.

Up to now, Evo Morales has been more successful with this strategy than Hugo Chávez. Not because he conceived means to remain in power, but because he managed to approve a deep constitutional reform, which, among other things, included the ability to run for re-election. On the other hand, Chávez managed to remain in power through popular approvals of his administration. His most daring attempt to search for unlimited re-election was banned by scarce 1.1% of the Venezuelans. I believe that in his new attempt, the Venezuelan President will be successful, because he will do whatever it takes to pass this particular amendment. In Equator, Rafael Correa took advantage of the situation involving his two counterparts in the continent and obtained an extension of his administration. Historically speaking, politics in Equator has been more complex than Bolivian or Venezuelan politics. Right now, however, Correa enjoys a more peaceful political situation than that of the other two South American countries.

It won’t be too long until we see something similar in the Paraguay of President Fernando Lugo. Incredibly, Paraguay is more politically disorganized than Equator or Venezuela.

Unfortunately, corruption in this country is so intertwined with the government that one can easily be confused trying to distinguish what is legitimate and what is not. The institutionalization of corruption will make it much easier for re-election amendments to be presented and passed in the country. As this is a political and, most of the times, customized negotiation in Paraguay, once this idea arises soon there will be conditions to approve it. Once again, the low educational level found among the Paraguayan population and the almost absolute lack of an intellectual elite in the political arena of that country will play a vital role so that Lugo, if he wants so, remains in power.

There are other examples in the region. In Argentina, there is a family perpetuation. Nestor Kirchner’s two mandates were followed by that of his wife Cristina. Today, it seems really hard that Cristina will manage to get re-elected by 2011. Nevertheless, major changes might happen for those who control the power machine. In the worst case scenario, Nestor may run for presidency again. In the Argentinean case, politics takes place inside the peronist party (Justicialist Party), which hinders the emergence of new scenarios that are not contaminated by the governing practices of the main and largest (and virtually the only one) Argentinean party.

The temptation to remain in power is not a privilege shared only by the current Latin-American “left” wing. Competent Colombian President Álvaro Uribe day after day copes with the temptation of going for another mandate. His approval rate, which is nearly 80%, turned him into a political phenomenon able to promise and deliver results. Under his administration, Colombia has become a safer and more peaceful country, placing Bogotá among the safest capital cities in the continent. With Uribe, Colombia has taken Argentina’s historical position as “number two” in South America.

However, are all these positive results enough to blow away the democratic spirit? Based on success and huge popular volition, can a president change laws in order to remain in office for yet another mandate? It is not up to me to comment on that, but for a continent that struggles with great difficulty to become a truly democratic continent, the example must come even from who had absolute success and delivered a good administration to voters.

In Brazil, the possibility of a third mandate has been considered. However, as we are light years ahead of our neighbors when it comes to institutional development (perhaps second to Chile) this idea soon vanished. The mere fact that it has been uttered indicates the true political colors of whoever had such idea. It does not matter whether it came from a right or left party, democracy must always be respected. We should not perpetuate leaders, but the good ideas and concepts these leaders implemented. Concepts are stronger than the people who created them. In Venezuela, Bolivarianism may last a thousand years if this is the will of the people, but Chávez cannot proclaim himself as the father of a country and become its supreme leader if his role model, Simon Bolívar, had hated the idea of perpetuation of power, an example set by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns.

It is true that EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs went out of his way to say last week, when he met Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, that EU-Ukrainian relations would not be damaged by the dispute. The fact that he needed to say this, however, was evidence enough that the relationship was under strain.

The timing is highly unfortunate as delicate negotiations are currently under way to conclude an association agreement with Ukraine, as well as to forge a new ‘Eastern partnership’, along the lines of the Swedish-Polish initiative, adopted by the European Commission last December.

The issues at stake are ably spelled out in a new pamphlet from the Centre for European Reform (CER), entitled Why Ukraine matters to Europe. The author is Thomas Valasek, a former senior official in the Slovak Ministry of Defence.

An unabashed supporter of Ukraine’s ambition for EU membership, Valasek makes no bones about the fact that Ukraine’s “messy politics”, and “exceptionally unstable” governments are largely responsible for the cooling of fervour on the EU’s side. He is particularly critical of the failure of the two pro-Western parties, led respectively by President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, to co-operate in a coherent way.

Their competing ambitions for the next presidential election, due late this or early next year, led to the breakup of the governing coalition last September, and the threat of premature parliamentary elections. In the face of the economic crisis, the government was put together again just before Christmas, with the addition of a smaller party, led by Volodymys Lytvin, the former (and recently re-appointed) Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament. This gave it a rather more comfortable majority against Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions and the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

Yet the internecine strife continues, with Yushchenko attacking the gas agreement which Tymoshenko concluded with Putin, while the Prime Minister last week openly speculated that Yushchenko, together with his chief of staff Viktor Baloha, was planning to declare the economy in default, and imposing a state of emergency that would preclude the presidential election (in which he is given little chance) from taking place.

The split in the pro ‘Orange Revolution’ forces has undoubtedly been a major element in preventing Ukraine from making steady progress towards becoming a viable candidate for EU membership. The achievements, however, have been far from negligible. Ukraine has a free media, and the last two elections have been open and free. Membership of the WTO was achieved last year and economic growth in recent years has been impressive, ranging between 6 and 9 per cent.

Ukraine, however, has been hit hard by the economic downturn, with demand slumping for its export products, notably steel, and its currency under attack. This led it to throw itself at the mercy of the IMF, which granted a loan of $16.4 billion in November.

Valasek lists corruption, the failure to depoliticise the administration and the law courts, and the excessive influence of oligarchs in all political parties, as factors inhibiting the introduction of necessary reforms. Yet he also blames the EU, which, he maintains has offered too little encouragement and support.

The successful transformation of the ten former Communist states, which joined the Union in 2004 and 2007, was driven by the perspective of eventual membership, which the EU has persistently refused to offer to Ukraine. Most recently at last September’s EU-Ukraine summit, when several countries, notably Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, resisted strong pressure for the gesture to be made.

Valasek concedes that Ukraine is nowhere near to meeting membership criteria at present, but points out that the same is true of five Balkan countries – Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia – which have been designated as ‘potential candidates’.

In the face of continuing Russian pressure, the least the EU should do in showing solidarity with the reform forces is to make the same commitment It will then be for the Ukrainians themselves to put their house in order.

Dick Leonard, who recently visited Ukraine, is author of ‘The Economist Guide to the European Union.’

The Middle East was always going to be a priority. As a region it sits at the heart of many of the US’s international concerns – it has an ongoing presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (the later due to take precedence over the former), a vested interest in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and concerns about ongoing difficulties in Israel-Palestinian peace process. But as President Elect, Obama has been much more vocal about his domestic priorities than his international intentions. He held off commenting on Gaza until pushed so far into a corner that he could not avoid calling for a cessation of violence and committing his forthcoming administration to regional peacekeeping.

Despite his reluctance in the past few months to commit himself to any policy agenda there are already some key indicators as to what to expect from Obama’s administration. The appointment of Senator Clinton as Secretary of State and the retention of Robert Gates as Defence Secretary at the Pentagon is a pretty robust sign that he does not intend to go ‘soft’ or in any way ‘left field’ on the US’s international commitments. America’s global positioning is important and Obama is not so radical as to think this an opportunity for a novice.

For his part Obama has already stated that that the peace process will be a priority for him when coming into office and has said that he will put together a team “who are going to be immediately engaged in the Middle East peace process as a whole.” In this regard the appointment of Clinton was a good one. The left wing intelligentsia on both sides of the pond have expressed concern that she comes with baggage and is hardly the fresh face of change that so much of his campaign promised. However if Obama is to ensure that foreign affairs are not sidelined and de-prioritised amongst urgent domestic concerns, then her experience and confidence will be invaluable. Furthermore the association with her husband’s time in office may actually be a help and not a hindrance. President Clinton understood the regional dynamic as well as anybody and knew how to speak to both sides in a language they understood. Although ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts, Clinton outlined criteria for a two state solution, the so called ‘Clinton Perameters’ that have become accepted wisdom for what a final settlement will look like. Hilary Clinton was an early advocate of Palestinian statehood but at the same time has been continually robust in her commitment to Israel’s security. Whilst her appointment is hardly symbolic of a break with the past she is determined to make her presence felt on the international stage and the Middle East may well set the stage for a formidable performance.

Recent events in Gaza will hopefully ensure that Obama does not repeat the mistakes of his predecessors – namely that no President is able to broker a comprehensive peace in the Middle East if he leaves it to the last year of his administration.

Clinton’s efforts at Camp David attempted too much too late in an effort to salvage some of his reputation as his Presidency came to an end amidst domestic scandal and a whole host of failed international endeavours. Bush’s efforts centred on the Annapolis process which came in the eighth year of a Presidency dogged by wide ranging domestic and global criticism of his conduct in the Middle East as a region. Specifically in the Israel-Palestine conflict Bush turned a blind eye to Israeli settlement expansion and watched Hamas take over the Gaza Strip with no clear strategic thinking on how to handle the crisis. His efforts to try and plaster over all the complications of the conflict by a peace summit in Annapolis never really produced much hope of any meaningful progress. His Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice visited Israel more times in the past year than any of her predecessors but her diplomatic efforts lacked impetus, her limited time in office rendering her ineffective.

Obama has made it clear that he will not procrastinate but before diving head first into the conflict it would be sensible for him to take some time to consider the nuances of American engagement in the region and what kind of ally the US should be. Bush mistakenly assumed that a US hosted summit and a cash injection would bring about change. Top level diplomatic activity is crucial and the Palestinians need financial support, but these interventions need to be coupled with a subtler, incremental approach that recognises the importance of changes on the ground and grass roots progress. Quartet Envoy Tony Blair, the ultimate ‘bigger picture’ politician took no time to realise this when he took up his post and has spent the past year making incremental (but not at all insignificant) changes to ordinary Palestinian lives. The US diplomatic team will have to be willing to get their hands dirty and bang a few heads together if they are going to affect a change in attitude and a commitment to a solution.

To this end we may also see a slight shift in rhetoric and the nature of friendship. Most assume that Obama will not be as emollient towards Israel as some of his predecessors. He is likely to be less tolerant of settlement building, more insistent that humanitarian passages into Gaza are kept open, checkpoints in the West bank contracted and demand Israel fulfil its Road Map obligations. With Obama and Clinton we may see more of the tough love, critical friend and Israel expects as much. I suspect Israel will want its actions in Gaza to be, for the most part, complete by the time the new President takes his oath, in recognition that this may be the dawn of a new era in Middle Eastern politics.

Of course part of this new dawn is the imminent arrival of a new Israeli Prime Minister and Government in the Knesset and with elections pegged for February, the possibility of a right wing Likud/Shas coalition looms large. Popular opinion over Gaza has raised Ehud Barak and Tzipi Livni’s standing in the polls but not fully reversed the inclination to bring back Binyamin Netanyahu. Incidentally this may not be a reflection of Israeli disregard for the peace process – most Israelis accept the inevitability of a two state solution – more likely if Israel do vote for Likud it will represent a sense of urgency and desperation in Israel to get tough on terror and hardline on Iran.

If that is the platform on which Netanyahu is elected then we could see an area of tension between Israel and its most important friend. It is hard to imagine a natural camaraderie between Obama and Netanyahu anyway – they have such divergent politics and may take very different approach to the circumstances required to ensure Israel’s security. Obama has made clear his willingness to talk to an extremely inclusive audience, possibly even Hamas and its Iranian sponsor. He may, find that the realities of the Presidency, the intelligence he will start to receive, and Israeli hostility to these conversations will preclude such daring intentions but the very existence of them constitute a significant sea change from the Bush Administration and will not be welcome in Jerusalem.

Policy over Iran may be where the special relationship between Israel and America falters. I don’t think this will be a significant or fundamental challenge – the friendship is deep and its longevity assured – but Israel and America under Obama may be about to navigate unfamiliar and at times uncomfortable terrain.

The Middle East in notoriously unpredictable as is second guessing a Presidency. 9/11 mapped out an unforeseen course for Bush’s time in office particularly resonant in the Middle East, the election of Hamas mapped out an unforeseen course for the Israel-Palestine conflict. Obama’s Presidency will be peppered with unexpected developments but there are some telling signs that he is set to do things a little differently to what we have seen in the past.