Looking specifically at the European Union, the economic crisis has led to a much sharper analysis of the economic and political policies being undertaken within EU member states. As EU heads of government and foreign ministers met in Brussels on 11 and 12 December for a two-day summit, there was undoubtedly another factor that was almost certainly in the minds of some of the attendees. This was the continuing decline of sterling which, at the time of the summit, had reached a low of 89 pence to the euro, the lowest since the single currency came into existence a decade ago. However, by 18 December, this had dropped even further as sterling reached an all-time low of 95.5 pence to the euro. Many analysts predict that it is only a matter of time before parity is met and at the rate it has been dropping, this could be reached well before the year is out. Gone are the days of Brits taking advantage of cheap weekend breaks to the continent, where three years ago a euro was worth as little as 69 pence. Britons flying to Eurozone countries over the holiday period and into next year will quickly come to realise that it may have been better value for money to holiday at home.

Worries about the demise of sterling have been coupled with recent debates within Denmark and Sweden – the only other ‘old EU’ economies that still remain outside the Eurozone – about proposing referendums on euro membership within the next year. In addition, Iceland, which isn’t even an EU member state, has been suggested as being the possible 29th member of the EU, because, had it been a member, many of its recent economic troubles would have been avoided. All this leads back to the one country where the euro debate has been remarkably silent until now. In Britain there has been very little debate since Tony Blair and Gordon Brown rejected the idea of British membership of the euro in 2003 when the five economic tests were not met. However, as the events described above indicate, the suggestion that British politicians seem so reluctant to talk about – Britain adopting the euro – will surely have to be re-examined.

In fact, someone has already started the debate for them. Jose Manuel Barroso, the head of the European Commission, stated at the beginning of December that ‘the UK was closer to joining the euro than ever before.’ Although he admitted that the vast majority of British people are opposed to the idea, he went on to argue that ‘those that matter in Britain’ had been discussing it. One person rumoured to have been involved in such discussions is Lord Peter Mandelson, the Business Secretary and a staunch pro-euro supporter, but he claims that he cannot recall any such conversation. During the past few weeks, this suggestion has also been picked up by George Osborne, the Shadow Chancellor, although he, when speaking to business leaders in the north east, said that in the current economic climate, abandoning the pound would be the wrong thing to do. That said, Caroline Flint, the Minister for Europe, maintained the Government’s status quo by stating that the British position on the euro has not changed. However, if sterling’s decline continues, and if the euro does continue to become a stronger and more stable currency than the pound, then surely it is only a matter of time before more involved debates about possible British membership of the euro become more widespread.

It is important to remember however, that there are many obstacles that still stand in the way of British membership. And before any serious debates on the possibility of joining are even entered into, many other factors also need to be considered. First, this is the first real test for the euro, and how it reacts and deals with the worsening economic picture will be seen by many as a test of its credibility. Although membership of the euro has eliminated the possibility of currency crises for countries such as Ireland and Spain, it does not mean that they are completely immune to shocks resulting from the global crisis. External threats could still harm their economies and that is why the events which unfold over the next few months will provide a real test for the currency and the eurozone as a whole.

Other obstacles to British membership are based on Britain’s very nature and relationship with the EU itself. The Government’s ‘five economic tests’ would have to be re-examined and each would have to be met before membership is even properly considered. However, even if these tests were met, the rest of Europe would then have to accept Britain’s bid to join. Following that, Britain would then have to undergo a transitional period of membership of the single currency exchange rate mechanism before qualifying for full membership, which would take some years anyway.

Finally and most importantly, the largest problem is political. There is currently a complete lack of balanced debate on the euro issue within Britain, with it tending to get left to bashing at the hands of the tabloid press and euro-sceptics. This means that the vast majority of the British public are unenthusiastic about the project. Study after study has revealed that if a referendum on membership were to be held, it would be easily lost. In addition, the ‘Europe/euro debate’ has never been a vote-winner in Britain and it is an issue that is likely to lead to further splits within political parties. As Labour closes down the gap which the Conservatives had managed to open up between the two parties in the polls, is Gordon Brown really likely to take Britain into a referendum on an issue that many predict the Government could never win? In addition, this also seems especially unlikely given that a general election must be called by the spring of 2010. Finally, it is important to note that even if the idea had crossed the minds of ministers over the past few weeks, aside from Lord Mandelson, no other politician has publically put forward a positive case for Europe which will be essential to lay the groundwork for the euro. If British politicians cannot even manage this, there is little chance of euro membership any time in the near future.

As economic events over the past year have demonstrated, nothing can be ruled out or predicted. But, for the moment, serious debate on the issue of British membership of the euro remains premature. The Government is playing safe by declaring that the policy hasn’t changed and that they will focus on other economic issues first. It is too early to tell whether the decline of sterling will continue along with that of the British economy. That is because speculative report after speculative report differs on just how bad the recession will be both for Britain and the Eurozone. If sterling does come out of the economic crisis worse off, then surely Britain should seriously start to consider membership – even if this is only a consideration.

Finally, it is important to remember that throughout 2008, Gordon Brown has said repeatedly to the public that he will do ‘everything in his power to protect the British economy’. Perhaps British membership of the euro may be just the thing to protect it. 2009 may indeed be one of the most interesting years for European Monetary Union, since it’s introduction to the markets ten years ago. It may prove to be a very interesting year indeed.

That is the headline message of an impressive new report, entitled Europe’s Demographic Future, just produced by the Berlin-Institute for Population and Development. Much the most thorough examination of the problem yet to be attempted, it is based on detailed studies of economic and demographic developments in each of 285 regions in all 27 EU member states, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.

A bulky document, it is profusely illustrated with tables and maps, the most striking of which is a map showing the fertility rates of every region. Those with a relatively high rate are shown in darker colours. These are mainly in the more northern and western parts of the continent – the farther east or south one looks the lighter the colouring of the map.

In no country shown is the average number of children born to women as high as 2.1, the rate necessary to sustain a stable or growing population. Iceland comes remarkably close, at 2.08, while the other Nordic countries, Ireland and France all have fertility rates ranging between1.8 and 2.0. The least fertile country is Poland, whose women bear an average of 1.3 children, though the most rural regions the country, as well as those of Slovakia, Bulgaria, northern Spain and southern Italy, all have fertility rates of less than 1.2.

The findings of the survey comprehensively refute two long-held views about fertility. Large families have traditionally been associated with Catholicism and the countryside. This may once have been true, but it is now the opposite. With the exception of Ireland, the Catholic countries now have the lowest birth-rates, and the areas of lowest fertility are in the most remote rural districts.

“Low fertility is not a natural law” says the report in explaining how it is that some countries and regions have achieved fertility rates far above the average for the continent as a whole. In every case it is because they long ago invested in family-friendly policies, which made it easier for women to bear and raise children, while not unduly compromising their employment opportunities.

In the Scandinavian countries, these date from the 1930s, or even earlier. In France, a conscious decision was taken immediately following the Second World War to proceed along the same lines, with the introduction of large family allowances, the provision of crèches and the exponential development of its health and educational systems.

Two inter-locking factors common to all the high fertility regions are the high proportion of women in the work force and rapidly rising educational levels. These are commonly found in the most advanced industrial countries, with one notable exception, of which the German authors of this report are uneasily aware. In a revealing paragraph, they say:

In France 18 per cent of 45-54 year-olds have a university degree. Today 39 per cent of their children, today aged between 29 and 34, already have the same qualification. In Ireland the figure has improved from 22 to 41 per cent. In Germany, however, which in any case has a low percentage of students for an industrialised country, this figure has even declined.

Strangely enough, most of the policies which Germany, and indeed Europe as a whole, needs to adopt in order to provide the necessary conditions for improving its birth-rate were included in the famous Lisbon programme adopted eight years ago. Each year since, the targets set have been reviewed by the European Council, and each year progress has fallen short of expectations.

It is time they were given a much higher priority. An intelligent and liberal immigration policy can certainly make an important contribution to the Europe’s demographic problem. Yet it is scarcely conceivable that anything like 50 million immigrants can be absorbed over the next four decades or so.

If a disastrous decline in the European population is to be avoided it can only be by taking energetic steps to bring the overall fertility rate up to the level that its most successful countries and regions already enjoy.

Dick Leonard is the author of The Economist Guide to the European Union.

A twist of fate just six weeks or so before had swung the electorate in Obama’s favour. His popularity soared as the American economy worsened. Perhaps if the economy had not taken centre stage, attention would have shifted to healthcare, education and foreign policy where the margin separating Obama from McCain would have been much smaller. George W. Bush had made a point of his role as commander-in-chief and he may have been passing the baton onto John McCain had events panned out differently. But that is what a matter of weeks can do in politics.

It may not have been Barack Obama’s foreign policy that got him elected by the US electorate. But in the international arena, it was his stance on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and openness to dialogue with Iran without pre-conditions that appealed to world leaders.

In particular, the letter of congratulations sent by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Obama seemed to garner much media attention. According to the Iranian President’s spokesperson, Gholam-Hussein Elham who was quoted by the Tehran Times, a similar letter of congratulations had been sent to Bush back in 2006, proposing a return to religious principles as a means of restoring confidence.

But this time, the act of sending a congratulatory message was seized upon as representing a fundamental shift in foreign policy direction. It was touted as having the potential to resurrect some kind of diplomacy between Iran and America that had been abruptly halted in 1979 after the US hostage crisis.

Was it overly-optimistic to presume that the United States would reach out to Iran? After all, it was Republican President George W. Bush who had named the Islamic Republic part of the ‘axis of evil’ alongside Iraq and North Korea in February 2002.

Given one of the key themes of Barack Obama’s foreign policy is to start a withdrawal of combat troops from neighbouring Iraq, trying to engage in ‘aggressive personal diplomacy’ with Iran and other regional powers looks to be a sensible move. In order to ensure Iraqi stability, he has pledged to develop a new relationship with Iran.

In exchange for cooperation on terrorism and nuclear issues and an end to Iran’s involvement in Iraq, the American president-elect has said that he would meet the country’s leaders (at a time and place of his choosing) and offer them economic inducements.

Should the Iranian government refuse to collaborate, stronger unilateral sanctions will be applied, alongside multilateral sanctions at the Security Council and ‘sustained action outside the UN to isolate the Iranian regime’ will be taken.

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has had sound economic growth hovering between about four and five percent since 2004, high consumer inflation and unemployment coupled with a forecast decline in oil revenues* suggest that economic inducements could prove tempting.

The incoming American president’s carrot of membership of the World Trade Organisation and economic investment may encourage some conservatives in the Iranian government to soften their stance to US diplomatic engagement.

Both Barack Obama and vice-president-elect Joe Biden oppose the Kyl-Lieberman amendment, passed by Congress, which says that the US should use its military presence in Iraq to counter the threat from Iran. Obama made his opposition to the Iraq war clear from the outset and he believes that it would be reckless to extend it into Iran. As such, he has introduced a resolution in the Senate declaring that no act of Congress gives the Bush administration authority to attack Iran.

Obama has even gone so far as to say that he may not seek ‘regime change’ in the Islamic Republic. This could possibly allay fears in Iran that the West is only willing to engage with an Iranian government they do not view as hostile.

Memories of the coup d’etat that deposed Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in the early 1950s, an operation funded by the Americans and the British, are still fresh in the minds of many Iranians.

However, Obama’s rival for the Democratic nomination, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, called talks with Iran, North Korea and Syria with few pre-conditions a propaganda victory for America’s international foes.

Her recent acceptance of the post of US Secretary of State could therefore prove significant in the future course of American foreign policy. Initial expressions of delight from Iranian quarters at a new era of Iranian-American relations may have been a little premature.

* Figures obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit

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While the world is focused on the Iranian nuclear programme, people in Iran are calling on its government to protect the human rights of its citizens. Many Iranians face routine persecution and discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnic or religious identity. A new pamphlet by the Foreign Policy Centre looks at the experiences of women, Kurds and Baha’is to highlight this challenge for equality in Iran.

Iran’s constitution declares “the abolition of all forms of unjust discrimination and the provision of equitable opportunities for all.” Iran is not living up to its own promises. The government regularly sidesteps its commitment to equality, especially when it comes to women and minorities.

As a theocratic state, Iran’s government is influenced by a narrow interpretation of Shi’a Islam. This version of Islam provides women with fewer rights than men and it brands Baha’is (the country’s largest non-Muslim religious minority) as heretics with little protection under the law. Ethnic Kurds are prevented from teaching their language and culture for fear that it will undermine Islamic unity. The marginalisation of these groups predates the Islamic Republic, but the ideology of the regime has institutionalised a pattern of discrimination.

The government regularly creates exceptions to principles of equality enshrined in human rights. It has increasingly used the pretext of national security to detain innocent women, Baha’is and Kurds. A cursory look at many of these cases shows the lack of credibility of such charges. Recently, Hiwa Butimar (a Kurdish historian), Esha Momeni (a student from California and women’s rights petitioner) and the entire Iranian Baha’i leadership were separately arrested under ‘national security’ charges. The authorities have been unable to present any credible evidence to back these claims.

Other charges used to prosecute women, Kurds and Baha’is are ambiguous, such as ‘acting against the regime,’ ‘enmity with God,’ or ‘insulting the sacred institutions of Islam.’ The application of the law by judges is often unpredictable and arbitrary.

Members of all three groups are regularly denied their due process and detainee rights under the law. Legal processes are outlined in the Iranian constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure, but many are not adhered to in practice. Detainees are often held incommunicado for long periods of time without any knowledge of the charges against them.

Hard-line clerics and government-sponsored media also promote a culture of prejudice against minorities and women. They frequently use the label ‘anti-Iranian’ to discredit marginal groups. Baha’i youth engaged in community service, women promoting women’s rights education, or Kurds teaching in their own language have all been branded with this defamatory label.

The state places obstacles to education and employment that prevent social advancement by members of these groups. It is official state policy to deny Baha’is access to universities, far fewer Kurds than the national average get places, and women are restricted in their choice of courses (even if they dominate numerically overall). All three groups have difficulty gaining employment in the public sector (Baha’is are officially banned).

Women, Baha’is and Kurds are far from the only groups that are marginalised, but their experiences highlight an issue that is gaining ground among Iran’s human rights activists. The struggle for equality is happening on the street corners and in the seminaries of Iran. National human rights organisations like the Campaign for Equality argue that Islam is fully compatible with human rights. Prominent clerics such as Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Ayatollah Yousof Sanei are challenging the rigid interpretations of the ruling clerics.

Iran says it has a sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons, but it has misunderstood what it takes to be a leader in the international community. For 60 years, the Declaration of Human Rights has been the universal standard for what it means to be a respected state in the community of nations. If Iran wants to play its part in the international community, it needs to revisit the noble principles set into motion by Cyrus and protect human rights at home.

Stephen Twigg is Director of the Foreign Policy Centre and Chair of Progress

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The situation that British servicemen and women find themselves in in Afghanistan can no longer be described as ‘forgotten’. The conflict has increasingly found itself in the headlines, and the subject of numerous documentaries(3), debates(4) and public discussions, and not necessarily (although not exclusively(5)), for the right reasons. This has been in part due to the decrease in size and prominence of British operations in Iraq, but also due to the number of British lives that have been lost in Afghanistan, and the increasing frequency(6) with which they seem to be being lost.

124 British troops have died in Afghanistan since 2001, including two Royal Marines(7) in Helmand Province this week. Just over 8,000 British troops are currently serving in Afghanistan, compared to half that number – around 4,000 – in Iraq. The number of British lives lost in recent times as a result of the conflict was no doubt uppermost in Mr Hutton’s mind as he prepared to speak on 11 November to justify the ‘sacrifices’ Britain has made thus far in pursuit of her political and military aims in Afghanistan.

As one might have expected then, at least half of Mr Hutton’s speech constituted a detailed explanation of the UK national security imperative driving the political objectives which keep British troops in Afghanistan; in short that, should the Taliban be allowed to regain power of the country, it would once again provide a ‘secure refuge’ which would allow Al Qaeda to re-group there and to plan and implement terrorist acts upon countries including the UK.

While this argument is compelling and undoubtedly persuasive when justifying why British troops remain in Afghanistan seven years almost to the day after the Taliban were ousted from Kabul, and why the government intends for them to stay ‘until their job is complete’, those that were hoping for a more detailed exposition of how the sacrifices that have already been made will not be in vain, and how future sacrifices might be avoided, or at least minimised, were disappointed.

General Petraeus’ review and predicted overhaul(8) of US operations in Afghanistan is widely regarded as acceptance that something needs to change strategically in order for quicker progress to be made. However, the Defence Secretary did not mention in his speech an issue that could prove to be key; the suggestion of a 30,000-strong troop surge, 5,000 of which would be made up of British forces. The idea has recently been linked with high profile figures including President-elect Barack Obama(9), and General Sir David Richards(10), the incoming Head of the British Army(11). Both of them, if recent reports are true, believe that a change in military strategy, in the form of a massive troop surge will be key to achieving military and political objectives and precipitating the eventual withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan.

Mr Hutton has indicated that he believes the role of Ministers to be to take the advice of their generals on issues of military strategy and act on it, rather than formulating such strategies themselves. While this is surely something to be welcomed, it appears that strategic advice on a surge has yet to be sought, and much less received. But, unless General Sir David Richards changes his mind, or is ‘uninstalled’ by the Ministry of Defence between now and next August, this seems likely to be his advice to the Defence Secretary, and Mr Hutton, it appears, might be wise to take it. Indeed, there were already reports emerging(12) at the time of writing, that a request(13) for a further 2,000 British troops was being anticipated by the Prime Minister from President-elect Obama’s new administration, but the exact number and timing of their deployment, would be dependent on the draw down in Iraq.

It is well known that the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, does not believe(14) that British troops returning from Iraq should be sent straight on to operations in Afghanistan, and for good reason. This perhaps provides an indication as to the division of opinion amongst the generals, which Mr Hutton will find himself facing when he does seek their advice on the future of British military strategy in Afghanistan. It will no doubt prove infinitely more complex than simply seeking and acting upon advice – there will be stark and difficult choices to be made, as one would expect in matters of war and peace. And, given the backdrop of the approaching general election, which must take place before the summer of 2010, making those choices could prove even more difficult. Yet, as Nick Clegg(15), the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, has pointed out, ‘…the worst option is to do nothing, because at the moment we have too few troops fighting an enemy that cannot be defeated by military means alone.’

The Defence Secretary freely admitted in his speech that ‘it would be a huge mistake for any politician to take [public] consent for the deployment of our armed forces for granted. Politicians have to earn and re-earn that consent.’ And yet, in a poll(16) of just over 1,000 members of the British public conducted by ICM and released by the BBC this week, more than two-thirds of those questioned (68%) believed that British troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan within the next year, and less than one quarter (24%) believed troops should stay. This is perhaps no surprise given the increased profile of the conflict itself and of the deaths which it has brought about. Whether the respondents believed that a troop surge was likely to take place in the next year, and that troops would therefore be able to withdraw more easily afterwards, is unknown, but that would perhaps have been a more useful, if less ‘poll-friendly’ question. The Ministry of Defence rebutted(17) this, quoting their most recent MORI poll which indicated that over 50% of the public supports the UK armed forces’ presence in Afghanistan, and that a recent Chatham House survey found only 37% of people favoured a withdrawal. Despite this, the MoD admitted that they do ‘need to do more to explain to the UK public why it’s so important that the UK continues to support the Government… and the international presence in Afghanistan.’ It seems Mr Hutton would do well to keep his own words at the forefront as he seeks strategic advice from his generals and decides whose advice to take, should he face a difference of opinion. The old adage that, in the midst of war, winning hearts and minds at home is as important as winning those abroad has never been truer.

Even if a surge were to be advised, the advice taken, acted upon, and successfully sold to the British public, opinion will still need to be convinced that the government is honouring the Military Covenant(18), or duty of care, that it owes to the armed forces. The British public needs to be reassured that British troops are adequately prepared, equipped, renumerated, supported and rested both before, during and after their deployment on operations, not least those in Afghanistan. Though Mr Hutton confirmed in an earlier interview(19), that he was happy that all equipment now being used by British forces in Afghanistan was up to the job in the majority of cases, he did concede that mistakes had been made in the past. The Ministry of Defence has indeed made much progress in terms of both equipment provision and reforming defence procurement procedures to enable ‘off the shelf’ emergency purchases to be made, now categorised as Urgent Operational Requirements(20) or UORs. And while no-one would deny that unforeseen equipment malfunctions do occur in the heat of battle, and that such occurrences are an unfortunate fact of war, the number and extent of avoidable equipment inadequacies(21) – both in terms of the availability, quantity and quality of equipment – has been borne out recently by a high profile catalogue of testimonies from serving and ex-service people, as well as coroners’ conclusions(22) identifying preventable deaths and injuries suffered by British servicemen and women. These will have no doubt done nothing to instil the public with confidence in the government’s ability to properly prepare and equip British troops for the job it is asking them to do. Admittedly, inquests follow actual events with a considerable time lag, so if Mr Hutton’s optimism is to be believed, one might expect the number of preventable deaths and injuries to drop considerably in the future.

To properly address the equipment and other Covenant-related issues, Mr Hutton needs to be open about the overarching issue of government funding for the armed forces. The level of funding that may or may not be available, given the government’s current economic commitments in other areas, needs to be, if not debated publicly, then certainly taken into consideration in any strategic choices and that consideration needs to be articulated to the British public effectively. Furthermore, the fundamental and related issues of recruitment and retention, especially as they affect the British Army, also need to be addressed, and be seen to be addressed, as a matter of urgency.

To ensure that past and future British sacrifices in Afghanistan will not have been in vain therefore, and to enable public support for the operation to be re-established and maintained, Mr Hutton and the government will need to move decisively. They must be seen to be tackling the conflict itself directly and efficiently, both in terms of lives lost, and from an economic point of view. Avoiding an ever-longer, more drawn-out, bogged down, expensive and bloody conflict than has already occurred is imperative. The effectiveness of the operation, in all senses, will now be publicly scrutinised as never before, and this against the backdrop of an unprecedented global economic crisis. Furthermore, what might be considered as issues slightly outside the scope of the conflict, but nonetheless integral to it, must also be addressed, and be seen to be being addressed, as a matter of urgency – equipment, retention, rest and recuperation, etc. It would perhaps be prudent for Mr Hutton to adopt a more holistic approach in his justification of the British presence in Afghanistan in the future. As well as providing a thorough outline of the national security imperative behind the operation, which is no doubt important, addressing the wider issues outlined above, as well as tackling head-on the issue of whether to ‘surge’ or not, will undoubtedly help to improve the public’s perception of the value of a more sustained British effort in Afghanistan, and perhaps of the accompanying sacrifices that such an effort might entail.

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References
(1) http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20081111InternationalInstituteOfStrategicStudiesLondon.htm
(2) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1553394/Our-forgotten-war.html
(3) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/7699917.stm
(4) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7714828.stm
(5) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7593901.stm
(6) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7648020.stm
(7) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7726447.stm
(8) http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-can-the-surge-in-iraq-work-for-afghanistan-932935.html
(9) http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-obama-offers-new-hope-in-afghanistan-1003450.html
(10) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/we-need-30000-more-soldiers-to-beat-taliban-says-general-964290.html
(11) http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/GeneralSirDavidRichardsAppointedNextChiefOfTheGeneralStaff.htm
(12) http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_4670000/newsid_4679900/4679986.stm?bw=bb&mp=wm&news=1&ms3=6&ms_javascript=true&bbcws=2
(13) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7728478.stm
(14) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/dont-redeploy-troops-warns-defence-chief-1006613.html
(15) http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/nick-clegg-tackling-the-terrorists-requires-more-troops-ndash-and-a-plan-1003449.html
(16) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7725228.stm
(17) http://www.industrymailout.com/Industry/View.aspx?id=121206&q=97668227&qz=e8cfcc
(18) http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/war/overview/covenant.shtml
(19) http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7721000/7721288.stm
(20) http://www.ams.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/toolkit/content/topics/crisis.htm
(21) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7703419.stm
(22) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7719847.stm

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Question: What is the capital of Iceland? Answer: Around four dollars and 50 cents. This cruel jibe epitomises the plight of the North Atlantic country following the ruination of its banks and the collapse of its currency.

On 24 October, the Icelandic government succeeded in negotiating a $6 billion IMF rescue plan, backed by Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Russia, but its approval by the IMF board has been delayed three times, and the country is far from being out of the woods yet.

Its leaders are feeling distinctly sore about the European Union, and – in particular – Britain, which they largely blame for making their troubles far worse than they would otherwise have been.

Gordon Brown may have become a hero within the EU for his decisiveness in proposing action to recapitalise the banks and restore liquidity to money markets, but in Iceland he has become something of a hate figure. His action in using anti-terrorist laws to freeze the British assets of a failing Icelandic bank caused immense offence, and undoubtedly helped to put the skids under efforts to keep the bank afloat.

Icelandic Foreign Minister Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir told the International herald Tribune that she “was absolutely appalled at opening the British treasury department’s home page… and finding Iceland featured on a list of terrorist entities that included Al Qaeda, Sudan an North Korea”.

More broadly, Iceland, which is a member of the European Economic Area, and participates in many EU programmes, including the Schengen agreement, was disappointed that the Union did not mobilize itself quickly to come to the stricken country’s aid, forcing it to turn instead to countries such as Russia and Japan, with which it has no formal links.

Somewhat belatedly, Icelandic Prime Minster Geir Haarde wrote to French President Nicolas Sarkozy in mid-October, asking for an EU loan. This has not yet yielded any result, though the Commission subsequently called for authority to double the Union’s crisis fund to €25 billion, which could possibly be utilised for this purpose.

Despite the widespread disappointment with the EU, many Icelanders appear to have concluded that their best bet for the future would be to join the Union as soon as possible. A typical reaction was that of Fisheries Minister Einar Gudfinnsson, who said: “Everyone knows that I am against EU membership, but today we should think about these questions in a new light”.

An opinion poll published in Frettabladid, Iceland’s leading newspaper, on 18 October, showed 70 per cent wanting a referendum on EU membership, with 49 per cent saying they would vote in favour, and 27 per cent against.

The present government, a coalition between the (conservative) Independence Party and the Social Democrats has, up till now, been split on the issue, with the Social Democrats in favour and their right-wing colleagues against.

Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn lost no time in laying out a metaphorical red carpet. In an interview with Agence France Press, on 20 October, he said that Iceland could quickly complete European Union membership negotiations, should it want to do so.

“Iceland is clearly a democratic country”, he said, “which has already negotiated perhaps two-thirds of the criteria needed to join the Union…this means that were Iceland to pose its candidature, we could quickly complete the negotiations”.

In practice, it is likely to be more complicated and more protracted than Rehn suggested. One of the biggest attractions of EU membership for Iceland would be to join the Euro, after the virtual destruction of its currency. This, however, requires a preliminary period of two years during which the Icelandic krona would need to be within the narrow band of the Exchange Rate Mechanism.

It would not be easy for Iceland to negotiate an exemption from this requirement, which is embedded in the Maastricht treaty, nor would the admission of any new member state, however generally acceptable, be straightforward in advance of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty.

As far as Iceland itself is concerned, however, the difficulties would be far less than an earlier period when the fishing industry totally dominated its economy. The rapid industrial development over the past two decades means that it now represents much less than 50 per cent of Iceland’s exports, and fitting it into the Common Fisheries Policy should not now prove an insurmountable obstacle.

So, it will not happen overnight, and Iceland is unlikely to leapfrog over Croatia, whose membership negotiations should be completed within the next year. It will not, therefore, become the 28th member of the Union, but it might well be the 29th.

Dick Leonard is the author of ‘The Economist Guide to the European Union.’

Drowned out by the acclamation for the Obama victory last week, the European commission quietly released its progress report on Turkish accession to the EU. While it welcomed Turkey’s economic performance and the progress it had made strengthening its legal system, the commission’s message was that there was a lot done but a lot still to do.

The road towards Turkish membership is long and rocky but I believe that Turkey is central to the future development of the EU. The eventual decision to accept or reject Turkey will have significant ramifications for the type of organisation it will become.

Put crudely, Turkish membership will signify a choice for Europe between becoming an outward-looking union at peace with its internal diversity that prioritises the economic and security needs of its members, or an insular, almost parochial grouping, searching for an imagined cultural homogeneity. This is why the Foreign Policy Centre has released a new pamphlet (pdf) to coincide with the report arguing that we have to clearly lay out the practical case that both the EU and Turkey would be more prosperous and secure if accession is successful.

Turkish membership is often described as a “win-win” situation for the EU and Turkey but it is clear that victory will be hard fought. The majority of European public opinion opposes Turkish membership and leading politicians in member states including France, Germany and Austria have publicly stated that they do not see Turkey as a future member and have pushed for a nebulous “privileged partnership”. Turkish support for membership has also waned in recent years due to the sluggish progress of the accession process and the opposition of some EU leaders.

The challenge set before advocates of Turkish membership then, is to transform a climate of cynicism and opposition to ensure membership is granted once Turkey meets the strict criteria required for entry.
Prosperity and security form the twin pillars of the case for Turkish membership. Turkey has been at the bedrock of European security since the cold war, joining Nato in 1952 and guarding Europe’s south-eastern flank against the former Soviet Union. Today it sits at the gateway to the Middle East, the Caucasus and central Asia, a key strategic player in all three regions. Turkey can play a critical role in our energy security, where it is the key alternative transit route to Russia for Caspian oil and gas and the swiftest route for Iraqi crude.

The key dynamics of the economic relationship between Turkey and the EU are clear. The EU is the market for 56% of Turkish exports, ten times that of any other export destination, while Turkey is the EU’s fifth largest export market. European firms annually invest over €3bn in Turkey. After economic setbacks in 1994 and at the turn of the millennium, Turkey has grown at an average annual rate of 6.8%. According to the World Bank, eventual Turkish membership should boost its GDP per capita growth by 1.5% per year, and allow it to expand as a market for European goods.

There remain significant political challenges that Turkey must face up to if it is to be ready for membership. This summer prosecutors in Ankara came within a whisker of removing the current Justice and Development (AKP) government on charges of undermining the secular state that included the decision to allow women to wear the hijab in universities. Had it succeeded, it would have dealt a hammer-blow to hopes of Turkish membership in the foreseeable future. Other outstanding issues include restrictions on freedom of speech, the future of Cyprus and the challenges faced by the Kurdish community over language rights and identity. These issues must be fully resolved prior to Turkish membership, but in these and the other main challenges Turkey faces, the rigorous criteria provided by the EU accession process act as an immense force for change.

At its core, the argument must be that if Turkey succeeds in fully implementing the EU’s accession criteria, the toughest given to any candidate country, it will have earned the right to join the EU. If Turkey has undergone the massive economic, political, social and legal transformation required, the denial of its right to join would be an affront to the principles of fairness that must underpin the EU and could lead a spurned Turkey to re-orientate itself away from the West, forming new alliances in the Middle East and central Asia to the detriment of Europe.

Although Turkey has already benefited from economic and political reforms necessary for accession to take place, the pace of change needs to increase, improving the quality of life in Turkey, and strengthening support for membership, both among Turks and EU citizens. Turkey must also reach out to EU citizens with effective public diplomacy, busting myths and raising awareness of Turkey as a modern European society with deep roots in the continent’s history. These steps must be reciprocated within the EU through cultural exchange and the use of economic links to break down barriers.
The European business community has an important role to play in standing up for Turkey and this must include leadership at the European level.

European companies operating in Turkey should take the lead in educating their workforces about the country and show the benefits that closer co-operation with it can bring. Similarly Europe’s trade unions can play a proactive role in informing their members and dampening fears over Turkish migration damaging employment opportunities.

Failure to grant Turkish accession would be one of the greatest strategic mistakes the EU could inflict upon itself, one that would be hugely harmful to business and undermine European prosperity and security. The path to accession is challenging for both the EU and Turkey, but advocates of an open and progressive Europe need to stand up and make the case that it is a challenge that we must not fail to meet.

To comment on this article, please visit the FPC Blog: http://foreignpolicycentre.blogspot.com

Hitherto seen as at least mildly euro-sceptic and barely interested in the doings of Brussels, the British Prime Minister created an entirely different impression during last week’s meeting of the European Council. He arrived eight hours early, formidably well informed and deeply committed to making a success of the ‘summit’.

He made himself freely available to the press and was all smiles and self-deprecation to every one he met. When he left some 36 hours later, he was almost universally seen as a ‘saviour’ by the large assemblage of politicians, diplomats and European officials gathered in the Belgian capital, with the apparent exception of some of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s entourage, who resented the fact that he had stolen the limelight from their chief.

By his performance, Brown has created a huge amount of goodwill for himself and his country. The question now is whether this will eventually be dissipated, or whether it will mark the beginning of the end of the period in which Britain has been seen as a ‘semi-detached’ member of the Union, more interested in opting out of successive European initiatives rather than playing a full part in their development.

Some useful suggestions on how Britain could play a more positive role have just been made by a high level working party convened by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, popularly known as Chatham House. Presided over by Sir Stephen Wall, a former British Permanent Representative to the EU, its report is entitled A British Agenda for Europe.

The authors’ rather bland conclusion is that “the correct approach is to use this moment to be creative and proactive, both for reasons of British self-interest and to help produce approaches to the EU’s problems that will suit all members of the EU”. They list five areas where a sronger British participation in EU policies would be both in the national and the general European interest.

They urge the greater development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the creation of a European External Action Service. The pursuit of a more active enlargement policy, including towards Ukraine, Georgia “and other countries of the Caucasus” and greater British participation in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA).

Without specifically arguing for British adoption of the euro, the group strongly implies that it would be in the long-term British interest, and urges the British government to keep the decision “under regular and public review”. Finally, they urge the creation of an EU-wide energy market and the establishment of a European Energy Agency.

These are fairly modest proposals, and it is very much to be hoped that they will in fact be actively pursued by Gordon Brown and his government. At least as important, however, is to persuade the Conservative opposition to take a more positive approach –no easy task. Despite the recovery of Brown’s reputation, most observers still regard them as the favorites to win the next British general election, due at the latest by June 2010.

Although David Cameron has been largely successful in weaning his party away from its more reactionary policies, Europe has been a notable exception. He has failed to give a lead, and in fact has shown himself – if anything – as even more euro-sceptic than his three predecessors – Michael Howard, Iain Duncan Smith and William Hague.

Under his leadership, the party has become more and more euro-phobic, and the formerly strong pro-European faction, led by Michael Heseltine, Ken Clarke and Chris Patten, has all but disappeared.

Cameron has recently established regular contacts with other Centre-right European leaders, including Sarkozy and Angela Merkel. Unless they can talk some sense into him, the next British general election could well provoke a major crisis in Anglo-EU relations, whatever progress is made under the new-born leadership of Gordon Brown.

Dick Leonard is the author of ‘The Economist Guide to the European Union’.

It is ten years since the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched, at an Anglo-French ‘summit’ at St. Malo, and there is now precious little to be shown for it. The French presidency of the EU is acutely aware of the failure of the policy, and is actively preparing a new European Security Strategy which will be presented for adoption at the December meeting of the European Council.

The full extent by which the ESDP has fallen short of expectations, and what needs to be done to make it effective, is set out in a coruscating new pamphlet by Nick Witney, who, until last year was the Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency.

Entitled ‘Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy’, it is published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (www.ecfr.eu).

It was not through lack of good intentions that the policy has failed, Witney makes clear. In 2003, all of Europe’s leaders signed up to an ambitious programme, of which the centre-piece was a ‘rapid reaction force’, 60,000-strong, which would be available at short notice for both peace-keeping and peace-making missions in trouble spots across the globe.

Nothing further has been heard of this projected force, except that – since January 2007 – two ‘Battlegroups’, each of around 1,500 troops, have been available at ten days’ notice. Had the rapid reaction force materialised it is highly likely that a number of conflicts could have been avoided or terminated more quickly,

On the Georgian-Russian border, for example, when in 2005 the Russians terminated a 150-person OSCE Border Monitoring Mission, the Georgians invited the EU to replace it. All the EU could manage was to send three persons (later extended to 12) to help Georgia reform its border management system.

Financially, the EU could easily have afforded to provide itself with an effective peace-enforcing capacity. The 27 member states are collectively responsible for almost a quarter of world defence spending. The trouble is, Witney emphasizes, that “massive sums” are spent on “irrelevance”.

Among many examples which he gives, the French and British so-called ‘independent’ nuclear deterrents are not mentioned. These are of, at best, doubtful utility, but to duplicate (and even upgrade them, as the UK is proposing through its Trident programme) is ludicrously wasteful.

Nor should manpower be a problem. Currently there are almost 2 million military personnel in the EU, compared to less than 1.5 million in the US. Yet less than one-fifth of these are defined as ‘deployable’, and only one in 20 was actually deployed in military operations or peace-keeping activities in 2006.

Behind this mismatch between resources and application lie a variety of malign factors – including inflexibility, vested interests, and a deep-seated reluctance to adapt outdated national practices. There is also a large element of ‘free-riding’, with some of the wealthier states shouldering far less than their ‘fair share’ of the overall burden.

Witney includes a table setting out the percentages of GDP spent by each country on defence expenditure. Only five countries – Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece and the UK – exceed the 2 per cent target set for NATO members. Among those who come down well in the lower half of the table are Germany, Spain, Sweden, Austria and Ireland.

The result is that European nations are left with far too much of things which they no longer need in the post-Cold War period – including 10,000 tanks and 2,500 combat aircraft, and large numbers of uniformed personnel performing non-essential duties. Meanwhile, says Witney, “transport aircraft, communications, surveillance drones and helicopters (not to mention policemen and experts in civil administration) remain in chronically short supply.”

The Georgian tragedy should have acted as a wake-up call. Europe’s leaders must now act decisively to establish ESDP as a reality rather than an aspiration. At the December summit they need to hammer out a new strategy and then show the political will to ensure that it is implemented.

If this isn’t done now, when will it ever be? Mr. Witney has provided the European Union with a comprehensive check-list of what needs to be achieved. It should form part of the briefing material of each of the 27 national leaders.

Dick Leonard is the author of The Economist Guide to the European Union.