Ukraine’s efforts to investigate conflict related sexual and gender-based violence and the role of the ‘complementarity’ in International Criminal law

September 21, 2023

Disclaimer: This article references topics that readers may find distressing and/or triggering.

Sexual violence has long been part of armed conflict. Despite prohibitions against sexual violence having been codified in international law it continues to be perpetrated. Under international humanitarian law and international criminal law, rape can constitute a war crime, crime against humanity, torture, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide when the other elements of the crimes are present. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Elements of Crime^[1] reflect the latest trends in the treatment of sexual violence.^[2]

There has been significant evidence collated that suggests conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) has been a prevalent issue in eastern Ukraine and occupied Crimea since 2014. The escalation of Russia’s advances to the illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has led to a notable increase in both the magnitude and volume of cases of CRSV across the country. When perpetrated in the context of an armed conflict, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is a serious violation of international humanitarian law and classified as a war crime. This underscores the urgency and importance of Ukraine’s attempts to address and investigate these crimes, by holding perpetrators accountable and providing justice and support to the victims.

Legal Context

The Government of Ukraine has not ratified the Rome Statute, it has, however, accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.^[3] It also follows that Ukraine is now duty-bound to assist the ICC. The principal obligations of Ukraine under the Rome Statute of the ICC fall within two major areas: “complementarity” and “cooperation”. The Rome Statute also requires the Government of Ukraine to ensure that it is able to cooperate with the Court fully and to adopt laws to this effect where necessary.^[4] The principle of complementarity, defines the relationship between the ICC and its States Parties, confirming the primary state jurisdiction whilst limiting admissibility of cases before the ICC.^[5] Complementarity is being dubbed as an “express will of States Parties” that acknowledges “the primary responsibility of States to exercise criminal jurisdiction”.^[6] To further support this process, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) adopted a policy of “positive complementarity”, that encourages “genuine national proceedings” where possible, relying on national and international networks, participating in a system of international cooperation.^[7] It provides the ICC with a mechanism that compels states to pursue an acceptable measure of accountability for major crimes including sexual violence. This stems from the OTP’s public commitment, made in 2006, to pay particular attention to methods of investigations of sexual and gender-based crimes.^[8]

Article 17 of the Rome Statute identifies the circumstances in which a case becomes admissible before the ICC: when it is not being investigated or prosecuted nationally, or when the state is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation and prosecute the case. The case must also be of sufficient gravity to justify investigation and prosecution by the ICC. A ‘case’ is described as proceedings against the same person in question, for the same conduct. This means that if a person is acquitted or convicted of a crime, they cannot be tried or punished again for the same crime, even if the second prosecution is for a different violation of law. Surprisingly, it is sufficient for a state to prosecute the subject’s conduct as a domestic crime rather than an international crime, as long as it is the same conduct as the issue.^[9]

The possible conclusion that can be drawn as a result of this is that rape, even when undertaken as part of systematic or widespread attack or with genocidal intent, would be prosecuted as a domestic crime, as opposed to a crime against humanity.

Complementarity and Legislative Limitations

The complementarity in itself does not explicitly require the adoption of the crimes nationally. It has, however, often been referred to as the catalyst of domestic reform in introducing international crimes.^[10] Despite the “margin of appreciation” that states retain in the extent of domestic legislation, coupled with the lack of clear guidance from the ICC, many member states have introduced far reaching legislative reforms.

Basic presumption found in the case law of the ICC and ad hoc tribunals is that the rape committed during an armed conflict differs from the one committed during the peace time. It is often used as a military tactic where sexual assault becomes a crime against the whole community.^[11] The UN Resolutions 1325 and 1820, both of which Ukraine supported, highlighted the need to protect women and support “maintenance and promotion of international peace and security”.^[12] Resolution 1325 emphasised that sexual violence as a tactic of war can significantly exacerbate armed conflicts and impede international peace. It also affirmed that rape can constitute a war crime, crime against humanitry and/or genocide. The Resolution urged all states to establish effective systems for investigating and punishing perpetrators of sexual violence within the context of armed conflict.

Resolution 1820 stresses that the state bears a responsibility for respecting and ensuring the human rights of their citizens as well as individuals on their territory.^[13] A report by the UN Commission on Human Rights investigating systematic rape committed during the armed conflict, concluded that nations must establish awareness of the seriousness of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence at the national level and deal properly with such crimes in international or non international armed conflicts. It reaffirmed the importance of states having clear legislation prohibiting rape and other forms of sexual violence and to provide adequate penalties commensurate to the gravity of such acts.

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has documented a number of SGBV cases.^[14] Based on the evidence collected, some members of Russian armed forces committed the war crime of rape and sexual violence involving women, men, and children, ranging from four to 82 years old.^[15] As of June 2023, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine recorded 208 cases of war-related sexual violence.^[16] However, according to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflicts, for every officially registered case of war-related sexual violence, in Ukraine, there are ten to 20 unregistered ones.^[17] Ukraine has been taking a number of steps to investigate and document war crimes committed by Russian forces. This included the creation of a special group within the structure of the National Police to document crimes committed during the armed invasion and occupation of Ukraine. This also involved granting investigative security bodies the power to investigate war crimes.

On 26 June 2023, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine signed the Strategic Plan for the Implementation of the Powers of the Prosecutor’s Office in the Field of Criminal Prosecution for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence. Its purpose is to improve access to justice for victims of CRSV through the improvement of investigation and criminal prosecution processes.^[18] Joint investigative teams (JITs) have been set up to investigate war crimes committed in Ukraine. These teams consist of prosecutors and investigators from Ukraine and other countries, and include digital tools to help gather evidence of war crimes.^[19]

Prosecuting SGBV Crimes in Ukraine

The Ukrainian Criminal Code contains two articles which could be applied specifically to cases of conflict-related sexual violence. Paragraph 1 of Article 433 envisages criminal responsibility for violence against the civilian population in a conflict area, which may include sexual violence, and is punishable with three to eight years of imprisonment. Article 438 foresees criminal responsibility for the violation of laws and customs of war, which includes cruel treatment of prisoners of war or civilians (and thus may include sexual violence), and shall be punishable by imprisonment from eight to 12 years. Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is often dubbed as a blanket provision by the human rights commentators. It provides liability for violations of the laws and customs of war (war crimes) and is usually invoked to cover sexual and gender-based violence. However, it contains no reference to the often gendered nature of crime, although it should be noted that SGBV can be carried out on persons of any gender.

Nevertheless, cases of sexual violence officially communicated by the Prosecutor’s office are investigated under Article 438, that is, as war crimes. The present provision seems to include common crimes for prosecution that do not cover all war crimes including rape, and/or other forms of sexual violence. It is thus void of any reference to SGBV. According to the statistics corroborated by the Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association JurFem, the absence of reference to ‘sexual crimes’ in the unified register of the pre-trial investigation system makes it difficult to discern how many cases refer to the act of sexual violence during the conflict.^[20]

Further to this, over the course of March to May 2022, Ukraine’s prosecutorial body has opened over 14,000 criminal proceedings under Article 438 and 111 proceedings under Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Rape”) punishable by three to five years and Article 153 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Sexual Violence”) punishable by five years.^[21] It can then be followed that the Office of the Prosecutor’s Office has qualified sexual violence committed during the conflict as rape (conducted in peacetime) under Article 152 as opposed to the war crime.^[22]

Notwithstanding the fact that the ICC allows crimes committed during armed conflict to be tried as ‘ordinary’ domestic ones, criminal law commentators perceive that judging them as such is similar to denying a crucial contextual and systematic aspect to their acts. It can be viewed as a partial “unwillingness” to try the perpetrators for what they did.^[23] According to Human Rights Watch, States should be aware that certain procedural or evidentiary rules that “effectively prevent the proper investigation and prosecution of crimes” may lead the ICC to establish an “unwillingness” by the state to take action.^[24] Most importantly, the comparative ease of prosecuting domestic crimes, compared to international crimes, may wrongly motivate Ukrainian prosecutors to refrain from identifying crimes in their broader social context in favour of increasing the prospect of convictions. This raises two further issues.

Contrary to the existing statutory limitations adhered to invoking Article 152, under international law there should not be any period of limitation in any circumstances for prosecuting the perpetrators of SGBV, whether their crimes are carried out in times of peace or conflict. There is a difference in evidentiary burden too, including the absence of the requirement for the testimony of the victim to be otherwise corroborated in order for that testimony to be considered credible to secure conviction.^[25] Finally there is a disproportionate difference between the sentence awarded to the perpetrators to appropriately punish the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. International law, however, prompts that sanctions are not proportional to the gravity of the crimes committed, so de facto impunity may arise.^[26] Most importantly, Ukraine is under an obligation to analyse and report conflict-related sexual violence, including rape in situations of armed conflict, relevant to the implementation of Resolution 1888 (2009). By the same token, under General Recommendation No.19 of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), state parties should encourage the compilation of statistics including the ‘effects of violence’.^[27]

Crimes against humanity refer to specific acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. These acts can include murder, extermination, torture, enslavement, persecution, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts. They can be committed in both times of war and peace, whereas war crimes are specific violations of the laws of war committed during an armed conflict. Moreover, crimes against humanity can be perpetrated against nationals of any state, including a state’s own citizens, if the state is involved in the attack. Otherwise, these are the norms reaching the ius cogens that require the state concerned to adopt necessary implementing legislation.^[28] As a consequence the state in question may be held accountable in such cases when it fails to enact legislation.^[29] For example, in 1998, the International Court Against Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in its judgement against Anto Furundzija, acknowledged state responsibility if the maintenance or passage of national legislation that is inconsistent with international rules is evidenced.^[30]

Since rape may constitute a crime against humanity as well as torture, war crime and genocide, its investigation requires the adoption of domestic criminal law. With a view to improving Ukraine’s criminal legislation on war crimes, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted a bill in May 2021, that, among other changes, incorporated a detailed catalogue of war crimes into the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The bill, however, did not enter into force since the President of Ukraine had not signed it.^[31] On 23 May 2022, a Kyiv appeals court tried a Russian soldier convicted for war crimes following the killing of a civilian under Article 438.^[32] Convictions of other members of Russian armed forces for wilful killing, rape, sexual violence, torture and other violations also followed. This also included conviction of 53 individuals and 207 indictments for war crimes since 24 February 2022.^[33]

Domestic war crime proceedings have been carried out in a number of countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the prosecution and criminal sanctioning of war crimes was prioritised in the aftermath of the conflict in the early 90s. A decade after the end of the conflict, the focus shifted from internationally led efforts to pursue justice towards strengthening the capacity of domestic courts. This also included enhancing the capacity of the prosecutorial offices to ensure the continuation of the prosecution of war crimes.^[34] This process however has been marred by the lack of harmonisation of the legislation and jurisprudence on international crimes throughout the country.^[35] It then follows that even with the involvement of the ICC and prosecution by foreign countries, relying on the principle of universal jurisdiction, the Ukrainian authorities face a daunting task to prosecute war crimes committed during the current conflict internally. However, it is important that they do so in a fair and impartial manner and with adequate expertise.

Procedural Limitations

Ukrainian authorities have set up consultation points where lawyers deliver free legal aid and provide legal support to victims in order to lodge a complaint before the national Ukrainian law enforcement authorities, should they come forward. There is a plan to introduce a draft law “On the legal status of victims of sexual violence related to the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the family members of the deceased persons.” This new law will entail granting SGBV survivors victim status as well as the provision of compensation.^[36] However, the UN Committee against Torture emphasised that this form of redress must be combined with a non-monetary reparation mechanisms, as money alone is not sufficient to repair the damage suffered by victims.The UN treaty body encourages a long-term, collaborative approach to ensure all aspects of the victim’s life have a chance for rehabilitation. This includes the provision of psychological and health services, as well as legal and social assistance and any other reintegration support. As suggested “rehabilitation for victims should aim to restore, as far as possible, their independence, physical, mental, social and vocational ability; and full inclusion and participation in society.”^[37]

To overcome the inherent limitations to procedural guarantees, however, one needs to effectively prosecute sexual violence. Ukraine is yet to develop witness protection programmes, which is a problem since sexual violence complainants and witnesses are at particular risk, and are likely to refuse to participate at trial. Ukrainian authorities should ensure that trained female officers conduct witness interviews in cases where the victim is also female, that there is continuity in case management, and that the victim does not encounter the perpetrator at court. These steps are needed to limit the potential re-traumatisation of the victim.

There is a further requirement to collect necessary evidence and testimony to prosecute sexual and gender-based crimes, and therefore interviews with women and victims of sexual violence should be conducted in secure and confidential settings. On top of this, failure to allocate resources to gender sensitisation training to those conducting interviews with women and victims of sexual violence or recruitment of female law enforcement officers may account for the insufficiencies of the judicial system with respect to these crimes, which might result in the inability to prosecute. Further, the current constraints on state resources can compound the re-traumatisation, stigma, or discrimination experienced by the victims of SGBV, highlighting the need to increase capacity-building support offered by other states or individual donors to Ukraine.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian Government has taken some important steps in the right direction, including: developing a strategy for investigating sexual violence related to the current conflict; creating a special unit on SGBV; and enacting a draft law on compensation for the victims of conflict-related sexual violence.^[38] However, more needs to be done to ensure that SGBV crimes are effectively prosecuted.

Specifically, the Ukrainian Government should accurately capture statistics on SGBV crimes. This will help to identify the scale of the problem and to target resources where they are most needed. It will also require training for law enforcement and prosecutors on how best to investigate and prosecute SGBV crimes in a victim-centric, trauma-informed, and gender-sensitive manner. Ukraine should also adopt a gender-sensitive legislation that defines SGBV crimes and provides for appropriate penalties. Finally, it should introduce Rome Statute standards into national law and prosecutorial practices for international crimes. This will help to ensure that SGBV crimes are prosecuted in accordance with international law.

By taking these further steps, the Ukrainian Government can help to ensure that those responsible for SGBV crimes are held accountable and that victims receive justice. In addition to the above, the Ukrainian Government can further:

Provide support to victim and witness units, including specialised training on SGBV crimes.
Create a comprehensive system for collecting and preserving evidence of SGBV crimes.
Establish a national SGBV database to track cases and provide data for research and policy development.
Promote public awareness of SGBV crimes and the importance of reporting them.

By taking these additional steps, the Ukrainian Government can help to create a more supportive environment for victims of SGBV and to ensure that SGBV crimes are effectively prosecuted.

Mariam Uberi is an FPC Research Fellow, Qualified Georgian criminal lawyer and a Human Rights analyst.

^[1]Elements of Crime, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf

^[2]Rome statute of the International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf

^[3]According to the declarations signed by the Ukrainian Government, the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to its preliminary examination in Ukraine extends to events from 21 November 2013 for an indefinite period and includes prosecutions for any war crime, crime against humanity or genocide falling under the ICC’s governing law. Ukraine is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, but it has twice exercised its prerogatives to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes under the Rome Statute occurring on its territory, pursuant to article 12(3) of the Statute.

^[4] The ICC relies mainly on the cooperation of national institutions and officials for essential tasks such as gathering evidence, handling of witnesses, protection of victims and the detention and transfer of indictees. Global Rights Compliance. 2021. The domestic implementation of the International Humanitarian law in Ukraine. p14.

^[5] Anna Kapur, Complementarity as a catalyst for gender justice in national prosecutions, The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict, December 2017, pp. 225–239,https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199300983.013.18

^[6]ICC-OT, Report on the Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September, 2006, see. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/report-pro secutorial-strategy

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Committee Against Torture (2012). General Comments No. 3 of the Committee Against Torture.UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), General comment no. 3, 2012: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Implementation of article 14 by States parties, December 2012, see: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5437cc274.htm

^[10] Eriksson, Maria. 2011. Definitions Rape: Emergings Obligations for States under International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] UN GA Resolutions 1325 and 1820, see:https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/resolutions-1325-and-1820

^[13]UN Doc.S/RES/1325, 31 October 20000, SC Res. 1820 on Omen, Peace and Security, UN Doc. S.RES/1820, 19 June 2008,SC Res. 18888 on Women, peace and Security.

^[14]Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/HRC/52/62)[EN/RU/UK] (Advance Unedited Version), see:https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/a77533-independent-international-commission-inquiry-ukraine-note-secretary

^[15]Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (A/HRC/52/62)[EN/RU/UK] (Advance Unedited Version).

^[16] Iryna Didenko, the prosecutor in charge of sexual violence cases of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, stats mentioned during the the U4J conference in Bucha, available at: see: Anna Steshenko, Officially recorded 175 facts of sexual violence by the occupiers, – Office of the Prosecutor General, LB.ua, March 2023, https://lb.ua/society/2023/03/31/550648_ofitsiyno_zafiksovani_175_faktiv.html

^[17] JurFem, Evidence in cases related to sexual violence at the International Criminal Court: The Ukrainian context, November 2022, https://jurfem.com.ua/dokazuvannya-snpk-u-mizhnarodnomu-kryminalnomu-sudi-ukr-kontext/

^[18] ICC-OT, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/paper-some-policy-issues-office-prosecutor

^[19] Including Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Germany, Sweden, Latvia, Norway, and France. See: JurFem, Evidence in cases related to sexual violence at the International Criminal Court: The Ukrainian context, November 2022, https://jurfem.com.ua/dokazuvannya-snpk-u-mizhnarodnomu-kryminalnomu-sudi-ukr-kontext/

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Ibid.

^[22] Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association “JurFem”, The analytical research ‘Gender dimensions of war’, April2023, https://jurfem.com.ua/en/the-analytical-research-gender-dimensions-of-war/#:~:text=The%20analytical%20research%20%E2%80%9CGender%20Dimensions%20of%20War%E2%80%9D%20contains%2010%20expert,to%20restore%20justice%20for%20the

^[23] Frederic Marget. The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice Implementation and the Use of Complementarity, p.384.

^[24]Human Rights Watch, International Criminal Court, Making the International Criminal Court Work: A Handbook for Implementing the Rome Statute, vol.13, no 4 (G), 16, September 2011, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/icc/docs/handbook_e.pdf

^[25]Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)No.19: Violence against Women, CEDAW General Recommendation No.19:Violence against women, 1992, see:https://www.refworld.org/docid/52d920c54.html

^[26] Accountability: Prosecuting and punishing gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law – Report of Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees (A/HRC/48/60) EN/AR/RU/ZH].p.12. (2021).

^[27]Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) No.19: Violence against Women, CEDAW General Recommendation No.19:Violence against women, 1992, see: https://www.refworld.org/docid/52d920c54.html

^[28] Peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.

^[29] Eriksson, Maria. 2011. Definitions Rape: Emerging Obligations for States under International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

^[30] Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), December 1998, see: https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40276a8a4.html

^[31]Draft Law of Ukraine No 2689 of 27 December 2019 on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the Implementation of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Ukraine: International Crimes Bill Adopted’ (21 May 2021) https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/21/ukraineinterna+onal-crimes-bill-adopted in Nuridzhanian, Gaiane, Ensuring Fairness of War Crime Trials in Ukraine (July 18, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4565541

^[32]RFE/RL.Life Sentence Handed To Russian Soldier For Killing Ukrainian Civilian Reduced To 15 Years. 29 July 2022.https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russian-soldier-sishimarin-life-sentence-reduced/31965731.html#:~:text=An%20appeals%20court%20in%20Kyiv,to%20arise%20from%20Russia’s%20invasion.

^[33]Nuridzhanian, Gaiane, Ensuring Fairness of War Crime Trials in Ukraine (July 18, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4565541,supra note 30.

^[34]Visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence (A/HRC/51/34/Add.2)p.8.

^[35]Ibid.

^[36]Ministry of Justice::Sexual violence during war is a war crime that does not have a statute of limitation. https://minjust-gov-ua.translate.goog/news/ministry/valeriya-kolomiets-seksualne-nasilstvo-pid-chas-viyni-tse-voenniy-zlochin-yakiy-ne-mae-stroku-davnosti?_x_tr_sl=uk&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp 5 May 2023..

^[37]Committee Against Torture (2012). General Comments No. 3 of the Committee Against Torture. UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), General comment no. 3, 2012: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: implementation of article 14 by States parties, December 2012, see: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5437cc274.htm

^[38] Prosecutor’s Office, Strategic plan for the implementation of the the Powers of Prosecutor’s Office in the field of criminal investigation for sexual violence related to the conflict, June 2023, (in Ukrainian), https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/andrii-kostin-pidpisav-strategicnii-plan-realizaciyi-povnovazen-prokuraturi-u-sferi-kriminalnogo-peresliduvannya-za-seksualne-nasilstvo-povyazane-z-konfliktom-snpk

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Op-Ed – Mona & Mahsa: 40 years apart what their deaths tell us about protecting the life and freedom of Iranians

Article by Nazanin Afshin-Jam MacKay & Dr. Tahirih Danesh

September 16, 2023

Op-Ed – Mona & Mahsa: 40 years apart what their deaths tell us about protecting the life and freedom of Iranians

On a hot summer day in 1983, the Islamic Republic authorities hanged 17 year old Mona Mahmoudnezhad. Her crime? Teaching morality to children.

On another hot summer day, this time in 2022, the Islamic Republic authorities induced the death of 23 year old Mahsa Amini while in custody. Her crime? Displeasing morality officers.

Mona and Mahsa, two young women representing Iran’s most persecuted religious and ethnic communities, those of Baha’is and Kurds, lived in a land troubled by a state which employs its brand of morality as an interchangeable tool for an ever-widening spectrum of human rights violations. Over the four bloodied decades in Iran’s most recent history, millions of Iranians have faced the same fate as Mona and Mahsa.

From arbitrary arrests to mass executions, from summary trials to fatal rapes, from attacks on the streets to war crimes, the Islamic Republic has made a concerted effort to fill cemeteries across the nation with Iran’s children, often in the absence of witnesses or burial rites.

The earliest targets of the Islamic Republic and its followers enraged with revolutionary fervour, were minorities and marginalised communities. Branded as spies or satanic, Baha’is and Kurds were the tip of an ever-growing iceberg of target communities subjected to unmentionable violence and suffering, much of which the international community had yet to categorise and codify.

Take Mona for instance. While her case in 1983 globalised the Islamic Republic’s ruthless maltreatment of its children, it was not until 1989 that the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child provided the legal framework through which Mona’s and many other cases could be deciphered and delineated accordingly.^[1]

Although that will never bring back Mona, or thousands of other children detained, tortured and executed by Islamic Republic authorities, it has helped millions readily recognise recent patterns that in a matter of months helped UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Dr Javaid Rehman, identify Mahsa as part of a series of state-sponsored policies and practices implicating the Islamic Republic in ‘crimes against humanity’. ^[2]

The legalese may mean little to those whose loved ones never came home, never graduated, never had the chance to marry or lead a typical life. But their lives were not cut short in vain. Their deaths not only developed the legal framework necessary to hold violators accountable, they also helped change post-revolutionary cultural dynamics far more than ever imagined.

The same nation that once upon a time fell for the Islamic Republic’s divisive rhetorics by placing Kurds, Azeris or Baluch on the periphery, or accepted Baha’is, Jews and Zoroastrians as enemies of God, are increasingly open to being a collective ‘us’ rather than ‘us and them’.

The same nation that once zealously aided the morality police raze the holiest site of Baha’is to the ground in Shiraz, marches shoulder to shoulder chanting ‘Baha’i, Baha’i, we support you’.

The same nation that once mistreated all Kurds as disposable vigilantes, has ablazed the globe with its cries of ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ in Jina Mahsa’s honour. Indeed, millions of Iranians of all ethnic and belief backgrounds are now standing up.

They’re not giving up. We are not giving up. Whether writing the first report on Iranian children’s executions in 2009, or now writing together to defend the lives of all Iranians, coalition or no coalition, transitional justice or not, we join our kin who are dancing, singing, calling, petitioning, painting, writing and seeking a life defined by a new form of morality, one centred around life and freedom for all Iranians. Why? Because our story is one.

In February 1983 the Revolutionary Court in Shiraz that executed Mona and her cellmates, accidentally sent an internal circular to its local newspaper. Khabar-i Junub mistakenly published the circular highlighting a call by the Head of Court stating “I warn the Baha’is, come to the bosom of Islam,” or essentially face demise.^[3] Emblematic of the Islamic Republic’s national policies, the call is meant to impose the state’s narrow version of morality by unleashing violence on one of the most diverse nations on earth. In February 2023, the Special Rapporteur called on the Islamic Republic to come to the bosom of morality in law and policy.^[4] He emphasised the need to “immediately end all forms of violence, torture and ill-treatment” of Iranians by issuing “urgent instructions to all law enforcement and prison authorities”. Dr Rehman also called on the rest of the world’s leaders to “prioritise human rights issues” when dealing with Islamic Republic authorities.

Reminiscent of the 1994 debates around whether mass murders in Rwanda amounted to genocide or simply crimes against humanity, key governments have frozen in a sort of political déjà vu, justifying their inaction on prioritising human rights issues on a convenient curiosity as to whether the events emblazoning Iran and enveloping the globe is a revolution or simply post Jina Mahsa mourning? The answer may be neither. Iran’s contemporary history sets a clear pattern of redefining historical processes.

Iran’s Mona and Mahsa represent two protagonists in a process of change that is slowly evolving Iranians, their neighbouring communities, and sympathisers around the globe for a new culture. One beckoning leaders and citizens everywhere to a new era in justice, equality and progress. To help strengthen this process of change, and perhaps as a response to those caught in their chosen déjà vu, the Baha’is have launched the #OurStoryIsOne campaign, uniting not only Mona and Mahsa, but millions of others seeking life and freedom. They have called on all artists and others benefitting from collective consciousness to carry forward this quest for life and freedom between June 2023 and 2024. While this campaign marks the 40th anniversary of execution for Mona and her cellmates, many the same age as Mahsa, its main aim is to expedite a process of change expressed through the arts, the very forms of arts that young Iranians dance, sing, call, petition, paint, or die for in order to demonstrate to the world that they will no longer let the Islamic Republic fill Iran’s cemeteries with their children. That is simply far from morality.

We along with our brothers and sisters stretching from Iran to South Africa, from Sudan to Iraq, from Afghanistan to Rwanda, call on leaders and citizens alike to stand together, commemorate the millions of Monas and Mahsas in our midst, and mark their anniversaries by committing to prioritise human rights as the code of morality in promises and policies, and help promote and protect life and freedom for all Iranians, for all humankind.

Nazanin Afshin-Jam MacKay is a International Human Rights Activist, Author, and Co-Founder of the non-profit Stop Child Executions.

Dr. Tahirih Danesh is a FPC Senior Advisor, Lecturer in Human Rights Law & Executive Director of the Persia Educational Foundation.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] United Nations Human Rights High Commission, Convention on the Rights of the Child, September 1990, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child

^[2] A/HRC/52/67: Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, United Nations Human Rights High Commission, February 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5267-situation-human-rights-islamic-republic-iran-report-special

^[3] Archives of Bahá’ì Persecution in Iran, Khabar-e Jonoob newspaper: Friday Imam of Shiraz on Baha’i treachery, June 1983, https://iranbahaipersecution.bic.org/archive/khabar-e-jonoob-newspaper-friday-imam-shiraz-bahai-treachery

^[4] A/HRC/52/67: Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, United Nations Human Rights High Commission, February 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5267-situation-human-rights-islamic-republic-iran-report-special

Topics

Human Rights

Regions

Middle East and North Africa

Gulf States

Iran

“One Earth, One Family, One Future”: Key takeaways from the 2023 New Delhi G20 Summit, with a spotlight on the UK

Article by Poppy Ogier

September 12, 2023

“One Earth, One Family, One Future”: Key takeaways from the 2023 New Delhi G20 Summit, with a spotlight on the UK

The G20 leaders met over the weekend, 9-10th September 2023, and reached a consensus on a joint declaration, but not without differing views on the war in Ukraine and climate change.^[1] Despite the compromises needed on these areas, India’s leadership surpassed expectations and solidified Modi’s aim of being a leading voice for the Global South.^[2]

Key takeaways from the two-day Summit:

‘Different views and assessments of the situation’

After 300 bilateral meetings, “over 200 hours of non-stop negotiations” and 15 drafts, consensus on the paragraphs concerning Russia and Ukraine were reached in the final G20 communiqué.^[3] These paragraphs avoided direct criticism of Russia, instead it focussed on the inadmissibility of nuclear weapons, the agreements that states cannot grab territory by force, and highlighted the human suffering this conflict has caused, and continues to cause. Reference was also made in particular to Turkey’s efforts to broker safe passage for ships moving grain.

‘Creating a more inclusive world’

The weekend’s formal proceedings opened with India welcoming the African Union (AU) as a permanent member of the G20. It will hold a similar position to the European Union (EU) and further signals India’s support for giving a greater voice to the Global South.^[4]

President Ramaphosa was a strong advocate for the AU’s membership at the last G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, until this point South Africa had been the only G20 permanent member from the African continent with the AU being only an invited guest. It will be interesting to follow the changes in the G20 as it becomes more globally balanced, especially with the leadership baton passing to Brazil before South Africa takes over the Presidency in 2025.

‘Impacts of climate change’

There was a recognition of the impacts of climate change and the need to accelerate action on it, with leaders referencing the need to limit warming to 1.5°C by reducing greenhouse gas ‘emissions by 43% by 2030 relative to the 2019 levels.’^[5]

Notably, for the first time leaders agreed to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030, but through existing targets and policies. They also indicated the need to ‘phase-down’ the use of coal power, noticeably not a ‘phase-out’. On both issues the leaders stopped short of setting goals or laying out plans or pathways to achievement. Additionally, the use of language around coal was a continuation of previous statements, which is unlikely to see a significant shift at the COP28 Summit starting this November in the United Arab Emirates.

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

On the sidelines of the Summit, IMEC was announced – a ship-to-rail transit network – by leaders of the United States (US), India and Saudi Arabia. This marks a change in US-Saudi relations, as well as an ambitious counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This modern-day ‘Spice Route’ would connect India, the Middle East and Europe by laying down railway lines and investing in ports, starting in the Middle East and South Asia before Europe. No further details on financing have been announced, but this is a significant move by Biden in ensuring the US’s interests and putting itself forward as an alternative partner to China, especially when taking into account the US elections next year.

The UK at the G20

The major announcement from the UK at the G20 was the Prime Minister’s (PM) commitment to climate aid with the UK set to provide $2 billion to the Green Climate Fund, a global fund committed to combatting climate change.^[6] It was announced in a bid to ‘cement’ the UK’s global climate leadership.^[7]

On the other hand, PM Rishi Sunak stated net zero cannot be achieved through “hair shirt” policies that would impact British consumers; adding that this was “not the vision of net zero that [he thinks] is the right one for the UK”.^[8] The growing discord within the Tory party on climate policies, especially post the Uxbridge byelection, is gathering momentum, as those on the liberal wing of the party urge for the net zero pledges to remain.^[9] With party conference a few short weeks away, it will be a key issue to follow to see where the Tory’s climate policies end up. Regardless, Sunak has confirmed he will be attending COP28 in Dubai later this year, which might signal a continued push to ‘cement’ and prioritise the UK’s leadership on climate. This confirmation was particularly taken notice of in light of him not attending the United Nations General Assembly next week – starting Tuesday 19th September.

UK-India relations were on show during the G20. While much was made of Sunak’s Indian heritage, and family connections, it did little to deflect from the UK’s reduced standing on the world stage. It was notable that the scheduled meeting between the two leaders was delayed, then moved from the auspicious surroundings of Modi’s house to a regular conference room.

These shifting dynamics between the two countries may also reflect that India overtook the UK in GDP earlier this year, with the latter going into sixth place and India to fifth in world rankings. A focal point for Sunak’s visit was the potential trade deal with India, the success of which would be a much-needed victory for the PM. In their meeting, both leaders indicated that work would continue towards a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).^[10] The hope on the UK’s side is that it could be signed by the end of the year. If this occurred, it would help mitigate some of the fiscal decisions that the Government might have to make. It would also help combat the narrative that Brexit has increasingly isolated the UK internationally.

With a general election looming, the issues discussed at the G20 are key areas that the UK needs to assess and take a position on as the parties make their case to the electorate. This year, both James Cleverly (Foreign Secretary) and David Lammy (Shadow Foreign Secretary) have outlined their plans for the UK’s foreign policy, with multilateralism being a key focus for both.^[11]

Looking ahead at these priorities

The three sessions held as part of the G20 Summit reflected the theme “One Earth, One Family, One Future”, with discussions centred around the thematic priorities laid out by India. These are:

Multilateral institutions for the 21st century
Accelerating progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Women-led development
Technological transformation & digital public infrastructure
Accelerated, inclusive & resilient growth
Green development, climate finance & LiFE

Over the course of the autumn, the Foreign Policy Centre will be rolling out a new series with invited experts providing comment on these priorities in turn. There will be a focus on how successful current British policy has been at addressing them, as well as establishing what the UK’s position and ambitions in these areas should be moving forward. The series can be followed here.

^[1] G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration, New Delhi, India, 9-10 September 2023, https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf

^[2] Atlantic Council experts, Experts react: Did India’s G20 just crack the code for diplomatic consensus?, Atlantic Council, September 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-did-indias-g20-just-crack-the-code-for-diplomatic-consensus/

^[3] Amitabh Kant, Twitter post, Twitter, September 2023, https://twitter.com/amitabhk87/status/1700692724910080350?s=46&t=kkMi2Eb_0HyodiDQ1c6BEw

^[4] Al Jazeera, Indian PM Modi proposes full G20 membership for African Union, August 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/27/indian-pm-modi-proposes-full-g20-membership-for-african-union

^[5] G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration, New Delhi, India, 9-10 September 2023, https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf

^[6] Green Climate Fund (GCF) ‘is the largest global fund dedicated to help fight climate change’, see here: https://www.greenclimate.fund/

^[7] Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak, Prime Minister announces record climate aid commitment as G20 in India concludes, September 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-announces-record-climate-aid-commitment-as-g20-in-india-concludes

^[8] Kiran Stacey, Rishi Sunak tells G20: UK will resist ‘hair shirt’ policies on net zero pledge’ The Guardian, September 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/sep/09/rishi-sunak-tells-g20-uk-will-resist-hair-shirt-policies-on-net-zero-pledge

^[9] A significant issue at the Uxbridge byelection was the expansion of Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ) to outer London areas.

^[10] Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, PM meeting with Prime Minister Modi of India: 9 September 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-meeting-with-prime-minister-modi-of-india-9-september-2023

^[11] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon James Cleverly MP, Multilateral reform: Foreign Secretary’s speech at Chatham House London Conference 2023, Gov.uk, June 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/multilateral-reform-foreign-secretarys-speech-29-june-202; David Lammy MP, David Lammy speech to Chatham House, Labour, January 2023, https://labour.org.uk/press/david-lammy-speech-to-chatham-house/

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Energy, Environment and Resources

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Asia

India

South Asia

Whither G20? The future of multilateralism and global governance reforms

Article by Oksana Antonenko

September 8, 2023

Whither G20? The future of multilateralism and global governance reforms

As the world gears up for the G20 Summit in Delhi, the gap between growing demand for global responses to many urgent crises, and the ability of existing global governance institutions to resolve (or even to manage) them effectively continues to widen. With geopolitical tensions on the rise, the key question is whether the international community should continue to push for a comprehensive reform of these inclusive institutions, or even to accept (and actively endorse) their fragmentation into like-minded mini-lateral clubs such as the G7 or BRICS.

Global governance reform has been on the international agenda for many years, but the COVID pandemic and Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine have elevated it to urgent priority. Paralysed by renewed confrontation between Russia and the democratic ‘West’, these inclusive institutions have no tools to contain, let alone to resolve, the current crisis in Ukraine, despite its devastating global implications. This failure to address urgent international security challenges comes on the heels of other recent disappointments: the World Health Organisation’s failure to ensure equal and fair global distribution of COVID vaccines; the World Trade Organisation’s inability to address the ongoing fragmentation of the global trade regime; and the apparent helplessness of the United Nations convened global climate summit (COP) – to avert catastrophic climate change. Can this trend be reversed, or have we arrived at the limits of global governance?

G20 was once viewed as an answer. Its more inclusive and geopolitically diverse membership coupled with refreshingly problem-solving origins and ethos, have been instrumental in helping to mitigate the consequences of the global financial crisis. Yet over time, the G20’s evolution has shifted its focus from urgent problem solving, turning more and more into a kind of geopolitical beauty pageant for the emerging middle powers. Amid pomp and ceremony, each presiding nation views its mission not to implement what was already agreed, but to stamp its own national mark on the process of re-shaping the emerging multipolar world. As a result, the list of G20’s priorities have multiplied, while successful solutions have stalled by the apparent lack of collective political will.

In this process, summits have become a marker of national prestige, rather than an exercise in problem-solving. The most important crises of the day were addressed not with actionable agreements, but with drafting compromises. And even these non-binding collective declarations are becoming increasingly unattainable, as more and more G20 summits end without an agreed statement. Despite its efforts and considerable diplomatic skill, India’s G20 Summit is likely to end in the same collective failure, as the Russian Government has already threatened to veto a joint statement containing criticism of its brutal war in Ukraine.

One important value of G20 summits – presenting a platform for side conversations (including strategically important US-China dialogue) – is also falling victim to a new trend of ‘forum shopping’. Authoritarian leaders prefer to attend summits at which they are admired or at least respected by other participants. President Xi’s decision to attend the BRICS Summit, hosted last month by South Africa, instead of the G20 could be interpreted as an attempt to avoid facing uncomfortable questions about China’s economy and its foreign policy from the US and its allies. President Putin, who is sending Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Delhi, will also not face any political accountability for his actions in Ukraine, yet still retains a veto power over G20’s statements.

Does it all mean that the G20, a symbol of inclusive global governance, has lost its value?

My answer is a cautious no. There are several reasons for sticking with it. The first one is that its ‘geopolitically selective’ peers appear to be even less well equipped to manage the current crises. Moreover, they offer less diversity in finding policy alternatives. The recent BRICS Summit in Johannesburg is a case in point. It may have attracted record attendance and accepted several new members, but it has made no headway on any pressing global problems (be it the war in Ukraine, the grain deal or climate change adaptation). Instead, BRICS membership offers emerging middle powers an opportunity to advance their multi-alignment strategy. They hope to secure additional aid and investment in exchange for indulging China’s and Russia’s geopolitical illusions that they are leading a ‘non-Western majority’. Unlike BRICS, the G7 has been re-energised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has since led the way in providing financial assistance to Kyiv and coordinating sanctions on Russia. However, the G7 alone cannot secure a sustainable and just resolution of the conflict. They need other key players like China or Turkey to cooperate in pressuring Moscow to change course.

The second reason for sticking with the G20 is that – with all its inefficiencies and frustrations – it enjoys more international legitimacy than any mini-lateral coalitions. This legitimacy through diversity has become even more important today, when powerful states no longer agree on the same set of rules and norms underpinning the global order. The G20 process helps to reaffirm some of these global norms, as each G20 Presidency is put into the international spotlight regarding its human right record, transparency and good governance. And the final reason for supporting the G20 is that it is much more than official summits, but a platform for engagement among NGOs, civic activists, youth, women, think-tanks and businesses. This community-building process may have a bigger impact in the long run on ensuring that the current geopolitical fragmentation should have its limits.

Oksana Antonenko is an independent consultant on geopolitical risk and a member of the FPC Advisory Council. She advises businesses around the world on how to assess, manage and forecast geopolitical risk. Ms. Antonenko is also a Global Fellow at the Kennan Institute in Washington DC and a Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. For over 15 years of her career Ms. Antonenko was a Senior Fellow and the Head of Eurasia Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Later as a senior Political Counsellor, she advised the President and the Board of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on political economy in Russia, Turkey and Central Europe. Ms. Antonenko was a Director at the Global Geopolitical risk team at Control Risks. Ms. Antonenko published extensively on the European security topics including Russia’s relations with the EU and NATO, arms control issues, protracted conflicts in Eurasia, energy security and regional cooperation in the Black Sea area.

Topics

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Asia

India

South Asia

The UK & EU at the G20: What role is there, post Brexit, for the UK in the European community’s engagement with India?

Article by Anna Chernova

The upcoming G20 meeting serves to highlight the ongoing lack of clarity around the UK’s policy coordination with the European Union (EU) block. The UK’s Integrated Review, published in 2021, set out a strategic geographical focus on Asia, while keeping an eye on Russia as a key threat to European and global security.^[1] In a post-Brexit context, an Asia tilt without deep and comprehensive coordination with the EU could however risk further undermining values-based foreign policy on the continent.^[2]

The neoliberal and geopolitical nature of EU and UK approaches to India trade relations risks weakening public confidence in the primacy of human rights and the “shared values” of democracy in international relations.^[3] On the margins of the G20, India plans to hold critical trade talks with the EU and the UK^[4] – but will the G20 civil society be allowed to meaningfully engage in a state where civic space is so repressed?^[5]

In the wider European community, the UK’s relationship with India had contributed through a long, at times conflicted historical track record of societal, cultural, political and economic links. Since Brexit, other multilateral spaces such as the G7+, G20 and others have become increasingly important. As Russia’s threat to global human security escalates, are the EU and the UK compromising too much?^[6] Is there too much focus on friendly ties with a regional hegemon, turning a blind eye to shared values of rule of law and democracy? Where does the focus on trade leave sustainable development objectives?^[7] Would weak cooperation with the EU on India undermine future UK-EU relations?^[8]

Post-Brexit, the UK is left in a vulnerable negotiating position in terms of strategic trade deals with larger, more powerful states. India now numbers among them. Without close collaboration between the EU and the UK toward a values-based foreign policy approach across geopolitical challenges, the UK risks undermining its own national interest through free trade agreements that could harm labour rights, gender justice, the environment, public health^[9] – including the NHS, due diligence across Indian-UK supply chains and wider good standing of EU and UK as champions of human security globally.^[10] The EU block is India’s third largest trading partner.^[11] The UK has championed inclusion of India in expanded G7 conversations, while too often remaining silent on the domestic good governance context.

Both EU and UK have perhaps too often muted their criticism of human rights, civic space, and the business and human rights agenda in India.^[12] Many continue to call India the ‘world’s largest democracy,’ however this status needs to be carefully considered – including during the G20. As BRICS+ configurations and United Nations votes hang in the balance, at a critical time for global security, are the UK and EU missing an opportunity to collaboratively and transparently uphold values-based alliances in multilateral spaces like the G20?^[13]

In today’s context, are there perhaps additional expectations on the UK in the wider European and G20 community to ensure democracy forms a part of its geopolitical engagement with India?^[14] Are the EU and UK duty bound to their domestic constituencies to challenge G20 hosts for their rights abuses and democratic backsliding? Or is the G20 process more about “cosy” trade relations among elites, designed to obfuscate domestic good governance challenges? Do these types of trade negotiations represent a race to the bottom, with G20 gatherings simply providing another forum for these elite bargains?

The regional significance of India in Asia and the diplomatic push to compromise on rights in favour of holding Russia collectively to account for its invasion of Ukraine, cannot come at a cost to the human security commitments the EU and the UK have come to champion globally. The EU and UK must work together toward shared values, not separately toward neoliberal, elite bargains through secretive trade deals and geopolitical manoeuvring on the margins of the G20.

Anna Chernova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Cabinet Officer, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021 (updated July 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy

^[2] Charley Coleman, UK and India collaboration: Roadmap to 2030, House of Lords, January 2023, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-and-india-collaboration-roadmap-to-2030/

^[3] Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, PM meeting with Indian Prime Minister Modi, Gov.uk, November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-meeting-with-indian-prime-minister-modi-16-november-2022

^[4] Reuters, India plans to hold FTA talks with UK, EU, Canada on G20 sidelines – trade secrecy, August 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/india-plans-hold-fta-talks-with-uk-eu-canada-sidelines-g20-meet-trade-secy-2023-08-18/

^[5] Civicus Monitor, Tracking Civic Space, India: https://monitor.civicus.org/country/india/

^[6] Lora Verheecke, EU-India Trade Deal: Business as usual?, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Febuary 2023 https://www.rosalux.eu/en/article/2204.eu-india-trade-deal-business-as-usual.html

^[7] Trade Justice Movement, UK-India Trade deal, https://www.tjm.org.uk/trade-deals/uk-india-trade-deal

^[8] Matthew Lynn, A trade deal with India would destroy forever the case for rejoining the EU, Telegraph, August 2023 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2023/08/26/india-trade-deal-destroy-case-for-rejoining-eu/

^[9] Kiran Stacey, A UK trade deal with India was promised by last October. Why is it still not ready?, The Guardian, September 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/03/a-uk-trade-deal-with-india-was-promised-by-last-october-why-is-it-still-not-ready; House of Commons, International Trade Committee, UK trade negotiations: Agreement with India, April 2023, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/39121/documents/192295/default/

^[10] Global Justice Now, Leaked UK-India Free Trade Agreement text threatens NHS, campaigners warn, November 2022, https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/leaked-uk-india-free-trade-agreement-text-threatens-nhs-campaigners-warn/; George Holt, Sustainable trade should be at the heart of India’s G20 presidency, Bond, December 2022, https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2022/12/sustainable-trade-should-be-at-the-heart-of-indias-g20-presidency/

^[11] European Commission, EU-India Free Trade Agreement, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india/eu-india-agreement_en

^[12] Meenakshi Ganguly and John Sifton, G20: India has work to do on key human rights issues, Human Rights Watch, September 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/04/g20-india-has-work-do-key-human-rights-issues; Civicus: India: ahead of the G20 summit, human rights defenders face raids, arrests and detentions, while impunity persists in Manipur, August 2023, https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/india-ahead-of-the-g20-summit-human-rights-defenders-face-raids-arrests-and-detention-while-impunity-persists-in-manipur/

^[13] Dr Gareth Price, Ukraine war: why India abstained on UN vote against Russia, Chatham House, March 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/ukraine-war-why-india-abstained-un-vote-against-russia

^[14] Toby Helm and Amrit Dhillon, Rishi Sunak faces fresh conflict of interest row over India trade talks, The Guardian, August 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/aug/26/rishi-sunak-faces-fresh-conflict-of-interest-row-over-india-trade-talks

Topics

Brexit

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Asia

India

South Asia

Europe

EU Institutions

United Kingdom

Preparing for the G20 presidency in a fraught world: Insights on South Africa’s priorities

Article by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

September 7, 2023

Preparing for the G20 presidency in a fraught world: Insights on South Africa’s priorities

When the first G20 Summit was held in 2008, as the global financial crisis was spreading across the world, the hope was that an informal club comprising systemically important developed and developing economies would enable an effective crisis response. The G20 was indeed effective at the time. More recently, however, the G20 has battled to stay above the escalating geopolitical tensions, not only between the West and Russia and China, but also between India and China.

This year India has put development at the centre of its G20 presidency, insisting that the Ukraine war should not sideline the imperative of dealing with the world’s significant challenges in this area – from sovereign debt and development financing to the climate crisis and the digital divide. With four consecutive developing country presidencies, starting with Indonesia in 2022 and ending with South Africa in 2025, the G20 can potentially build up momentum on pressing development issues that can then also be advanced at the formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or processes such as the climate COPs, the annual global climate summit convened by the United Nations (UN).

South Africa (SA) has been a champion of development issues, specifically African ones, at the G20. As the only African G20 country, it has sought to put the continent’s concerns on the agenda, or highlight where policy initiatives that are intended to address a developed economy problem may impact negatively on developing countries.

Strengthening multilateralism is an important element of South Africa’s foreign policy. As such, it sees the G20, not as a replacement to the formal institutions of global governance (such as the UN), but rather as an important vehicle for building consensus among important powers to overcome hurdles in the formal structures. Furthermore, South Africa believes, like India and other emerging economies, that the G20’s focus should be global economic governance, not politics or peace and security.

Equally, in line with the position of other emerging economies in the G20, South Africa is a vocal proponent of the urgency to reform the global governance system. The push for more rapid and fundamental reforms, especially to the global financial architecture, has accelerated in recent times. However, it is important that the debate moves beyond platitudes to concrete outcomes. Much of the power to drive such reform lies with the G7 members in the G20. At the recent Paris financing summit, SA President Ramaphosa forcefully reminded the West about the ‘negative’ experiences meted out by the West to African countries. He referred specifically to access to vaccines during the pandemic, but also spoke about the need for these countries to scale up their financial contributions and to change the modalities of finance for climate adaptation and mitigation.

In the G20 South Africa has also advocated the need for international action to curb illicit financial flows – some of the world’s major enablers are in the G20 – fairer international taxation and tackling sovereign debt in a manner that doesn’t undermine the ability of developing states to achieve sustainable development. In addition, ensuring that any energy transition is just so that social inequalities are not deepened is a concern that will become even more prominent in the South African narrative both in the G20 and elsewhere.

South Africa will succeed Brazil as G20 chair in 2025. None of these issues will have disappeared from the global agenda. Addressing them, however, requires sincere cooperation across the multiple divides that are emerging and of which the G20 is a microcosm. The challenge that both Brazil and South Africa will face is preserving the G20 space as one where genuine dialogue and progress on outcomes can occur in the interests of achieving sustainable development. Failing to do so will only exacerbate both socio-economic and political conflict worldwide.

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs. Her areas of expertise lie in South African foreign policy, Africa and external powers, global governance and south-south cooperation. Her most recent publications include co-edited volumes on Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times (2020), and The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda (2021). She is the editor-in-chief of the South African Journal of International Affairs, a policy-oriented, peer-reviewed and interdisciplinary forum for discussion on Africa’s and South Africa’s international affairs. She is a regular commentator in South African and foreign media. In December 2020 she was appointed to serve on the UN’s Second High-Level Advisory Board on Economic and Social Affairs. She is a co-chair of the task force on the SDGs of the Indian Think 20 presidency in 2023.

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

South Africa

Germany’s priorities going into the G20 Summit

Article by Dr Ed Turner

Germany’s three party coalition of the SPD (the Social Democrats of Chancellor Olaf Scholz), Greens and the Liberal Free Democrats has had a pretty miserable 2023. A poll in mid-August found that just 19% of Germans were satisfied with the Government’s work, compared to 79% dissatisfied.^[1] According to the same poll, new elections would see the SPD score 16%, a long way off the Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU) opposition (29%) and most worryingly the far-right Alternative for Germany (22%), with its mix of xenophobia and distinctly accommodating poise towards Putin’s Russia.

Germany’s economy is not doing well – with a real risk of entering recession for the second time this year – and the Government has been beset by conflict.^[2] In particular, the Greens and FDP have been at each other’s throats, with the FDP, after a series of dreadful regional election results, especially assertive with its coalition partners and resisting most projects that could increase Government spending. There was an attempt at a ‘reset’ at a cabinet away day in August, but low-level argument continues.

In this context, it will be hard for German leaders to put domestic matters, in particular economic preoccupations, to one side at the Summit. As with other G20 members, it faces something of a dilemma in relations with India – seeing substantial and much-needed opportunities for trade, but with concerns (notably on the Green side) about human rights issues in the background. This dilemma is, of course, even more sharply present in the case of China, and the Government’s new China Strategy (published in July 2023) has a fair degree of ambiguity about how it will walk this particular tightrope.^[3] Of course, Germany will line up with its allies – including the US and the UK – to try to secure some sort of constructive statement on the war in Ukraine, but that seems an unlikely prospect. Germany has set out a particular priority to promote the global expansion of renewable energy, and keep the goal of restricting warming to 1.5 degrees within reach, requiring a tripling of renewable capacity in the G20 by 2030, and a doubling of progress in energy efficiency measures.^[4]

The country’s delegation will also be pressing for progress at the Summit on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (a framework which German policy-makers very much endorse). Olaf Scholz, in a pre-Summit interview, pointed to a desire for “fair partnerships” with the Global South, recognising the particular responsibility of former colonial powers, including Germany.^[5] As an example, he suggested that, in contrast to China, the West could look not simply to extract raw materials from the Global South, but process them in the countries themselves, to mutual benefit; this alternative offer could also help reduce growing Chinese influence there.

Notwithstanding India’s energetic presidency, with rifts notably over the war in Ukraine, but also Chinese frictions with other G20 members (including India), there are reasons to be circumspect about what the Summit can achieve. This will not be helped by the major challenges the German Government faces back at home.

Dr Ed Turner is a Reader in Politics at Aston University and Co-Director of the Aston Centre for Europe.

^[1] Ellen Ehni, Support for traffic lights at a new low, tagesschau, August 2023, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/deutschlandtrend-3396.html

^[2] Maria Martinex, Gloomy Ifo fuels fears of second German recession in a year, Reuters, August 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/gloomy-ifo-fuels-fears-second-german-recession-year-2023-08-25/

^[3] Bernhard Bartsch and Claudia Wessling, Germany’s new China strategy: Ambitious language, ambiguous course, MERICS, July 2023, https://merics.org/en/germanys-new-china-strategy-ambitious-language-ambiguous-course

^[4] Federal Ministry of Economy and Climate Protection, Negotiations in the G7 and G20 on the global expansion of renewable energies, August 2023, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Schlaglichter-der-Wirtschaftspolitik/2023/09/05-verhandlungen-in-g7-und-g20.html

^[5] Deutschlandfunk, Interview of the Week: Scholz still believes the G20 is important despite the “BRICS” expansion – “shaping the future on an equal footing and offering partnerships”, September 2023, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/scholz-haelt-g20-trotz-brics-erweiterung-weiterhin-fuer-wichtig-auf-augenhoehe-zukunft-gestalten-und-100.html

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Erdoğan’s priorities for Turkey at the G20 Summit

Article by Emre Caliskan

September 6, 2023

Erdoğan’s priorities for Turkey at the G20 Summit

In recent years, Turkey has used G20 meetings as part of its ‘the World is Bigger than Five’ campaign launched by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to criticise the structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey has been trying to pursue a more independent and active foreign policy. However, this approach is sometimes at odds with the interests of the Western-based international system and the goals of the UNSC. Nevertheless, Erdoğan wants the G20 to play a more active role in global problems.

At previous G20 meetings, Erdoğan has drawn attention to inequalities within global politics and surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals. For example, Turkey hosted the Least Developing Countries meetings during its G20 presidency in 2015, allowing Erdoğan to send the message that Turkey represents developing countries.

Erdoğan’s other key priorities at previous G20 meetings have included global terrorism and drawing international attention to Turkey’s domestic terrorism problems. For instance, following the coup attempt in 2016, Erdoğan asked G20 leaders to support Turkey’s fight against the Gulen movement, an organisation Turkey blames for the attempted coup. In recent G20 meetings, Erdoğan has focused on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its activities in Iraq and Syria. This gained traction in 2022, when the G20 meeting took place immediately after the PKK attack in Istanbul, which killed eight people and injured over 80 people.

The G20 also provides an important platform for Erdoğan to meet with world leaders and solve Turkey’s bilateral problems. Erdoğan uses these meetings to boost his personal global image and popularity in Turkey. For instance, US President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, both of whom have had troubled relations with Erdoğan, have nevertheless met with him at G20 meetings.

Erdoğan is likely to have three main topics on his agenda at this year’s G20 meeting. Firstly, he is expected to tell world leaders about Turkey’s increasing role in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, from the grain deal to the prisoner exchange agreement. Secondly, he is likely to talk about Turkey’s role in preventing the influx of refugees into Europe. Thirdly, and most importantly, Erdoğan, who has fallen on hard economic times at home, is trying to repair Turkey’s foreign relations, especially with the West, after his third presidential election victory in May, which extended his 21-year rule for another five years. Erdoğan is also likely to call on G20 leaders to invest more in the Turkish economy.

One of Erdoğan’s important allies at the G20 summit will be the UK. Concerned about Turkey’s growing rapprochement with Russia and China, the UK is trying to support Turkey economically, politically and militarily. Following its purchase of the S-400 missile system from Russia, Turkey became subjected to the United States’ Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which imposed sanctions on Turkey and later resulted in Turkey being kicked out of the F-35 fighter programme. The UK, on the other hand, supports Turkey’s F-16 modernisation agenda alongside the US, and is prepared to sell Eurofighters to Turkey. Additionally, the UK continues to make significant investments in Turkey’s infrastructure. For example, UK Export Finance (UKEF), the UK Government’s export credit agency, has recently given Turkey a 867 million USD loan for a new high-speed electric railway. Moreover, in 2022, the UK approved its biggest-ever civil infrastructure export finance deal, for 2.3 billion USD, to underwrite a high-speed rail line between the Turkish capital Ankara and the port of Izmir.

Emre Caliskan is a political analyst and freelance consultant who previously worked for IHS Markit, now as part of S&P. As a former journalist, he worked for the BBC Turkish Service, Cumhuriyet, and the Turkish public broadcaster TRT, as a foreign correspondent based in Ankara, Damascus, Beijing and London. Emre is a co-author, with Simon A Waldman, of, “The New Turkey and Its Discontents” (Hurst and Co and Oxford University Press: 2017). He is currently completing his PhD in International Relations at University of Oxford. He is also a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre.

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China’s G20 Priorities: Maintaining Status amid Economic Challenges

Article by Dr Catherine Owen

September 5, 2023

China’s G20 Priorities: Maintaining Status amid Economic Challenges

Since its inception in 1999, the G20 has become one of the world’s primary forums for debating economic issues: the 19 countries plus the EU account for over 80% of the global economy. Of those 19, China is the largest trading partner of Australia, Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, and the second largest of Argentina and Canada. An important discussion point will surely be China’s economic slowdown.

China’s domestic economy is showing strain in a number of areas: the bubble in the residential housing market appears to have burst;^[1] youth unemployment is at a record high of around 20%;^[2] Chinese stock markets are falling (with the Hong Kong Index falling more than 20% since January);^[3] and in August the economy slipped into deflation.^[4] Achieving consensus on collective measures to mitigate a global economic slowdown will be difficult. There are disagreements over sanctions applied by Western states following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, moves by China and Russia towards the de-dollarisation of global trade, as well as on-going attempts by some US and European economic actors to diversify supply chains.

While UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly’s recent visit to Beijing indicated an attempt to ‘re-set’ Sino-British relations, Western delegates may be less optimistic. First, the expansion of the BRICS grouping has been widely interpreted in Western media as part of a dilution of the web of Western-led global institutions – including the G20 – and a further shift towards a Beijing-centric world order. And second, that President Xi is rumoured to be skipping the G20 this year, having recently attended the BRICS summit in person, has been interpreted by some as underlining Beijing’s preference for non-Western multilateral platforms.^[5]

One area likely to elicit consensus among delegates will be to approve, as expected, the inclusion of the African Union (AU) into the G20 – the first new member since its creation. This overdue move will tilt the bloc towards the interests of the Global South more broadly, of which China considers itself a leading figure. And it may benefit China’s external economic relations: China is the largest trading partner of several African countries, including South Africa, Nigeria and Angola, and a major creditor of several more, including Angola, Ethiopia and Zambia.

A second major issue area for China will be climate, one of the summit’s key themes highlighted by India’s presidency. Only this summer, the heaviest rains in 140 years ravaged parts of Beijing and China’s highest ever temperature was recorded in Xinjiang. China itself has a quixotic approach to addressing climate breakdown. On one hand, it produces more than half of the world’s coal, and Western leaders have criticised Beijing for allegedly stymying an agreement on climate issues in a G20 meeting in July.^[6] On the other, China has also made leaps in solar and wind power, and is on target to achieve its renewable energy goals five years ahead of schedule.^[7] However, as environmental economists repeatedly demonstrate, addressing the climate crisis stands in stark contrast to growing the economy. Real solutions to the climate crisis are therefore unlikely to materialise in New Delhi.

That said, despite the complex and inter-related global problems of economic slowdown and climate breakdown, Beijing’s concerns are currently more domestic than international. China’s leaders will be more concerned with seeking remedies for the domestic economy, than for advancing its pre-pandemic projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the short term, at least, China’s approach on the world stage is less likely to be underpinned by loans and infrastructural investments, and more by ideological and political engagement – an approach that is almost certainly cheaper, but by no means less impactful.

Dr Catherine Owen is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter’s Penryn Campus. Prior to that she was British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, also at the University of Exeter.

^[1] Cheryl Arcibal and Chuqin Jiang China’s home prices decline in July as property crisis worsens, South China Morning Post, August 2023, https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3231274/chinas-home-prices-decline-july-property-crisis-worsens

^[2] BBC News, China suspends youth unemployment data after record high, August 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-66506132

^[3] Phil Rosen, Hong Kong’s benchmark stock index just closed in a bear market as China’s economy wavers, Markets Insider, August 2023, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/china-stocks-economy-hang-seng-bear-market-hong-kong-deflation-2023-8

^[4] Graeme Wearden and agencies, Chinese economy slips into deflation as recovery falters and demand slows, Guardian, August 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/08/chinese-economy-expected-to-have-slipped-into-deflation-as-recovery-falters

^[5] Martin Quin Pollard, Laurie Chen and Liz Lee, Xi to skip G20 summit in India, China to send Li instead, Reuters, September 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-says-premier-li-will-attend-g20-summit-2023-09-04/

^[6] David Stanway, China denies reports it obstructed G20 climate discussions, Reuters, August 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/china-denies-reports-it-obstructed-g20-climate-discussions-2023-08-02/

^[7] Amy Hawkins and Rachel Cheung, China on course to hit wind and solar power target five years ahead of time, Guardian, June 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/29/china-wind-solar-power-global-renewable-energy-leader

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Rocks and Hard Places: A priority for the US going into the G20 Leaders’ Summit

Article by Tony Silberfeld

As India prepares to welcome members of the G20 Summit to New Delhi, leaders will be confronted with a range of daunting global challenges from technology transformation to the reform of multilateral institutions. Some of these discussions will result in hand wringing and the usual declaration of aspirational targets that will never be met. There are, however, real opportunities for this group to channel its efforts toward meeting the India presidency’s lofty goal of “One Earth, One Family, One Future.”

High on the Summit’s priority list is creating a viable pathway toward a green future. While it’s probably a fair critique to question the credibility of ‘an Arsonists Convention on Fire Prevention’, the reality is that the energy transition cannot come to fruition without the likes of the United States, China, India and the other members of the G20 club. Central to mitigating the impact of climate change is continuing to expand the use of renewable energy from wind and solar, and electric batteries. Paradoxically, these technologies are powered by minerals that necessitate digging up the planet in order to save it. Added to the environmental costs involved in extracting critical minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt, is the moral and economic quandary of propping up regimes around the world with dubious safety and human rights records to satisfy this massive demand. According to the International Energy Agency, from 2017 to 2022, the overall demand for cobalt rose by 70 percent, nickel by 40 percent and lithium tripled.^[1]

These figures can no longer be ignored. The United States has begun to chart a path that aims to secure reliable sources of critical minerals by working closely with partners and allies to future-proof its economy from uncertainty or potential economic coercion. Beginning at home with the Inflation Reduction Act, US Congress set out to incentivise the green transition throughout the global supply chain. To bolster this effort, the United States and Japan signed a critical minerals agreement in May 2023, that serves as a blueprint for creating a bloc of countries from Australia to Canada to South Korea with the shared objective to ensure access to the production, processing and delivery of the materials that will shape the decades ahead.

In order to capitalise on this momentum, US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak agreed during their June bilateral meeting in Washington to, among other things, begin negotiations on a US-UK critical minerals agreement to increasing “our respective and collective clean energy industrial capacity, boosting electric vehicle production and deployment, and expanding access to sustainable, secure, high-standard critical mineral and battery supply chains.”^[2]

It remains to be seen whether this Anglo-American initiative will yield action, but it is clear that the current winds toward agreement are favourable. With China controlling approximately 60 percent of critical mineral production and 85 percent of processing, the external catalyst for movement is present. Containing China continues to be one of the few bipartisan issues in the US Congress, and there doesn’t appear to be much daylight left between Washington and London on addressing the rising challenges posed by China.

Though the US, UK, and its partners among the G20 nations may have been behind the curve in connecting the dots between securing critical minerals and prospering in a green future, the upcoming meeting in New Delhi may prove to be pivotal to defining the road ahead.

Tony Silberfeld is the Director of Transatlantic Relations at the Bertelsmann Foundation in Washington, DC.

^[1] IEA, Critical minerals market sees unprecedented growth as clean energy demand drives strong increase in investment, July 2023, https://www.iea.org/news/critical-minerals-market-sees-unprecedented-growth-as-clean-energy-demand-drives-strong-increase-in-investment

^[2] White House, The Atlantic Declaration: A Framework for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership, June 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/08/the-atlantic-declaration-a-framework-for-a-twenty-first-century-u-s-uk-economic-partnership/

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Ukraine’s efforts to investigate conflict related sexual and gender-based violence and the role of the ‘complementarity’ in International Criminal law

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Op-Ed – Mona & Mahsa: 40 years apart what their deaths tell us about protecting the life and freedom of Iranians

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“One Earth, One Family, One Future”: Key takeaways from the 2023 New Delhi G20 Summit, with a spotlight on the UK

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Whither G20? The future of multilateralism and global governance reforms

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The UK & EU at the G20: What role is there, post Brexit, for the UK in the European community’s engagement with India?

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Preparing for the G20 presidency in a fraught world: Insights on South Africa’s priorities

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Germany’s priorities going into the G20 Summit

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Erdoğan’s priorities for Turkey at the G20 Summit

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China’s G20 Priorities: Maintaining Status amid Economic Challenges

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Rocks and Hard Places: A priority for the US going into the G20 Leaders’ Summit

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