Legal impasse or excuse for inaction? The state of play in the efforts to seize oligarchs’ assets

Article by Dr Maria Nizzero and Oksana Ihnatenko

February 26, 2024

Legal impasse or excuse for inaction? The state of play in the efforts to seize oligarchs’ assets

In the two years since Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine, policymakers in the Western block have made big statements of their intention to seize Russian oligarchic wealth in their countries. Sanctions were rolled out quickly to freeze assets. It was thought that their confiscation would come just as nimbly.

Experts were, however, quick to point out that confiscation was going to be an uphill and lengthy battle.^[1] The most obvious solution, devising a new mechanism that would allow the seizure of sanctioned assets within the boundaries of the law and in full respect of human rights, needed time and skilled researchers. However, political interest, and with it funding for research, ran out quickly.

Despite this, proposals on how to break the deadlock on asset recovery have been made. First, it was suggested to focus on sanctions evasion as a short-term route for confiscation, albeit with limited scope, given it would only allow for confiscation where sanctions evasion is proved.^[2] Supporting this approach, in early February this year, the UK government announced new reporting obligations for sanctioned individuals to disclose their UK assets, making it easier to tackle sanctions evasion attempts.^[3] It is a little early to claim victory, but it’s a step in the right direction. Still, the UK response remains far from ideal. While confiscations have started appearing in the US, the UK’s Combatting Kleptocracy Cell is yet to announce a high-profile case.^[4]

Upgrading the overall asset recovery response is also required.^[5] After all, the oligarchs’ wealth has notoriously been amassed through corrupt practices. Enhancing the ability to recover the proceeds of crime would be a sensible move. Two Economic Crime Acts later, one of which included amendments to the Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWOs) regime, no significant case has been initiated against any high-level sanctioned kleptocrat, and law enforcement remains largely under-resourced to meet the challenge.

With sanctions and asset recovery not doing the trick, a voluntary donation route has been proposed. But even there, rhetoric and reality mismatched. Last June, the UK Government promised a route for sanctioned oligarchs to donate their frozen funds for Ukrainian reconstruction.^[6] Since then, neither the route, nor an oligarch offering to donate has appeared. Even the much-anticipated sale of Chelsea FC, the result of an agreement between Abramovich and the UK Government, has stalled – provoking the ire of the House of Lords.^[7]

While the UK has taken every opportunity for inaction, Ukraine has kept itself busy. As a country at war, Ukraine has developed and employed three distinct mechanisms for asset seizure: confiscation via sanctions, forcible seizure of objects of property rights of the Russian Federation and its residents, and confiscation within the criminal proceeding framework.^[8] The forcible seizure mechanism is currently being applied against the financial assets of Ukrainian subsidiaries of bank Sberbank.^[9] Meanwhile, the High Anti-Corruption Court has issued 34 decisions on seizure of the assets of Russian oligarchs.^[10] Ukraine’s confiscation mechanisms may potentially result in contested cases in international arbitration. They also represent an exceptional scenario, given Ukraine is currently under martial law. However, they are a good reminder of the benefit that recovered assets could bring to Ukraine’s cause.

It seems that it is not just the oligarchs’ assets that are frozen in limbo; the Western asset recovery response is too. If at the beginning the legal difficulties of moving ‘from freeze to seize,’ and the lack of understanding of the issue by policymakers, could be blamed, now these seem just an excuse for inaction. Western governments had all the opportunities to act. Whether by tackling sanctions evasion, funding research to develop new legislation, strengthening existing asset recovery mechanisms against any kind of kleptocratic wealth, or encouraging voluntary donations to materialise – the options to confiscate these assets are many.

In the words of the House of Lords, this ‘reflects poorly’ on Western governments, and the UK in particular.[11] What is needed now is for rhetoric and reality to meet. Not all is lost: the sanctioned oligarchs’ pot is still there, albeit slightly depleted by their attempts to evade sanctions.

The options mentioned above are all still viable and are not mutually exclusive – now it is up to governments to listen and act. This year, different countries will undergo election processes. While the focus will inevitably shift to domestic issues, it is important that support for Ukraine, and long-term commitments to sustain its reconstruction, remain high on the agenda – if oligarchs pay, taxpayers that have been supporting Ukraine will feel some relief. Despite the complexities involved, asset confiscation still stands as one of the tangible means of bolstering Ukraine’s pursuit of freedom.

Maria Nizzero is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI. She is a member of the Financial Crime Policy Programme, which tracks the implementation and evolution of anti-financial crime policy both in the UK and globally.

Oksana Ihnatenko is a Researcher for the SMURF project at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI.

^[1] Maria Nizzero, From Freeze to Seize: How the UK Can Break the Deadlock on Asset Recovery, RUSI, October 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/freeze-seize-how-uk-can-break-deadlock-asset-recovery

^[2] Maria Nizzero, Sanctioned oligarchs should have to list their UK assets, The Times, February 2023, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sanctioned-oligarchs-should-have-to-list-their-uk-assets-lqprkw3fs

^[3] Giles Thomson, New reporting requirements for Designated Persons under the Russia Regime, Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Gov.uk, February 2024, https://ofsi.blog.gov.uk/2024/02/12/new-reporting-requirements-for-designated-persons-under-the-russia-regime/

^[4] RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, U.S. Attorney General Allows First Transfer Of Russian Oligarch’s Confiscated Assets To Ukraine, RFE/RL, February 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-malofeyev-transfer/32255371.html

^[5] SOC ACE Research Programme, How to Seize a Billion: Exploring Mechanisms to Recover the Proceeds of Kleptocracy, RUSI, March 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/external-publications/how-seize-billion-exploring-mechanisms-recover-proceeds-kleptocracy

^[6] FCDO, HM Treasury, Home Office, The Rt Hon Suella Braverman KC MP, The Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP, and The Rt Hon James Cleverly MP, New legislation allows Russian sanctions to remain until compensation is paid to Kyiv, Gov.uk, June 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-legislation-allows-russian-sanctions-to-remain-until-compensation-is-paid-to-kyiv

^[7] Kiran Stacey, ‘Incomprehensible’ that Abramovich’s Chelsea funds not yet spent on Ukraine, The Guardian, January 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/31/incomprehensible-roman-abramovich-chelsea-proceeds-still-not-spent-to-help-ukraine; House of Lords European Affairs Committee, Call for UK and Eu to continue support for Ukraine, and sanctions on Russia, UK Parliament, January 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/516/european-affairs-committee/news/199672/call-for-uk-and-eu-to-continue-support-for-ukraine-and-sanctions-on-russia/

^[8] The Law of Ukraine, About sanctions (Reports of the Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2014, No.40, Article 2018), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1644-18#Text; The Law of Ukraine, About the main principles of forced seizure in Ukraine of objects of property rights of the Russian Federation and its residents, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2116-20#Text

^[9] National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Decision from May 11, 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0006525-22#n2

^[10] Higher Anti-Corruption Court, Decisions in administrative cases (Part 7 of Article 283-1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine), https://hcac.court.gov.ua/hcac/gromadyanam/administrative_judgments

[11] House of Lords European Affairs Committee, Call for UK and EU to continue support for Ukraine, and sanctions on Russia, UK Parliament, January 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/516/european-affairs-committee/news/199672/call-for-uk-and-eu-to-continue-support-for-ukraine-and-sanctions-on-russia/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Two years on: The importance of protecting the media and winning the informational frontline in Ukraine

Article by Sergiy Tomilenko

February 23, 2024

Two years on: The importance of protecting the media and winning the informational frontline in Ukraine

The Ukrainian army has been holding the Russian aggressor off for two years already. In its desire to destroy Ukraine at any cost, the Kremlin has spared neither its missiles nor its soldiers. Moreover, Putin has also spared no resources to fight on the parallel informational front, in order that the world receives distorted information about his crimes.

Once Russian soldiers have seized a new piece of our land, the propaganda machine immediately begins to inundate local residents with Russian-printed newspapers. At the same time, the enemy often resorts to falsifications, including using the names of Ukrainian local media, so that people believe more in what they read.

Today, it has become common practice that a journalist with the inscription ‘PRESS’ on his body armor is a target no less important than a tank or artillery unit for a Russian soldier. Ukrainian and international journalists document the war crimes of the Russians so that, thanks to the international court, Putin will be brought to justice.

Unfortunately, more than 80 journalists have already been killed in Ukraine, and the fate of several more is unknown. Of that number, 16 colleagues were killed while performing their professional duties; nine became civilian victims of the aggressor state, and others have been mobilised to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Journalists who reveal the truth about the war in Ukraine to the whole world understand their extremely important mission.

While the Russians convince the world that their targets are only military facilities, Ukrainian and international journalists show the world destroyed cities with civilians. Currently, a critical situation has developed in the thousand-strong town of Avdiyivka, Donetsk Region. The city has almost been destroyed.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who continue to live in the front-line and de-occupied territories remain in an information vacuum. They have neither electricity supply nor communication. Sometimes, Russian or Belarusian radio reaches their territory.

Therefore, the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) is doing everything possible to find funding for Ukrainian newspapers. Today, thanks to the cooperation of the Union and international partners, we have resumed the work of 30 newspapers in the front-line and de-occupied territories. Hundreds of thousands of people in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and the Kharkiv Regions are now able to obtain information from Ukrainian sources.

Since the beginning of the war, the NUJU, together with UNESCO, has also launched six assistance centers for Ukrainian and international journalists, where they can receive protective equipment, advice, and/or use an equipped workplace in a co-working space. Due to the constant danger to the work of journalists in Kharkiv, we recently opened the Journalists’ Solidarity Center. There, hundreds of colleagues receive both protective equipment and a place where they can work readily and easily.

Two full years have passed since the full-scale invasion. The war continues. The world is increasingly talking about fatigue. Ukrainians are also tired. But evil does not exhaust… and so we must continue.

Support Ukraine. Support Ukrainians! Support journalists who fight injustice. Journalists are important!

Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of journalists of Ukraine.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Two years on: Breaking the cycle of impunity for Russian war crimes

Article by Oleksandra Matviichuk

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a result of the total impunity that Russia enjoyed for decades. The Russian military has committed terrible crimes in Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia, Syria, Mali, and Libya but was never punished. They believe they can do whatever they want.

Now, Russian troops are destroying residential buildings, churches, museums, schools, and hospitals in Ukraine. They are shooting at evacuation corridors. They are torturing people in filtration camps. They are forcibly taking Ukrainian children to Russia. They are abducting, robbing, raping and killing in the occupied territories.

This is a conscious policy. Russia uses war crimes as a method of warfare. Russia attempts to break people’s resistance and occupy the country by means of inflicting immense pain on civilians. At the Centre for Civil Liberties, we document this pain. Over the past two years alone, with the joint efforts of the ‘Tribunal for Putin’ initiative, we have documented 62,000 episodes of war crimes.

However, we face an accountability gap. The Ukrainian legal system is overloaded with an extreme level of war crime cases. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court restricts its investigations to just a few selected cases and has no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression to hold Russia to account for its actions against Ukraine.

If we want to prevent wars, we have to punish the states, and their leaders, responsible for starting them. In the whole history of humankind, we have only one such precedent.

That’s why we still look at the world through the lens of the Nuremberg Trials, where Nazi war criminals were tried only after the Nazi regime had collapsed. But we are living in a new century. Justice should not depend on how and when the war ends. We must establish a special tribunal now and hold Putin, as well as Belarussian President Lukashenko and others, guilty of the crime of aggression, accountable.

Besides the crime of aggression, there are other international crimes – war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. These crimes should not have to remain as simply information stored in our archives, in the media, and in reports of international organisations.

New technologies allow us to document war crimes in a way that we could not even dream of 15 years ago. The experience of the open source media outlet Bellingcat and other investigators convincingly proves that we can rebuild a picture of what took place without even being on the spot.

The challenge facing Ukraine is the unprecedented amount of international crimes. The Office of General Prosecutor has registered more than 125,000 criminal proceedings. International donors can finance thousands of training and hundreds of advisors; but in a situation where Ukrainian investigators need to investigate more than a thousand criminal cases simultaneously, we will not get results.

Instead, we must ingrain an international element into the level of national investigation and national justice. Ukraine requires the support of foreign professionals, judges, prosecutors and detectives, in order to properly investigate and ensure court proceedings for the tens of thousands of crimes, in compliance with international standards of justice.

We must break this circle of impunity. Not only for Ukrainians. But also for the people who could become the next target of Russian aggression. And prevent it this time.

Oleksandra Matviichuk is the Head of the human rights organisation Center for Civil Liberties, which won the Nobel Peace Prize 2022.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Two years on: in the face of continued Russian aggression, Moldova is navigating its path towards the West

Article by Iulian Groza

February 22, 2024

Two years on: in the face of continued Russian aggression, Moldova is navigating its path towards the West

Two years have elapsed since Russia initiated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, yet the reverberations persist across the European continent. Moldova, standing among the most affected states after Ukraine, grapples with the enduring repercussions of Russia’s hybrid aggression.

Amidst these challenges, Moldova has showcased a resilient spirit and an unwavering commitment to fortify its defenses, secure its future, and advance on its path to becoming a member of the European Union (EU). The national aspiration, as set by President Maia Sandu, is for Moldova to be prepared to join by 2030.

In April 2023, the EU reaffirmed its support for Moldova by deploying the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM), signaling a robust commitment to bolster the country’s crisis management structures and ability to combat hybrid threats, including cyber warfare and foreign information manipulation. Moldova’s embrace of this collaborative initiative underscores its determination to safeguard its sovereignty in the face of external pressures and fortify its ties with European allies.

The adoption of Moldova’s new National Security Strategy in December 2023 marked a pivotal moment in the country’s security agenda. President Sandu’s vision for Moldova prioritises strengthening democracy, fostering prosperity, and ensuring the protection of all citizens through a modern security sector. Central to this vision is the imperative of building resilience to hybrid threats and modernising Moldova’s armed forces and civil security sector. The strategic partnership with the EU emerges as a cornerstone for comprehensive security enhancement, encompassing economic, energy, cyber, and environmental dimensions.

In 2023, Moldova faced escalating hybrid aggression from Russia, including attempts to undermine the country’s democratic process. Kremlin-backed forces sought to manipulate Moldova’s local elections, prompting decisive action to preserve the integrity of the country’s democratic institutions. The resilience displayed in the face of external interference underscores Moldova’s commitment to upholding democratic values and protecting its national sovereignty.

Supported by the EU, the United States, and other Western allies, Moldova has made significant strides towards economic resilience and energy independence. By reducing its dependency on Russian gas, Moldova has charted a path towards self-reliance and sustainability, mitigating vulnerabilities to external pressures and advancing its integration into European networks.

As Moldova continues on its European path, the forthcoming constitutional referendum initiated by President Sandu will determine the country’s strategic objective of EU accession, solidifying Moldova’s commitment to becoming a member of the EU in the next decade. The overwhelming support for European integration reflects the Moldovan people’s aspirations for prosperity, stability, and security within the European family of nations. The referendum, slated to coincide with presidential elections, symbolises a pivotal moment in securing the country’s future within the Western democratic fold.

Two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moldova stands as a testament to resilience and determination. As Moldova charts a path towards a brighter future, its resilience serves as an inspiration for nations striving to uphold democratic values and principles in the face of adversity.

Iulian Groza is an expert in international relations, European affairs and good governance. He is a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova in charge for European integration and international law. Currently, Groza leads the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) – a Moldovan think-tank that aims at supporting Moldova’s accession to the EU. Since 2022, Groza is representing Moldovan civil society in the Supreme Security Council and the National Committee for European Integration chaired by the President of the Republic of Moldova. He holds a University Degree in Law. He also did postgraduate European Studies at Birmingham University and NATO Security Studies at SNSPA in Bucharest. He is fluent in English, Russian and Romanian (native) languages. Groza is a career diplomat and holds a diplomatic rank of Minister-Counsellor. He is also an FCO Chevening Scholar.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Two years on: Business as usual in a new geopolitical reality?

Article by Dr Aijan Sharshenova

Two years into the full-scale Russian invasion in Ukraine, Central Asia finds itself under slightly less pressure to take sides. It seems that both Russia and the West have finally accepted Central Asian republics’ reluctance to unequivocally support one side over another and have left them to be ‘neutral’ on the matter. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace some direct and indirect impacts of the war on Central Asian society, politics and economics.

In the external political domain, international politics is still a dynamic balancing act for Central Asia. The republics’ leaders have to continue cooperating with Russia without alienating the rest of the world.^[1] Secondary sanctions remain a very real threat, but the extent to which this threat provides strong leverage is questionable given the limited trade the region has with the European Union (EU) and the USA, the key driving forces behind anti-Russian sanctions.^[2]

In terms of economic development, there has certainly been a reinvigoration of Russian-Central Asian economic relations, but there also exists a continuous danger that Russia’s war economy might result in an economic crisis domestically, which might have a ripple effect impacting on Central Asia too.

In the regional political domain, the war in Ukraine has become a part of everyday news. As each country in the region grapples with their own internal political struggles, energy and food security issues, the war is not something that stays at the top of the agenda.

However, those in the region face another issue connected to the ongoing conflict, that is – the growing level of disinformation and misinformation. As a region where Russian is either the second or third most-frequently used language, any Russian-language information about the war finds its way into the Central Asian information spaces. And, this is not necessarily limited to the war in Ukraine only – Russian conspiracy theories of any kind spread freely via social media platforms.

Central Asian governments have adapted their narratives and policies to make the most of the current geopolitical situation, seeking benefits from all parties involved and avoiding any negative repercussions through a declared neutrality. To what extent this neutrality is genuine is difficult to assess due to the closed nature of the states. What the majority of the region’s population thinks about the war is even more obscure as reliable public opinion polls are still lacking two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion into Ukraine.

Dr Aijan Sharshenova is a FPC Research Fellow.

^[1] Aijan Sharshenova, Understanding Russia’s Central Asia policy, Crossroads Central Asia, September 2023, https://crossroads-ca.org/understanding-russia-s-central-asia-policy/

^[2] Filippo Costa Buranelli, Central Asia and Secondary Sanctions: The Tight Rope of Compliance, ISPI, November 2023, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/central-asia-and-secondary-sanctions-the-tight-rope-of-compliance-151442

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Two years on: The war has left the OSCE in peril, but the institution is worthy of reinvestment

Article by Prof Stefan Wolff

As the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine heads into its third year, the Euro-Asian and Euro-Atlantic security orders remain deeply unsettled, and there is little prospect of their imminent restabilisation. This is nowhere more obvious than in relation to the OSCE—the sole remaining, yet barely surviving collective security mechanism created at the height of the Cold War with a view to managing relations between East and West in ways that would avoid all-out military confrontation.

Last year’s Ministerial Council avoided the complete collapse of the Organisation, but only just. And it did not resolve several of the fundamental institutional impasses that have been apparent for some time. This includes a lack of a unified budget since 2021, and hence an increasing dependency on so-called extra-budgetary contributions from individual participating States. The top-four positions in the OSCE, including the Secretary General, have only been extended for nine months, rather than the customary three years, thus foreshadowing the next leadership crisis in the run-up to the expiry of this briefly extended lifeline.

All the while OSCE staff in Vienna and in the field operations from the Balkans to Moldova, and Central Asia have worked hard to keep the Organisation going and its mission—comprehensive, cooperative security—alive. Beyond the headlines of the Ukraine war, their day-to-day efforts make real contributions to security and stability across the OSCE area. In their work, they address the broader security needs of states and societies including when it comes to protracted conflicts and instability in Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, and the South Caucasus; emerging security risks, such as the climate emergency, natural resource scarcity (particularly water), new patterns of migration, and the aggravation of food and energy security problems; and the risks that disinformation poses to social cohesion and societal stability.

The OSCE is not the mechanism to ‘fix’ any one of these problems on its own, but if its participating States would muster the requisite political will, the Organisation could certainly make a meaningful contribution to their management—because it (still) has the tools, staff, and institutional knowledge and understanding to do so. With some modest investment of political and financial resources, early-warning and early-action capabilities could be upgraded, allowing the OSCE to deploy its considerable mediation and dialogue facilitation capabilities on the ground to prevent conflict escalations.

Similarly, when it comes to emerging security risks, the OSCE has access to know-how and expertise that can be mobilised for knowledge creation and knowledge transfer to enable affected participating States to address the risks they are facing. In relation to information security, the OSCE, especially through its field operations, could contribute to ‘restoring’ the perceived value of scientific knowledge and expertise to inform public debates and decision-making by facilitating and encouraging dialogue between the academic/think tank community and civil servants, elected representatives, and media professionals.

None of this should detract from the importance of the war against Ukraine and the role that OSCE can play in supporting Ukraine in mitigating the consequences of Russia’s aggression. But it is important to remember that the Organisation’s continued relevance, and functionality, as a platform for dialogue among 57 participating States extends beyond this war.

Professor Stefan Wolff is a FPC Senior Research Fellow.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Two years on: Proactive measures are needed to address the conflict related mental health crisis

Article by Prof Robert van Voren

February 21, 2024

Two years on: Proactive measures are needed to address the conflict related mental health crisis

The war in Ukraine has entered its third year with no end in sight. This is not surprising. The future of the Putin regime depends fully on victory and cannot survive a defeat, thus fighting will continue to the bitter end.

For Ukraine this is a nightmare scenario. The war is nothing less than a war of destruction, with large swaths of territory totally devastated, towns eradicated, agriculture destroyed for many years to come (if for no other reason than the massive use of landmines and unexploded ordnance), and the country facing a decreased population. About one-fourth of the population are now displaced, either inside the country or abroad. The longer the war lasts, the less likely it is that people will return, and of course those who have the best prospects of building a new life abroad are those with education and knowledge of languages. At the front, the losses of personnel are immense, even though no official data is given. Those who should be on the forefront of rebuilding the country – the young men and women who believe in Ukraine and are willing to sacrifice their lives – are dying.

Ukraine will probably emerge from this war devastated, with a greatly reduced population, a destroyed economy and a large number of traumatised people. With over one million Ukrainians under arms and more than 600,000 with front-line experience, we estimate up to 100,000 people will need long-term psychosocial support. However, veteran mental health services in Ukraine are disorganised, highly dependent on volunteers and NGOs, and it is unlikely that the country will have sufficient resources to develop a system in time. Traumatised veterans have families and live in communities, who will also suffer from the inflicted trauma.

With millions of refugees eventually returning to Ukraine, mainly women who will have spent time in countries with greater gender balance, higher levels of domestic violence and divorce can be anticipated. Furthermore, while the Ukrainian society is still highly supportive of the military and veterans, we already see a decline. When veterans have outbursts of violence as a result of war-related trauma, this support will gradually change to stigma and fear. This does not bode well for the future.

What Ukraine will need is a system of community-based support for those traumatised by war, both military personnel and civilians who provided the vital support at the front by providing food, care, and medical support, and who are now not eligible for any participation in services earmarked for the military. Such a system should be sustainable and based on what Ukraine can really afford, even when Western support gradually disappears and the country will be left to start the long and winding road to recovery and rebuilding a severely affected society.

Robert van Voren is Chief Executive of the international foundation Human Rights in Mental Health-FGIP, an international foundation for mental health reform. He is also Executive Director of the Andrei Sakharov Research Center for Democratic Development and Professor at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania. Robert van Voren in an Honorary Fellow of the British Royal College of Psychiatrists and Honorary Member of the Ukrainian Psychiatric Association. He has worked in the field of human rights and mental health in Ukraine since 1990.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Two years on: Russia continues to weaponise and attack healthcare in Ukraine

Article by Elly Nott

At the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 I wrote in the British Medical Journal that, based on my experience of the Syrian conflict, I feared for Ukraine’s healthcare workers.^[1] Tragically, my predictions have been proved correct.

In Syria, where the charity I co-founded has worked since 2012, attacks on healthcare in non-government areas have been a consistent feature of the conflict. Far from being ‘collateral damage’, there is evidence – including cockpit recordings from Russian air force pilots – that healthcare institutions and workers were intentionally targeted.^[2]

Two years in to the full-scale invasion and the statistics are shocking. The World Health Organisation has verified over 1,000 attacks on health care in Ukraine since February 2022;^[3] more than 60% of all attacks against health care worldwide in that period.

Citizen researchers at the Centre for Information Resilience have documented attacks on Ukrainian facilities including maternity units and cardiology treatment centres in Kherson, calling them “strikingly reminiscent” of Russian tactics in northwest Syria.^[4] Absent a clear link to any military ground operation, the parallel objectives are to create insecurity among the Ukrainian population and demonstrate ongoing determination to secure victory to the Russian public.

Attacking civilian infrastructure frays the ties that bind, both between citizens, and citizens and their government. A strong state relies on an active, vibrant civil society and Ukrainians have valiantly resisted attempts to denigrate their national esprit de corps despite the damage wrought to their infrastructure.

The weaponisation of healthcare and disruption of essential services harms public health and morale in a way that can test that resilience to breaking point.

If the state can no longer provide services, it can prompt the forced displacement of large numbers of people as they seek safety abroad, putting further stress on host nations and in some cases exacerbating social tensions. These actions constitute hybrid warfare tactics, which Ukraine and its allies need to be alert to.

To date, there has not been a prosecution or indictment brought for attacking a healthcare institution. A first step toward accountability is gathering evidence which grassroots entities like the Ukrainian Healthcare Centre are doing.^[5] In areas close to the frontline, healthcare facilities may also need to consider moving infrastructure underground or changing their location as protection measures.

There is every indication that attacks on health will continue to be part of the ongoing conflict, necessitating a full spectrum of practical and legal measures to protect healthcare institutions and workers.

Elly Nott is a leader in the humanitarian sector and PhD Candidate, King’s College London.

^[1] Elly Nott, Ukraine invasion: Why I fear for Ukraine’s healthcare workers, BMJ, March 2022, https://www.bmj.com/content/376/bmj.o605

^[2] The New York Times, Russia Tapes: Healthcare and Civilians Under Attack in Syria, https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/visual-investigations-russia-syria

^[3] United Nations Ukraine, Attacks on healthcare in Ukraine are a grave violation of international humanitarian law, August 2023, https://ukraine.un.org/en/240605-attacks-health-care-ukraine-are-grave-violation-international-humanitarian-law#:~:text=Since%20the%20escalation%20of%20the,on%20health%20care%20in%20Ukraine.

^[4] Centre for Information Resilience, Kherson after occupation: Mapping Russian attacks on medical infrastructure, September 2023, https://www.info-res.org/post/kherson-after-occupation-mapping-russian-attacks-on-medical-infrastructure

^[5] UHC, Annual Report of the Ukrainian Healthcare Center (UHC) in 2023, February 2024, https://uhc.org.ua/en/2024/02/02/annual-report-of-the-ukrainian-healthcare-center-2023/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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Middle East and North Africa

Syria

Two years on: The ongoing war in Ukraine is further highlighting the ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ divide

Article by Dr Sasikumar Sundaram

February 20, 2024

Two years on: The ongoing war in Ukraine is further highlighting the ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ divide

Soon to enter its third year, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to highlight a stark geopolitical split between the Global North and the Global South. For the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe, which represent the ‘Global North,’ resisting Russian aggression is an existential issue to save humanity from hell. By bringing the full force of sanctions, lawsuits, and military might, they stood together as democracies. However hard it may have been, they were united against the bewildering reality of global disorder brought by the Russian invasion.

These Global North states have displayed a steadfast commitment to preserving the rules and norms that define and guide the conduct of states. Many have also revised their foreign and security policies to preserve global order in ways that were simply unimaginable before. Two years into the war, how they articulate and hold these commitments together and stay true to the promises made to fierce Ukrainians poses new challenges. Particularly within the context of emerging democratic crises and changing public opinion on the war within the West.

For many Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American states, making up the majority of the ‘Global South,’ this war is an existential issue but from another reality. It has created food insecurity, rising energy prices, and a supply chain crisis. It led to the weaponisation of the US dollar, which made international borrowing costly. The war has relied on disruptive technologies to spurt out simplified images of supporters and detractors from the non-Western world. Furthermore, the rejection by the West to calls for a ceasefire, not the least in part due to an academic-military-industrial complex which is justifying the war to protect liberalism, has created, and in some places entrenched, mistrust and dissatisfaction.

For the Global South states, the approach of countries in the Global North has appeared ever more like a continuation of the established practices of the West, oblivious of the concerns of the rest. For many poor Global South states, Western hypocrisy toward upholding the norms of sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law is not new. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine only brought these further out in the open. However, many other powerful Southern states have amplified these hypocritical practices to drive their exclusionary nationalism, using the crisis to point out the unfolding of a global disorder. Russia in turn has seized the opportunity to strategically reach out to the Global South, and declaim its association with the West, a move that was simply unimaginable before.

At this juncture, there are new challenges facing those seeking to win over the Global South states. Working within new coalitions and blocs, many of them have become emboldened and fastidious about speaking truth to power. Two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Global South and its leaders are more central than ever on the international stage.

Dr Sasikumar Sundaram is a Lecturer at the Department of International Politics at City, University of London. His main research interests lie in International Relations Theory and the Global South States, focusing on India, Brazil, and China. His book Rhetorical Powers: How the Global South Asserts Competence in World Politics is forthcoming from Columbia University Press (June 2025).

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

International Relations and Geopolitics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Ukraine

Two years on: Will Washington remain a reliable ally to Ukraine?

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

Two years after the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, war weariness has descended on Washington. The initial American reaction to the attack seemed to be a fulfillment of President Joe Biden’s promise that “America is back”.^[1] After the chaos of the Trump years, Washington took on its traditional role as the leader of an international coalition of states, in this case coordinating the provision of international assistance to Kyiv. Since then, the United States has provided about $75 billion in aid to Ukraine.^[2]

Continued American assistance now seems in doubt, mostly due to shifts within the Republican Party, which controls the House of Representatives. The party’s supporters increasingly oppose aid to Ukraine and demand a focus on perceived problems at home. Their leader, Donald Trump, has long sought friendly relations with Vladimir Putin and has promised to end the war in “24 hours” if elected, presumably by pressuring Kyiv to cede territory to Russia.^[3] While a new tranche of aid has been approved by the Senate, it looks unlikely to be passed by the House.

American support for Ukraine has also been undermined by the poor results of Kyiv’s 2023 offensive, in which a substantial number of American-trained and equipped troops failed to make substantial headway in regaining Ukrainian territory. American military commanders have been critical of the Ukrainian military’s tactics and have begun to concede that further breakthroughs by Kyiv seem unlikely.^[4] As a result, the Biden administration has begun to shift its approach and prepare for what it views as inevitable negotiations in which Ukraine will be forced to make territorial concessions to Russia.^[5]

Barring a sudden Ukrainian military collapse this summer, the next decisive event in the conflict will likely be the US presidential election later this year. The Biden administration may have decided that negotiations are inevitable, but unlike Trump it does not intend to pressure Kyiv into joining them. Meanwhile, Putin is likely to wait for the outcome of the election before entering serious talks, given that he would be able to achieve much better results if Trump were in office.^[6]

Washington’s fraying support for Ukraine also has broader implications. If isolationist and Russia-friendly Republicans can pull the plug on American support even under a strongly internationalist president, then many other American security guarantees – for instance to NATO or Taiwan – begin to look questionable. As a result, America’s domestic political divisions, which only look set to widen in a contentious election year, may well persuade many other countries that the time has come to reassess whether Washington is still a reliable ally.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

[1] Joe Biden, Remarks By President Biden On America’s Place In The World, Whitehouse.gov, February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/

[2] Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, How Much Aid Has The U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts, Council on Foreign Relations, December 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

[3] Jack Forrest, Trump Won’t Commit to Backing Ukraine in War with Russia, CNN, May 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/ukraine-russia-putin-trump-town-hall/index.html

[4] Washington Post Staff, Miscalculations, Divisions Marked Offensive Planning By U.S., Ukraine, The Washington Post, December 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/; Washington Post Staff, In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls, The Washington Post, December 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-stalled-russia-war-defenses/

[5] Michael Hirsh, The Biden Administration Is Quietly Shifting Its Strategy in Ukraine, Politico, December 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/27/biden-endgame-ukraine-00133211

[6] Michael Crowley, U.S. Rejects Putin’s Latest Call for Ukraine Negotiations, The New York Times, February 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/09/us/politics/biden-putin-tucker-carlson-peace.html

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

International Relations and Geopolitics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Europe

Former Soviet Union

Ukraine

United States and Canada

United States

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