South Africa’s creeping embrace of Russia leans heavily on the country’s collective perception of history; one that imagines Russia as the saviour that delivered South Africa from Western-sponsored apartheid. Having almost completely abandoned non-alignment and now chairing the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) alliance, Pretoria understands its position is elevated, not undermined, by its proximity to Moscow. The West should be concerned, but claiming moral authority is highly unlikely to win over South Africa’s political classes.

The shadows of history, real or imagined, loom large over South Africa’s Russian dilemma. Old alliances, grudges and obligations seem now to be making themselves felt, and Putin’s potential visit to the BRICS summit in August is presenting President Ramaphosa with an ever growing problem. He must choose whether to continue down the road both he, and the ruling African National Congress (ANC), have determinedly followed in embracing Russian narratives, thereby risking South Africa’s international reputation; or, to firmly pull the handbrake on Moscow’s creeping influence and risk one of its most prominent diplomatic positions in the BRICS alliance. The decision Ramaphosa makes will be pivotal for the future direction of South African foreign policy and other nations across the continent will be keeping a close eye on Pretoria.

The evolution of South Africa’s position to one of relative warmth towards Moscow began with an initial condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine by South Africa’s Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor. In February 2022, Pandor’s department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) expressed its ‘dismay’ at the situation, using a statement – notably since scrubbed from government websites – to urge Russia to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and withdraw.^[1] Subsequent statements from DIRCO have emphasised South Africa’s independence and non-alignment, in keeping with its membership of the Non-Alignment Movement, and highlighting what it sees as Western hypocrisy on issues relating to territorial integrity. A solution, said Pandor, ‘will not be found in isolating one party or bringing it to its knees’.^[2]

Non-alignment no more?

Over the past year of ongoing violence in Ukraine, South Africa’s evocation of history to justify its proximity to Moscow has however developed pace, drawing accusations of historical blindness, moral failing and hypocrisy.

Internationally, South Africa has drawn international condemnation for allowing joint Russian and Chinese naval exercises and recently hosting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Distancing herself yet more from those words on the first day of the invasion, Foreign Minister Pandor has recently declared Russia an ‘old, historical friend’, of whom ‘we cannot become sudden enemies [with] on the demand of others’.^[3]

Perhaps this position is less surprising, when given the previously cosy relationship some ANC members appeared to enjoy with Russian representatives in South Africa. Hours prior to Russia’s invasion, Defence Minister Thandi Modise had been pictured at the Russian Ambassador’s Pretoria residence celebrating ‘Defender of the Fatherland Day’.^[4] While attending another such gathering, ANC provincial MP Cameron Dugmore recorded a video referring to the event as a celebration of the ‘relationship that started between the ANC and the former Soviet Union, and how that relationship has continued’, and calling for solutions that create a ‘lasting peace’; all while Russia’s imperial eagle looked down on him from a banner in the background.^[5]

Criticism of ANC’s apparent continued rapprochement with Russia over the past year has been fierce within South Africa, with the leader of the opposition and the political party Democratic Alliance (DA), John Steenhuisen, accusing the ANC of having ‘picked the wrong side of history’, but it has been fiercer still in the Western press. David Pilling in the Financial Times said South Africa’s position “smacks not of respect for human rights or non-alignment, but rather for might is right.” Brian Pottinger, a prominent South African journalist, wrote in Unherd that the ANC had embraced an ideology of “nostalgia, self-interest and greed”.^[6]

A question of Western moral posturing?

Nostalgia it seems does rule the day, and Western governments should be wary of moral posturing if they hope to get South Africa back on side. Congolese politician Jérémy Lissouba makes the astute argument that demands from the West for countries to unambiguously pick a side risk misunderstanding the complexity of their positions.^[7] For South Africa’s ruling class, real or imagined ties between the former Soviet Union and the anti-apartheid movement remain strong, while painful memories of US and UK support for the apartheid regime remain very much in living memory.

This is not a political class inheriting a generational burden, it is one that actively fought for freedom and bears the scars of fascist violence. Further, as ANC leaders often comment, perceived Western moral grandstanding invokes little sympathy. Minister Pandor argued in an event last September that Western inaction in Palestine undermines its support for Ukraine, “you can’t say because Ukraine has been invaded that suddenly sovereignty is very important, because [according to the US] it was never important for Palestine”.^[8] As the terms of Western assistance for Africa have always been so unequal, argues Lissouba, Western affirmations of the UN Charter and Universal Declaration for Human Rights have often been viewed with suspicion as ‘pretences to maintain hegemony in the face of existential threats’.^[9]

A spotlight on South Africa in the BRICS

Renewed attention will be directed at South Africa if Putin attends August’s BRICS conference. As a full member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) it has the legal obligation to carry out Putin’s arrest. Having wavered before, by failing to arrest Sudanese President al-Bashir in 2015, South Africa would truly damage its international standing by shirking its obligations again – and Ramaphosa’s response has been far from confident. Mirroring Pandor’s flip-flop at the start of the invasion, the President initially stated that the ANC wanted to withdraw from the ICC, followed by a statement hours later that South Africa will remain a member and the comment was made ‘in error’.^[10] In recent weeks it has become clear that Ramaphosa wishes to avoid confrontation – deciding to shift to hosting the summit online, despite Putin’s previous acceptance of an in-person invite.^[11]

While eyebrows continue to be raised, both within and outside of South Africa, about the country’s continued relationship with the Kremlin, its role as a BRICS member has elevated South Africa’s diplomatic position. South Africa’s membership is a major diplomatic win; and, despite being a far smaller country, both in economy and population, than any other member, its economic ties are strengthening. Between 2017 and 2021, trade with other BRICS members went from R407bn ($22bn) to R702bn ($38bn), and in 2018 65% of all arrivals into South Africa were tourists from other BRICS countries. [12]

What next?

Western countries should be wary of a continued drift that may see South Africa and other regional powers put further distance between themselves and the West. Tackling this, however, cannot rely on claims of moral duty or international obligations based on the will of Western superpowers.

Taking a harder approach may go some way – threatening South Africa’s position in the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has brought opposition and government MPs to Washington. However, ‘big stick’ approaches, such as this and the US’s ‘Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa’ bill, will only stoke allegations of American imperialism and hypocrisy. While the US signalled their intention to engage with the recent US-Africa Summit, lumping an entire continent together furthered suspicion that African leaders are not receiving due respect or understanding. Meanwhile, the UK’s international development fund is spending twice as much within its own borders as it is across the entire continents of Africa and Asia, and further isolation would damage the UK and EU’s chance to follow AGOA’s example and cement meaningful engagement with African countries.[13]

Moreover, the openings left by the US, UK and EU’s insistence on continued uni-polarity has allowed Russia to pursue its commitments in Africa and strengthen its economic ties, which are approached without interference in domestic affairs or tying aid to good governance.^[14] To counteract this, the West does not have to abandon its commitment to democracy but must rather engage equally and respectfully. Many across the entire continent have not forgotten being bussed to Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral, called ‘shithole countries’ by a sitting US president, or witnessing hypocrisy between words and actions on democracy and human rights. In short, something more has to be brought to the table.

Russia’s authoritarianism is a stark contrast to South Africa’s non-racial, rights-based constitution and democracy, so historical support aside they are extremely uncomfortable bedfellows. The US, UK and the European Union should highlight this, bringing South Africa back into the fold by fostering a respectful relationship, not as a former colony, nor as a weapon in a new cold war, but as a democratic nation-state.[15] In turn, this may highlight that Russia’s respect goes only as far as its own economic and strategic interests, creating an opportunity to slow its insidious influence.

Cameron Scheijde is a political communications professional who grew up in Johannesburg, with specialist knowledge of African political affairs. He holds Master’s degrees in African Studies and Political Theory from the University of Oxford, and has formerly worked as an Africa expert for the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation and as a Researcher for Justice Albie Sachs at the South African Constitutional Court. He can be followed on Twitter @camscheijde.

Disclaimer: The view expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Image by www.kremlin.ru.

^[1] Peter Fabricius, Pretoria scrambles to repair relations with Russia after calling for invasion forces to leave Ukraine, Daily Maverick, February 2022 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-27-pretoria-scrambles-to-repair-relations-with-russia-after-calling-for-invasion-force-to-leave-ukraine/

^[2] Naledi Pandor, Minister Naledi Pandor on Russia / Ukraine Conflict, South African Government, April 2022 https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-naledi-pandor-russia-ukraine-conflict-8-apr-2022-0000

^[3] Eyewitness News, 30 March 2023, https://ewn.co.za/0001/01/01/minister-pandor-says-russia-an-old-historical-friend

^[4] Tom Eaton, The flip flopping ANC has a lot to be grateful to Russia for, TimesLive, March 2022 https://select.timeslive.co.za/ideas/2022-02-28-the-flip-flopping-anc-has-a-lot-to-be-grateful-to-russia-for/

^[5] Eusebius McKaiser, Twitter, February 2022 https://twitter.com/Eusebius/status/1498394725572829188

^[6] John Steenhuisen, Address by DA leader, Polity, https://www.polity.org.za/article/da-john-steenhuisen-address-by-da-leader-during-an-urgent-debate-on-the-impact-of-the-russian-federations-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-south-african-economy-parliament-15032022-2022-03-15, David Pilling, South Africa’s Russia stance shows it has lost the moral high ground, Financial Times, February 2023 https://www.ft.com/content/02085c6c-7ae5-4dd0-817d-7ce3f49ea303

^[7] Brian Pottinger, Why South Africa is siding with Russia, Unherd, November 2022 https://unherd.com/2022/11/why-south-africa-is-siding-with-russia/

^[8] ​​ Jérémy Lissouba, Relations with Africa, Asia are on the brink of collapse – to Russia’s benefit, Politico, March 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/relations-africa-asia-brink-collapse-russia-benefit/

^[9] ​​Ibid

^[10] Julian Borger, South Africa’s President and Party Sow Confusion over Leaving ICC, The Guardian, April 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/25/south-africas-president-and-party-sow-confusion-over-leaving-icc

^[11] Kuben Chetty, Putin has confirmed he will attend BRICS summit in Durban says SA’s BRICS sherpa, IOL, April 2023, https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/putin-has-confirmed-he-will-attend-brics-summit-in-durban-says-sas-brics-sherpa-4600c86d-ebec-4477-8098-6d0ddb6c20b8; Amanda Khoza, SA’s quiet push for virtual Putin visit to solve ICC arrest warrant dilemma, Sunday Times, 30 April 2023 https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2023-04-30-sas-quiet-push-for-virtual-putin-visit-to-solve-icc-arrest-warrant-dilemma/

^[12]  Cyril Ramaphosa, ‘BRICS partnership has great value for South Africa’, BRICS Summit 2022, June 2022, http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/tpzx/202206/t20220621_10707340.html

^[13]  William Worley, Nearly double UK aid spent on refugees at home than on Asia and Africa, Devex, April 2023 https://www.devex.com/news/nearly-double-uk-aid-spent-on-refugees-at-home-than-on-asia-and-africa-105288

^[14] SAIIA, ‘Moscow’s Continent: The Principles of Russia’s Africa Policy Engagement’, Occassional Paper 341, March 2023, https://saiia.org.za/research/moscows-continent-the-principles-of-russias-africa-policy-engagement/

[15] NPR, ‘Russia and the West are vying for influence in Africa and Ukraine is a big reason why’, Associated Press, July 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/07/28/1114187972/russia-and-the-west-are-vying-for-influence-in-africa-and-ukraine-is-a-big-reaso

Six leaders of former Soviet states attended the 9 May Parade on Red Square this week to commemorate the end of World War II (WWII) in Europe in 1945.[1] Among them was the leader of Armenia, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The two other countries of the South Caucasus – Georgia and Azerbaijan – did not participate.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has elicited a range of reactions from countries around the world, the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have found themselves balancing between their aspirations for independent diplomacy and Russia’s enduring influence in their region. These countries view the war in Ukraine through the lens of their own conflicts – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). The extent of their political dependence on Moscow varies, meaning that their responses to the war have differed as well.

As a country that has had its own conflict with Russia over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, some might have expected that Georgia’s response would have been more aligned with that of Western countries. However, the leadership in the capital Tbilisi looked at the events through the prism of the challenges presented before it. The Georgian side, despite expressing its opposition to Russia’s actions, was extremely critical of the Ukrainian leadership, which at one point claimed that in order to lighten their own burden in Kyiv, a  ‘Second Frontline’ should be opened in Georgia.[2]

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, tries to keep a balance between Russia and the West. In many international fora, Azerbaijan has refrained from participating in any decisions against Russia. For example, Azerbaijan opted out of the vote to terminate Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe and similarly from the vote on the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council.[3] However, having signed energy deals with both Russia (to import Russian gas to Azerbaijan) and the European Union (to double the flow of gas to Europe in five years), Azerbaijan is in a good position to profit by maintaining this balancing act[4]. Most notably, those in the capital Baku look to Russia in relation to its significant role in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, while demonstrably showing support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity (which is the main line of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), President Aliyev still maintains relatively friendly relations with Russia, including keeping silent when the Azerbaijani honorary consulate in Kharkiv was destroyed by Russian airstrikes in March 2022.

By contrast, Armenia’s position is more difficult. In light of its devastating defeat to Azerbaijan in the second Karabakh War in 2020, Armenia’s response to the war in Ukraine has been more cautious.  The leader of Armenia, Prime Minister Pashinyan, even avoided calling the Russian invasion a war, instead referring to it from the outset as “the events in Ukraine”.[5] Yet he harshly reacted to the disinformation that Armenia had sent Su-30SM multifunctional jets to Russia, demonstrating a desire to make it clear that Armenia is not helping Russia in this war.[6] Nevertheless, Armenia’s relations with Russia are at a historical low, due to the country’s disappointment with Moscow’s actions during the 2020 Karabakh War and inaction during the attack by Azerbaijan on the territory of Armenia proper in 2022, when Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) stayed silent.[7]

The situation is antagonised further by Azerbaijan’s continued blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Armenians of Artsakh to the rest of the world.[8] The tension between Armenia and Russia showed itself once again when Azerbaijan, in a move denounced by Yerevan as a violation of the November 9 Trilateral statement, installed a checkpoint on the Hakari Bridge at the entrance to the Lachin corridor.[9] Amidst the apparent indifference or inaction from the Russian peacekeepers deployed to the region, the United States and France, two key countries involved in mediating the negotiations, have voiced their concerns over Azerbaijan’s establishment of the checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, considering that a step that “undermines the ongoing efforts to build confidence in the peace process“.[10] A statement by Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2023 called “on the Russian Federation to finally fulfil the obligation under provision 6 of the Trilateral statement by eliminating the illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor”.[11] Indeed, Russia seemingly does not wish to confront Azerbaijan, while President Aliyev looks to gain an advantage from Russia’s war, namely the ability to apply pressure on Armenia.

This situation, and Armenia’s recent shift towards the West, might have a knock-on impact on the country’s stance on the war in Ukraine. However, while the political centre of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has moved to the West (the next round of peace talks are to be held in Brussels), Armenia’s dependence on Moscow remains strong. [12]  This could explain Pashinyan’s decision to visit Moscow on May 9. Nevertheless, this may not be the only reason.

Since 9^th May 1992, when Armenian forces entered the town of Shushi (Shusha for Azerbaijanis) in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, May 9 has embodied not only the 1945 victory for Armenians. Every year Armenia’s leaders have congratulated the nation on the 1992 historic victory as well; and prior to the country’s defeat in the 2020 war, Pashinyan was no exception.[13] However, this year Pashinyan noted in his address “In recent years, we celebrate May 9 with bitterness and anxiety. This is primarily related with the severe consequences of the 44-day war of 2020, with the loss of Shushi during the war, with the aggressive policy unfolding around Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia”.[14]

In this context, Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow could be seen as a helpful deviation from the tradition of visiting the Yerablur Military Pantheon, where many of those who died fighting for Nagorno-Karabakh rest. With previous visits resulting in uncomfortable political scandals, avoiding this scenario fits with the adopted policy of Pashinyan’s government to achieve peace at any cost and to prevent angering Azerbaijan, and its patron Turkey, in any way. This aside, Moscow also retains the means by which to pressure Pashinyan to participate in the events in Red Square, in order to show that Putin and Moscow still have friends and are not isolated from the world.[15] Potential coercion and blackmail could be effective, especially given the Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia proper, the Azerbaijani blockade of the Lachin corridor and the Russian military presence in Armenia.[16]

In contrast to Pashinyan, and in a move mostly likely designed to demonstrate that the city is under Azerbaijani control, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva spent 9th May in Shushi*.[17] Interestingly, the President’s website made no mention of a visit to a memorial dedicated to the victory of May 9, 1945. The leader of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili meanwhile opted for a third way.[18] He laid a bouquet of flowers at the monument of Meliton Kantaria, a Georgian sergeant in the Soviet Army, and spoke with veterans of WWII. The whole emphasis of the event was Georgians’ participation in WWII, with the May 9 victory seen as a national rather than Soviet celebration.

The varied responses by the countries of the South Caucasus to the war in Ukraine, and their level of engagement with Moscow, clearly reflect their complex relationships with Russia as well as the conflicts within their own region. Understanding these can provide important insights into the political dynamics in the region as well as the broader geopolitical landscape. Yet it is difficult to predict with certainty how this might evolve in the near future. While the complex historical, geopolitical, and security considerations will remain unchanged, some shifts towards the West have already been observed. The ultimate outcome of the war in Ukraine will inevitably have an impact, but the current ties and dependencies on Russia, as well as the unresolved conflicts in the region, will continue to strongly shape each country’s position in the near future.

Naira Sahakyan is a Senior Researcher at the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute and is a Visiting Scholar at the University of Cambridge and part of a Turkish-Armenian Relations research project hosted by Cambridge Interfaith Programme and funded by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. She is also lecturing at the American University of Armenia and Yerevan State University. Follow her on Twitter @NSahakyan

*Editorial note: As referenced earlier in the article, different place names are used – Shushi for Armenians and Shusha for Azerbaijanis.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

[1] RadioFreeEurope, Russia Holds Victory Day Celebrations Amid Fresh Strikes On Ukraine, May 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-president-russia-visit-japarov-putin-victory-day/32400550.html

[2] Prime Minister of Georgia Official Website, Keynote Speech Delivered during Interpellation at the Plenary Session of the Parliament of Georgia, March 2023, https://garibashvili.ge/en/n/all/gamosvla_parlamentshi_interpelatsiis_formatshi

[3] United Nations UN News, UN Affairs Team, UN General Assembly votes to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council, April 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782

[4] David O’Byrne, Azerbaijan’s Russian Gas Deal Raises Uncomfortable Questions for European, Eurasianet, November 2022, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-russian-gas-deal-raises-uncomfortable-questions-for-europe; O’Byrne, Azerbaijan and EU Agree to Strategic Energy Partnership, Eurasianet, July 2022, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-and-eu-agree-to-strategic-energy-partnership

[5] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s speech at the National Assembly during the discussion of the performance report of the Government Action Plan for 2021, April 2022, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2022/04/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/

[6] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, It is necessary to launch an international mechanism for the monitoring of the border situation, Nikol Pashinyan, March 2022, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2022/03/31/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/

[7] The Collective Security Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance in Eurasia consisting of six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. See – https://en.odkb-csto.org/

[8] Amnesty International, Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted, February 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-putting-thousands-of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/

[9] Commonspace.EU, Document: Full text of the agreement between the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, November 2022, https://www.commonspace.eu/news/document-full-text-agreement-between-leaders-russia-armenia-and-azerbaijan

[10]  The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, Azerbaijan – Lachin corridor, April 2023, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/azerbaijan/news/article/azerbaijan-lachin-corridor-23-april-2023; US Department of State Website, Press Release, Actions on the Lachin Corridor, April 2023, https://www.state.gov/actions-on-the-lachin-corridor/

[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Press Release, The Statement of MFA of Armenia regarding the installation of an illegal checkpoint by Azerbaijan in the Lachin corridor, April 2023. https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/04/23/statement_lachincorridor/11980

[12] Henry Foy, Armenia and Azerbaijan to resume peace talks in Brussels, FT, May 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/f42c16b6-1c36-4d14-ab51-9d85e1da4d49?fbclid=IwAR3JofpNjlSOgyFv6sWtjwqZlXhA6fhEn5Ip01GvsJ-QNI08OOZ2ipTbysw

[13] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, Congratulatory Message by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Victory and Peace Day, May 2019, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2019/05/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-Congratulations-May-9/

[14] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, Congratulatory Message by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Victory and Peace Day, May 2019, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2019/05/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-Congratulations-May-9/

[15] Hetq, Yerevan Police Remove Protesters at Yerevan’s Yerablur Pantheon, Sep 2022, https://hetq.am/en/article/148531

[16] Natalia Konarzewska, What’s behind the new round of clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, New Eastern Europe, September 2022, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/09/20/armenia-azerbaijan-pelosi-russia-ukraine/; Amnesty International. Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted, February, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-putting-thousands-of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/

[17]  President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev Official Website, Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva examined works to be carried out in front of administrative building of Special Representative Office in Shusha, May 2023, https://president.az/en/articles/view/5966

[18] Government of Georgia Official Website, Irakli Garibashvili: I wish to first of all congratulate our heroic veterans on this day, marking the defeat of this huge evil – fascism – and our victory over it, May 2022, https://www.gov.ge/en/news/357782?page=&year=