Corruption and reform in Uzbekistan: The elephant is still in the room

Article by Professor Kristian Lasslett

July 14, 2020

Corruption and reform in Uzbekistan: The elephant is still in the room

When Uzbekistan’s first post-Soviet President, Islam Karimov, passed away in September 2016, he left behind a complex legacy. Uzbekistan had not suffered prolonged instability, armed conflict, or state-failure, like in certain other post-Soviet spaces. On the other hand, life had become increasingly choreographed by an authoritarian state, buttressed by an expansive surveillance apparatus, and arbitrary forms of violence.[1] Behind the state lay opaque cliques of security chiefs, politicians, mandarins, businessmen, and select organised crime figures, who built personal alliances, and leveraged unchecked state power, to administer rackets and protect economic territory. In the academic literature neo-patrimonialism and clientelism have been employed to describe these dynamics.[2] Victims interviewed by the author have used the more visceral phrase, mafia-state (this denotes the state operates like a mafia organisation, not that the state has been captured by an outside crime group). Each term, in their own way, depict how power to make political and economic decisions in Uzbekistan, with profound implications for the distribution of wealth and the enjoyment of human rights, has been captured by closed, elite networks and frequently used for improper ends.

Islam Karimov’s Presidential successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has attempted to shed some of these legacies by framing himself as an ambitious moderniser with an appetite for greater levels of transparency and accountability.[3] This has presaged a raft of pro-business reforms, and some market liberalisation measures. These reforms have met cautious enthusiasm at home and at times rapturous applause from abroad. In a context marked by hope and goodwill, pointing to the enduring challenge of corruption and kleptocracy triggers the risk of being labelled a ‘spoiler’. Yet it is an issue that is difficult to avoid. Deeply entrenched political-economic structures, and the institutional and social cultures they are syncopated with, are difficult to shift, especially in a top-down manner where those in power have excelled because of their ability to navigate this particular environment.

It is important, therefore, that the enduring spectre of grand corruption is considered and calculated into any analysis of the reform process in Uzbekistan.[4] Even as this essay is being edited, reports are emerging in Uzbekistan that may tie the Sardoba dam collapse, and emergency COVID-19 spending, to corruption.[5] Accordingly, understanding and challenging the practices, processes, relationships and structures that systemically reproduce grand corruption remains an important task.

The documentation and clinical analysis of such practices trigger challenges. Processes captured under the rubric of corruption, are frequently understood in quantitative terms using different measurement tools. It is exceedingly difficult, given the secretive nature of such transactions and the often unchecked power enjoyed by practitioners, to qualitatively document them, at least at a grand level. Without qualitative documentation based on representative and robust samples, it is difficult in turn to produce sophisticated and reliable forms of analysis that can guide policy and practice.

Against this challenging backdrop the following essay takes an inductive approach, working off investigative data-sets pertaining to a number of cases in order to formulate a series of evidence based hypotheses on the structures and drivers that stimulate grand corruption in Uzbekistan.

The first part of this essay deals with a classic case study on corruption in Uzbekistan, looking at the underpinning structures its content points to. Then the analysis turns to two contemporary case studies relating to the Mirziyoyev era, where serious governance concerns have been raised, in order to consider whether they exhibit similar traits to this classic case. The conclusions that follow from this will then be employed to deduce how the underpinning system these cases are outward evidence of, may mediate reform process outcomes.

Gulnara Karimova: A Baseline for Grand Corruption Studies in Uzbekistan

The eldest daughter of Islam Karimov, Gulnara Karimova, is currently serving a custodial sentence in Uzbekistan for a series of criminal convictions relating to corrupt activity that a range of authorities assert took place between 2000 and 2012.[6] This activity has also been the subject of international asset forfeiture, civil litigation, and foreign jurisdiction prosecutions.[7] Researchers, as a result, have access to granular detail on the underpinning activity. This classic case, therefore, serves as an instructive baseline window into a wider system.

The first point to note is that the evidence, and judicial findings, indicate Karimova headed a powerful organised crime syndicate that was embedded within the Uzbek state.[8] This network featured an inner core of fixers, managers, envoys and proxies, who were intimately involved in the group’s day to day business affairs. In addition, the syndicate also enjoyed ties to a non-core set of high profile fixers and envoys, who prosecuted the group’s affairs on a needs basis

Syndicate activities, the evidence indicates, were conducted with the assistance and complicity of senior state officials, and enacted through a diverse range of state organs. These organs included cabinet, government committees, ministries, the courts, sector regulators, and the security services. These different state levers enabled the syndicate to expropriate businesses, monopolise markets, solicit bribes, and administer extortion rackets. Through these activities the syndicate was able to develop a diverse portfolio of business interests across a range of sectors including services, construction, manufacturing, industrial, retail, natural resources, and finance. Once markets and businesses had been seized, they continued to be operated on a privileged basis, drawing on special state treatment, reportedly generating significant profits for the syndicate.

A range of international actors and jurisdictions have in practice proved essential buttresses for this activity. It appears European and North American businesses have been consenting parties to protection rackets. Foreign telecommunications providers in particular, were aware of the Karimova syndicate’s racketeering activities, and the ultimate beneficiary. While overseas banks in the United Kingdom (UK), Switzerland and Latvia have been employed as key conduits for syndicate money laundering operations. It is less clear from the public record how culpable these financial institutions are. However, the group’s primary bankers in these regions have a documented criminal history. A range of corporate services were offered by the British Overseas Territories. This enabled syndicate activities to be conducted with secrecy and security.

Karimova used these arrangement to grow her own personal wealth. She was able to obtain productive assets that could generate profit, and then operate them under privileged conditions that augmented financial returns. This income was supplemented by rents derived from non-productive assets such as real-estate, and bribes/protection payments solicited from companies seeking market access. Businesses were also in a position where they had to accommodate syndicate commercial proposals, regardless of merits. Failure to do so risked state persecution and loss of assets. The wealth generated was transformed into political capital, through funding a wide range of charitable initiatives that positioned Karimova as a potential successor to her father. However, this was a highly competitive process at an elite level. Subsequently Karimova herself experienced expropriation and imprisonment after influential rivals organised against her. This is one potential exit point for ‘game’ losers.

Subsequent investigative research by the author indicates that the schemes and practices summarised above, were at the more extreme end of the spectrum in terms of volume and the tactics employed. However, the opaque use of state power to obtain unfair commercial advantage, the use of complex offshore structures that conceal beneficial ownership and conflicts of interest, the provision of state aid to politically exposed entities without transparent rationale, the use of illegal methods to make augmented profits, expropriation and intra-elite cannibalisation of corporate assets, and the cultivation of significant private business portfolios by senior state officials and their family, remain systemic features of Uzbekistan’s political-economy. Karimova’s case represents an instance where these dynamics were taken to their most extreme. But evidence indicates that in the Mirziyoyev era, these dynamics remain an enduring mediation that will shape reform outcomes. One recent example that exhibits some of these ongoing challenges is the controversial mega-project, Tashkent City.

The Tashkent City Mega-Project

Tashkent City is a major US$1.3 billion property development in the heart of Tashkent.[9] It was ushered in by the Mirziyoyev government as a powerful urban signal of its modernising agenda.[10] Once complete Tashkent City will consist of residential complexes, retail, business and financial districts, Hilton and Radisson branded hotels, a Congress Centre, and a large recreational park boasting a 7D cinema, planetarium and wax museum. The property development is divided into eight lots. Each lot has a designated investor or investors, a designer, and general contractor responsible for construction efforts.

A government directorate was set up to coordinate the project, in collaboration with private investors, designers, and construction companies. Article eight of the Cabinet of Ministers decree governing Tashkent City states that investors would be selected through a tender process, which would be set out in future regulations.[11] Under the decree Tashkent City investors stood to benefit from significant state aid including tax and customs exemptions.

No transparent tender process took place. The Mayor’s Office and Tashkent City Directorate confirm that investors were selected by an Administrative Council set up under the originating decree.[12] Members of the Administrative Council include the Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, the Ministers for Finance, Economics, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Internal Affairs, Chairmen and Directors of various state committees and public enterprises, the Mayor of Tashkent and the head of the public directorate responsible for Tashkent City. A request was made for investor bid and selection documents. The Tashkent Mayoral Office responded: ‘Administrative Council documents relating to the approval of investors are internal documents for official use, and therefore, we are not able to give them to you’.[13] When questions were asked about the level of due diligence conducted during the selection and award process, the Mayor of Tashkent, Jahongir Artikhodjayev, informed the media, ‘if we ask the beneficiary for each investor, we can close the gates of Uzbekistan, nobody will come here’.[14]

This remark followed an exposé published by Open Democracy in the UK.[15] Their investigation claimed that shares in Tashkent City’s biggest foreign investor, Hyper Partners GmbH – which is providing US$400 million – were owned by a teenager, Mustafa Palvan. The investors in lots one, five, and seven, and the general contractor selected for lots one, five, seven and eight, also triggered serious governance concerns.

Table 1: 2019 shareholding profile of investors and contractor for lots one, five, seven and eight, Tashkent City[16]

Company	Role	Lot	Shareholders
High Land City	Investor	One	Ismail Israilov (81.24%), Techno Continental (8.19%), Next Generation Product (8.17%), and Azizxuja Azlarov (2.40%)
Akfa Dream World	Investor	Five	Perfect Plast Profil (21.4%) (April 2020 update[17]: Wide Tent System 31.45%, Techno Continental 21.36%, Perfect Plast Profil 19.23%, Asia Electron 12.92%, Atlant Metal 6.44%, Baxodir Abdullayev 8.6%)
Premium Village	Investor	Seven	Ismail Israilov (23.28%), Quality Electronics (37.2%), Asia Electron (28.51%), Factory of Technologies (9.3%), Athamjon Israilov (1.17%)
Discover Invest	Contractor	One, Five, Seven and Eight	Abror Ganiyev (86.18%), Sobirjon Xakimov (13.82%)

Table 1 indicates that Ismail Israilov and Abror Ganiyev were both key shareholders. At the time, both individuals were managers in the Akfa-Artel group of companies. The corporate shareholders identified in Table 1, were tied to the same conglomerate. Akfa-Artel thus emerged as a key player in Tashkent City. This prompted particular concern as a result of the fact both Akfa and Artel were founded by the Mayor of Tashkent (2018-current), Jahongir Artikhodjayev, who served in 2017-18 as head of the public directorate responsible for implementing Tashkent City.[18]

Further corporate data collated between January and May of 2019, confirmed that Ganiyev jointly owned at least four companies with Jahongir Artikhodjayev, he co-owned a further three companies in the Akfa-Artel group (at least three), has been identified as an executive in two Akfa-Artel linked entities, and was appointed Chairman of the Board at Akfa.[19] Additionally, the registered address for Discover Invest, contractor for lots one, five, seven and eight, was found to be the same as J-United Group, a key holding company 100 per cent owned during 2019 by the Mayor of Tashkent.

Israilov exhibited a similar profile to Ganiyev. He was, for instance, listed as a Manager at Akfa Engineering and Management, a firm at the time 100 per cent owned by Jahongir Artikhodjayev. In addition to this, the data-set revealed that Israilov co-owned at least four companies with Artikhodjayev, he was sole shareholder in six companies linked to the Akfa- Artel group, and co-owned at least four companies with Abror Ganiyev.

Ganiyev and Israilov were both asked if they held the shares on behalf of a third party. Neither individual responded. The Mayor of Tashkent’s office denied he had an interest in Tashkent City.[20] Because of the Akfa-Artel group’s use of opaque offshore holding companies (see Table 2), and Ganiyev/Israilov’s silence on the matter, it was impossible to verify whether or not the Mayor of Tashkent had a beneficial interest in Tashkent City. It could be verified though that the Mayor retained significant beneficial interests in the Akfa-Artel group.

Because Administrative Council tender records were withheld, Artikhodjayev’s potential role in the selection process for Tashkent City investors could not be scrutinised either.

Table 2: Offshore ownership structure of investor for lots one, five, and seven, Tashkent City[21]

Company	Shareholders	Person with Significant Control (UK only)
Techno Continental	Wynex Innovation LLP (100%)	None declared
Next Generation Product	MacMerry Management LP (50%), Singapore Syndicate Group Pte Ltd (50%)	Dalston Management LP (Dalston Management declares no PSC)
Perfect Plast Profil	Esperansa Group LP (100%)	Esperansa Incorporated LP[22]
Wide Tent System	Esperansa Group LP (100%)	Esperansa Incorporated LP
Asia Electron	MacMerry Management LLP (50%), Commerce Standard Pte Ltd (50%)	Dalston Management LP (Dalston Management declares no PSC)
Quality Electronics	MacMerry Management LP (50%), Commerce Standard Pte Ltd (50%)	Dalston Management LP (Dalston Management declares no PSC)
Factory of Technologies	MacMerry Management LP (50%), Singapore Syndicate Group Pte Ltd (50%)	Dalston Management LP (Dalston Management declares no PSC)

After the above details were published in the international and national media, a leaked audio-recording emerged. The voice recording is reported to be the Tashkent Mayor.[23] The recorded voice makes serious threats against the media. The threats include disappearing journalists, or subjecting them to false allegations of a homophobic nature.

Given the levels of state secrecy experienced, it is difficult to substantively compare and contrast this case with the example of Gulnara Karimova. However, there are certain prima facie parallels. First, we observe in the case of Tashkent City a major state organised economic opportunity being awarded through closed channels, instead of a transparent open tender. Second, numerous corporate beneficiaries of the subsequent awards made through a closed process, exhibit a range of red flags. These red flags include the use of opaque offshore holding companies, further camouflaged in one instance by a persons with significant control declaration that violates UK transparency laws (see footnote 22). Third, some of the key corporate beneficiaries of this mega-project are tied to the Akfa-Artel conglomerate, a group founded by the current Mayor of Tashkent, who previous served as head of the Tashkent City directorate. No conflict of interest has been acknowledged by the Mayor’s office. Finally, following a period of heightened scrutiny it appears the Mayor used serious threats to intimidate journalists. This echoes the coercive tactics experienced by residents displaced by the Tashkent City project.[24]

These features of Tashkent City, as a totality, reflect many of the risk factors exhibited by the Karimova case between 2000 and 2012, which were subsequently found to be the outward symptoms of corrupt activity following extensive investigation by justice agencies in multiple jurisdictions. While Tashkent City may exhibit a number of the same red flags documented in the Karimova case, it cannot be factually established the same types of corruption underpin Tashkent City. Given the Uzbekistani state’s opposition to basic forms of transparency in this case, it is unlikely there will be any state-led attempt to verify whether or not the red flags pointed to above are symptomatic of impropriety. However, based off the information collated to date, and the state secrecy surrounding Tashkent City, serious concerns remain over the probity of this mega-project.

These concerning structural features exhibited by Tashkent City were observed in a sector wide study of cotton conducted during 2019. Although, in this study more granular detail was uncovered on certain key corporate players.

Evaluating Cotton Sector Integrity

Agriculture, cotton cultivation, and associated forms of manufacturing, including textiles, constitutes a key pillar of Uzbekistan’s economy. Textile companies in particular are among some of the largest and most influential concerns in Uzbekistan. The cultivation of raw cotton, however, has been seriously tarnished by a quota-system reliant on state-organised forced labour regimes. To address this serious human rights issue, stimulate new investment, and enhance value-added activity, the Government of Uzbekistan implemented a privatisation programme in the cotton sector through a ‘cluster’ system.[25]

Cotton clusters are vertically integrated production units, organised on a district basis. Cluster operators, primarily textile companies, are responsible for overseeing the production of cotton and its conversion into value added products. Transparent, competitive tender processes were not employed to select cluster operators. Instead, the governing decrees state that cluster operators have been picked on the basis of a proposal made by each company in conjunction with the relevant regional government.[26] The Ministry for Agriculture, and the President’s Office, failed to respond to a written freedom of information request for these proposals sent in the required format. Under the law, On the Openness of the Activities of Public Authorities and Administration, authorities must respond within 15 days of registering a request.[27]

In light of the sector’s fragile human rights record, a corporate integrity analysis was conducted of 71 cluster operators looking at a series of benchmarks linked to financial transparency, corporate governance, and professional track record.[28] Following an initial iteration of the research in early 2019, a scorecard system was developed and applied to twenty representative clusters. Green flags were awarded for evidence of good practice, red flags were awarded where bad practice was documented, while amber flags were reserved for situations where key benchmarks could not be verified due to a lack of corporate information on the public record (direct requests were also made to companies for information). A systematic application of the scorecard revealed a high proportion of red (41 per cent) and amber flags (49 per cent). This indicated that companies operating the cluster system were opaque, and where records could be located, they exhibited concerning features.

One example of this is the Uztex group. Uztex brands itself as the largest textile company in Uzbekistan. It is a conglomerate made up of primarily limited liability companies, which are responsible for different aspects of group operations. Uztex was founded by Fakhritdin Mamatdjanov and his son Farkhod.[29] The Mamatdjanov family are also the principal owners of Invest Finance Bank, which encountered negative publicity after it was found managing significant accounts connected to Gulnara Karimova (although to the author’s knowledge Uzbek authorities have not charged the bank for any offences relating to Karimova or her companies).[30]

Shares in Uztex are held primarily through a complex offshore structure, using incorporated entities in Switzerland, Singapore and the UK. The General Director of a Russian subsidiary alleged to Uzbek authorities that the group’s key Swiss offshore vehicle has been used by Farkhod Mamatdjanov to covertly facilitate criminal activities.[31] Subsequently, Russian authorities seized corporate property as part of a criminal investigation into Mamatdjanov.[32]

Leaked Uztex internal records raise further concerns. They indicate that Uztex contracted to buy US$84 million in equipment from Swiss multinational, Rieter, for two Uzbek operations, Textile Finance Namangan LLC and Textile Finance Khorezm LLC.[33] Rieter is a highly regarded supplier of premium industrial equipment to the textile sector. Following the initial agreements in 2017, Rieter then subcontracted the job to a little known British Limited Liability Partnership, Wayrex LLP.[34] Wayrex LLP is a ‘trade agent for polymeric raw materials’.[35] Wayrex LLP is also a significant holding company in the Uztex group. Rieter was asked why they subcontracted the job back to the very group which had made the purchase, especially given that according to public disclosures Wayrex LLP is a minor trade agent. The company responded ‘it is a common practice in our industry that machine manufactures like Rieter are trusted with the coordination of different suppliers’.[36] Rieter claim only one of the two contracts with the Uztex group went ahead.

Another example from the cluster system involves Beshariq Tekstil and Amudaryotex. These two cluster operators are significant, established textile companies. Investigations revealed that both companies had acted as guarantors for significant loans provided to affiliated Russian companies by Russia’s Starbank. These loans were defaulted on during March 2016.[37] In the same month Starbank lost its banking license and was eventually declared bankrupt. Starbank’s appointed trustee Russia’s Deposit Insurance Agency, claims senior Starbank executives, including its Chairman Agadzhan Avanesov, knowingly formed bad debts.[38] Russian newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, claims this bad debt was formed with companies owned by the Chairman.[39]

After corporate filings were analysed, it was discovered that Beshariq Tekstil is part owned by Avanesov, through a British limited liability partnership, Vertical Alliance LLP.[40] Amudaryotex at the time inquiries were made during 2019 was owned by Mirakbar Yakubzhanov, through British holding company, Welroy Technology Ltd.[41] Yakubzhanov and Avanesov are former business affiliates. Avanesov, who is now based in Geneva, denies allegations made by Russian authorities and media. Avanesov claims his commercial relationship with Yakubzhanov ended in litigation, where he was awarded USD1.33 million.[42] Russian media reports from July 2019 claim Avanesov remains wanted by authorities, a claim he denies.[43]

Thinking about Reform and Grand Corruption

The high profile case of Gulnara Karimova projected the image of a political-economy where lucrative sectors were being seized by senior regime figures, and their close affiliates, through opaque means that relied on the covert and improper application of authoritarian state power. These commercial arrangements readily availed of international corporate and financial infrastructure to further conceal activities, launder proceeds, and safely manage assets abroad. The application of coercive state-power was used to intimidate targets of different racketeering operations.

Research into two of the most significant projects shepherded into being by the Mirziyoyev government, indicates that they exhibit some of the same core governance weaknesses and corporate red flags that marked the preceding era. It cannot be factually inferred that the same forms of criminality are generating these red flags. However, in light of previous patterns, their systematic appearance is a matter of serious concern.

In the case of Tashkent City companies closely linked to the Mayor benefited from significant state facilitated investment and construction opportunities, awarded under notably opaque conditions. These companies employ extensive offshore structures which serve to conceal beneficial ownership arrangements. Tashkent City construction activities were prefaced by the use of coercion against residents, while subsequently according to news reports the Mayor has been recorded making threats to disappear journalists. Similarly, the cotton cluster research reveals state facilitated opportunities and aid, was awarded to corporate operators through an administrative process fundamentally lacking transparency. A significant number of corporate operators were found to be opaque, and making active use of offshore holding structures, which served to conceal beneficial ownership arrangements. Serious evidence was uncovered which tied cluster operators to improper activity. Since this study was concluded news reports have appeared, which accuse cluster operators of employing coercive tactics against farmers and workers.[44] In all of the above cases, the Mirziyoyev government potentially breached its own law by failing to respond to lawful requests for public administrative documents.

This data serves as an important reminder. Uzbekistan’s political economy functions through the close integration of authoritarian politics with choreographed market activity. In a country as large as Uzbekistan, there clearly remains space for business to emerge on a licit footing. However, at the upper echelons of society, where some of the most lucrative trade is done, evidence indicates that success is premised in part on political influence, the opaque provision of state aid which gives selected businesses commercial advantages, and the tactical use of illicit commercial strategies to engorge rates of profit and monopolise economic opportunities.

In the post-Karimov era it appears the upper hand has been gained by a more entrepreneurial class of elites, who can navigate this system with dexterity to accumulate wealth across a range of industries. Ground has been lost by a more conservative class of rent-seeking officials tied to the security state. Modest accommodations have also been made to civil society by the Mirziyoyev government. However, this appears to be driven more by reputational concerns that impact on investor/business confidence, rather than a conversion to liberal politics.

It would seem likely the Mirziyoyev government will achieve some success in implementing its modernising agenda. To the extent this grows the national wealth, it will disproportionately benefit elite networks, although this will likely take place alongside a general improvement in the standards of living for the wider population. With a larger economic pie, there is the potential for growing clusters of power to emerge allied to the President, but which also have independent capacity to prosecute political and economic objectives, navigating authoritarian capitalism to the power-cluster’s benefit. Indeed it is no contradiction to imagine that a successful process of authoritarian modernisation will increase levels of grand corruption, as different power-clusters look to game the system to augment their political influence and financial returns. In this scenario, which looks a likely one, opening up civil society, growing democratic institutions, and cultivating genuine agencies of oversight and accountability, constitutes a structure and culture that is highly antagonistic to this system as it stands, and thus is a dimmer prospect.

The outcomes of this prospective balance will be acceptable to many national and international elites who will benefit from a stable system of authoritarian capitalism mediated by certain unsaid national ‘realities’ i.e. systematic grand corruption, while improved standards of living and the continuing limits placed on civil society will weaken the potential for the type of spontaneous uprisings that were observed in the Middle East and Africa. And in a world where authoritarian politics is making a return, as global capitalism struggles with a range of existential threats, Uzbekistan’s state may find itself increasingly the norm rather than the exception.

Of course, even within this prospective balance of forces, there is room for incremental progressive change. As Uzbekistan opens up its capital markets, deregulates industries, and primes privatisation initiatives, economic transactions will increasingly be mediated through the corporate sector. There is a serious need to modernise the corporate law in Uzbekistan in order to strengthen corporate governance and corporate transparency. In line with this, there has been incremental improvements in governmental transparency. These improvements need to be built on. In particular to ensure, for example, open registers of interests are made mandatory for public officials, all public procurement is open and transparent, and important records, such as court documents, are made available to the public in a timely, accessible and unredacted manner.

International jurisdictions have a role to play too. In the UK the government has strengthened corporate transparency, but has failed to prosecute companies which submit false or improper filings. Nor is there a substantive system in place to actively detect irregular filings. Other jurisdictions used by Uzbekistani corporate groups such as Switzerland, Singapore, and Cyprus, are even further behind, with corporate registers that still permit the use of nominee directors, and where required, nominee shareholders. All of which creates an opportunity structure that allows improper dealings in Central Asia to be processed through international corporate and financial infrastructure, with looted value often resting in global centres of wealth, such as London, Paris and Geneva.

Finally, independent civil society in Uzbekistan is vulnerable. It operates under an environment of surveillance, where civil rights are far from assured. Furthermore, as Uzbekistan’s market, financial and public infrastructure rapidly changes, they present new challenges for civil society if it is to hold the powerful to account. This requires capacity building. We are seeing examples in the Uzbekistani media of data-driven journalism that exposes irregular commercial and public transactions. These seeds require nurturing. Resources are needed in order to strengthen civil society’s capacity to fully harness data sources, rights to information, data-processing facilities, and advocacy opportunities, so that the public has access to forensic information on the activities of government and the private sector, synthesised with critical analysis that can enrich the public’s capacity for political agency. Though, with opposition political activity forbidden in Uzbekistan significant limits remain in place on the public’s political agency.

Of course, we face one known unknown in Uzbekistan – the long-term impact of COVID-19 on an already fragile global political-economy. If a global recession is sparked, leading to serious downturn in Central Asia, the more predatory forms of racketeering observed in the Karimova case study may grow in appeal. If this coincides with diminished standards of living for the general population, these structural antagonisms could indeed provide the kindling for more radical forms of political challenge to the status quo, which we have observed for instance in neighbouring Kazakhstan.

Kristian Lasslett is Professor of Criminology at Ulster University, sits on the Board of the International State Crime Initiative and is Co-Director of Uz Investigations. He is an investigative researcher who works on corruption and kleptocracy in Central Asia, Europe and the South Pacific. Professor Lasslett’s work focuses on new ways data science, open source intelligence gathering, digital analytics, and traditional investigative methodologies, can be synthesised to help build theoretically rich understandings of how grand corruption shapes national and international political economy. His most recent book, Uncovering the Crimes of Urbanisation, was published by Routledge in 2018.

Photo by Tashkent City Park, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en

[1] Cooley, Alexander and Heathershaw, John. 2017. Dictators without borders. London: Yale University Press; David G. Lewis, Tackling corruption in Uzbekistan: A white paper, Open Society Foundations, June 2016, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/ff271daf-1f43-449d-a6a2-d95031e1247a/tackling-corruption-uzbekistan-20160524.pdf; Alexey Malashenko, Exploring Uzbekistan’s potential political transition, Carnegie Moscow Center, July 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Uzbekistan_web_Eng2014.pdf;

[2] See for example: Ceccarelli, Alessandra. Clans, politics and organized crime in Central Asia. Trends in Organized Crime 10(3): 19–36; Ilkhamov, Alisher. 2007. Neopatrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan. Central Asia Survey 26(1): 65–84; Walker, Justine. 2009. Drug trafficking and terrorism in Central Asia: An anatomy of Relationships. Phd Thesis: University of St Andrews.

[3] Edward Lemon, Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan: Democratization or authoritarian upgrading?, Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 2019, https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/lemonrpe4.pdf

[4] Transparency International define grand corruption as ‘the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many, and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society. It often goes unpunished’. See, anti-corruption glossary, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/grand_corruption

[5] Mutaxassislar: Sardobadagi falokat sababchisi shamol emas¸ qurilishlardagi dahshatli o‘g‘riliklardir!, Radio Ozodlik, May 2020, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/30587855.html; Маҳаллий нашр Сардобада кўпқаватли уйларни қурадиган ширкат Ортиқҳўжаевга алоқадорлигини фош қилди, Radio Ozodlik, May 2020, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/маҳаллий-нашр-сардобада-кўпқаватли-уйларни-қуриш-ҳуқуқини-олган-ширкат-ортиқҳўжаевга-алоқадорилигини-фош-қилди/30625879.html

[6] Gulnara Karimova sentenced again for corruption, financial crimes, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/gulnara-karimova-sentenced-again-for-corruption-financial-crimes/30495071.html

[7] See for example, Dutch prosecution of Uzbek-owned firm, Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, August 2016, https://www.uzbekforum.org/dutch-prosecution-of-uzbek-owned-firm-takilant/

[8] To survey the primary and secondary sources on which this summary is based, see Lasslett, Kristian. Kanji, Fatima. McGill, Daire. 2017. A dance with the cobra: Confronting grand corruption in Uzbekistan. London: International State Crime Initiative. Available online: https://statecrime.org/data/2017/08/Full-Report-with-Executive-Summary.pdf

[9] See http://www.tcibc.uz/

[10] Dilmira Matyakubova, Who is ‘Tashkent City’ for? Nation-branding and public dialogue in Uzbekistan, Central Asia Program Paper 205, June 2018, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/who-is-tashkent-city-for-nation-branding-and-public-dialogue-in-uzbekistan/https://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Matyakubova-CAP-Fellows-Paper-June-2018.pdf

[11] On measures to improve the architectural appearance and improvement of the central part of the city of Tashkent, as well as the creation of appropriate conditions for the population and guests of the capital, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Decree, No.559, July 2017, http://lex.uz/ru/docs/3295075

[12] Letter from B Rizaev, Deputy Director, Tashkent City Directorate, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019; Letter from E Iminov, Head of Administration Tashkent Mayor’s Office, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.

[13] Letter from E Iminov, Head of Administration Tashkent Mayor’s Office, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.

[14] ‘It doesn’t matter when a company is created’ – hokim about investors Tashkent City, Gazeta, January 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/01/31/investors

[15] Phantom foreign investors for an open new Uzbekistan, Open Democracy, December 2018, https://www. opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tashkent-city-project-uzbekistan-phantom-foreign-investors

[16] High Land City LLC, Company Extract, 597138; Akfa Dream World LLC, Company Extract, 557636; Premium Village LLC, Company Extract, 538977; Discover Invest LLC, Company Extract, 002784-05.

[17] During the original investigation in 2019 the company extract for Akfa Dream World could not be located. Only one shareholder was identified through stock exchange filings. Subsequently the commercial extract was identified.

[18] Akfa Group CEO Ortiqhojaev named interim Tashkent mayor, The Tashkent Times, April 2018, https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/2318-akfa-group-ceo-ortiqhojaev-named-interim-tashkent-mayor

[19] For a full breakdown of the data see, Breaking with the past? Conflicts of interest and transparency in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, London: Corruption and Human Rights Initiative. Available online: https://corruptionandhumanrights.org/app/uploads/2019/05/Breaking-with-the-Past-30-May-2019-FINAL.pdf

[20] Letter from E Iminov, Head of Administration Tashkent Mayor’s Office, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.

[21] Techno Continental JSC, Company Extract, 569933; Wynex Innovation LLP, Company Extract, OC393843, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC393843; Next Generation Production, Company Extract, 600194; MacMerry Management LP, Company Extract, SL011585, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL011585; Perfect Plast Profil JSC, Company Extract, 1633; Esperansa Group LP acquired a 100% stake in Perfect Plast Profil JSC, Tashkent Republic Stock Exchange, July 2018, https://www.uzse.uz/boards/539?locale=en; Esperansa Group LP, Company Extract, SL025982, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL025982; Wide Tent Systems JSC, Company Extract, 1652, accessed 15 September 2019; Asia Electron, Company Extract, 533066, accessed 19 May 2019; Quality Electronics, Company Extract, 561905; Factory of Technologies, Company Extract, 600187.

[22] Esperansa Incorporated LP is an English Limited Partnership and is not deemed a relevant legal entity for the purposes of PSC declarations under the Scottish Partnerships (Register of People with Significant Control) Regulations 2017. This is due to the fact English limited partnerships are not subject to equivalent transparency requirements that would permit the public to successfully trace the chain of PSCs.

[23] Farangis Najibullah, ‘No winners in this fight’: Journalists resign after Tashkent Mayor’s ‘death’ ‘gay threats’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-journalists-resign-after-tashkent-mayors-death-gay-threats-/30282235.html; Uzbekistan decides against charges over mayor’s threats against journalists, Reuters, November 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-uzbekistan-mayor-media/uzbekistan-decides-against-charges-over-mayors-threats-against-journalists-idUKKBN1Y11GB

[24] Atkhan Akhmedov, Dispossession and urban development in the new Tashkent, Open Democracy, December 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/dispossession-and-urban-development-in-the-new-tashkent/

[25] Shavkat Mirziyoyev: There are still 3.5 months before the end of the year, we should determine plans for next year today, Website of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, September 2018, https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/2024; Cluster system: Development prospects, Committee on Agriculture and Water Management, Oliy Majlis, May 2019, available online: http://parliament.gov.uz/ru/events/committee/25863/

[26] On measures to introduce modern forms of organising cotton-textile production, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Decree, January 2018, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/3527483; On additional measures for the further development of cotton and textile industries, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Decree, September 2018, https://www.lex.uz/docs/3906242

[27] On the openness of the activities of public authorities and administration, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.ZRU-369, 5 May 2014, https://lex.uz/docs/2381138

[28] Lasslett, Kristian and the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights. 2020. Out of the Cauldron, into the Fire? Risk and the Privatisation of Uzbekistan’s Cotton Sector. Belfast: University of Ulster.

[29] Work as the essence of life – Interview with Mamatjanov Fakhritdin Djuraevich, Uztex Magazine, Autumn 2017, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/59560256/eng-light-uztex-

[30] Ordinary general meeting of shareholders, InFinBank, June 2019, https://www.infinbank.com/en/investors/decisions/2019/06/2065/; Gulnara Karimova’s Terra group bank accounts have been frozen’, Radio Ozodlik, October 2013, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/25151464.html

[31] Stavropol Region Arbitration Court, Case No.A63 – 13475/2018, Decision, 19 December 2018.

[32] Stavropol Regional Court Criminal, Case No.22-958/2019, Appeal Decision, 26 February 2019.

[33] Contract No.21425014, Textile Finance Khorezm LLC and Rieter Machine Works Ltd, 10 May 2017; Contract No.21529101, Textile Finance Namangan LLC and Rieter Machine Works Ltd, 27 September 2017.

[34] Agreement between Textile Finance Khorezm LLC, Rieter Machine Works Ltd, and Wayrex LLP, 19 October 2017; Agreement between Textile Finance Namangan LLC, Rieter Machine Works Ltd, and Wayrex LLP, 19 October 2017

[35] Wayrex LLP, Report of the members for the financial period from 1.03.206 to 28.02.2017, April 2017, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC311533/filing-history

[36] Letter from Thomas Anwander, General Counsel, Rieter Management AG, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 18 October 2019.

[37] Moscow City Arbitration Court, Case No. A40-45399 / 18-25-340, Decision, 23 May 2019; Moscow City Arbitration Court, Case No A40-228454 / 17-25-1453, Decision, 8 May 2018.

[38] Deposit Insurance Agency, On filing an application on bringing subsidiary liability of controlling Starbank JSC, March 2019, https://www.asv.org.ru/liquidation/news/570136/

[39] Andrew Zayakin and Irek Murtazin, How are bankruptcy of a bank in Moscow and a fish factory in St. Petersburg connected with the serene life of Russians in Geneva, Novaya Gazeta, August 2018, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/24/77590-shveytsarskiy-beglets

[40] Beshariq Tekstil JSC, Company Extract, 35/2, accessed 22 December 2019; Vertical Alliance LLP, Company Extract, OC321610, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC321610/filing-history

[41] Amudaryotex LLC, Company Extract, 94, accessed 8 January 2019; Welroy Technology Ltd, Company Extract, 06857165, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06857165/filing-history

[42] Email from Mr Agadzhan Avanesov to Professor Kristian Lasslett, 26 February 2020.

[43] In St. Petersburg, a wanted co-owner of Starbank was spotted. The investigation believed that he lives in Switzerland, Fontanka, July 2019, https://www.fontanka.ru/2019/07/07/015/

[44] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Cotton clusters and the despair of Uzbek farmers: Land confiscations, blank contracts and failed payments, April 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COTTON-CLUSTERS-2_compressed.pdf

Topics

Civil Society

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

Reversing brain drain is the key to Uzbekistan’s future

Article by Navbahor Imamova

The COVID-19 pandemic threatens economies and has disrupted societies everywhere. To recover, restore, and rebuild, every country will need to lean on expertise and the very best of its human capital. However, in Central Asia, the bitter truth is that systems that were already struggling before the pandemic will suffer more because so many of their best and brightest have simply left. This brain drain of the region’s human capital now poses nearly as big a problem as the virus itself.

Once the pandemic fades, governments hope their citizens abroad can be enticed home to help their native countries heal from the effects of the pandemic, applying their knowledge, skills, networks and finances to the problems of recovery. Yet appeals to altruism and patriotism may not be sufficient. For instance, the region’s largest country, Uzbekistan, is already trying to find new and additional appeals to attract these specialists to return.

There are two schools of thought on this in Uzbekistan. One is that many intelligent and capable Uzbeks left because they were not valued by the established system. A second view claims that Uzbekistan still has many well-educated and skilled people inside the country but their skills are misapplied. Put bluntly, what remains of Uzbekistan’s human capital base is not doing the right things, or doing them in the right places.

This underlying problem of human capital has been one of the country’s hottest topics since late 2016, when Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power and promised to create a new Uzbekistan on the ashes of the late Islam Karimov’s stagnant dictatorship. However, to make that new Uzbekistan, and thus remake this hub of Central Asia, Mirziyoyev has had to expand his patriotic appeals, lean on an array of new incentives and enticements, and, ultimately, broaden the country’s political, economic, and intellectual establishment.

The patriotic piece of this appeal is the most straightforward. Proud of their ancient history, culture, and scientific heritage, Uzbeks have always shared the dream of a prosperous, truly independent society where people could achieve their own dreams and every citizen have a chance to thrive. In this, Uzbekistan is not unique. The ‘Uzbek dream’ has echoes in most developing countries, including those that are considered to be fast-rising powers, such as China and India. Like Uzbeks, millions of their citizens also live and work in the more advanced economies of North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. And also just like those countries, millions of Uzbeks have sought opportunities for study and work abroad, settling wherever they can best pursue their professional and economic dreams.

Both sides of Uzbekistan’s human capital debate reflect elements of the true picture. Many talented Uzbeks have indeed emigrated in the face of a system that has not known how to appreciate them. At the same time, many of the talented Uzbeks who remain are underutilised, underpaid, or undervalued. Adham Bekmurodov leads an ambitious government effort, ‘El-yurt umidi’, or the Nation’s Hope Foundation. With an initial state investment of $75 million at its launch in late 2018, the programme envisioned training 5,000 specialists within two to three years at the top schools around the world.[1]

“The state is funding graduate, PhD, postgraduate studies, and training opportunities,” Bekmurodov says. “The top priority is to place them in government institutions and have them work to speed up the reforms because we need these professionals in the system as soon as possible.” In the fall of 2019, the fund had 907 fellows scattered across the globe, nearly 700 of them attending professional training programmes. The next stage aims to supply the private sector with these foreign-educated specialists.

Applicants to the programme proceed through four stages but the most important one is to convince the selection committee that she or he strongly believes in Mirziyoyev’s reform agenda, has ideas to further it, and then advocate their own case for overseas training abroad, suggesting ways that it can help them to be more useful upon return.

Bekmuradov says 885 of his fund’s alumni have already joined the government and are serving in key roles in various institutions. ‘El-yurt umidi’ also seeks to link Uzbek professionals around the world to relevant sectors at home. It has forged networks through its expert council comprised of scientists, academics, entrepreneurs, financiers, doctors and others.

In the fall of 2017, when Mirziyoyev made his first trip to the United States (US), he met 18 Uzbek professionals in New York, urging them to come home and help him to reform Uzbekistan. And while none of those Uzbeks followed him back to Tashkent, Mirziyoyev’s message was still received as a historic sign of opening and inspired those present and thousands of others around the world to look at the country through new eyes.

Indeed, many of these overseas Uzbeks have since developed close relations with their colleagues in the country. And they see a role for themselves in attracting investment, fighting corruption, and linking Uzbekistan with international networks and global practices.

Mirziyoyev followed his New York and later Washington visit with similarly-spirited stops in Paris, Berlin, Tokyo and other capitals, where he met with more groups of successful and well-established Uzbeks, repeating the same exhortations and telling them that Uzbekistan is proud of them wherever they are and whatever they are doing. Many of these Uzbeks are enthused but cautious since the government may not follow up on the President’s promises. But, the doors to their native land are now open and they have more options to help Uzbekistan than ever before.

In 2017, when Mirziyoyev unfolded the highlights of his reform agenda, a group of these Uzbeks launched ‘Buyuk Kelajak’ (Great Future), bringing together hundreds of professionals from East Asia all the way to Canada. In 2019, Bahrom Ismoilov, one of its founders, told VOA that this expert network had proposed a development strategy for Uzbekistan for the next 15 years. “We are a network of great minds and capable hands, ready to contribute and change the course of the country if the leadership is ready to consider our ideas and advice,” Ismoilov said.[2]

Buyuk Kelajak’s institutional sponsors in Tashkent, the Development Strategy Center and the ‘Yuksalish’ National Movement, contend that many of that network’s ideas are already being realised, specifically in public administration, and in the legal and economic sectors. Ismoilov has since left the network but Buyuk Kelajak maintains that it is continuing to grow and increase its impact. Its members have diverse and sometimes conflicting goals; some want to pursue these from abroad, while others seek to return and join the government, and there are those who merely want to use this platform to grow their own ventures. The Mirziyoyev Administration seems comfortable with all of these propositions but is eager to turn their talk into genuine results that pay dividends for Uzbekistan’s economic development.

In 2019, Mirziyoyev launched a new institution, the Government Service Development Agency, and appointed Sherzod Kudbiyev, a presidential advisor and former Minister of Labor, to head it. Kudbiyev’s main task was to set up a professional public service in Uzbekistan, which should include a substantial number of Uzbeks with foreign experience. In a summit in Tashkent with over 300 overseas Uzbeks in early 2020, Kudbiyev tried to persuade professionals from various fields that the system was open to hire and accommodate them.[3]

“Uzbekistan, your motherland, is waiting for you!” he exclaimed, challenging them to join its ranks to help take the country to a new level in every sphere. Kudbiyev has moved to a new position since then but the agency’s mission remains the same.

Abdujabbor Abduvohidov, a veteran academic with vast experience in the government, is now Mirziyoyev’s close aide on education, science and culture. He argues that Uzbekistan cannot transform without the contributions of its citizens abroad, and especially those with solid networks and experience.[4]

“Who will work in Uzbekistan if not you?” he asks these overseas Uzbeks rhetorically. “We will create the necessary conditions for you, but it will be up to you to show us what you can do.”

The event at which Abduvohidov spoke focused on two groups of Uzbeks trained abroad: the first is a former Umid community, ‘Umid’ being a scholarship fund launched by Islam Karimov that from 1997-2003 funded 828 students to obtain degrees abroad. The Karimov Administration later ended the programme on grounds that it was not delivering a sufficient return on investment. Many Umid fellows simply did not return after graduation; even among those who did return, many chose to leave again or opt out of government service.

Yet, El-yurt umidi director Bekmuradov does not agree that Umid failed. Nor do many Umid fellows. At least a dozen now either serve as ministers or deputy ministers in the government or manage high-profile portfolios below that level in the Uzbek government. Minister of Foreign Trade and Investments Sardor Umurzakov is one of them. Educated in the United Kingdom and experienced in international banking, he is now the face of Uzbekistan’s quest for foreign direct investment and aims to forge close ties with global markets.

Umurzakov’s calls to his fellow Uzbek professionals sound like John F. Kennedy’s from the 1960s when he exhorted his fellow Americans, “ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.” Umurzakov says he knows how many of these passionate yet cautious Uzbeks feel about returning and joining the ranks.

“You left or stayed abroad because there were no opportunities to grow and achieve your dreams here in Uzbekistan… I was one of you too. I came back following my studies, worked hard to make a difference but grew frustrated with the lack of will to change the system, so I went back to Europe. But the times that we dreamed of are now here. Under the leadership of President Mirziyoyev, we have more options and opportunities than ever to change this country, to make this a better place to live. Together we can offer a better future for the generations to come.”[5]

Umurzakov asks those interested in working in Uzbekistan to embrace the challenges and use them to shape the system in every field in ways that they think are right for the country. The Uzbek people want these specialists back, says Umurzakov, because they believe they are capable of forging a new Uzbekistan. So, he urges, those who believe in themselves and their skills to return and seek the most challenging positions, such as deputy governors, who execute and manage local reforms.

Uzbekistan’s Justice Minister Ruslanbek Davletov, another Umid alumnus, believes there is room now for willing and talented people. As someone overseeing the human rights reform process, with responsibility for improving the way the government serves its citizens, Davletov believes in reducing the state’s role in a citizen’s life and business. Describing his own professional path and lessons learned so far, he advises Uzbek professionals interested in working in Uzbekistan to focus on how they can shape the system and society in general to become more accountable and transparent.[6]

Davletov told VOA in 2018 that he saw no clash or disagreement between those with foreign experience and locally trained professionals. “I can assure you we all want to reform Uzbekistan and while we may have different ideas, the goal is the same,” he said.

Atabek Nazirov, formerly a US-based banker is now on his third high-level position in the Mirziyoyev Administration. He says that when he came to Tashkent in 2018, he committed to keep his mind “as open as possible,” to get to know the system, connect with relevant people and entities, and most importantly to learn from them and listen. “What is clear,” he told VOA when he was working as deputy minister of public education, “is that Uzbekistan needs us, and it needs us now.” He previously served as the Deputy Minister of Innovative Development and currently heads the Capital Market Development Agency.[7]

“You can’t come here expecting miracles. You come because you want to be a part of the changes this country needs, and because you can help during this process with your knowledge and work,” Nazirov observes. “You are taken very seriously by everybody in the country and you’re given every chance and every opportunity to share your knowledge and make your recommendations. So, the message I would send to someone like myself, willing to come back is, drop all your expectations. Don’t expect anything. Just be ready to come and join the reform programmes. Join the government if you’re offered the chance. If not, there are other things to do, in the private sector, among NGOs, anything, its fun to be here. It’s the best time to be here.”

Based on his own experience, Nazirov advises others to be ready for personal sacrifices, such as having your family still based abroad, or losing some income. But, he says, once back in Uzbekistan, you can definitely make a difference. “You take initiative, you run with it, and if you can convince people, your idea wins the day.”

Bakhrom Mirganiev, a tax lawyer based in the US, with extensive experience in Big 4 tax firms, as well as banking, IT, media, and capital markets, believes Uzbekistan can equally utilise its human capital at home and abroad. Mirganiev spent a year in Tashkent, working at the Ministry of Finance, reforming tax and customs duties policies. He has also consulted for Uzbek banks, focusing on restructuring the banking system, their short and long-term strategy, implementing risk management and compliance mechanisms, as well as developing retail business.

“What’s clear is that Uzbekistan does not lack knowledge or skills. There are enough professionals and experts at home and those willing to join from abroad. But we need a substantial amount of will to move projects and initiatives forward,” Mirganiev told VOA.[8] “No matter where you are – in Tashkent or elsewhere, locally trained or foreign educated – those with ideas are struggling to make themselves heard and their work seen.” These stories beg a pivotal question: are these people, faced with systemic challenges and barriers, supporting each other and networking?

Everyone who has talked to VOA says ‘yes’, but also points to obstacles. While moral support plays a role, colleagues rooted in the system and those just joining it need to connect and cooperate to deliver results. That means both groups need to share common goals, and both see a lack of leadership and effective management.

Several expats, including Mirganiev, say they face enormous difficulties in getting paid by the Uzbek government. Banks and consulting firms pay fine, Mirganiev says, but if you work in the bureaucratic system, promises are rarely kept, and employment contracts are not developed. Clearly stated rights and responsibilities mean little except on paper. And they are not followed, diminishing trust in the government. That, in turn, makes many of these foreign-based Uzbeks reconsider their return. They come to question the value of the sacrifices they are making, including being away from family and earning less income.

“We are not asking for the money we make in America, even though that was the initial promise by the Uzbek government. All that has changed now. But we want reliability. Some offer to do pro bono work if they can afford to do so, but if you are here in Uzbekistan full-time, then those employment contracts and salary agreements are critically important,” Mirganiev says.

“There is no doubt we want to help and are willing to share our experience to make Uzbekistan a modern, economically strong and internationally recognised player in the world, but all these goals require hard-won professional expertise.”

Umid Mamadaminov is another US educated and experienced professional. He has founded several business ventures with American as well as Chinese partners in Uzbekistan. Focused on the energy, agricultural and education sectors, Mamadaminov observes that there are plenty of opportunities and space for anyone with skills to do great things.[9]

“Obviously there are many challenges,” he says. “The important decisions made at the top don’t always filter down into the system and people like us face many barriers because of the lack of responsibility, perception and will. I know the leadership is aware of these issues. But we are trying every day to make things work, to break those barriers and find a common language with the local authorities. But we can’t just pick up and leave or lose hope because of these longstanding issues. Aren’t we here to fix problems and show new ways of doing things?”

Azizjon Rasulov, a German-educated lawyer and international business expert, returned in 2001 and has since worked in Uzbekistan, in his own fields, leading several projects. He believes in living up to commitments, stressing that his five-year government work requirement helped him understand the system better. He adds that every dollar that Uzbekistan has spent in educating and training its youth bears fruit. No matter where people work today, he says, they are helping this country in some way.[10]

“I see an open policy now in terms of connecting with the world, including with Uzbeks abroad. If you want to work here, make sure you have a clear contract outlining the terms and conditions. The country needs you, but nobody is requiring you to come back. You can return if you want to and are ready to deal with the challenges. It’s harder if you’ve been away for too long but if you are someone who has maintained professional ties with Uzbekistan over the years, it may be easier for you to adjust.”

Like many others, Rasulov, too, believes Uzbekistan can and must find a golden mean that balances the role of local professionals and foreign educated ones. Their input, he says, complements to one another’s and can produce amazing results for the country when joined together. Indeed, he adds, such cooperation can perhaps demonstrate that Uzbekistan’s ‘brains’ have not actually ‘drained’ but simply travelled the world to get the best of it and then brought it back home to make what was left behind stronger and more effective.

The question, ultimately, is what the Uzbek government will do to overcome these concerns—to retain talent, incentivise returnees, and change the environment for both groups in meaningful and enduring ways. The good news is that the Mirziyoyev Administration is more open than ever before to ideas and proposals from compatriots around the world. And it has demonstrated the credibility of that openness by actually hiring some of them.

But the system needs to take further steps. One would be to establish a central recruiting body, which should announce vacancies, act as a centralised clearing-house for applications, provide a single of point-of-contact for those seeking opportunities, and coordinate interviews with candidates while helping them navigate the system to match their talents to tangible prospects. Right now, interested professionals have been left to their own devices, relegated to seeking opportunities through personal networks without an assistance from an outlet empowered to truly help them. Such a body would match the right talent to the right people in the right places and ensure that they are considered and then matched to relevant positions. At present, the expert councils and the ‘El-yurt umidi’ Foundation are neither tasked with nor aim to offer these services. So, what Uzbekistan needs now is a transparent, fair and professional recruitment system dedicated to hiring from abroad.

Navbahor Imamova is a prominent Uzbek journalist at the Voice of America. As anchor, reporter, multimedia editor and producer, she has covered Central Asia and the U.S. for nearly 20 years on TV, radio and online. Since 2018, she has also been reporting from inside Uzbekistan as the first-ever U.S.-based accredited correspondent in the country. During 2016-2017, she was a prestigious Edward S. Mason Fellow in public policy and management, while earning her Mid-Career Masters in Public Administration at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Imamova played a pivotal role in the launch of Uzbek television programming at VOA in 2003, and has since presented almost 900 editions of the flagship weekly show, ‘Amerika Manzaralari’, which covers American foreign policy focusing on Washington’s relations with Central Asia, as well as life and politics in the U.S. She speaks frequently on regional issues in Central Asia, as well as Uzbek politics and society, for policy, academic, and popular audiences. Her analytical pieces have been published in leading academic and news outlets including Foreign Policy, The National Interest, and The Atlantic. Imamova also is the founding President of the VOA Women’s Caucus. She began her career at the Uzbek state broadcaster in Tashkent. This paper does not reflect the views of the Voice of America, where author works;

Photo by Papas Dos, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

[1] Navbahor Imamova, “El-yurt umidi”: Uzbekistan needs personnel and support of compatriot, Amerika Ovozi, June 2019, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/4948935.html

[2] Navbahor Imamova, What role does “Great Future” want to play in the future of Uzbekistan, Amerika Ovozi, June 2019, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/4943132.html

[3] Amerika Ovozi, Mirziyoyev’s adviser: The homeland is waiting for you, January 2020, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/5241269.html

[4] Amerika Ovozi, Adviser to the President: If we do not work for you in Uzbekistan, who will?, January 2020, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/5241271.html

[5] Amerika Ovozi, Minister: Uzbekistan cannot develop without you, January 2020, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/5241258.html

[6] Amerika Ovozi, Minister: The role of the state in human life and business should be reduced, January 2020, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/5241268.html

[7] Navbahor Imamova, Deputy Minister Atabek Nazirov: Uzbekistan needs us now, Amerika Ovozi, July 2018, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/4507430.html

[8] Amerika Ovozi, Compatriot: We are back and working, January 2020, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/5231865.html

[9] Amerika Ovozi, Umid Madaminov: Entrepreneur attracting US and Chinese businesses to Uzbekistan, YouTube, January 2020, https://youtu.be/YNT8WYEsLvE

[10] Amerika Ovozi, How much does Uzbekistan need personnel trained abroad?, January 2020, https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/5233488.html

Topics

Civil Society

Covid-19

Diaspora

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

The perils of rebuilding Uzbekistan: The rise of glass and glitter

Article by Dilmira Matyakubova

Central Asian countries have attempted to build their nation branding strategies through redesigning their capital cities. The process can be widely observed in former Soviet republics with Kazakhstan that built Astana (now Nur-Sultan), a capital of modernity and progress anchoring the legacy of the first president’s name Nursultan Nazarbayev; Turkmenistan re-modelling Turkmenbashi’s white marble-clad Ashgabat with the aim to eternalise the name and figure of ‘the Great Head of the Turkmen’, the first president Saparmurat Niyazov. Post-Soviet Uzbekistan is not left outside the trend. Although the previous leader was less concerned with the creation of a cult of personality in material spaces, rather leaving a legacy of an impregnable leader that led to the formation of such places of recollection.

The new government under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is committed to demonstrating its progress through significant urban regeneration projects that are aiming to transform the capital into a modern business pivot. In 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a Decree ‘On measures to improve the architectural appearance and improvement of the central part of Tashkent, as well as creation of favourable conditions for the population and visitors to the capital.’ This led to initiation of a US$1.3 billion urban project called ‘Tashkent City’, which occupies the central part of town, covering 80 hectares (3.1 square miles).[1]

Mirziyoyev ‘views the role of the city as a tool to promote a new brand image for the country that is ‘modern’ and open to foreign business and investment’.[2] He seeks opportunities to bring more and more foreign businesses and investment, thus creating favourable conditions for them in the capital. The remodelling of the city is one of these policy measures. It aims to rebuild the country a distance away from the previous authoritarian regime that had investment constraints and lacked transparency in governance. The government’s approach to planning, whilst designed to attract and appease global investment and more tourists, however, lacks empathy and understanding of social relevance of these projects for the local city dwellers. While it is sensible for the new government to seek a distinct image that repositions the country’s place in the world through investment oriented projects, its policy has created major social and increasingly political problems that are now a major cause for public discontent. Demolitions and mass evictions have been the major topic for debate in the media in Uzbekistan since late 2017 starting with the removal of the Soviet-era Cinema House. The public believes that many of the new projects are built as facades of progress to accommodate certain ‘important’ events rather than meeting the needs of the inhabitants.

The project ‘Tashkent City’ aimed to build an international business centre with an industrial park, shopping malls, Congress Centre, high-rise hotels, restaurants and residential apartments. With all these major developments, like a ‘city in the city’, the capital is becoming a façade of a progressive country. The projects like ‘Tashkent City’, whilst promoting modernism and progress masks the reality of the social and economic predicaments and can hardly contribute to enhancement of economic or social wellbeing of the vulnerable population, particularly those affected by ongoing mass demolitions.

From Mahalla to Skyscraper

The redevelopment of the area for ‘Tashkent City’ began with the rapid demolition of houses and homes in the historical mahallas (traditional neighbourhood) of O’qchi (Fletcher) and Olmazor (Apple Orchard) of the old town, leaving the residents no choice but to hastily find new homes. The Mahalla is a local institution of self-governance and it plays an important socio-economic role in society in Uzbekistan. ‘It serves a cultural function: is a place for social interactions between communities’, tied to the space and the sense of community is solid in the mahallas.[3] When people were forced to leave their mahallas, they did not only lose their homes, they lost their livelihoods, their communities, social networks, and their memories tied to the space. Forced eviction without consultation, adequate compensation or resettlement is widespread in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan. Tashkent City did not merely clear the space for a modern city; it eradicated an epoch from the history of a traditional life in Uzbek mahallas that carried a long history dating back to 14^th century. The state owns the land and the right to use it for so-called ‘state and public needs’ but does it have a right to eradicate the history and sweep away the public memory? For the government however, it did not matter whether the people agreed to eviction or felt emotional attachment to the space. As it was a top-down decision, it did not involve any public engagement or discussion of any form.

Olmazor mahalla. Photo: Umida Akhmedova

By closing the doors to its past and remodelling the capital, new Tashkenters, rising from commercial structures to be part of the government elite, are attempting to build an image for themselves by borrowing iconic names such as Cambridge Residence, Gardens Residence, Boulevard, etc. These are mere imitations of locations that have a strong, historic legacies and stories attributed to their names whereas the Boulevard in ‘Tashkent City’ represents a recent and painful narrative for its residents.

An investor who is building a lot in Tashkent City area is a local packing company ‘Universal Packing Masters’ under ‘Murad Buildings’ plans a 266, five meter skyscraper called ‘Nest One’ in the area, with luxury apartments, restaurants, offices, etc.[4] The company has a motto, ‘Murad Buildings Builds Happiness!’. The owner advertises his lofty project that is building so-called ‘smart houses.’ These houses are being built in the very ground from where previously, people had been strong-armed out their homes. For many though it is building rather a turmoil, far from happiness.

The situation of Davron Halikov, a former resident of Olmazor mahalla illustrates the social problems of vulnerable population affected by the clamour. Found sitting on a bench in the middle of the city, Davron is quietly thinking about how to cover his next rent payment. His current earnings at a car dealership are not enough to make ends meet. He is renting an apartment with his wife and four children as he lost his home during the mass demolition of his mahalla in the old town. Davron is far from the ability to rent or buy a place in the Boulevard of ‘Tashkent City’, which would cost him $100,000 for a one bedroom, 64-m² (square meter) unfurnished apartment.[5] He was refused a replacement dwelling on a simple technicality; he was not living in the house the moment of demolition together with the rest of the larger family. Due to the great size of the family in one house, he had opted to rent another place in the city. He filed a case at the city court, but has since dropped it as he does not believe either the government or the judicial system has anything to offer him:

‘This country does not exist for me as homeland anymore. It is just a place for living for the moment until I find a place somewhere abroad. The only thing I am worried about now is my apartment rent payment, which is due on Monday. I am worried about my children’s fate. I want to help them to stand on their feet… I am waiting for magic to happen. I know that I cannot expect anything from the government.’[6]

Davron tried to approach local government for help with his case, but he did not receive any. He is not the only person who remains homeless due to the demolitions. During the swift preparation of the territory for ‘Tashkent City’, in neighbouring mahalla O’qchi 521 houses owned by 2165 families were demolished. According to a legal expert at the directorate of ‘Tashkent City’, out of 2165, only 1138 families lived in the area before demolition started. This means that the other 1027 families have not received compensation in any form for not residing in the de facto area.[7] Meaning there are people like Davron who remain without a home. The expert also claimed that the residents of the mahalla expressed a desire to move to multi-storey apartments instead of receiving land plots in a similar size. The interviews in the past however, evidenced the opposite; many asked for a house to accommodate the whole family, in the same or nearby territory, they were unhappy with replacements offered.[8] The state failed to understand the difference in lifestyles and cultures between those living in traditional settlements and those in multi-story contemporary apartments. In traditional settlements, families are large and extended family often sharing the same dwelling. They were offered smaller distributed residences based on the legal owner. Those who were sharing had rights, which were ignored, and they ended up homeless, stressed and distressed.

The unfinished part of the Boulevard. Photo: by author

There is a clear violation of the legislation in this regard, as according to the regulations ‘on the Procedure for Compensation of Damages to Citizens and Legal Entities due to Seizure of Land for State or Public Needs’, all residents who are registered in the properties are guaranteed to receive a compensation.[9] In addition to this, the forced eviction occurred as most families were forced to leave the area rapidly as the demolition started before the resettlement of all the residents. This happened through extortion in the form of creating an untenable environments for the residents; they were cut off from utilities such as electricity and gas, which is an obvious sign of forced eviction according to international law.[10]

The new Decree of Cabinet of Ministers, ‘on the on the procedure for compensation of losses to citizens and legal entities in connection with the seizure of land for state and public needs’, known by local people as ‘Fascistic PKM 911’, has been an exploitable tool for developers to pursue their profitmaking activities as building business centres, real estate, amusement parks, etc.[11] This decree, unlike the previous one, has amended the deadlines for notification and demolition giving more licence to the investors and construction companies to carry out their actions. It states notice periods of three to five days or simply ‘as necessary’. This means that these deadlines are very flexible to the extent that investors can use them in their favour. It allows the decision on demolition of a housing block if 75 per cent of the residents have given their consent. The investor can gain the rest through court as laid out in the legislation. In principle, an investor or contractor must go through a set of legal steps that includes a number of procedures to gain permission for action. However, in practice, only the final phase of the application is applied (gaining consent of the 75 per cent of the residents) resulting in a higher number of permissions for demolitions.

Besides, the decree uses the phrase ‘compulsory purchase’ of a property in cases when the residents disagree, which grants the state and developers even more authority. Judicial tools are important in local enforcement of the regulations and obligations stated in the right to adequate housing (United Nations Habitat) or by direct reference to International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Thus, the legislation should include an aspect on forced evictions, aligning it with international norms and agreements to ensure the right of an individual to security and the right to protection from forced evictions. The new decree does not meet international norms, as it does not incorporate the fundamental rights and protection against forced evictions enshrined in international law on socio-economic and cultural rights. Nonetheless, Uzbekistan signed those agreements, thus it carries obligations to comply with norms specified as ensuring protection from unlawful and forced evictions and safeguarding adequate housing. [12] It seems like the government of Uzbekistan has no intention to comply with those agreements it signed thus failing to fulfil its obligations as a member state.

The new Tashkenters attempt to ‘sell’ the city as something it is not by creating facsimiles of world icons and popular metropolises, yielding gruesome results. The irony is that whilst the population of the demolished mahallas remain homeless, the real estate agency ‘Dream City Development’ who is responsible for selling the new properties is constantly advertising sales of new apartments. The real-estate agency is devoting a large resource pool towards selling apartments and commercial buildings in ‘iconic’ locations such as Boulevard and Gardens Residence in the territory of ‘Tashkent City’, now called Dream City. Dream City is being developed in eight lots; each lot has its own investors who have opaque roots but who seem to be connected to newly appeared bureaucrats in government. The original sources for investment for the lots are unknown and unavailable in the public domain. There is strong evidence however, which suggests these investors are using offshore entities and surrogate shareholders to conceal their engagements in these lots. The investigations by the Open Democracy society identified foreign investors who may be acting as covers for local businesspersons. The chains of companies that are in the frontline of the project closely linked to Jaxongir Artikxodjaev, the mayor of Tashkent were exposed.[13] About the ambiguity of the true beneficiaries of the lots in the Tashkent City, anti-corruption campaigner, Thomas Mayne, reports that:

‘This shows how easily it is to obscure the true owners of a project – the beneficial owners – using companies registered abroad. The project certainly raises many red flags: the source of the funds is unclear, and a 19-year-old is unlikely to be the true beneficial owner of the company responsible for the Tashkent City shopping centre project.[14]

Gardens Residence apartments. Photo: by author

Whilst the residential buildings remain empty in the Boulevard section of Dream City, the real estate agency Dream City Development claims that 80 per cent of the apartments in the Boulevard section have been sold. According to the agency, 70 per cent percent of the buyers are Tashkenters and 10 per cent of them are foreign acquisitions. The other 20 per cent is available for purchase.[15] Although there is a lack of social infrastructure in the new project, this does not seem to deter prospective buyers. It appears that the nouveau riche in ‘Tashkent City’ will not feel the need for schools or medical centres in the immediate vicinity. The abundance of shopping avenues, offices and hotels will be sufficient. It is anticipated that the apartments are purchased as investments and those who acquire them have no plans to live in the area.

Alexey Ulko, a writer on Arts and Culture uses the term ‘new bureaucracies’ for people who have appeared in the government and government-affiliated commercial structures. In his opinion, these urban projects are not designed to address public needs rather focused towards meeting the needs of these new elite who aim to climb the social ladder:

‘Old bureaucracies lived in impregnable castles, stagnant and stiff, surrounded by old loyal servants and faded portraits of glorious ancestors. New bureaucracies are more like financial pyramids sucking in more and more new people. You cannot run such an enterprise in a bleak Soviet-built barrack isolated from the rest of the world by an ugly concrete wall. What you need is an urban area with tall, shiny, expensive-looking and spacious offices for thousands of people to work in and many more thousands craving to: glitzy temples of conspicuous consumption.’[16]

The current government is employing a strategy of ‘Destroy and Build’, a quick fix to realise their current plan of buying off land, destroying old areas and building new in the city. The outfall from the demolition is not only one of practical complications but of psychological distress and resistance.

Towering Rage of Demolition

The degree of devastation is so strong that this has led to citizens attempting suicide by setting themselves alight in protest to demolitions or attacking public officials. On December 14^th 2018, Nozima Ergasheva in Kibray District publicly set herself on fire during a reception of citizens in the district administration to illustrate her protest of the decision on demolition of her house. As a result, she received injuries to 68 per cent of her body.

Cases of suicide attempts have been common among the people whose homes are threatened to be taken away due to the reason that they are deemed to be built illegally on agricultural land. During 2018-2019, ‘23,000 cases of unlawful appropriation of land were recoded’ in the country.[17] This means that 23,000 families would lose their homes because the state found them illegal and decided to take the land for so-called ‘state needs.’ Shaken by the news, people committed desperate actions. In February 2020, Mukaddas Mustafaeva in Karshi set herself alight in protest at the demolition of her house and her father suffered severe burns in an attempt to stop the fire.[18]

The mass demolitions, on the other hand, sparked civic activism; citizens adopted a different role, people have become more and more alert and posting, sharing the cases they witness. They have become agents of potential political change. Although the situation with freedom of expression and freedom of assembly has not improved in post-Karimov Uzbekistan and there have been direct threats to the lives of journalists and bloggers who have openly discussed the hottest issues in the country, issues like eviction and mass demolition. The case of Amir Sharifullin, a blogger at Tashkent – DEMOLITION (Ташкент – СНОС) Facebook group has been a litmus test for intolerance of the government towards public criticism. Amir was kidnapped and beaten by two men causing him serious bodily injury. Later one of these men was held administratively liable as opposed to criminal charges, while the other one went free. The media believes that there is an evident link between the perpetrators and the state security structures.[19]

The group is owned and administered by Farida Charif (Sharifullina) who is the mother of Amir and housing rights activist who is outspoken about issues on demolition and evictions. The group that united more than 20,000 people is a platform where members post, share, discuss demolition and eviction related issues. As Amir believes, the kidnapping was a way of threatening and putting pressure on his mother. Naming the case of violent kidnapping as ‘administrative liability’ and letting perpetrators go free evidently shows that this was most likely the act of the authorities who have conflicts of interest in the matters discussed in the group. Apparently, those who did not find any criminal aspect in the case were unhappy about public criticism of the unlawful demolitions and wanted to quash the protests.

From World Heritage to World Disney

The urban transformation processes stretch far beyond merely redeveloping the capital. There are also growing efforts to develop the tourism industry across the country with regional cities being remodelled to make them more attractive for tourists. In the minds of the government officials, being ‘attractive’ is about building shiny, high-rise hotels and business centres, or Disney-like amusement parks, often changing the environment surrounding historically important sites. High-rise buildings are appearing in Samarkand’s heritage zone where buildings of more than two-storeys are prohibited by law suggesting, corruption across the process of beautification and modernisation for the sake of tourism. This is evidenced through the former khokim (mayor) of Samarkand, Turobjon Juraev, being sentenced to 13 years in prison for taking a bribe of $2,000,000 for permitting the construction of high-rise buildings in the city’s heritage zone and another four officials in the same office were punished for the same crime.[20] This is what happens when you just move the chairs around. Juraev was sharply criticized by previous president Karimov and sacked in 2013; he was accused of corruption. In 2017 however, he was appointed as khokim of Bekabad District of the Tashkent region and in the same year then became head of Samarkand. This is a perfect example of the power loop and nepotism among corrupt officials in government where the same faces come back to new chairs and commit the same crimes.

Samarkand. Photo: M & G Therin-Weise (UNESCO)

Carrying out this beautification process for the sake of tourism in this manner is resulting in mass destruction and irreparable changes. The beautification process that is assumed will charm the appetites of tourists is nothing more than a mere tourist kitsch. It is a process of mass destruction and Disneyfication of historic monuments, such as attempting to turn Shakhrisabz into a World Disney Park as opposed to a World Heritage site.

In 2016, the World Heritage Committee considered the historic centre of the city of Shakhrisabz in southern Uzbekistan to be added to the List of World Heritage in Danger of over-development and irreversible alterations. The Committee then asked the UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre and the International Council on Monuments and Sites to evaluate the damage and advise restorative measures.[21]

Conclusions and Recommendations

The government has to acknowledge that a lack of a well-thought out plan caused the perils of its rebranding policy to seize people’s homes, their communities and their welfare. To ensure the wellbeing of society and to ensure that the population benefits from planning efforts, the government should have a dialogue with the people to explore what they wish for their own wellbeing, as the state’s perception of wellbeing does not seem to coincide with the nation’s understanding of wellbeing. The leadership appears to be trying to build a nation brand, seeking to whitewash its reputation and promote tourism and investment in the country. The process of nation branding is rather a complex development as it is far from merely public relations and marketing a country to a target audience. Nor is it merely building favourable conditions to please guests; it is a systematic and continuous commitment to improvement. Countries are judged based on their governance, policies, their novel ideas, symbolic actions and their contribution to global development. Before investing in promoting itself, its tourism or newly branded cities, a double landlocked country such as Uzbekistan with a murky reputation needs to work towards improving its character through thoughtful reforms in the aim to gain genuine respect on the world stage. Enhancing and ensuring human rights protection, judiciary independence, accountability, transparency in governance and open dialogue with people will enable it to succeed in building a nation brand. These efforts would then guarantee an enhanced reputation for the nation rather than a glittering, soaring, pretentious capital. Further recommendations are that:

Government ought to revise the current decree on compensation of losses to citizens and the seizure of land to include an important aspect on forced evictions, aligning the legislation with international norms and agreements that ensure the right of an individual to security and the right to protection against forced evictions;
Government should ensure that residents are given fair and adequate compensation and replacement in accordance with principles on adequate housing rights prior to resettlement and are protected from extortion and intimidation; and
To ensure unanimity in decision-making and that legislations do not contradict one another, there needs to be an independent committee for reviewing the decrees and amendments accepted. The committee would ensure that the domestic laws seriously affecting citizens’ rights and liberties are to be closely aligned with international human rights laws.

Photo by Mysportedit, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en

[1] Dilmira Matyakubova, Who Is “Tashkent City” For? Nation-Branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan, Voices on Central Asia, June 2018, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/who-is-tashkent-city-for-nation-branding-and-public-dialogue-in-uzbekistan/

[2] Dilmira Matyakubova, Nation Branding, Social Classes and Cultural Heritage in Uzbekistan, Cabar.asia, April 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/nation-branding-social-classes-and-cultural-heritage-in-uzbekistan/

[3] Dilmira Matyakubova, Who is Tashkent City For? Nation branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan, CAP Paper 205 (CAAF Fellows Papers), June 2018, https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/12455

[4] Про Nest One – About Nest One, https://nestuzbekistan.uz/ru/kurumsal; Murad Buildings and Ozguven announced the first skyscraper’s name in Uzbekistan, UzA, August 2019, http://uza.uz/en/society/murad-buildings-and-zg-ven-announced-the-first-skyscraper-s–29-08-2019

[5] Dream City, A conversation with an agent of ‘Dream City Development’, February 2020, http://dreamcity.uz

[6] Interview with Davron Halikov, former resident of Olmazor mahalla. March 2020.

[7] «Было много сомнений, но мы сделали это…» – интервью с представителем Дирекции Tashkent City (‘There were many doubts but we did it’…interview with a representative of Tashkent City Directorate), Podrobno.uz, December 2019, https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/-bylo-mnogo-somneniy-no-my-sdelali-eto-intervyu-s-predstavitelem-direktsii-tashkent-city/

[8] Matyakubova. Who is Tashkent City For? Nation branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan

[9] Положение о порядке возмещения убытков гражданам и юридическим лицам в связи с изъятием земельных участков для государственных и общественных нужд – Regulation on the procedure for compensation of losses to citizens and legal entities in connection with the seizure land for state and public needs, May 2006, https://nrm.uz/contentf?doc=105171_polojenie_o_poryadke_vozmeshcheniya_ubytkov_grajdanam_i_yuridicheskim_licam_v_svyazi_s_izyatiem_zemelnyh_uchastkov_dlya_gosudarstvennyh_i_obshchestvennyh_nujd_(prilojenie_k_postanovleniyu_km_ruz_ot_29_05_2006_g_n_97)&produ

[10] Matyakubova. Who is Tashkent City For? Nation branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan; The Right to Adequate Housing, UN Habitat, Fact Sheet No. 21/Rev.1, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_ru.pdf

[11] Ўзбекистон республикаси вазирлар маҳкамасининг қарори, жисмоний ва юридик шахсларнинг мулк ҳуқуқлари кафолатларини таъминлаш ҳамда ер участкаларини олиб қўйиш ва компенсация бериш тартибини такомиллаштиришга доир қўшимча чора-тадбирлар тўғрисида – Regulation on the procedure for compensation of losses to citizens and legal entities in connection with the seizure land for state and public needs, November 2019, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4597630

[12] The Right to Adequate Housing, UN Habitat. Fact Sheet No. 21/Rev.1.

[13] Kristian Lasslett, Uzbekistan Ltd: private-public interests clash in flagship project, openDemocracy, January 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/uzbekistan-ltd/

[14] OpenDemocracy Investigations, Phantom foreign investors for an open new Uzbekistan, openDemocracy, December 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tashkent-city-project-uzbekistan-phantom-foreign-investors/

[15]Dream City, A conversation with an agent of ‘Dream City Development’, February 2020.

[16] Interview with Aleksey Ulko, writer on Arts and Culture, February 2020.

[17] Uzbek Justice Ministry hints at new wave of illegal buildings demolitions, Fergana News, February 2020, https://en.fergana.ru/news/115498/

[18] Vladimir Rozanskij, Another woman sets herself on fire to save her home, AsiaNews, February 2020, http://asianews.it/news-en/Another-woman-sets-herself-on-fire-to-save-her-home-49359.html

[19] AsiaTerra, Why police did not detect corpus delicti in the actions of two recidivists who attacked Amir Sharifullin?, March 2020, http://www.asiaterra.info/news/pochemu-militsiya-ne-obnaruzhila-sostava-prestupleniya-v-dejstviyakh-dvukh-retsidivistov-napavshikh-na-amira-sharifullina

[20] Sputnik News, Ex-khokim of Samarkand region received 13 years in prison for bribes, August 2019, https://uz.sputniknews.ru/society/20190802/12158730/Eks-khokim-Samarkandskoy-oblasti-poluchil-13-let-tyurmy-za-vzyatki.html

[21] World Heritage Convention, Historic Centre of Shakhrisabz, Uzbekistan, added to List of World Heritage in Danger, July 2016, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1522/

Topics

Civil Society

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

Media landscape in Uzbekistan

Article by Nikita Makarenko

Scorched earth: media in Uzbekistan between 2005 and 2016

Under the rule of President Islam Karimov (1991-2016), the media in Uzbekistan experienced significant pressure. The total domination of the media environment by censorship and threats to journalists meant there was no freedom of expression in the media at all. Only a few websites such as Uznews.net, Ferghana.ru, and Neweurasia.net were brave enough to publish critical stories, and their offices were abroad. None of these websites were registered in the country. But all of them were blocked and only a few people were able to read it using a VPN (virtual private network). It was extremely dangerous to write for these outlets and many journalists faced threats or had to emigrate outside of Uzbekistan to seek safety. Local TV, radio, and newspapers were sterile in terms of criticism during this time.

A 2006 Human Rights Watch report summarised the media environment in Uzbekistan at the time saying that ‘the government continues its practice of controlling, intimidating, and arbitrarily suspending or interfering with the work of civil society groups, the media, human rights activists, and opposition political parties. In particular, repression against independent journalists, human rights defenders, and opposition members increased this year.’^[1]

2005 should be considered a watershed moment because, after the Andijan Events in 2005, the media environment was cleansed of any remaining opposition. Foreign journalists were banned and websites were blocked. I entered the National University of Uzbekistan Faculty of Journalism in 2004 and was a witness to these events. ‘You cannot discuss the question of freedom of speech in this building’, as Dean of the Faculty Kudrat Irnazarov once said. A generation of journalists were raised in such an environment, and it is important to understand this context when examining the present day situation.

A shift of the media landscape in Uzbekistan between 2016 and 2020

The new President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, was elected in 2016 after the death of Karimov. Surprisingly for all he chose a course to let people speak more freely. It was not announced like ‘now you could speak’, but people started to write increasingly critical posts on Facebook or via Telegram messenger, and there were no repressions. Step by step, you were able to see critical posts in private online media outlets too. I stepped up in the process in May 2017. I was not sure that it was ‘allowed’ to write yet but was persuaded to by the Editor-in-Chief at Gazeta.uz to try.

My first critical story was published in May 2017 and it was well received.^[2] People were calling me and saying: ‘We can’t believe it is online. Should be a new era’. We realised that it was a success and we had none of the ‘consequences’ as it could happen in Karimov times. No phone calls, no threats. That was the beginning, and from that point, I was constantly trying to publish more and more stories.

The following month, President Mirziyoyev for the first time confirmed his intention to develop freedom of speech and blamed the media for the lack of criticism saying “it is a pity that our media still don’t reflect all problems which we have in our lives, yet we need to strengthen a spirit of criticism and self-criticism in our society.”^[3] From this time journalists and bloggers became an integral part of the so-called ‘Uzbek Thaw’. Reforms were coming in thick and fast and people were demanding more and more information. As a result of the ongoing process of liberalisation, Uzbekistan jumped from 169^th in the World Press Freedom Index in 2017 to 156^th in 2020.^[4] It was also excluded from the ‘blacklist’ of countries, deemed to have a ‘very serious situation’, and put on the ‘red list’ for countries with a ‘difficult situation’.

Waiting for consequences and media boom

A new liberalisation sparked a boom of online media. From 2016 through 2019 the Internet was the main platform of debates and critical publications. Many new media outlets were opened and competition between them increased. Daryo.uz and Kun.uz became the main competitors in the Uzbek language, while Gazeta.uz dominates in Russian, especially among liberal-oriented parts of the society.

While there is no censorship anymore like in the past (telephone calls from high ranking officials with an (unofficial) order to take down an unwanted article), the question of self-censorship continues to exist. Many editors and journalists asking themselves: ‘Where is the boundary? What remains a taboo?’ And there is no strict answer. Every media outlet has to decide for themselves. As far as I can see, major corruption investigations could be a problem for a journalist and could lead to ‘bad consequences’. However, it is a question of brave people to start, to lead and to try.

Right now, there is no strict and open pressure on media anymore. Imprisoned journalists were released, and no journalist or blogger has received a long-term prison sentence in the last three years (except a few minor cases with 15 days detention). However, there are some threats and trends which make journalists uncomfortable. For example, a conflict between Kun.uz and the Mayor of Tashkent Jakhongir Artikhodjaev. In November 2019 he threatened journalists in a private conversation. This happened after a deputy in one of districts of Tashkent insulted Kun.uz’s journalist and smashed his camera. Artikhodjaev responded that “you could disappear and nobody will find you”. An audio recording of this conversation was later published. In a few cases regional governors have also threatened journalists, sometimes even with death. It mostly happens in Ferghana Valley, where the Governor of Ferghana district, Shukhrat Ganiev, in December 2019 asked Ravshan Kurbanov, a Governor of Kuva district, during a telephone call if he had already read a “funeral praying” for an unnamed blogger or not. This blogger was posting about protests in Kuva (people had blocked a road because of a lack of gas and electricity). Ganiev instructed Kurbanov, that instead of “fixing problems” he should “read a funeral praying”.

Despite these unpleasant cases, there has been no significant sign that the course of the government to provide freedom of speech will be changed. However, there is always a question: is it an experiment, or it is forever? A universal fear that this situation could be turned 180 degrees back into the Karimov times always exists among journalists and bloggers, even if there is no reason to have this fear in the present moment. This fear is a cause of self-censorship. Self-censorship is also a consequence of the Karimov era. Many journalists just cannot change their mind-set and they continue to work as they worked before the ‘thaw’.

Moreover, the boom of online media has highlighted the significant lack of qualified people. This is also a heritage of the Karimov era. It was never prestigious to be a journalist before, nor was it profitable. Today online media can offer decent salaries, but there are only a few people who could create honest and professional content. This lack of human resources dramatically affects the media and prevents the market from enlarging.

TV and radio environment

While online media is the locomotive of criticism in Uzbekistan, TV, and radio are far behind. These spheres were less affected by the ‘thaw’ than the Internet. It is true to say that TV dominates the media market and has the widest coverage in the country while Internet consumers are mostly situated in major cities. According to the latest poll by Internews, 77 per cent of people between the ages of 30 and 45 got their news from TV.[5] 23 per cent trust online websites and 18 per cent trust social networks. State-controlled TV channels are still old-fashioned, very cautious in their criticism and avoid any ‘conflict topics’. Those TV channels such as Uzbekistan 24 and Toshkent act as an instrument of state propaganda. Their attitudes toward what should be shown on TV have not changed since Karimov’s time. Mostly their news highlights development, prosperity, and praises the country’s leaders.

However, a few private TV-channels, taking advantage of digital broadcasting opening up the number of possible channels, have started to attract more viewers and compete with state channels. ZOR TV, Sevimli, Milliy, and Mening Yurtim produce entertaining shows and broadcast movies and TV series, while Uzreport TV concentrates on reports and high-quality journalism rather than entertainment.

Despite this, the local TV market has not developed as much as online media and has not moved towards freedom of speech values. Also, Russian TV still dominates the market and people prefer to watch it via cable or antenna. The local TV has the potential to develop as soon as producers are able to buy and adapt major international shows and projects or create something unique which will attract viewers.

Unblocked websites

For years, many critical websites have been blocked in Uzbekistan. Mostly it happened in 2005. This legacy of Karimov initially remained under the next president, and it took some time before they began to be unblocked. Some of them were unblocked in 2017, some of them in 2018 and finally by May 2019 most of them were unblocked.

A dangerous step backwards happened in September 2018 when Facebook and YouTube were blocked for users in Uzbekistan. Officially the government explained it as a ‘temporary problem on their side’, blaming Facebook and YouTube for problems with a connection. Both websites were unblocked in February 2019, right after the former Chief of the National Security Service, Ikhtiyor Abdullaev, was dismissed and put under arrest. These two events were never officially connected but Facebook and YouTube were never blocked again.

Finally, in May 2019 most of the websites had been unblocked, including Ferghana.ru, Uzmetronom.com, AsiaTerra.info, Eurasianet.com, Voice of America, BBC Uzbek and Deutsche Welle. This decision was hailed by Reporters Without Borders.[6] However, the only major website which is still blocked is Ozodlik, the Uzbek service of RFE/RL. While the website of RFE/RL works normally, only the Uzbek service page is inaccessible from Uzbekistan. The reason has not been officially explained.

The Agency, the Mass Media Fund, and new legislation

An inspiring signal to the mass media happened in November 2018. Komil Allamjonov, a former press-secretary of President Mirziyoyev, was appointed to the position of chairman of the Agency of Information and Mass Communications (AIMC). Known as a liberal person he replaced a former pro-Karimov chairman Laziz Tangriev. But what was a more important signal is that Saida Mirziyoyeva, a daughter of the President was appointed as his first deputy. In patriarchal Central Asian society, this step means a lot. Both Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva proclaimed that they would protect the rights of journalists and bring attention to the rights of bloggers too.

The new Agency started to develop legislation that would protect journalists and provide more rights to them. Corrections to the Law Codex offered by the Agency removed the risk of prison for defamation and slander. This is a big problem for modern journalism in Uzbekistan. While ‘traditional’ ways of repressing the media are not accessible to elites and businessmen anymore, suing a journalist for defamation and slander is a new trend. It was the right decision to protect journalists from prison terms, but still it is a problem. Every court case costs an enormous amount of money for a media outlet even if they win due to legal costs and it could lead to bankruptcy if they lost. There have been no such cases of bankruptcy yet in the Mirziyoyev-era but the media society has a fear of this. Lawyers usually do not work pro-bono and fines for defamation and slander are still high. In the environment of the ‘sick’ judiciary system in Uzbekistan which is still highly corrupted, this is a dangerous trend that potentially could hurt freedom of speech.

In February 2020 both Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva decided to quit the Agency. Citing that they aimed to concentrate on non-profit work which would allow them more opportunities. A new Public Fund for the Support and Development of National Mass Media was created and popular Uzbek blogger Khushnudbek Khudayberdiev was appointed as chairman. Allamjonov and Mirziyoeva joined the Board of Trustees that oversees the strategic direction of the fund. The new fund should accumulate donor funds (including the state budget) to support projects in education, news content and should continue work to simplify and improve media legislation. A group of popular bloggers and journalists has entered the Public Council of the fund to control its day to day activities with Lola Islamova (Anhor.uz) appointed as chairman.[7]

Bloggers on the rise

From the very beginning, the Agency put a lot of attention to raising the status of bloggers. And there was a reason. From the very first days of the ‘thaw’ bloggers were the first to start reporting honestly. While traditional media was slow to change their minds, bloggers were brave and gained the trust of the audience. Uzbekistan is unique in that most of its blogging is concentrated around Telegram messenger. In general, Uzbekistan is second in the world for Telegram users. And with its pretty secure environment and great interface blogging has flourished. Popular bloggers who write in the Uzbek language could have up to a few hundred thousand subscribers, such as the channels of Davletov, Khushnudbek Khudayberdiev, and Troll.uz. Russian-writing bloggers have up to ten thousand subscribers each with Effekt Makarenko, Insider.uz and Nablyudeniya Pod Chinaroy among the most popular blogs.[8]

A project of legislation to provide bloggers the same rights to information as journalists was announced in August 2019 but has not been finished or signed. Currently, bloggers are not named in any media law. The law on digital information mentions them stating that a blogger is responsible for his/her content and should not publish anything which contradicts current laws. Even though channels on Telegram and Facebook page are not mentioned in any Uzbek legislation and are not a subject of Uzbek law, court cases where bloggers are accused of defamation and slander are a common thing in modern Uzbekistan. For example, in December 2019 blogger Abdufato Nuritdinov from Andijan was arrested and got 15 days of isolation in prison for insult, defamation and using swear words directed at a local district mayor, Erkinjon Yakubov. In another case in February 2020 the most popular Russian-language Facebook group ‘Potrebitel.uz’ was sued by a businessmen for defamation, but they won the case.

However, bloggers are continuing to gain strength with successful monetisation in 2019. Some popular bloggers are efficient in advertising and businessmen prefer to cooperate with them because they have people’s interest and trust. A groundbreaking event in 2019 happened on August 27^th, when Mirziyoyev for the first time met a group of local and foreign bloggers in Samarkand and shot a famous selfie with them. “I see among you our bloggers too. I am proud of that. You should know that the president will always support you”, said Mirziyoyev.^[9]

Pandemic reaction

Uzbek media representatives are proud of their current work during the pandemic. From the very first days of quarantine and lockdown, a group of 72 most popular media leaders and bloggers united and created a Telegram channel called Coronavirus.info on March 15^th. Among them are journalists from Gazeta.uz, Kun.uz, Daryo.uz, TV and radio channels, and popular bloggers Khushundbek Khudayberdiev, Nozim Safari, Troll.uz, Feruzkhan Yakubkhodjaev and others. Every day it posts important information, fights fake news and provides citizens with an opportunity to get trusted information about the situation. The channel is supported by the Mass Media Fund, the government and its related offices. All leaders and bloggers daily discuss a strategy and make decisions to step up together, combining efforts. In a few weeks Coronavirus.info got 1.4 million subscribers which is a huge number and a successful result acknowledged by many other countries who are trying other tactics. This achievement was acknowledged by Telegram Messenger, and on April 3^rd they have launched a special page to gather verified Telegram coronavirus information channels from other joining countries.[10] To this day, such verified channels exist in Cuba, Georgia, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Togo, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Together with this, every day during the pandemic private TV channel Uzreport TV was able to broadcast live briefings. More than five to six times per day officials from different offices gave updates and answered people’s questions. These videos are immediately uploaded to the Telegram channel too, keeping most of the population in the loop; TV and Telegram is a perfect combination in modern Uzbekistan. However, many media outlets had to minimise their costs and let go of staff because of the pandemic. A possible economic crisis is coming and it will hit the media if the demand for advertisements decreases.

Nikita Makarenko is a journalist, blogger and TV producer. Born in Tashkent, Nikita graduated from the National University of Uzbekistan in 2011 and started his career on radio. He worked for various local and international online outlets, in 2017 he joined one of the most popular Uzbek media outlets, ‘Gazeta.uz’, where he worked until May 2020. Currently, he runs his show at the ‘Uzreport TV’ channel and works as a blogger. In 2019, he taught a class on propaganda theory at Oberlin College (U.S.).

^[1] Human Rights Watch, Uzbekistan: Events of 2005, World Report 2006, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2006/country-chapters/uzbekistan

^[2] Nikita Makarenko, Why tourists are not coming to us, Gazeta.uz, May 2017, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/05/05/tourism/

^[3] Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Print and media workers, President.uz, June 2017, https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/707

^[4] RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2017, https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2017; RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2019, https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2019

[5] New Reporter, Test ‘How old are on you on the Internet?’ and study results, April 2020, https://newreporter.org/2020/04/23/test-skolko-vam-let-v-internete-i-rezultaty-issledovaniya/

[6] RSF, Uzbekistan unblocks many independent news sites, May 2019, https://rsf.org/en/news/uzbekistan-unblocks-many-independent-news-sites

[7] The author is a member of the Public Council.

[8] This is a personal blog of the author.

^[9] Gazeta.uz , Shavkat Mirziyoyev assured bloggers of support, August 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/08/27/blogers/

[10] The Telegram Team, Coronavirus News and Verified Channels, Telegram, April 2020, https://telegram.org/blog/coronavirus

Topics

Civil Society

Covid-19

Human Rights

Media and Online Freedom

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

Challenges NGOs in Uzbekistan are still facing

Article by Dilmurad Yusupov

Overview of NGOs in Uzbekistan

According to the Ministry of Justice of Uzbekistan the total number of registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the country as of 2020 exceeded 10,000.[1] The Ministry boasted that NGOs are increasingly gaining strong positions in the development of Uzbek society and are becoming a full-fledged partner of the state as the result of adopted legislative measures. Indeed, since the adoption of the decree of the President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in May 2018 a number of positive measures have been taken to ‘radically increase the role of civil society institutions in the process of democratic renewal of the country’.[2]

Starting from January 2020 state fees for registration of NGOs, their symbols and representative offices and branches were considerably reduced or lifted with additional privileges for organisations for disabled people, veterans, women and children. The application lead time for NGO registration was reduced from two to one month. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice is developing a web portal, e-ngo.uz, to reduce paperwork and allow registration, reporting (about upcoming NGO events including any trainings/seminars/conferences inside or outside the country, and providing annual reports on the activities of NGOs) and other services for NGOs to take place online.

Being registered as an NGO leads to specific tax benefits particularly if it is an organisation for either disabled people, veterans, women or vulnerable children. The government decided to lift these benefits in the new Tax Code 2020 but under the pressure of civil society activists and the local media the benefits were returned.[3] Importantly, NGO status allows organisations to receive local and foreign grants, and work with international organisations.

The graph shows that there has been a steady increase in the number of NGO registrations in Uzbekistan for the last ten years which almost doubled from 5,103 NGOs in 2009 to 9,338 in 2019. However, can these quantitative changes speak of a quality change and a real breakthrough in the development of civil society in Uzbekistan? Firstly, it is necessary to understand how the figures are calculated and what type of NGOs make up the ostensible positive dynamics. Importantly, the overall number includes all city, district and regional representative offices and branches of NGOs, political parties and trade unions which leads to a multiplier effect. Importantly, a distinction must be drawn between systemic and self-initiated NGOs.[4] Systemic NGOs are government-organised non-government organisations (GONGOs) established by government decrees, directly funded by the state budget and have an extensive network of regional branches.

For instance, before the Women’s Committee of Uzbekistan and the Republican Council for the Coordination of Activities of Citizens’ Self-Government Bodies (the Mahalla Fund) were merged into the Ministry for Support of Mahalla and Family in February 2020 both NGOs counted hundreds of local branches as separate NGOs.[5] As these two systemic NGOs ceased to exist, a possible reduction in the total number of NGOs is expected. Currently, systemic NGOs including their branches account for about 65 per cent of all registered NGOs in Uzbekistan – more than 6000 units.[6]

Struggling with registration of self-initiated NGOs

Another question is whether the quasi-governmental systemic NGOs represent genuine civil society institutions in Uzbekistan. Only about 3000 registered NGOs can be considered as self- initiated by groups of activists which operate at the grassroots level without direct financial support of the government and territorial branches across the country.[7] While systemic NGOs, public organisations and funds of those groups enjoy a close relationship with the government and are easily registered, civil society activists may spend months or even years to do so and face formal and informal barriers when registering their organisations with the Ministry of Justice. Although positive steps are being taken to support civil society in Uzbekistan, the internal administrative procedures of registration for self-initiated NGOs remains bureaucratic, with red tape seemingly designed to frustrate applicants into giving up in the end.

The registering bodies are applying unlawful tactics when reviewing applications which contradict the newly adopted law ‘On Administrative Procedures’.[8] Despite the fact that the review period of the constituent documents was reduced to one month the registration process can be quite lengthy as the judicial authorities do not indicate the full list of shortcomings at first application and keep refusing the NGO registration based on new and vaguely defined mistakes in the organisation’s charter or other founding documents. If necessary, the registering authority has the right to send the application documents to ‘relevant organisations for an expert examination’ which should provide their opinion within 20 days of receiving the documents.[9] However, these ‘expert organisations’ and the criteria for judging registration documents of self-initiated NGOs remain vague and the decisions by third party expert organisations are not usually disclosed to applicants.

The case of an initiative group, a youth volunteer centre, ‘Oltin Qanot’ (Golden Wing) which has been struggling to register as an NGO since October 2018 and has received more than ten refusals from the justice authorities confirms the above mentioned complexities.[10] The initiative group would like to establish an NGO in Tashkent city and has applied to the Department of Justice of Tashkent city, a route deemed easier than registering an NGO at the Ministry of Justice. The reason for the continuous refusals of ‘Oltin Qanot’ can be associated with the monopoly status of the systemic NGO Youth Union of Uzbekistan. The necessity for registration of another youth organisation is most likely questioned by the registering authorities and ‘expert organisations’ as the Youth Union is already in charge of this sphere. Moreover, the Youth Union itself can be listed among organisations which can give their ‘expertise’ on feasibility or usefulness of opening another youth organisation which creates a conflict of interest of a systemic NGO reviewing the registration documents of a potential self-initiative NGO.

The low level of legal literacy amongst initiative groups further complicates the registration process as the Ministry of Justice state they ‘are not entitled to provide legal support in the preparation of constituent documents on state registration of NGOs to counteract the occurrence of a conflict of interests and corruption risks in the judiciary’.[11] While the authorities made sample Charter documents for various types of business entities publicly available and it is now possible to register a commercial company online in 30 minutes via the Single-Window System Centre, self-initiative groups are left behind without any support to facilitate the registration process of NGOs.[12] Although the new e-ngo.uz portal allows online submission of registration documents the internal review procedures remain unchanged. Without officially approved sample NGO Charters grassroots activists are turning to paid services of lawyers which cannot guarantee the correctness of the prepared Charter. The registering bodies can find faults in the constituent documents and reject registration on the basis of the smallest grammatical mistakes or issues with their translation into Uzbek as all the application documents must be submitted in the state language.

Burdensome requirements for notification and prior approval

The lengthy and discouraging process of registering self-initiated NGOs is only the beginning in terms of obstacles. After exhaustive time and money consuming administrative procedures and obtaining the long-awaited certificate of NGO registration, many grassroots civil society organisations are facing other barriers in the process of carrying out their statutory activities.[13] Although the law ‘On Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organisations’ forbids ‘interference by state bodies and their officials in the activities of NGOs’ the Ministry of Justice obliges NGOs to inform them in advance about all planned activities, including conferences, seminars, trainings, meetings, events, roundtables, symposia and other forms of events due to take place in Uzbekistan or overseas.[14] At the same time these burdensome requirements do not apply to political parties and religious organisations which also have NGO status.

For instance, if an NGO plans to hold an event on the territory of Uzbekistan without participation of foreign nationals it should notify the local justice authority at least ten days before the event takes place. If the planned event in Uzbekistan involves foreign citizens or is to take place on the territory of a foreign state – notification should be sent at least 20 days before the event. There is a special notification form consisting of 12 questions to be answered. This form can now be sent online through the e-ngo.uz portal and the information to be provided in advance includes: the theme of the event and the number of participants; the date and the venue; the basis for the holding and sources of funding; attached copies of handouts; print, audio-visual and other materials; as well as personal data of participating foreign citizens. NGOs must also notify officials about all their foreign travel related to the activities of their NGOs and about visits of international guests to Uzbekistan. All above mentioned onerous requirements in practice illustrate direct intervention of the authorities in the activities of NGOs. The justice authorities also have the power to reject or stop activities even if the formal requirements are fulfilled and all necessary documents have been submitted. However, an NGO retains the right to appeal to the court if it is dissatisfied with the decision of the judicial body to ban the event.[15]

Restrictions on foreign funding

While the financial assistance of the Uzbek government to support the third sector is quite limited barriers are still in place for NGOs to receive grants and other financial support from abroad. The public fund for the support of NGOs and other civil society institutions under the Oliy Majlis is one of the few sources of financial support for NGOs. The diagram below shows the financial flows in the NGO sector of Uzbekistan in 2016. Membership fees and other voluntary contributions account for 28.2 per cent and form the main source of NGOs funding. Importantly, only 11 per cent are funds received from foreign and international organisations while about ten per cent comes from the state trust and extra-budgetary funds.

In his May 2018 decree President Mirziyoyev pointed out that ‘funds allocated by the state to support civil society institutions do not allow the implementation of their medium-term and long-term large-scale and republic-wide projects and programs’.[16] Therefore, the decree outlined the creation of public funds to support NGOs through the allocation of the necessary resources from regional state budgets. Although such public funds were registered in all regions across Uzbekistan, not many of them are actually operating as their funds have not yet been allocated and their staff have not been recruited.

Based on the laws ‘On NGOs’ and ‘On Public Associations’, NGOs are entitled to receive grants and financial support from foreign donors.[17] The Ministry of Justice says that ‘the use of funds and property received by NGOs from foreign states, international and foreign organisations is carried out without any obstacles after agreeing on their receipt with the registration authority’.[18] It should be acknowledged that there have been some alleviations for NGOs to receive foreign grants by opening a grant account at any bank in Uzbekistan. Before NGOs would have had to open special accounts at only two banks, the National Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan or the state-owned joint-stock commercial bank Asaka where a so-called special ‘grant commission’ carried out evaluations of received grant funds based on unwritten rules and criteria.

In October 2019 the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan approved a new regulation on the procedures for coordination of the money and property received by NGOs from international donors. According to the decree signed by the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Abdulla Aripov, if the amount of foreign cash and property received by an NGO within one calendar year does not exceed 20 ‘basic calculation values’ (4,460,000 Uzbekistani Som as of February 1^st 2020), then the documents are submitted to the Ministry of Justice for information. If the amount exceeds this, documents must be submitted for approval.[19] Considering that 20 BCV in one calendar year is a minor amount (about 450 US dollars), for many NGOs relying on foreign funding coordination means getting approval. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice retains the right to reject receipt of foreign funding if the funds are found to ‘jeopardise [the] health and moral values of citizens’.[20] Taking into consideration the vague nature of the concept of ‘morality’, which is not legally defined, this provision can be used by the authorities to refuse foreign funding for NGOs.

Low organisational capacity of self-initiated NGOs

Due to the limited financial support from the government and existing barriers on international funding self-initiated NGOs, unlike systemic GONGOs, do not have sufficient organisational capacity and resources. This was also confirmed by the presidential decree from May 2018 recognising that ‘the state of material and technical support of non-governmental non-profit organisations is still unsatisfactory’. One of the biggest problems self-initiated NGOs are facing is the inability to rent office spaces to carry out their activities. About 80 per cent of NGOs do not have their own premises, particularly in the remote regions.[21]

Based on the decree the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, hokimiyats (local government) of regions and the city of Tashkent, together with the State Committee for the Promotion of Privatised Enterprises and the Development of Competition, had to create ‘houses of NGOs’ based in empty or inefficiently used state property in all regions of Uzbekistan until January 1^st 2019. Nevertheless, only three ‘house of NGO’ were created throughout the republic – one in Urgench, where only 19 NGOs were provided with office space, one in Gulistan, where 12 NGOs found shelter, and one in Nukus. The office spaces in the ‘houses of NGOs’ should be primarily allocated to newly established NGOs in socially significant areas at a ‘zero’ rental rate. However, there are doubts that this will be enforced, and that preference will be given to systemic GONGOs rather than self-initiated grassroots organisations. The creation of several NGO houses in each region may not be a feasible solution as there will be not enough for the estimated 3000 self-initiated NGOs.

Centralisation of charity activity during the COVID-19 pandemic

The first case of COVID-19 was registered in Uzbekistan on March 14^th and on the same day the Uzbek government announced the shutting down of schools, colleges and universities.[22] Subsequently the Tashkent government introduced strict quarantine measures step-by-step: banning and introducing penalties for walking in public without PPE, closing all border checkpoints, prohibiting weddings and other public gatherings, cancelling all domestic flights and railways, suspending public transport, putting restrictions on using private vehicles, etc.[23] Despite these strict measures the initiative to support vulnerable groups (elderly, disabled and low-income families) came from volunteers and grassroots civil society activists that used social networks (Telegram and Facebook) to distribute help to those in need.

However, on April 1^st Elmira Basitkhanova the former chairperson of the systemic NGO Women’s Committee of Uzbekistan who was appointed first deputy Minister for Mahalla and Family Affairs announced in public that in five days 200 complaints were received about the delivery of food to the elderly and low-income families by volunteer groups.[24] She backed up her argument to curb volunteer efforts asking whether donating to elderly people who are at higher risk of contracting the coronavirus is a violation of quarantine requirements, questioning how their safety is ensured and who controls the quality of delivered products. Therefore, on April 1^st the Sponsorship Coordination Centre was established under the Ministry for the Support for Mahalla and Family with a single short number 1197.[25] It was recommended to transfer all donations to a systemic public foundation with an NGO status, ‘O’zbekiston mehr-shafqat va salomatlik’ (Uzbekistan – mercy and health), which was established by the Government of Uzbekistan in November 28, 1988 at a conference in February 1989 and re-registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan on November 21^st 2014.[26] Thus, the Uzbek government centralised and monopolised charity allocation through a single government-organised public fund and the Sponsorship Coordination Centre while the activities of volunteer groups and civil society organisations were restricted.[27]

Moreover, on April 20^th President Mirziyoyev proposed the creation of another systemic NGO fund, ‘Saxovat va ko’mak umumxalq harakati’ (nationwide movement ‘Generosity and Assistance’), suggesting that businessmen and entrepreneurs should transfer their donations to the fund to actively support vulnerable members of population in their local mahallas during the period which coincided with the holy month of Ramadan.[28] The businessmen who donated to the fund were promised by the president they would receive various benefits (e.g. taxes concessions, access to leasing, credits and other resources) depending on the level of assistance and support they provided. Rather than resorting to ‘helicopter money’ Mirziyoyev decided to provide social protection via his appeal to businesses and entrepreneurs.[29]

Due to the lack of transparency and accountability of the state-organised funds there were several cases of violations and crime related to the appropriation of donated funds. For instance, a deputy mayor (Khokim) in the Akkurgan district who was the head of the district department for mahalla and family affairs misappropriated charitable funds from the ‘Mahalla’ fund and ‘Saxovat va ko’mak’ fund. The Prosecutor’s Office have opened a criminal case under Article 167 (theft by embezzlement) of the Criminal Code.[30] In another investigative report it was found that the activities of the state-owned charity fund ‘Saxovat and ko’mak’ contradicts the laws of Uzbekistan, which prohibits the government to create such foundations.[31] Moreover, the journalist found that the fund purchased products at inflated prices, and its account was replenished through ‘voluntary’ random deductions from the salaries of employees of state organisations.

Apart from the embezzlement of public funds, the top down approach to charity allocation has had negative impacts on the most vulnerable segments of Uzbek society. Firstly, the centralisation of aid allocation in the form of a single Centre and single emergency hotline considerably increased the transactions costs to review each application, which was quite difficult in the absence of any eligibility criteria and lack of a single database of children and adults in need of social protection. The one-size-fits-all approach with a fixed bundle of basic goods did not really work as the people had unique needs. As a result, many people who needed help were not able to reach the hotline on the phone and were left behind.

Social partnership and trust of the government in volunteer groups and civil society organisations rather than the monopolisation of charity activities via government-organised public funds would have been a more effective and efficient response to the needs of the vulnerable amid strict COVID-19 quarantine measures. Compared to systemic GONGOs, self-initiated NGOs and civil society groups already had an extended network of beneficiaries at the grassroots levels and a better understand of the needs of their members. Therefore, the transaction costs and time they use to distribute goods and services might be lesser. Importantly, if the Uzbek government had cooperated with such NGOs the staff and volunteers could have been supported and remunerated for their charity work thus being able to sustain their families as well through the crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic should have been used an opportunity to develop the organisational capacity of self-initiated NGOs to make them more resilient for future crises.

Strict controls rather than equal partnership

In March 2020 the registration of a human rights NGO Huquqiy Tayanch (Legal Support), the first since 2003, has sparked some hope for further liberalisation of the third sector in Uzbekistan.[32] Despite this successful single case and the recent easements in the formal registration and regulation requirements of NGOs in Uzbekistan tightly controlled measures are still in force. The sector is in need of systemic changes to provide freedom of association and to develop models of equal social partnership.[33] Persistent stereotypes and prejudices towards independent NGOs prevail, with a lack of trust and negative attitudes towards NGOs, sometimes seen as ‘foreign agents’ by the Uzbek government and society may further hinder the reforms that are vital to strengthen the capacity of self-initiated NGOs.[34]

On April 16^th 2020 the Public Chamber under the President was created with the main objective to establish a dialogue between the state, citizens, and civil society institutions.[35] The Public Chamber can organise public hearings, examine draft laws and regulations, and monitor and prepare annual national reports on the state of civil society in Uzbekistan. However, as not all of its members are elected, with 18 out of the 50 members appointed by the president, there are doubts that the Chamber will be truly public and independent and that it may turn into another state Chamber.[36]

Currently, the Ministry of Justice together with civil society activists are working on a new NGO code which should become a touchstone to develop a genuine and vibrant civil society in Uzbekistan. However, the working group should have submitted a draft of the NGO code to the Cabinet of Ministers by February 1^st 2020. This is not the first delay, with several deadlines missed already.[37] To make it happen the authorities are advised to follow these recommendations:

Improve data collection practices on NGOs and make their financial data publicly available for researchers and those interested in independent assessment and evaluation of the third sector development;
Make the registration process of self-initiated NGOs transparent and easy in the interest of grassroots initiative groups, provide legal support and samples of Charter documents to avoid shortcomings in the application documents and to facilitate their swift processing;
Provide financial and organisational support to self-initiated NGOs and other civil society institutions through state funds and other means of support by encouraging local public and philanthropic fund-raising activities;
Restrict unlawful state intervention in the activities of NGOs through burdensome requirements for reporting and advance approval for the day-to-day activities of NGOs; and
Lift limits on foreign funding of NGOs and other administrative barriers to their international contact.

Dilmurad Yusupov is doctoral researcher at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex. He can be followed on Twitter @d_yusupov.

[1] Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Refusal to register NGO: causes and the consequences, January 2020, https://www.minjust.uz/en/press-center/news/98816/

[2] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, On measures to radically increase the role of civil society institutions in the process of democratic renewal of the country, LexUZ, dated May 2018, http://lex.uz/docs/3721651

[3] Dilmurad Yusupov, Uzbekistan’s Tax Code 2020: no benefits for charities, March 2020, https://dilmurad.me/uzbekistans-tax-code-2020-no-benefits-for-charities/

[4] Dilmurad Yusupov and Oybek Isakov, Why is it Difficult to Open an NGO in Uzbekistan?, CABAR.asia, January 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/why-is-it-difficult-to-open-an-ngo-in-uzbekistan/

[5] UZDaily, Mahalla and Family Support Ministry established in Uzbekistan, February 2020, https://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/54895

[6] Analytical report ‘The state of the “third sector” in Uzbekistan: realities and development prospects’, Independent Institute for Monitoring the Formation of Civil Society (NIMFOGO), 2018.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Leonid Khvan, Legislatively about administrative procedures and registration of NGOs, Gazeta.uz, February 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/02/14/administrative-procedures/; Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, On Administrative Procedures, dated January 2018, No. ZRU-457, LexUZ, https://lex.uz/docs/3492203

[9] Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan ‘On measures to implement the resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated December 12, 2013 No. PP-2085 ‘On additional measures to assist the development of civil society institutions’, LexUZ https://www.lex.uz/acts/2356874#undefined

[10] Dilmurad Yusupov and Oybek Isakov, Answer to the Ministry of Justice about the problems of registration of NGOs, Gazeta.uz, February 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/02/12/answer/

[11] Ministry of Justice, Denial of registration of NGOs: causes and consequences, Gazeta.uz, January, 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/01/28/mj/

[12] Business Entity, Registration Module of the EITI Portal, https://fo.birdarcha.uz/s/uz_landing

[13] Yusupov and Isakov, Regulations of NGOs: Control of Partnership?

[14] Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘About Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organizations’ dated April 14, 1999, LexUZ, https://www.lex.uz/acts/10863; Order of the Justice Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On approval of the regulative procedure for notification of planned activities of non-governmental non-profit organizations’ of June 1, 2018, LexUZ, https://www.lex.uz/acts/3776151#3776168

[15] Decree of the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On Approval of the regulation and procedures of notification of planned activities non-government non-profit organisations’, dated June 1, 2018, LexUZ, https://www.lex.uz/acts/3776151#3776168

[16] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On measures to radically increase the role of civil society institutions in the process of democratic renewal of the country’, dated May 4, 2018 No. UP-5430, http://lex.uz/docs/3721651

[17] Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On non-government non-commercial organisations’, dated April 14, 1999, LexUZ, https://www.lex.uz/acts/10863; Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On public associations in the Republic of Uzbekistan’, dated February 15, 1991, LexUZ, https://www.lex.uz/acts/111827

[18] Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Refusal to register NGO: causes and the consequences, MinJust, January 2020, https://www.minjust.uz/en/press-center/news/98816/

[19] Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On approving the procedure for accepting the receipt of funds by non-governmental non-profit organizations from foreign states, international and foreign organizations, citizens of foreign states or, on their instructions from other persons’, dated October 9, 2019, LexUZ, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4546607

[20] Ibid.

[21] Yusupov and Isakov, Regulations of NGOs: Control of Partnership?

[22] Olzhas Auyezov, Uzbekistan confirms first coronavirus case, closes schools, borders, Reuters, March 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-uzbekistan/uzbekistan-confirms-first-coronavirus-case-closes-schools-borders-idUSKBN21206W

[23] Gazeta.uz, The month that has changed Uzbekistan, April 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/04/15/chronicle/

[24] Kun.uz, Elmira Basitkhanova appointed to a new position, February 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/02/20/elmira-basitkhanova-appointed-to-a-new-position; Anora Ismailova, Elmira Basithanova said that in five days there were about 200 complaints about the delivery of food to elderly people and low-income families, Podrobno.uz, April 2020, https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/elmira-basitkhanova-zayavila-chto-za-pyat-dney-postupilo-okolo-200-zhalob-na-rabotu-volonterov-dosta/

[25] UZDaily, Sponsorship Coordination Centers to start operating in Uzbekistan, April 2020, http://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/55794

[26] Mercy and Health Community Foundation, https://mehrshafqat.uz/

[27] Dilmurad Yusupov, How COVID-19 is affecting disabled people in Uzbekistan?, Dilmurad.me, April 2020, https://dilmurad.me/how-covid-19-quarantine-is-affecting-disabled-people-in-uzbekistan/

[28] Fergana News, “Generosity and Assistance”, April 2020, https://en.fergana.news/articles/117489/

[29] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: President nixes helicopter money idea, appeals to business community, April 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-president-nixes-helicopter-money-idea-appeals-to-business-community

[30] Kun.uz, Deputy khokim misappropriated charitable funds in Akkurgan district, May 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/05/18/deputy-khokim-misappropriated-charitable-funds-in-akkurgan-district

[31] Mirzo Subkhanov, Uzbekistan: charity with violations, CABAR.asia, May 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/uzbekistan-charity-with-violations/

[32] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan sparks hope with registration of NGOs, March 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-sparks-hope-with-registration-of-ngos

[33] The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On Social Partnership’, dated September 25, 2014, Lex.Uz, https://www.lex.uz/docs/2468216

[34] Nikita Makarenko, Maidan-Paranoia, Gazeta.uz, January 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/01/31/ngos/; Referencing the 2013/14 protests in Ukraine that led to the overthrow of its Government; Gerard Toal, John O’Loughlin and Kristin M. Bakke, Are some NGOs really “foreign agents”? Here’s what people in Georgia and Ukraine say, openDemocracy, April 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/are-some-ngos-really-foreign-agents-heres-what-people-georgia-and-ukraine-say/

[35] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘On the Creation of the Public Chamber under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan’, April 16, 2020, uza.uz, https://uza.uz/ru/documents/o-sozdanii-obshchestvennoy-palaty-pri-prezidente-respubliki–17-04-2020

[36] Sanjar Saidov, Uzbekistan: Public of State Chamber? CABAR.asia, May 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/uzbekistan-public-or-state-chamber/

[37] Gazeta.uz, NGO code will be developed in Uzbekistan, October 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/10/05/ngo/

Topics

Civil Society

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

Rebranding Uzbek cotton: An opportunity for lasting reform

Article by Lynn Schweisfurth

A Toxic Legacy

The spectre of the use of child and forced labour to pick cotton haunts the Uzbek government to this day. At its peak, the government orchestrated the world’s largest seasonal recruitment effort, which involved the forced mobilisation of approximately one million children, students and adults to pick cotton, resulting in a global boycott by some of the world’s leading brands and retailers.[1]

The Uzbek Forum for Human Rights (formerly Uzbek-German Forum/UGF) has monitored child and forced labour in the cotton sector in Uzbekistan since 2009.[2] Ten years ago, the Uzbek government categorically denied the very existence of child labour and even accused human rights activists of lies and deception. The harvesting of the ‘white gold’, worth approximately $1.5 billion in 2019, meant the closure of schools, colleges and universities every autumn to send schoolchildren and students to pick cotton for the state.[3] As one school director explained, “Cotton is not a plant, it is politics”.[4] It is worth remembering that the current president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in his role as Prime Minister at the time, oversaw the cotton harvest and had personal responsibility for fulfilling cotton quotas which relied on forced mobilisation.

During those years, in the absence of the slightest hope that the Uzbek government would ever abstain from this constant, convenient supply of cheap labour that inflated the state’s badly needed income, local and international human rights activists called for a boycott of Uzbek cotton as the only means available to exert influence on the authoritarian power in Tashkent. The petition grew into a global boycott of Uzbek cotton, led by the Cotton Campaign, and has to date been signed by over 300 brands including Zara, H&M, Walmart, Marks & Spencer, Ikea and many more.[5] Given the sensitivity of brands and retailers to the threat of consumer boycotts because of links to child labour and modern slavery, it did not take much to persuade them to sign up.

When human rights activists filed a complaint with the World Bank in 2013 after identifying the use of child and forced labour in projects it was financing, the government could no longer ignore the pressure of potentially losing millions of dollars in investments.[6] In 2017, after decades of denial, President Mirziyoyev finally acknowledged the existence of forced labour, a long-awaited confirmation that it had not been a figment of the imagination of troublesome human rights activists.[7]

Impact of Reforms

Since then, the government has taken concrete steps that have led to a marked decline in the number of people being forced into the fields: wages for cotton pickers have increased attracting more voluntary pickers and providing welcome seasonal income for rural communities; the use of forced labour is now a criminal offence under Uzbek law for repeat offenders; there are now more trained labour inspectors; a nationwide outreach campaign has raised awareness among the population; and there has been an increased number of investigations and punishments for the use of forced labour.

Although President Mirziyoyev cannot be considered a democratic reformer, he is no Vaclav Havel, and while the reform process has focussed mainly on the economy, he deserves some credit. He has begun to discuss the huge backlog of human rights issues in the country and there has been a significant opening up to international organisations, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and United Nations (UN) agencies. Independent media outlets have sprung up that have surprised with vocal criticism of the government and hundreds of political prisoners have been released. Civil society, however, for the most part remains weakened by decades of Soviet-style dictatorship and plans to reverse that still do not yet appear to be moving up the line of priorities of presidential decrees. In a country attempting such sweeping reforms without actually altering the authoritarian nature of government, there are bound to be challenges in the implementation of new laws in the absence of independent institutions.

Not all efforts to reform the cotton sector however have proved efficient and often expose uneven and sometimes arbitrary application.[8] Mechanisms such as hotlines to report instances of forced labour have been shown to be ineffective because they are not independent of the government and require complainants to divulge personal information such as name, address, passport number and place of work. Many victims are therefore naturally reluctant to file complaints for fear of reprisals. Criminalisation of forced labour only came into force in 2020 for repeat offenders and although there have been administrative punishments, they were often not made public. In some cases where perpetrators were held accountable, forced labour continued at the same premises by the same perpetrator only days later.[9] Because of a lack of transparency in how investigations are handled, it appears that those held accountable are not actually the ones giving orders to forcibly recruit cotton pickers. Where doctors and teachers were found guilty of using forced labour, no-one investigated further as to why people with no connection to the cotton sector would be motivated to lose their staff to picking cotton.

Uzbek Forum’s latest report on the 2019 harvest found that forced labour remained widespread, albeit to a far lesser degree than in previous years, a sign that the reform process is indeed taking hold.[10] However, the ILO’s estimate of 102,000 forced pickers, based on a nationwide telephone poll, does not appear to reflect the wider patterns of coercion that Uzbek Forum monitors documented. A lack of effective recruitment systems, for example, mean that local authorities are still involved in mobilising pickers. Given the power these officials wield over local communities, such as the disbursement of social benefits, the pressure to follow the call to the fields is difficult to withstand. As one community leader pointed out, “It’s a good thing that we control their benefits payments, or we would never be able to find enough pickers to fulfill our recruitment quota.”[11]

There is clear evidence of the continued role of the state in cotton production, despite the privatisation process. In many cases documented by Uzbek Forum monitors during the 2019 harvest, orders were given to state- and privately-owned enterprises including banks, local administrations and government agencies to either send employees to the fields or pay for replacement pickers, leaving many employees short of up to two months’ salary during the harvest. In short, Uzbekistan’s cotton sector still has red flags all over it (although it is worth remembering that there were a number of private companies operating in Uzbekistan even while schoolchildren, some as young as ten, were routinely bussed from school to pick cotton in the blazing sun and exposed to dangerous chemicals). So despite reforms, the question remains as to why they have not yet led to the eradication of forced labour.

Where the State and the Private Sector Merge

Until 2017 when privatisation began, the Uzbek government retained a monopoly over the cotton sector, controlling price, production, sales and inputs such as fertilisers and seeds. This state involvement, in particular the state-set production quota, has been the key driving force in the persistence of forced labour. The responsibility for delivery of quotas lie with local officials or hokims throughout the regions. These officials are under enormous pressure, often under the threat of penalty, to fulfil their quotas even in the absence of sufficient picker numbers, particularly in less populous regions such as Jizzakh. Tape recordings, in which hokims can be heard berating, insulting and even beating farmers for failing to deliver their quotas, have been made available to Uzbek Forum many times over the years.[12] The pressure from the government to meet cotton quotas is simply passed down the chain of command until tens of thousands of Uzbeks find themselves often miles from home for days on end picking cotton in derelict accommodation, often without access to clean drinking water. Every year has brought at least one death on the fields.[13]

In March this year, following meetings of delegates of the Cotton Campaign with government officials in Tashkent, a presidential decree was passed that abolishes the state quota system. This significant step simultaneously removes the motivation of hokims to force people to deliver quotas and instead leaves production targets in the hands of private companies. The government plans to privatise the entire sector by the end of 2020 through ‘cotton textile clusters’ which are designed to bring production, processing and manufacturing into the hands of single private operators, thus increasing the value chain and creating badly needed jobs. In 2019, 75 private clusters accounted for 73 per cent of Uzbekistan’s cotton production.[14] However, the private sector cannot be a guarantee of the absence of forced labour, especially in a country without independent trade unions and where the concentration of money and political power is in the hands of a few.

The Impact of Cotton Clusters on Farmers

The cotton cluster system has brought with it a whole new set of problems. Farmers, for example, have long been at the mercy of the whims of the state. They do not own their land but lease it from the government usually for a period of between 30 and 49 years. Since privatisation began, farmers have been reporting that unscrupulous methods have been used to transfer their land to private operators with little or no compensation.[15] Numerous ‘land optimisations’ in recent years have seen farmers have their land confiscated for ‘failure to fulfil the cotton quota’.

Historically, farmers have had little freedom to choose what products to cultivate and, given the intense effort required to grow cotton profitably, many would prefer to cultivate fruit and vegetables which may be more suited to their soil and bring higher yields. Farmers claim that they are often pressured by hokims to sign contracts obliging them to deliver unrealistically high amounts of cotton, forcing them again to choose cotton over more profitable crops to meet the production target or lose their land.[16] Others reported this year that they had still not received payment for cotton they delivered in 2018. Some have alleged that they have been forced to sign contracts without the name of the private operator and the production targets left blank. In one case, farmers complained that they did not even know who the director of the cluster was or to whom they should direct their complaints. Uzbekistan’s agriculture sector looks increasingly precarious for those trying to make a living from it. The vulnerability of farmers to exploitative practises is compounded by the concentration of entire districts in the hands of one cluster, a pattern that comes dangerously close to regional monopolies.[17] A number of these new clusters have gone to considerable lengths to conceal their ownership structures and many are registered as Limited Liability Companies in the United Kingdom (UK), a preferred method for those wishing to veil owners, beneficiaries and most of all taxes.[18]

The government may be heading towards eschewing the responsibility for forced labour in the cotton sector and will no doubt declare victory if in future the blame can be laid at the feet of private operators. Indeed, Uzbek Forum has found evidence of forced labour at a number of privately-operated clusters.[19] In 2019, the government still imposed state quotas for cotton production for which local authorities have the responsibility to deliver, including cotton produced by private clusters. Again, the responsibility of hokims to either meet those quotas or face consequences such as dismissal, coupled with regional shortages of labour, meant that cluster operators knowingly or otherwise had their cotton harvested by people under coercion. Even companies which were consciously making an effort to avoid the use of forced labour found themselves caught between the competing priorities of local officials to meet their targets and avoid penalties, and farmers who were unable to attract enough voluntary labour at the end of the season when weather conditions are harsh and earning potential is low.

These prevailing challenges have nonetheless failed to dampen the Uzbek government’s enthusiasm to have the ban on its cotton lifted – notably supported by the ILO which itself confirms the persistent widespread use of forced labour. PR campaigns proclaiming that ‘Uzbekistan is open for business’ and that the boycott is preventing job creation in a country with rampant and growing unemployment, have been ubiquitous both at home but more noticeably abroad. The argument for lifting the boycott was sharpened as soon as COVID-19 reached Uzbekistan. In an open letter issued together with a press release, the Minister of Labour urged the Cotton Campaign to show its solidarity with the people of Uzbekistan, in a sleight of hand reversal of the understanding of solidarity.[20]

The Way Forward

The erasure of the toxic legacy of Uzbek cotton will require more explicit political reforms if the government is to successfully coax international brands to re-enter the Uzbek market. Even conservative ILO estimates of 102,000 forced cotton pickers during the 2019 harvest do not impart a message of confidence to would-be buyers of Uzbek cotton, no matter how the numbers are packaged.[21] Apparel companies conduct extensive due diligence which go beyond the use of forced labour. They include ethical and social indicators to assess the risk of human rights violations in their supply chains. The European Union (EU) has recently taken a further step to strengthen corporate accountability, raising the bar higher for those wishing to do business in countries that lack democratic oversight.[22]

If the government is to create a business-friendly environment that guarantees transparency, accountability and rule of law and gives assurances to brands and retailers, it must urgently acknowledge that sustainable reform cannot be achieved in the absence of a vibrant and empowered civil society. Without independent trade unions, transparency, rule of law, accountability and registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs) free from government interference, there are no voices other than a handful of courageous human rights defenders with the ability to monitor and report on forced labour and other human rights abuses in the sector. This point was reinforced in a recent joint article by representatives of the United States (US) Fashion Industry Association and the American Apparel & Footwear Association in which they argue that “ending the boycott must be matched with more ironclad commitments for responsible sourcing and investment that respect labour and human rights in the country.”[23]

President Mirziyoyev should heed that sage advice and legitimise the participation of civil society to foster a business environment that respects human rights. Mirziyoyev’s track record shows a less determined inclination to do so. Since coming to power, only one single independent human rights organisation has been registered, the second since 2003. Independent initiative groups are rejected time and again for failing to comply with the cumbersome registration process and are often subjected to threats and harassment by the authorities.[24]

The initiative group Chiroq, founded by an Uzbek Forum monitor in Karakalpakstan, not only had its application to register rejected twice, but was the target of a concerted effort by the authorities to prevent its members from meeting with Cotton Campaign delegates while they visited the region in February this year. Uzbek Forum published a chronology of incidents Chiroq has experienced in its attempts to be legitimately registered as an NGO.[25] In a recent troubling incident on June 8^th, four human rights defenders were arbitrarily detained while monitoring child labour in cotton weeding in the Namangan region.[26] The activists were forcibly tested for COVID-19 and placed under police-supervised quarantine, an action that appeared intended to limit their monitoring, not protect public health. This year, the government will draft a new NGO code, providing a unique opportunity to send a strong, clear message to civil society that reform can go beyond the economy. Indeed, an empowered and enabled civil society is one of the core objectives laid out in a roadmap of reforms to eradicate forced labour developed by the Cotton Campaign and shared with the Uzbek government.[27]

Uzbekistan’s cotton sector has become something of a bellwether of the speed and success of the government’s reform process. The 2020 cotton harvest will be a real test of the Uzbek government’s ability to eliminate forced labour in the cotton sector, although the use of forced labour is still commonplace in other sectors such as silk and public works.[28]

In order to move forward, it is essential to acknowledge the past, much as President Mirziyoyev did in 2017 when he finally acknowledged the existence of forced labour. By doing so, he was able to lay the groundwork and usher in the changes that are taking place today. The same signals must now be given to civil society to ensure that these reforms result in meaningful changes for ordinary Uzbek citizens and not just a select elite. While it would be premature to encourage brands to return to Uzbekistan while forced labour persists, the potential development of a responsible sourcing framework in which an empowered Uzbek civil society could take up the reins in monitoring workers’ rights might just give brands the assurances they need. That is surely an opportunity the Uzbek government cannot pass up.

Lynn Schweisfurth holds an MA in German Language and Literature from the University of Glasgow and a Masters Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation from the European Inter-University Centre, Venice. She was formerly Director of Development for Human Rights Watch, Germany and is a consultant for Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, based in Berlin;

Photo by Shuhrataxmedov, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

[1] Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, The Uzbek Forced Labor System of Cotton Production, April 2017, http://harvestreport.uzbekgermanforum.org/the-issue-at-stake/

[2] See: https://www.uzbekforum.org/

[3] Ibrahim Sirtioglu, New Textile Investments Reduce Uzbekistan Cotton Exports, USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, April 2019, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Cotton%20and%20Products%20Annual_Tashkent_Uzbekistan%20-%20Republic%20of_4-1-2019.pdf

[4] Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “Cotton – it’s not a plant, it’s politics”. The system of forced labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector, January 2013, https://www.uzbekforum.org/cotton-its-not-a-plant-its-politics-the-system-of-forced-labour-in-uzbekistans-cotton-sector/

[5] See: http://www.cottoncampaign.org/; Pledge Signatories, Responsible Sourcing Network, (continuously updated), https://www.sourcingnetwork.org/cotton-pledge-signatories-complete-list

[6] Cotton Campaign, Formal Complaint Filed with World Bank Inspection Panel, September 2013, http://www.cottoncampaign.org/formal-complaint-filed-with-the-world-bank-inspection-panel.html

[7] Address by Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the General Debate of the 72^nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 2017, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/uz_en.pdf

[9] In October 2019, Uzbek Forum monitors interviewed hospital staff of the Turtkul District Central Hospital in Karakalpakstan

who had complained about forced labour. Although the Ministry of Labour inspectorate fined the director of the clinic, further hospital staff were sent to pick cotton under threat of penalty.

[10] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, “Tashkent’s Reforms Have Not Yet Reached Us” – Unfinished Work in the Fight Against Forced Labor in Uzbekistan’s 2019 Cotton Harvest, June 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/UzbekForum-2019-Harvest-Report-Seiten-Mail.pdf

[11] Uzbek Forum interview with Women’s Committee representative, Pakhtakor district, Jizzakh, October 16, 2019.

[12] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Just Like Old Times: Ministry of Internal Affairs Continues to Meddle in the Lives of Farmers, August 2019, https://www.uzbekforum.org/just-like-old-times-ministry-of-internal-affairs-continues-to-meddle-in-the-lives-of-farmers/

[13] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Spanish-Owned Chemical Company Implicated in Forced Labour with Tragic Consequences, December 2018, https://www.uzbekforum.org/spanish-owned-chemical-company-implicated-in-forced-labour-with-tragic-consequences/

[14] REGUM, In Uzbekistan, starting from 2020, cotton will be grown only by the cluster method, Regnum News, December 2019, https://regnum.ru/news/2800903.html

[15] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Farmers’ Land Transferred to Privately-Owned Clusters, May 2019, https://www.uzbekforum.org/vse-izmeneniya-sohraneny-uzbek-farmer-my-land-was-unexpectedly-transferred-to-a-cotton-cluste/

[17] Ron Synovitz and Sadriddin Ashur, Uzbek Farmers Get ‘Cluster’ Bombed By Reforms, RFE/RL, December 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-farmers-get-cluster-bombed-by-reforms/30328781.html

[18] The Tashkent Times, Agricultural cluster reform – a failure by design?, December 2019, https://tashkenttimes.uz/economy/4750-agricultural-cluster-reform-a-failure-by-design

[20] Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Uzbekistan seeks end of cotton boycott as virus weighs on economy, AlJazeera, April 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/uzbekistan-seeks-cotton-boycott-virus-weighs-economy-200416074105140.html

[21] International Labour Organization, Third-party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2019 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, February 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—ipec/documents/publication/wcms_735873.pdf

[22] Publications Office of the EU, Study on due diligence requirements through the supply chain, April 2020, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/8ba0a8fd-4c83-11ea-b8b7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[23] Julia K. Hughes and Nate Herman, It’s not Time to End the Uzbek Cotton Boycott Yet, Foreign Policy, May 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/uzbek-international-cotton-boycott/

[25] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Tricks, Threats and Deception: Registering an NGO in Uzbekistan, March 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/tricks-threats-and-deception-registering-an-ngo-in-uzbekistan/

[26] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Human Rights Activists Isolated for 14 Days After Monitoring Cotton Fields, June 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/human-rights-activists-isolated-for-14-days-after-monitoring-cotton-fields/

[27] Cotton Campaign, A Roadmap of Reforms to End State-Sponsored Forced Labor, June 2019, http://www.cottoncampaign.org/a-roadmap-of-reforms-to-end-state-sponsored-forced-labor-in-uzbekistan.html

[28] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Uzbek Farmer: I would be glad to refuse to grow cocoons, June 2018,https://www.uzbekforum.org/uzbek-farmer-i-would-be-glad-to-refuse-to-grow-cocoons/; Uzbek Forum has documented a consistent pattern of officials ordering citizens to undertake forced labor tasks including community maintenance and beautification, street cleaning, wheat harvesting and collection of scrap metal and paper; Solidarity Centre and Uzbek-German Forum, There Is No Work We Haven’t Done: Forced Labor of Public-Sector Employees in Uzbekistan, February 2019, https://www.solidaritycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Uzbekistan.Forced-Labor-in-Public-Sector-Report.English.1.2019.pdf

Topics

Civil Society

Energy, Environment and Resources

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

Rehabilitation here and now: Pursuing transitional justice in Uzbekistan

Article by Steve Swerdlow

We urgently need a structure independent of the state’s prison administration that will have the authority to devise remedies in individual cases of past and ongoing abuse. The creation of a commission of this type would signal the government’s willingness to listen to its citizens’ calls to end human rights abuses and embark on a path that offers greater respect for human rights.

–interview with Agzam Turgunov, a human rights activist and victim of torture, imprisoned 2009-2017.

More often than democracy-watchers would like to acknowledge, the death of a dictator usually does little to fundamentally change the nature of a political system. Think Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in 2000, North Korea’s Kim Jong Il in 2011, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez in 2013. But in certain rare cases, it can lead to concrete improvements in the lives of millions of ordinary people. Some have argued this occurred—at least in part and for a time—in the case of Josef Stalin’s death in 1953. It most certainly happened in August 2016 with the death of Islam Karimov, whose ruthless 27-year reign (1989-2016) in Uzbekistan became synonymous with the worst forms of repression, torture, and political imprisonment.

Now nearly four years since Karimov’s death and Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s assumption of the presidency, Uzbekistan’s government has taken several decisive steps to address some of the worst human rights abuses associated with the long rule of his predecessor as part of a larger, ambitious reform program.

Beginning in September 2016, almost immediately following Karimov’s death and following on years of international pressure, the government began releasing political prisoners, approximately 55 as of July 2020, including long-held journalists and human rights defenders, in addition to releasing an undetermined number of religious prisoners.[1]

Those released include Yusuf Ruzimuradov and Muhammad Bekjanov—two of the world’s longest imprisoned journalists, in jail for 19 and 18 years, respectively—human rights defenders Agzam Turgunov and Azam Farmonov, and peaceful political dissidents like Samandar Kukanov, Uzbekistan’s first vice-chairman of Parliament after independence. Unlawfully jailed for 24 years, Kukanov had been one of the world’s longest jailed political activists after Nelson Mandela.

Interview in Qarshi, Uzbekistan with recently released journalist Yusuf Ruzimurodov, imprisoned for 19 years and tortured. © Steve Swerdlow, Philippe Dam, Qarshi, November 2018.

Dismantling another legacy, in August 2019, the president ordered the closure of the notorious Jaslyk prison – long a symbol of Uzbekistan’s torture epidemic and imprisonment of government critics – fulfilling a demand United Nations (UN) human rights bodies first issued 17 years earlier. Ruzimuradov, Bekjanov, Turgunov, and Farmonov all served time there. There is ongoing concern, however, that authorities have not permanently closed the facility and could still use it to detain suspects.

This January, Mirziyoyev announced the abolition of the propiska, or Soviet-era residence permit, which allowed authorities to highly restrict citizens’ internal freedom of movement. And breaking with decades of internet censorship, he ordered a lifting of the ban on several critical websites, with his government’s key representative on the media all but conceding that social media and bloggers are now some of Uzbekistan’s most important arbiters of public opinion. Despite a more vibrant media landscape, however, some bloggers and journalists are still subject to harassment, even detention, when sniffing out corruption or challenging the conduct of local authorities.[2] Probably the most notable attempt to stamp out Soviet and Karimov-era abuses has been the government’s significant efforts to eradicate forced adult and child labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector.

The above steps represent significant breakthroughs on human rights. But the past, especially when left unexamined, has a way of taking revenge on well-intentioned reform plans, and of projecting itself onto the future. The only way to ensure Uzbekistan decisively moves beyond the Karimov era’s worst abuses and further improves its human rights record is for the government to commit to a meaningful process of reckoning with the past and of transitional justice. Transitional justice refers to judicial and non-judicial measures focused on truth and reconciliation as well as on justice and accountability to acknowledge and redress the legacy of widespread human rights abuses that became systematic under the rule of Islam Karimov.

Furthermore, violating its international and national obligations, Tashkent has yet to create avenues for the rehabilitation of freed political and religious prisoners—many of whom remain in terrible health due to the ordeal they experienced behind bars for decades. Uzbekistan’s former and still detained political prisoners are entitled to justice and reparations for the serious human rights violations they have endured—a process that is not yet on the table in Uzbekistan.

Embedded in international human rights law, transitional justice focuses on holding perpetrators accountable for abuses and recognising the suffering and dignity of the victims. It also seeks to establish an accurate account of the past—something which has never been possible since Uzbekistan became independent in 1991. Moreover, transitional justice is necessary for an Uzbekistan that is slowly emerging from a period of intense repression, but where human rights violations have been so severe and entrenched in the way the county has functioned for a generation that the normal justice system is not yet able to provide justice.

While not possible to examine each in depth here, transitional justice measures in Uzbekistan could include: (1) public criminal prosecutions of the perpetrators of serious abuses; (2) truth commissions relating to the persecution of government critics, including for the mass killings in Andijan in May 2005; (3) reparations for and the rehabilitation of victims of torture and politically-motivated imprisonment; (4) institutional reform of the State Security Services (SSS) and police; and (5) memorialisation of past abuses in the form of public spaces, monuments, and museums.

Museums in both Lithuania and Estonia have been built to memorialize the crimes of the Soviet period, in some cases, on the premises of the former KGB headquarters. Some have suggested that President Mirziyoyev and the Uzbek parliament consider transforming the former headquarters of the feared Uzbek State Security Services (SSS) into such a museum. © Steve Swerdlow, Tallinn, Vilnius, February 2019, November 2018.

This essay aims to provide a roadmap for transitional justice in Uzbekistan by examining the international and domestic legal framework that already exists to support such efforts. It summarises the courageous attempts by former political prisoners to pursue their individual legal rehabilitation, and in so doing, a larger national conversation about Uzbekistan’s dark past. It also mentions statements by some government officials, however tentative, to open the door to a reckoning with Uzbekistan’s past and ongoing human rights abuses.

The brutal torture and death in police custody of Andijan resident Alijon Abdukarimov in May 2020 and the rare, public outcry Abdukarimov’s death has engendered illustrates the difficulty of rooting out entrenched policies and practice of human rights abuse without sustained, independent scrutiny, parliamentary oversight, and the robust involvement of independent media and civil society.

Transitional justice and rehabilitation are needed here and now in Uzbekistan. While the results of some of the above-listed reforms are real and have in effect overturned a significant amount of the Karimov legacy, government officials, including President Mirziyoyev himself, have only made oblique references to the repression of the past, preferring instead to ‘look ahead’. Such an approach, however, is insufficient in addressing the underlying human rights issues that must be addressed for Uzbekistan to move forward.

Transitional justice and rehabilitation are essential for helping establish respect for the rule of law and accountable institutions after decades in which neither has existed. Such processes will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve and require serious political courage. But absent a sobering national dialogue about past abuses—one primarily guided by the voices of independent civil society—it will be hard to imagine the ambitious reform program President Mirziyoyev has made the hallmark of his administration being successful or sustainable over the long term.

Rehabilitation is a Right

In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (hereafter ‘Basic Principles’). The Basic Principles aim to merge international humanitarian and human rights law and stress the importance of and obligation to implement domestic reparations for victims of abuses. In March 2006, the Basic Principles were adopted by the UN General Assembly, further strengthening their status even though they are formally non-binding.[3]

Significantly, the Basic Principles detail the range of possible reparations—restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. The Basic Principles, while still in draft form, were already being referred to in the jurisprudence of numerous human rights treaty bodies, and figure in several recently adopted international legal instruments and domestic legislation, and have also been applied by a number of truth commissions across the globe.[4] The Basic Principles largely reflect already established norms in international law and make an important contribution in unifying and reinforcing them.

Relevant to victims of serious human rights abuses in Uzbekistan, Nowak and MacArthur state: ‘usually, victims of torture are not primarily interested in monetary compensation but in other means of reparation which are better suited to restore their dignity and humanity.”[5]

International law does not clearly define rehabilitation as a form of reparation. The closest expression of a definition found in the Basic Principles shows that in certain situations persons who have suffered serious human rights or humanitarian law violations should be redressed by way of, among others, rehabilitation, meaning physical and psychological care as well as social and legal services.[6] Therefore, while the concept of rehabilitation set out in the Basic Principles points to forms of rehabilitation beyond health, it does not fully define what each one of them means or includes.

Diane Shelton, a leading scholar on reparations, defines rehabilitation as a right of “all victims of serious abuse and their dependants” [sic] and is “the process of restoring the individual’s full health and reputation after the trauma of a serious attack on one’s physical or mental integrity […] It aims to restore what has been lost. Rehabilitation seeks to achieve maximum physical and psychological fitness by addressing the individual, the family, local community and even the society as a whole.”[7]

Recently, the UN Committee against Torture made more urgent and concrete Uzbekistan’s obligation to provide rehabilitation to former political prisoners and victims of torture. In its December 2019 Concluding Observations, welcoming Tashkent’s release of a ‘substantial number’ of political prisoners since September 2016, the Committee called on the government to ‘exonerate’ those convicted in unfair trials or on the basis of torture, provide them with ‘redress, including compensation and rehabilitation’ and to ‘consider creating an independent commission to investigate these matters.’[8]

Beginning in September 2016, following former prime minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s ascendancy to the presidency on the death of Islam Karimov, the Uzbek government began to release political prisoners – among them human rights activists, journalists, political opposition and peaceful religious figures. To date, approximately 55 high profile political prisoners have been released. Almost none have received rehabilitation. © Steve Swerdlow, September 2014.

Former Prisoners Lack Access to Justice

Although it has received praise for their release, the Uzbek government has taken no concrete action to rehabilitate the approximately 55 political prisoners, including human rights defenders, political activists, journalists, and other public figures, nor the many other religious prisoners it has freed. The vast majority of those the government has released are still presumed to be guilty of committing a crime.

The mechanism of release has taken the form of pardons, early releases, or amnesties, rather than successful appeals or any official action taken to explicitly recognise that detention was unlawful or arbitrary. While some of the long-term imprisoned human rights defenders and journalists refused to officially ask forgiveness for the crimes they did not commit as a condition for release, some were pressured to do so.

In practice, Tashkent’s current policy amounts to a refusal to acknowledge officially the arbitrary or politically motivated nature of the original detention and later imprisonment and deprives victims of an opportunity to investigate the perpetrators of serious abuses they have suffered.

In the absence of government action to provide rehabilitation, many released political prisoners have taken it upon themselves to seek legal reviews of their earlier convictions. In the process, they have met with serious obstacles.

“We Regret to Inform You That Your Case File Has Been Destroyed”

Several released prisoners report that they are unable to obtain the court documents in their own cases without which they are unable to file and litigate appeals of their original convictions.

For example, Samandar Kukanov, a former member of parliament who served 23 years and five months in prison in retaliation for his peaceful opposition political activity, was released on November 24^th, 2016. “I served longer than any other political prisoner in Uzbekistan’s history,” Kukanov told me. “During the 23 years of my imprisonment, several of my family members were jailed and my wife’s health was destroyed. More than anything I want to be exonerated because I never committed the crimes for which I was convicted.”

In September 2018, after filing an appeal with the Tashkent Regional Court to review his criminal sentence, Kukanov received a letter informing him that the “materials of his criminal case” had been “destroyed in accordance with established procedure” on April 6^th, 2017 by the Tashkent Region State Archive. On this basis, the letter said, his requests for “full rehabilitation” could not be reviewed. The letter later proved to be an attempt by authorities to derail him from prosecuting the case.

The following year, Kukanov went on to argue for his rehabilitation in Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court—a remarkable hearing attended by the author of this piece. His lawyers argued passionately that the case had been fabricated on the basis of false evidence, was retaliation for Kukanov’s peaceful opposition to Karimov, and that the conviction should be overturned in accordance with the “reforms of the new president.” Nonetheless, in July 2019, the Supreme Court rejected Kukanov’s effort to quash the conviction and ruled that “all charges in the [original] case… had been proven.” Kukanov is determined to continue his struggle and will appeal again.

Former political prisoner and political activist Samandar Kukanov (center) served almost 24 years in prison on political grounds, making him the world’s longest serving political prisoner after Nelson Mandela. In June 2019, Kukanov and his lawyers petitioned Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court for rehabilitation but his petition was denied. © Steve Swerdlow, Tashkent, June 2019.

Multiple UN Rulings for Rehabilitation, Compensation Ignored

Erkin Musaev, a UN employee and former government official, was tortured and unjustly jailed for 11 years. He was freed on August 11^th, 2017 after the Supreme Court issued a decision shortening his sentence. In its 2007 Human Rights report on Uzbekistan, the United States (US) State Department reported that Musaev was tortured in detention, which included severe beatings to his head, chest, and feet, and held for two months without access to a lawyer or any visitors.[9] A joint letter from the UN special rapporteur on torture and the head of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to then-President Karimov said that one beating by prison officials broke Musaev’s jaw. Authorities also coerced him to sign a confession that he had engaged in espionage for the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and the UN.

In May 2008, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that Musaev’s imprisonment was ‘arbitrary’, and in contravention of several international treaties to which Uzbekistan is a party. By February 2011, when authorities transferred Musaev to a high security prison in Navoi province his body showed signs of burns and other wounds. In June 2012, the UN Human Rights Committee issued its decision that the government had tortured and otherwise ill-treated Musaev and violated his rights to liberty, security, and fair trial under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (articles seven, nine and 14 respectively). The committee called on Uzbekistan to provide him with an effective remedy for the violations. But authorities ignored the ruling, and Musaev remained in prison until 2017.[10]

Musaev’s efforts to obtain legal rehabilitation have been repeatedly thwarted. Court authorities refuse to provide him with his criminal sentence and have denied his right to appeal on the basis that he did not submit it in the file. Like other former prisoners Musaev has struggled to find gainful employment due to his criminal record. He has been subjected to surveillance by security services and has faced great difficulties reintegrating into society after years in prison.

Remarkably, the existence of two separate rulings from UN human rights bodies declaring his conviction unlawful and calling for him to be provided compensation and a remedy have not moved Uzbek authorities in Uzbekistan to fully exonerate Musaev, nor to even open a new trial. They should do so immediately.

Movements Restricted, Surveilled

Other former prisoners who were ‘conditionally released’ under Article 73 of Uzbekistan’s Criminal Code have said their freedom of movement has been restricted, that they were under surveillance, and that they have been required to report periodically to police for ‘preventative conversations’.

Muhammad Bekjanov, one of the world’s longest imprisoned journalists until his release in February 2017, was unable to travel outside of his home region of Khorezm in northwestern Uzbekistan for a whole year. He has since left Uzbekistan to reunite with his family in the US. But he said that the authorities have not provided him any legal avenues to challenge his conviction, nor to recover property that was confiscated after his arrest and kidnapping from Ukraine in 1999.

Human rights defender Agzam Turgunov and independent journalist Bobomurod Abdullaev, both former political prisoners, said that since their releases security services and police have subjected them to surveillance and even intimidation. Turgunov has been detained and fined multiple times since his release—on one occasion in August 2018 for using his phone to record a peaceful protest in front of the Supreme Court and again in 2019. Abdullaev was detained by security services in September 2017 and tortured while in pre-trial detention on charges of attempting to overthrow the government. In May 2018, following a trial attended by the author he was conditionally released and fined. While Abdullaev’s trial set precedent for its degree of openness and transparency, authorities have never followed up with an investigation into Abdullaev’s credible allegations of torture.

Azam Farmonov, a human rights activist, whose 14-and-a-half-year sentence was shortened upon his release in October 2017, said that he still is required to pay a monthly portion of his salary to the government as part of his conditional release, and that it is extremely difficult to get the medical care payment that is supposed to be provided by the government for former prisoners. “Obtaining the monetary stipend provided by the government for medical is so difficult, I simply gave up,” Farmonov told me.

Female Prisoners Released Also Face Stigma, Difficulties

Unfortunately, the enormous legal, psychological, physical, and financial hardships suffered by Uzbekistan’s former political prisoners are not limited to men. Several female former prisoners with whom I have met have described lives after release in which they feel invisible, marginalised, and even less able to access justice for the ordeals they have endured. In June 2018, I met Dilorom Abdukodirova at her home in Andijan. Abdukodirova had been given an 18-year sentence in 2010 after traveling back to Uzbekistan to reunite with her children. Five years earlier, she had fled the country after being an eyewitness to the brutal Andijan massacre, when Uzbek government troops shot and killed hundreds of largely unarmed protestors near the city’s central square. Abdukodirova served out her sentence in Uzbekistan’s single women’s prison in Zangiota in the Tashkent region. Abdukodirova developed severe leg and hip pain while in prison. She could not even sit down for more than a few minutes due to the pain when I interviewed her family in her home. Abdukodirova deserves justice, support, and financial compensation for her wrongful imprisonment far from her family. Social support structures and medical, psychosocial services she and other former prisoners need are largely non-existent and should be established without delay.

Early Successes

Despite the many barriers to achieving justice and accountability, there have been some early, important legal victories on the road to rehabilitation in Uzbekistan.

Article 83 Provides ‘Grounds for Rehabilitation’

Chuyan Mamatkulov, a human rights defender based in the southern Uzbek city of Qarshi, has the impressive distinction of being the only person who has ever attempted to sue Islam Karimov in court. In response to this and many years defending ordinary citizens in court as a human rights defender, police and security services planted drugs on Mamatkulov during an arrest in 2012, ultimately sentencing him to 12 years imprisonment. Like several others mentioned here, Mamatkulov spent time in Jaslyk, where he was severely tortured. He was released in March 2018.[11]

Asked how he assesses Uzbekistan’s tentative reforms over the past four years, Mamatkulov says they have been life-changing for him and his family.[12] Still, those years the repressive state stole from him, separating him from his wife and two daughters are years he can never get back. Undaunted, however, Mamatkulov has resumed his human rights work and has doggedly pursued his own rehabilitation in the courts.

Setting a precedent for Uzbekistan, the Supreme Court granted Mamatkulov a new trial in December 2018—the first case of a former political prisoner winning the right to a new trial. The more important victory came in March 2020, when a Qarshi appellate court fully acquitted Mamatkulov of all charges and awarded him nominal monetary compensation.[13] The ruling established that evidence in Mamatkulov’s case, including false statements by police officers and testimony falsely coerced from witnesses, were fabricated. Thus, the court ruled that no evidence supported the commission of a crime.

Applying Article 83 of Uzbekistan’s Criminal Procedure Code (‘Grounds for Rehabilitation’), Mamatkulov’s case provides a potential roadmap in future cases. Article 83 states:

A suspect, accused, or defendant shall be acquitted and rehabilitated if, among others: the occurrence of the offense on which the case has been brought, or the investigation and trial were conducted, is absent; the constituent elements of an offense in the act do not exist; or the individual did not commit the crime.[14]

Based on a full acquittal, Mamatkulov is now seeking full compensation in a civil case. His case shows that Uzbek law already provides the basis for rehabilitating individuals imprisoned on false, arbitrary, or politically motivated grounds. This practice could be streamlined and applied, through a transitional justice mechanism or commission, to a larger group of former political prisoners.

Former political prisoner and human rights defender Chuyan Mamatkulov was released from prison in March 2018 following six years imprisonment on trumped-up charges in retaliation for his human rights work. He is the first former political prisoner to not only win a new trial but be fully rehabilitated and have his underlying criminal conviction overturned in the courts in accordance with Uzbekistan’s Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 83) in March 2020. © Steve Swerdlow, Qarshi, November 2018.

Acquittal on ‘Spy’ Charges Provides Hope

Another case that provides a ray of hope is Andrei Kubatin, a Turkic languages scholar who was imprisoned for espionage in 2017 under Article 157 (high treason).[15] Article 157 has been repeatedly used on political grounds to prosecute and imprison dozens, possibly hundreds, of individuals, including former government officials, UN staff, scholars, military personnel, journalists, and others for espionage allegedly carried out in the service of a rotating cast of countries (US, UK, Russia, Turkey, Tajikistan, and beyond). Disturbingly, a significant number of individuals have been arrested on Article 157 charges since 2016, tried in closed trials, and subjected to torture or ill-treatment.[16]

Fearless activism by his sister Klara Sakhareva led authorities and a Tashkent court to agree to review his conviction, first reducing his sentence and in September 2019 exonerating Kubatin on all charges.

Following the acquittal, Alice Wells, then Acting US Principle Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia and Washington’s top diplomat for Central Asia, tweeted: “The release of scholar Andrej #Kubatin from prison is a welcome development. I encourage the Government of #Uzbekistan to continue a thorough review of previous convictions under #Article157. AGW”.[17] Unfortunately, the Uzbek government has not yet heeded this advice. Relatives of the many other Article 157 prisoners still behind bars are fighting for their relatives’ release and eventual acquittal.[18]

While not direct action on rehabilitation, authorities sparked hope in March with the registration—after three attempts—of a local rights group, Huquqi Tayanch (‘Legal Support’), the first independent human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO) registered in Uzbekistan since 2002. Huquqi Tayanch, established by former political prisoners Azam Farmonov and Dilmurod Saidov, has set rehabilitation and social reintegration for former political prisoners and torture victims as one of its key activities.[19] Unfortunately, the registration of a single critical independent NGO has been the exception and not the rule in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan. Numerous NGOs like the Bukhara-based Humanitarian Legal Center and the forced labour monitoring group Chiroq, based in Karakalpakstan, have been denied registration on spurious grounds by the Justice Ministry despite the government’s much touted commitment to promote the role of civil society. Change in this area is long overdue.

Transitional Justice and Andijan

Any discussion about transitional justice in Uzbekistan would be incomplete without consideration of the most collective trauma in the country’s recent history and the defining event of Islam Karimov’s 27-year rule: the Andijan massacre.

On May 13^th, 2005, government forces opened fire on thousands of mostly peaceful protesters in the central square in the town of Andijan, a city in the Fergana Valley in eastern Uzbekistan. The protesters had gathered to speak out against poverty, unemployment, and government repression, and to call on the government to respond to their plight.

Earlier on the day of the protest, armed men had freed 23 local businessmen who had been sentenced for ‘religious extremism’, and took over local government buildings. As the thousands of protesters gathered, government forces in armored vehicles (APCs) and snipers fired without warning and indiscriminately on the crowd of civilians, blocking off the square as people attempted to flee, killing hundreds. Although a small group of gunmen were on the square, the overwhelming majority of demonstrators were unarmed. Government troops then moved through the square and executed wounded people where they lay.

Government agents made no apparent effort to limit the use of lethal force to situations where it was strictly unavoidable to protect lives, as required by international law. The United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations found that the government had used lethal force excessively.

Following the massacre, the Uzbek government rejected all efforts to allow an independent inquiry and sought to rewrite the history of that day, unleashing a ferocious crackdown against any attempts to expose the truth about the brutal killings or seek accountability. Although eyewitness accounts and other evidence point to more than 700 killed, Uzbek authorities claimed only 187 were killed and blamed Islamists and unnamed Western powers for planning a coup. In the following months, hundreds were sentenced to up to 22 years in jail during trials critics called government-orchestrated and anyone suspected of having participated in the events or witnessing them was targeted for persecution.

Karimov’s fierce rejection of calls for independent investigation into the massacre led the US and European Union (EU) to strengthen sanctions on Uzbekistan for several years, setting in motion the en masse expulsion of international NGOs from the country and a deep period of political and economic isolation for millions of ordinary Uzbeks. Only with Karimov’s death in August 2016 has Uzbekistan begun to slowly emerge from the stagnation and deep climate of fear that resulted from Andijan.

Truth-telling and public discussion about the Andijan massacre are deeply important 15 years after the events. In public remarks delivered during his May 2017 historic visit to Tashkent the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein also underlined the importance of ensuring accountability for the ‘terrible events’ in Andijan that day. “While it is important to look forward, it is also important to come to terms with past events and ensure that victims are not forgotten and their grievances are addressed,” he said.[20]

There was a slight shift in the official tone earlier this year when Deputy Prosecutor General Svetlana Artykova gave an interview to a local outlet, Qalampir.uz, in which she appeared to concede that excessive force was deployed.[21] The remarks made by Artykova, who was the spokeswoman for the prosecutor’s office in May 2005, could only have been made with approval from above.

When asked if weapons were used by government forces against civilians, Artykova answered that there had been no clear coordination between troops and the national leadership and that this was why “a certain number of citizens died during the rally.”

Some officials found responsible for unlawful killing were convicted and some were already out of prison, Artykova claimed. This was the first time any Uzbek official has alleged that any officials were imprisoned for their involvement in the Andijan events. Last month, following the gruesome death by torture of Andijan businessman Alijon Abdukarimov, Uzbek MP Gulrukh Agzamova from the Adolat (Justice) party also referenced the Andijan events when condemning the actions of the Internal Affairs officers who committed torture.[22]

These allusions to Andijan are from an official inquiry but may signal a readiness on the part of officials to revisit the Andijan massacre’s painful history. Beyond the importance of providing justice and accountability to the victims and their families, an impartial, independent investigation and truth commission are necessary to establish an accurate historical record and could contribute to national healing and cohesion. Understanding the tragedy of Andijan in an open, accessible format is essential for helping Uzbekistan make a transition to a more open and democratic society.

A Roadmap for Action: Recommendations

Rehabilitation and transitional justice are fundamental to the overall success of the reform agenda that President Mirziyoyev has repeatedly made the centerpiece of his government over the past four years. This is because at its core transitional justice is a commitment to recognise the dignity of individuals, to establish respect for the rule of law by delivering redress and acknowledgment of human rights abuses, and to prevent them from happening again.

President Mirziyoyev and the Uzbek government should acknowledge past abuses officially, provide concrete avenues for redress, and send a clear message that peaceful criticism of government policies and scrutiny of the past will be genuinely valued in Uzbekistan. Transitional justice and rehabilitation policies should place the involvement of torture survivors, rights defenders, and independent civil society at the center and also closely include Parliament (Oliy Majlis), the Ombudsman for Human Rights, the National Center for Human Rights, law enforcement structures, the Justice Ministry and international human rights experts.

Former political prisoners recommend that Uzbek authorities should establish a special commission consisting of government officials, representatives of non-governmental groups, and international experts to address the rehabilitation needs of former political prisoners, examine cases of people still in prison on politically motivated charges, and make recommendations to appropriate government agencies. It is high time to heed their calls and provide them with the comprehensive rehabilitation that is their right under Uzbek and international law. As described by legal scholar Diane Shelton, rehabilitation in Uzbekistan should “achieve maximum physical and psychological fitness by addressing the individual, the family, local community and even the society as a whole” and encompass former political prisoners, torture survivors, and “all victims of serious abuse.”[23]

Article 83 of Uzbekistan’s Criminal Procedure Code and the cases of Chuyan Mamatkulov and Andrei Kubatin provide a tentative blueprint that Uzbek courts could apply in many cases across the board. Parliament should also consider adopting a separate Law on Rehabilitation. A fuller examination of what this rehabilitation law would include, the timeframe and types of victims it would cover, and comparative international practice will be the subject of a separate scholarly article.

The government should also amend vague and overbroad criminal code provisions relating to espionage and extremism that are commonly used to criminalise dissent – articles 157, 159, 216, 244-1, and 244-2 of the Criminal Code – and bring them into compliance with Uzbekistan’s international human rights obligations.

Tashkent should allow independent monitoring of Uzbekistan’s prisons and other places of detention with the aim of eradicating torture and other forms of ill-treatment and ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. The protocol creates a monitoring system and requires that independent entities responsible for such monitoring be able to enter detention facilities at any time, unannounced. In 2013, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) halted its monitoring of Uzbekistan’s prison facilities, citing interference by authorities.

Transitional justice in Uzbekistan will only succeed by enabling independent civil society to take a more active role in advocating and implementing change. This means the Justice Ministry should remove immediately the many bureaucratic hurdles that have prevented many human rights, media, and other critically important NGOs from registering and the regulations that have restricted the activities and operations of local NGOs working on politically-sensitive issues such as torture.

Steve Swerdlow is a human rights lawyer and expert on human rights issues in the former Soviet Region. Between 2010 and 2019, Swerdlow was Senior Central Asia researcher in the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch (HRW). An attorney with two decades of scholarly and human rights experience researching and advocating on the post-Soviet region, Swerdlow headed HRW’s work on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, was the founding director of HRW’s Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan field office, and has been among the first independent human rights workers to conduct extensive fieldwork on the ground inside Uzbekistan since the Uzbek government’s decision to allow human rights organisations back into the country in 2017. He now is a consultant with the UN Development Programme and the International Labour Organisation, where he conducts trainings to build the capacity of human rights activists and journalists in Central Asia. Earlier Swerdlow was a fellow in the US State Department’s Young Leaders for Public Service program in Russia and worked as a human rights monitor for the Union of Council for Soviet Jews and the International Organisation for Migration in Russia. Prior to joining HRW, Swerdlow practiced law in San Francisco at Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, and served as a law clerk to the Honorable Judge Dean Pregerson of the US District Court for the Central District of California; Photo: Formerly imprisoned human rights defender from Andijan Isroiljon Kholdarov meets formerly imprisoned human rights defender Ganikhon Mamatkhanov from Margilan in Andijan in June 2018 following each’s recent release from prison. Each had thought the other might have died while in prison.

[1] Government officials have reported that prison authorities have also released hundreds of independent Muslims – people who practice Islam outside of strict state controls – who had been imprisoned on extremism charges for lengthy jail terms. However, it is impossible to independently confirm claims about those releases or interview any of them without access to a list of people serving these sentences. The authorities should make available a list of all persons currently serving sentences for extremism-related charges.

[2] Amnesty International, Blogging in Uzbekistan: welcoming tourism, silencing criticism, June 2020 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/06/blogging-in-uzbekistan-welcoming-tourism-silencing-criticism/

[3] UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Preamble, adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 and adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147.

[4] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) contains an implicit reference to the principles in Article 75; they are also explicitly mentioned in the International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Article 24 (adopted December 20^th 2006, entered into force December 23^rd 2010); For example, the truth commissions in South Africa and Sierra Leone, as underlined by Yasmin Sooka, former Commissioner in the South African and Sierra Leone TRCs during ‘Workshop to Combat Impunity and Provide Reparations’ at OHCHR Geneva on September 19^th 2005. See also Shelton, Dinah. 2005. Remedies in International Human Rights Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 350.

[5] Nowak, Manfred and McArthur, Elizabeth. 2008. The United Nations Convention against Torture, A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 483.

[6] UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Preamble, adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 and adopted by the General Assembly on December 16^th 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147.

[7] Shelton, Dinah. Remedies in International Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 275.

[8] UN Committee against Torture, Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Uzbekistan, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/UZB/CAT_C_UZB_CO_5_39781_E.pdf

[9] US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007//index.htm

[10] Musaeva v. Uzbekistan, Communications Nos. 1914, 1915 and 1916/2009, UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, June 2012, http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2012.03.21_Musaeva_v_Uzbekistan.pdf

[11] Steve Swerdlow and Andrew Stroehlein, Beyond Samarkand, Los Angeles Review of Books, March 2019, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/beyond-samarkand/

[12] Interview with Chuyan Mamatkulov, Qarshi, November 2018; Telephone interview on March 22^nd, 2020.

[13] Radio Ozodlik, Суд в Кашкадарье полностью оправдал экс-политзаключенного Чуяна Маматкулова, March 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.mobi/a/30496604.html?withmediaplayer=1; Gazeta.uz, “Правозащитник Чуян Маматкулов полностью оправдан,” March 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/03/20/mamatkulov/?utm_source=push&utm_medium=telegram

[14] Article 83, Uzbekistan’s Code of Criminal Procedure, https://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/8932

[15] Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Why is a Turkic languages scholar imprisoned in Uzbekistan?, Al Jazeera, August 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/turkic-languages-scholar-imprisoned-uzbekistan-190801120104671.html

[16] Current Article 157 prisoners include former Uzbek diplomat Kadyr Yusupov, analyst journalist Vladimir Kaloshin, current or former soldiers Ravshan Kosimov, Alisher Achildiev, Viktor Shin, former policewoman Alyona Kim, and the former director of the presidential Institute for Strategic and Interregional Research, Rafik Saifulin.

[17] See Tweet by Alice G. Wells, Acting Principal Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, September 27^th, 2019, https://twitter.com/State_SCA/status/1177630285644607491

[18] A recently recorded podcast on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Majlis Podcast tells the stories of many of these cases and includes a discussion with the relatives of imprisoned journalist Vladimir Kaloshin and former diplomat Kadyr Yusupov. See RFE/RL, Majlis Podcast: Spy Games In Uzbekistan, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-spies-in-uzbekistan/30670139.html

[19] See Eurasianet, Uzbekistan sparks hope with registration of NGOs, March 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-sparks-hope-with-registration-of-ngos

[20] OHCHR, Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein at a press conference during his mission to Uzbekistan, Tashkent, May 2017, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21607&LangID=E

[21] See Qalampir.uz, Andijon voqealarida tinch aholiga o’q uzilganmi? Svetlana Ortiqova bilan suhbat, February 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mmRknUZMqo&; See also Bruce Pannier, ‘We Made Mistakes’: In Uzbekistan, A Rare Admission Over Andijon Killings, RFE/RL, February 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-andijon-assacre-officials-willingness-talk-analysis/30442215.html

[22] See Gulrukh Agzamova, Ichhki Ishlar – ichichimizdagi ishkalmi yoxud xiyonat?, Adolat, June 2020, http://adolat.uz/partiya/ichki-ishlar-ichimizdagi-ishkalmi-yohud-xiyonat

[23] Shelton, Dinah. 2005. Remedies in International Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 275.

Topics

Civil Society

Conflict Resolution and Security

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

Is President Shavkat Mirziyoyev a reformer or a follower of the Karimov dictatorship?

Article by Nadejda Atayeva

Over the past 15 years, more than 600 civil society activists have been subjected to politically motivated persecution in Uzbekistan.[1] At least half of these have been tortured and imprisoned, and a significant number have fled the country. In total, just ten of the activists outlined in this essay maintain a presence in their native country.

Their capacity to defend the principles of human rights, seek accountability from authorities and demand answers from the government are guaranteed, de jure, by Uzbekistan’s Constitution. In reality, countless hurdles exist to prohibit third sector organisations from conducting their activities, while in parallel checks still exist on journalists. Countless amendments in the law, make de facto exercise of the rights to free speech a dangerous pursuit. In spite of the proven risk to physical safety, new activists continue to emerge regularly. This trend is not, and must not, be mistaken for the emergence of a pluralistic society in the aftermath of Karimov’s dictatorship, or of a will to tolerate greater freedom of expression, listen to criticism or tolerate accountable governance in the Uzbekistan of today. Uzbekistan still has some of the same problems that the country’s people have experienced for more than three decades. The experiences of torture, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing and forced labour exist in Uzbekistan today.

My human rights work began during my emigration from Uzbekistan in 2000. My first acquaintance with Uzbek human rights activists took place through the internet, because many of them were not allowed to leave Uzbekistan for years. For some time we could communicate only through e-mail, and a forum on the website ‘Fergana.Ru’. There were no social networks at that time, and the speed of the internet did not allow communication via Skype, or similar mediums, as it would today. When, in 2000, I learned from human rights activist Agzam Turgunov about the fate of the former Mayor of the city of Mubarek and member of the first Parliament of Uzbekistan, Murad Juraev, my work as a human rights activist became the life calling which I continue to pursue today.

Juraev was accused of preparing acts of terrorism in Turkey and attacking the constitutional system. Juraev had not committed these crimes. His true reason for imprisonment was for supporting leaders of the political opposition, and openly criticising dictator Islam Karimov’s regime for the massacre of students in University City.[2] Juraev had also criticised subjects that have been proven true since he first drew attacks from the regime for speaking about them. One topic that became a particularly pervasive criticism of Karimov’s regime was the use of child labour in cotton fields and for the practice of political repression. Juraev was one of the first activists to speak of Uzbekistan’s use of forced labour. He is not, nor will be, the first to experience torture. Juraev stood for the duration of that first court hearing because he could not sit down due to burns all over his body.

The prosecution was unable to produce evidence for the charges, but nevertheless, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Juraev’s story shocked me, and I began to openly support him and help his family during their ordeal. Juraev spent 21 years in prison – five consecutive terms, in one of which he was given a four-year prison sentence because he was cleaning carrots incorrectly in the prison kitchen. With the active participation of international human rights organisations, including the European and American diplomatic community, Juraev was released in November 2015 – when Islam Karimov was still alive.

Fortwoyears after release,Juraevsoughttherighttogoabroadforurgent medical care,buthewasnotremovedfromtheregime’s prisoner supervision schemeand was prevented from leaving Uzbekistan.Weoftencalled each other,andcorresponded regularly.WewerebothwaitingtomeetinGermany,wherehewas expected by doctorsfor hissurgery.InDecember2017,Juraevdiedofaheartattackinthearmsof his wifeHolbikaJuraeva,who throughoutall their yearsofmarriagebelieved inhimandtreatedhimwithgreatrespect.

Abror Juraev, Murad Juraev’s son, was fired from his job three years ago and when he asked for the reason for termination his boss replied: “You are the son of an enemy of the people.” Mirziyoyev has been presented to Western actors as a modern reformer. Yet, the use of a Stalinist term to dismiss a man from his job on basis of his father’s opposition, sets in sharp relief how human rights in Uzbekistan operate contrary to the laws of physics and international development. The reason for the dismissal of Abror Juraev due to the fact that he is the son of Murad Juraev, which suggests that the practice of “black lists” in Uzbekistan continues under Shavkat Mirziyoyev. And since such lists are compiled within the walls of the State Security Service of Uzbekistan (SGB), it indicates that the Uzbek special services are not yet ready to uproot the legacy of the Stalin NKVD. So while civil rights organisations across the world continue to discuss how the path of human rights can be shaped and improved, Uzbekistan uses terms for dissent coined during the Russian Civil War, and methods of interrogation believed effective by medieval societies.

Mirziyoyev did not respond to Murad Juraev’s appeals about the need to reform Uzbekistan’s administrative system. Mirziyoyev ignored his son’s, Abror Juraev’s, request for justice in the case of losing employment, too. But, lest this appear to be an isolated incident, I wish to make clear that countless human rights organisations concur on the prevalence of such practices in Uzbekistan, for all who express dissent. The personal examples I give hereafter are chosen because they provide important and specific testimony. But they are neither unique, nor isolated.

Agzam Turgunov was tried three times because he supported the People’s Movement of Uzbekistan (‘Birlik’) and voted in Uzbekistan’s first presidential elections for Muhammad Salih, the alternative candidate. Salih is a dissident poet and leader of the opposition ERK party. He has been in exile for 30 years and in Uzbekistan has seven criminal cases open against him. All those who communicated with him at some point (even on social networks, and to this author’s knowledge) were subjected to torture for their exchanges. Such attacks continue to occur under the presidency of Mirziyoyev. Akrom Malikov and Rustam Abdumannopov, both social media activists, were imprisoned, because they openly sympathised with Salih and kept his poems at home.

After the first eight years of our cooperation, Agzam Turgunov found himself on the list of imprisoned civil society activists. He spent almost ten years in prison, from 2008 to 2017. During one of his first interrogations, the investigator poured boiling water on him for refusing to sign the indictment. This, and other forms of torture, were inflicted upon Turgunov repeatedly. Members of the United Nations (UN) Committee on Torture recognised human rights defender Akzam Turgunov as a victim of torture and called on the Uzbek government to reconsider the sentence against him, but the Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the first instance, ignoring Turunov’s allegations of torture.

The first list of imprisoned Uzbek civil society activists was drawn up in November 2006, just days after the official registration of the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, which we founded together with the poet Jodgor Obid, who lives in Austria and became the first Uzbek refugee who fled the regime of Islam Karimov.[3] I handed this list to Pierre Morel, the European Union’s (EU’s) then Special Rapporteur on Central Asia.[4] Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also sent Morel their lists. Our consolidated lists then formed the basis of two resolutions before the European Parliament on Uzbekistan in 2009 and 2014.[5] As an experienced French diplomat Morel actively raised the issue of the list of political prisoners in negotiations with Uzbek diplomats and has long been interested in the results of human rights monitoring in Uzbekistan, prepared by participants of our volunteer network in Uzbekistan. As far as I know, some 30 Uzbek prisoners were released with his active participation.

During our meeting with him in 2006, he said at the time that Uzbek political emigrants could become an effective lever of pressure on the dictatorship of Karimov, because we are safe and finally we can openly raise issues that are extremely dangerous to talk about inside Uzbekistan. Indeed, our organisation always raises issues that are extremely sensitive for the Uzbek regime. Ambassador Morel was also one of the initiators of the lifting of EU sanctions against Uzbekistan, imposed in October 2005 after Uzbekistan refused to allow an international independent investigation into the Andijan events (the mass shooting in May 2005). And then he helped to start a dialogue on human rights between the EU and the government of Uzbekistan.

In 2011, it was reported that the European Commission had secretly awarded a grant of 3,700,000 euros to the Republic Center for Social Adaptation of Children, headed by Islam Karimov’s youngest daughter, Lola Karimova.[6] This fact caused great public outcry and became the basis for growing distrust in Morel, who began to defend the decision of the European Commission in favour of Lola Karimova. Morel’s visits to Uzbekistan became more frequent. He met with Islam Karimov, declaring this an achievement of a new level of dialogue on human rights. In the meantime, the arrests of civil society activists continued. Some political opposition activists and human rights activists have yet to emerge from hiding.

After the death of Karimov, thanks to external pressure via diplomatic channels, the process of releasing all civil society activists sentenced to imprisonment under the rule of Karimov was completed in 2018. In the past two years alone, Uzbekistan has adopted more than 2,000 new laws. Only three deal with the prevention of torture. Moreover, finally Uzbekistan began a process of discussion on the UN Human Rights Charter violation brought via clandestine forced labour initiatives which forced the people of Uzbekistan to harvest cotton.

Uzbekistan has now been visited by UN missions, EU delegations, the United States (US) and most international human rights organisations. These facts, at least on paper, imply that Uzbekistan has a strong regard for reform, and harmonisation of local law with international norms and treaty obligations. On paper, diplomats can be forgiven for believing that Uzbekistan is moving away from the horrific violations of human rights committed under Karimov, and beginning a tentative national discussion about setting right the past.

Yet after 13 years as Karimov’s Prime Minister, any informed party would have serious reservations about Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s commitment to changing the systemic practices of torture and imprisonment for which he was not only a passive observer, but one of the system’s leading figures. After three years in the Presidency, has the situation of civil society activists released from detention materially changed? Do independent activists enjoy freedom of expression, without fear of oppression? Have the new laws led to the development of fundamental rights and freedoms, or do they simply serve as a paper tiger to placate international actors critical of the President?

Looking through the pages of new online publications in Uzbekistan, I have not found a single article about human rights defender Agzam Turgunov. Nor have I heard mention of former Member of Parliament (MP) Samandar Kukonov. In fact, there is no mention of the cases I describe, in any single article, from Uzbekistan’s purportedly pluralist media – now believed by international observers to be free from self-censorship. So far only human rights defender Chuyan Mamatkulov from the Kashkadarya region was able to receive rehabilitation, others were refused.

There was no possibility of registration for the opposition parties Birlik or Erk. Both their leaders remain in exile. Agzam Turgunov made his fifth attempt to register his organisation ‘Human Rights House’, he had been already refused four times on formal grounds. One such ground, was that he was told that he had not correctly bound documents submitted. The documents had been bound correctly. Upon his raising of this matter, a written response was issued prohibiting the organisation’s creation, as the necessary fee had not been paid for the formation. The Ministry of Justice informed him that they will tell him when to pay the fee.

Is there an opportunity for political emigrants to return home? No, because the reform of the passport system allows all political dissidents to be stripped of their citizenship and the formal basis is that a citizen living abroad is obliged to register with the Embassy of Uzbekistan. This rule also applies to persons who have refugee status, which goes against a condition of the country providing international protection not to contact the state departments of Uzbekistan.

In addition, the practice of in absentia sentencing of critics of the regime, on the basis of which the property of political emigrants is confiscated and sold through an auction at symbolic value, has begun to develop. This process has become a source of corruption and illegal income for officials from investigative bodies, courts and court bailiff departments. As the analysis of the situation shows, criticism is still perceived by officials in Uzbekistan as a particularly serious crime and this practice began at the time when the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan was headed by Zakirjon Almatov. On his orders government forces used disproportionate and indiscriminate force during the Andijan events in May 2005, and as a result hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands fled the country. Almatov is one of 12 senior officials who were on the European sanctions lists introduced in 2005.

With Mirziyoyev’s rise to power, Almatov returned to the Uzbek Interior Ministry as an adviser to the Interior Minister and at the same time as a member of the Uzbek parliament. Isn’t it strange that Zakirjon Lamatov and Rustam Inoyatov – the former chairman of the National Security Service, who both coordinated political crackdowns on dissidents and the ruin of successful businessmen, retained their presence in the entourage of President Mirziyoyev?

I didn’t initially believe in Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s reforms, but for a while I cautiously waited for some change for the better. However, I later received a draft resolution of the US Congress on Uzbekistan, developed by American lobbyists under a contract with the Public Fund for Support and Development of National Mass Media established by Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s eldest daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, which pays lobbyists, including congressmen Kelly and Gonzales, $30,000 a month.[7] Do the bloggers and journalists working with and helping to run the Public Fund think this is the most effective use of Uzbekistan’s public money?

When it was officially announced that Islam Karimov had passed away, a Euronews correspondent asked me: what would you like to say on the occasion of the death of the first president of Uzbekistan? [8] I said, “I am very sorry that dictator Islam Karimov escaped the Hague Tribunal and the same criminals like him came to power, depriving citizens of the right to democratic elections.” I am sure that real reforms can begin in Uzbekistan if the real investigations into crimes of Islam Karimov and the heads of law enforcement agencies under his direct control begin. So far there are no conditions for democratic presidential elections, as the majority of votes, like before, are provided by Khokims (heads of administrations). This process can begin only when human rights defenders and journalists will be able to carry out their activities legally, and this can be achieved with the active participation of democratic forces.

How can the West affect the development of positive changes in Uzbekistan? I am sure that only an adequate response is needed to the events in Uzbekistan and the actions of the Mirziyoyev government. It is necessary to completely get rid of flirting and the distribution of advances to those now in power, if the countries of the democratic community are interested in democratising Uzbekistan.

Are the EU and the US ready to build a foreign policy towards Uzbekistan in such a way to make the Mirziyoyev’s government be interested in introducing a national effective mechanism to fulfil its international obligations, to provide conditions for independent monitoring of human rights, without any restrictions on the activities of independent human rights defenders and international human rights organisations?

As a matter of urgency, it is important to strengthen the measures of responsibility the Uzbek authorities take for human rights violations, starting with monitoring the implementation of the recommendations of the UN Executive Committees on the payment of compensation to victims of torture and other citizens who are recognised by international experts as victims of human rights violations.

At the same time, it is important to strengthen the protection of human rights defenders who operate in particularly dangerous conditions, sometimes even life-threatening, and even though they are subjected to widespread discrimination, none of them have permanent medical or legal insurance, and the authorities continue to use provocations against rights defenders, threaten them with reprisals and restrict their human rights activities.

The government of Uzbekistan has been and remains interested in developing relations with democratic countries, and if the condition for the development of such cooperation will be the fulfilment of already adopted laws and ratified international conventions, then this will also create conditions for democratic elections.

Nadejda Atayeva is an Uzbek citizen living in France, where she has refugee status. Since 2006 she has been the President of the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia. For details about some of the cases raised in this essay please visit https://ahrca.org/uzbekistan.

[1] Since 2004 we have kept a database of all activists working in the country. There were 600. Over the years, some have died, some were tortured and stopped their work, some were imprisoned, released and stopped working, and some immigrated. In accordance with our data only ten currently remain in the country and are still active. This is based on count of activists from 2004 through to 2018 who were subject to political repression.

[2] John Iams, Student Protest Police Shootings in Uzbekistan, AP News, January 1992, https://apnews.com/da89dfe56538f77672959ab1567c331f

[3] Yodgor Obid, Biography, Wikipedia, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yodgor_Obid

[4] Pierre Morel biography, Wikipedia, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C,_%D0%9F%D1%8C%D0%B5%D1%80_(%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82)

[5] European Parliament, Joing motion for a resolution on human rights in Uzbekistan (2014/2904(RSP)), October 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+P8-RC-2014-0166+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

[6] Nadejda Atayeva, The European Union has allocated a grant of 3,7 million Euro to an organisation controlled by the daughter of Uzbek dictator, Nadejda Atayeva Blogpost, June 2011, http://nadejda-atayeva-en.blogspot.com/2011/06/european-union-has-allocated-grant-of.html; That’s how the Republic Center for Social Adaptation of Children was created – according to The Cabinet Resolution No. 419 of 7.09.2004.

[7] Foreign Lobby, Uzbekistan sells ‘change’ campaign with second PR hire in six months, June 2020, https://www.foreignlobby.com/2020/06/22/uzbekistan-sells-change-campaign-with-second-pr-hire-in-less-than-a-year/; For examples of the work done see: Bridgeway Advocacy, Creating a More open Society in Uzbekistan, NSD/FARA Registration Unit, March 2020, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6799-Informational-Materials-20200318-1.pdf

[8] Euronews (in English), Putin expresses condolences after death of Uzbek President Karimov, YouTube, September 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5y0rhJQ7Vo&feature=emb_logo

Topics

Civil Society

Covid-19

Democracy and Elections

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan: on the brink of social explosion

Article by a Uzbekistan based human rights group

The socio-political situation in Uzbekistan has been tense in recent years but now in many areas a crisis may be unfolding in the wake of the pandemic. As the economic tensions are reflected in the published figures, it can be seen that the country’s external debt and levels of poverty are growing and an atmosphere of social control is on the rise. At the end of June this year, due to poverty, a group of young men robbed the houses of rich people in Kokand in the Fergana region, and in the Payarik district of Samarkand region, there was a mass theft of grain from a grain warehouse. Jamshid Kochkarov, the country’s Deputy Prime Minister for poverty alleviation, will have a difficult financial year. This is a source of potential social protest, and the partial freedoms of speech granted by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev are likely sparks that could ignite a fire. President Mirziyoyev himself has stated his sadness at the gravity of the situation in the country, namely foreign debts, unemployment and the lack of reforms. The media has proclaimed that Uzbekistan has recently been promised potentially as much as $26 billion in foreign direct investment and financial support but there are fears that the amount of money actually delivered so far has not yet reached even a billion, as much of the pledged support came in the form of memorandums of understanding. In addition, despite the reform process, the country’s position in international rankings is not significantly changing for the better.

External debt

According to the Central Bank, in 2019 the external debt of Uzbekistan amounted to $24.4 billion US dollars, of which $15.8 billion is public debt and $8.6 billion is private sector debt, equating to 42 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) before COVID-19 the prediction for the 2020 level of public debt in Uzbekistan was due to be 29.7 per cent of GDP but this now is predicted to rise to 34.5 per cent due to the impact of the pandemic.[1] Uzbekistan’s Eurobonds account for one billion US dollars in public debt. The level of public debt has significantly increased since Karimov’s time, it was 7.5 per cent in 2015.[2] There are concerns about whether this extra money coming in to the economy is reaching those who need it most.

Unemployment

According to the Ministry of Labor, the number of unemployed in the country as of June 1^st 2020 reached 2.6 million people. According to the State Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, the number of working age people is 14.9 million.[3] The true unemployment rate in the country is very high, when considering that more than four million people had living abroad as cheap labour (so called ‘Gasterbaiters’), many of whom are now returning to Uzbekistan due to the downturn in the Russian and global economy. The loss of remittances will hit poorer and rural families particularly hard.

Pandemics and man-made disasters

Prolonged quarantine restrictions due to the coronavirus pandemic pose real challenges, potentially leading to a sharp increase in imports relative to exports. The impact on the services sector – aviation, railway, tourism, hotel chains, etc., is significant with job losses due to the almost complete cessation of activities. Problems may arise in financing the monthly expenses of employees working in state budget organisations. Also, enterprises operating in the above areas will need special support from the state. The near cessation of certain production during the pandemic means that demand is higher than supply for some products, with potential pressure on families who rely on them. The persistence of the economic downturn will increase the unemployment rate and lead to a sharp decline in the population’s ability to pay. As a result, there will be a decrease in revenues to the state budget, including tax payments, which will negatively affect the formation of the budget.

The Sardoba dam tragedy is the result of ignoring climate change, 100 years of bad governance, 30 years of water disputes, as well as the demands to achieve rapid political results, rather than science and open discussion according to Evgeny Simonov, the international coordinator of the Rivers without Boundaries coalition in a recent article on the Sardoba tragedy bluntly entitled “Dam construction in Uzbekistan was a long-awaited disaster”.[4] Viktor Dukhovny, who led the construction of canals in the Syrdarya basin during the Soviet era, says his team found the area unsuitable for a water infrastructure. On May 1^st, at 5:55 a.m., after five days of rain, the Sardoba Reservoir in the Syrdarya region collapsed, flooding surrounding cotton fields and villages. Officials say six people have been killed, 35,000 hectares of land in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan flooded and at least 111,000 people displaced. If the long-term response in permanently rehousing these residents and rebuilding their communities is not handled well, particularly when it is no longer in the news, it will create the risk of social unrest amongst those who suffered in the flood.

Energy shortage

Uzbekistan annually produces about 60 billion cubic meters of gas and seven million tons of liquid hydrocarbons. Experts say these reserves should be enough to meet the demand of country’s population. However, corruption in this area and unsustainable export volumes are artificially creating energy shortages in the country. Also, one of the most important problems of the increasing population of Uzbekistan is the huge demand for electricity and oil products. Particularly in rural areas where there are shortages of gas, a low and erratic electricity supply and many houses without water supply from the mains. If economy suffers then those reliant on using expensive local generators for power and bottled water (or long trips to springs) will suffer even more.

Freedom of speech

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has recently published the World Freedom of Expression Index for 2020.[5] According to it, Uzbekistan ranks 156^th out of 180 countries surveyed. Uzbekistan, where freedom of speech is ‘complicated’, is in red on RSF’s world map. In red states, freedom of speech is considered very weak and unstable. On the plus side, Uzbekistan has previously always been ‘black’, reserved for the world’s worst abusers of freedom of expression, as in the past decades there has been no mention of freedom of speech as the state has struggled with the concept and has seen journalists, bloggers, and free information as its enemies. Over the next two to three years, Uzbekistan’s rating has improved slightly, but has not changed dramatically. The problematic aspect of the situation is that freedom of speech in Uzbekistan is still not widespread and stable. That is why Uzbekistan is a ‘complex, troubled country about freedom of speech’. According to the ranking, neighboring Kyrgyzstan is in 82^nd place, Afghanistan is 122^nd, Pakistan is 145^th. After Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan – 157^th, Tajikistan – 161^st, Turkmenistan – 179^th.

In the coming years, the conflicts within Uzbekistan, the socio-economic crises will intensify. In particular, the situation with the coronavirus has added an additional cause. It is in these times of conflict that maintaining, nurturing and transforming free speech into a sustainable institution is a crucial task. In some institutions of the state, there is a growing tendency to restrict freedom of speech in order to maintain social stability in the wake of the pandemic. In the future, there will be many contradictions and tension, both temporary and fundamental, between freedom of speech and stability, between freedom of speech and bureaucracy, and between freedom of speech and systems of power. If the institution of freedom of speech continues to function, and freedom of speech is given priority in these conflicts, Uzbekistan will be able to significantly change its global position in a positive way in the next decade.

Torture and social control

Uzbekistan is still at the forefront of the fight against torture. Today, the main protest in Uzbekistan is against physical torture. However, there is little talk of psychological torture in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, through the institutions of the mahallas, with the help of relatives and through social relations in society, there is a system of denial of human rights through psychological pressure, which use carries a subjugation much wider than only physical torture. The goal of combating all forms of torture is to ensure that a person feels free and at ease, and to keep the state within the legal framework. However, in the context of Uzbekistan, 99 per cent of the pressure used to ensure an authoritarian society and the rule of law is psychological pressure.

From these concerns set out above it can be concluded that Uzbekistan is at risk of a social explosion. If and when the powder keg explodes depends, in part, on what political steps the Uzbek government will take. 2021 is the year of the Presidential election, which in many ways means the government has to reckon with the public. But, unfortunately, this process is not transparent. At the request of President Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan will join the Eurasian Economic Union by the end of this year. In this case, the country’s economic independence will be cracked, and the conditions for political reform will depend on Russia. The country’s integration into the world economy is also weakening. Currently, the situation with coronavirus in the country is very tense. It is believed the government is ‘hitting its own leg with an axe’ because of concerns amongst activists that some officials may not be being fully transparent about the mortality and morbidity statistics. If the Uzbek Government does not redouble its efforts to manage the crisis in an accountable way this will add to the risk of social unrest over the coming months.

This essay has been written by Uzbekistan based human rights experts who for safety reasons have requested to remain anonymous.

Photo by LBM1948, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en

[1] IMF, Republic of Uzbekistan Requests for disbursement under the rapid credit facility and purchase under the rapid financing instrument, May 2020, https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2020/English/1UZBEA2020002.ashx

[2] See General Government Debt World Bank Selected Indicators, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/415991492021935119/data-uzb.pdf

[3] State Statistical Committee, Labour Market, https://stat.uz/uz/180-ofytsyalnaia-statystyka-uz/6555-mehnat-bozori Figure for working age population as of Q1 2019.

[4] Eugene Simonov, Uzbekistan dam collapse was a disaster waiting to happen, The Third Pole.net, June 2020, https://www.thethirdpole.net/2020/06/23/uzbekistan-dam-collapse-was-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen/

[5] Reporters Without Borders, World Freedom of Expression Index 2020, https://rsf.org/en/ranking

Topics

Civil Society

Covid-19

Human Rights

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Uzbekistan

COVID-19: Actions taken in Uzbekistan

Article by Eldor Tulyakov

Since March 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic, along with the world economies has had a negative impact on Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan. The pandemic and economic crisis have affected national healthcare systems, public sectors, business activity, consumption, international trade and investment both on a human and an economic level all over the world. In Uzbekistan, for instance, the largest decline in economic activity during the quarantine period took place in the first ten days of April, when the volume of trades on the commodity exchange fell by an average of 30 per cent, and sales of some goods by up to 80 per cent. Between April 1^st and 27^th, compared to the same period in March, the total cash receipts in the country decreased by 45 per cent, while revenues from sales of products decreased by 31 per cent and revenues from paid services by almost 2.7 times.[1] In these circumstances, Uzbekistan has been taking certain actions to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the global economic crisis on economic growth.

The first case of coronavirus infection was detected in Uzbekistan on March 15^th, spurring the leadership to take immediate measures against the COVID-19 outbreak to curb the spread of the virus in the country. First of all, the Republican Anti-Crisis Commission of high-level government officials was established and headed by Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov. As part of the quarantine measures, the Commission urgently announced a strict quarantine regime on almost the whole territory of the country. Public health measures were the first step to control the spread of the virus among the population. Economic measures were the second step to maintain national business activity. The initial and second packages of economic support for the public and economic sectors, including household and business entities totalled 32.3 trillion soms.[2] Moreover, a number of measures are being implemented to encourage economic activity in the country, to ensure social support for the population, optimise budget expenditures, and to support the most affected areas. As of May 30^th 2020, more than 500,000 business entities and more than eight million citizens have received benefits and preferences in the amount of about 30 trillion soms, or about $3 billion (six per cent of GDP).[3]

In general, Uzbekistan’s action plan to combat the current and future consequences of the global COVID-19 pandemic can be divided into four areas:

General economic measures;
Measures of social support for the population;
Measures to support entrepreneurship; and
Measures to support the most affected sectors.

General economic measures

As noted above, the Anti-Crisis Fund was the first economy-wide step to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic on the country’s economy. As of June 17^th 2020, the income of the Fund (ten trillion soms) amounted to 7.44 trillion soms. That is, 74.4 per cent of its total amount was formed by June 17^th. Of these, 7.32 trillion soms are allocations from international financial institutions, 123.5 billion soms have been channeled from the state budget, and the total amount of expenditures amounted to 3.3 trillion soms.[4] The funds were spent as follows:

43 per cent went to support the economy, including thermal power plants, regional power networks, oil and gas networks, air transport and rubber industry;
17.6 per cent accounted for the Republican Agency for Sanitary and Epidemiological Well-Being for the purchase of test systems, reagents, and protective equipment, the cost of disinfection, the purchase of special equipment, etc.;
15.5 per cent went for water supply and irrigation activities;
14.9 per cent was spent for the construction and equipping of hospitals and quarantine complexes; and
Nine per cent of the funds went to engaging unemployed citizens in the social area for temporary work, social benefits, to support women in low-income families, the development of personal subsistence plots for the unemployed, low-income families, and for workers of enterprises providing transport services.[5]

Second, to ensure financing of the State Budget and the Anti-Crisis Fund through soft loans from international financial institutions and other sources, it is further planned to implement measures to draw external debt funds to support the budget. As such, Uzbekistan approved a Roadmap to attract grants and long-term concessional financing for measures to combat the negative effects of the global coronavirus pandemic. This April, Uzbekistan reached preliminary agreements to attract long-term soft loans and grants to a total amount of more than $3 billion. These funds will be built up from loans from the Economic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, JICA, and the French Development Agency (in euros). It is also planned to attract grants from the Government of the United Arab Emirates, the European Union (EU), the Government of Korea and international organisations.[6]

The funds have been distributed as follows:

$5 million for the implementation of measures to strengthen the health system;
$700 million to support entrepreneurship and the banking system;
$1.7 billion and 150 million euros are allocated to build a resource base of the Anti-Crisis Fund and support the State Budget;
$300 million is allocated to ensure the smooth functioning of the utilities and energy enterprises;
$30.6 million is allocated for grants for various purposes, including grants from the United Arab Emirates for the construction of a children’s clinic in Tashkent, additional grants from the EU, the Government of Korea and international organisations for the purchase of medical equipment and supplies.

Third, measures were taken to optimise the parameters of the State Budget 2020.[7] Budget revenues were primarily channeled to financing the following areas:

Measures to curb the spread of coronavirus infection, including the purchase of medicines and medical products, construction, reconstruction, repair and the equipping of medical institutions;
Timely payment of wages to Government employees, pensions, scholarships, and allowances;
Purchase of food, utility bills and the reimbursement of other untimely expenses; and
Other activities and expenses based on the decision of the Republican Anti-Crisis Commission.

Projects and expenses that were considered as not relevant were postponed. Specifically, budgetary organisations suspended expenses related to the acquisition of fixed assets and major repairs (until July 1^st). For these purposes, the funds scheduled for the second quarter were reduced or transferred to the second half of 2020.[8]

Fourth, certain measures have been taken to increase economic activity and sustain financial stability. Specifically, in April the Central Bank lowered the base rate by one percent (16 per cent to 15 per cent) and envisioned funds for active use of monetary policy instruments (up to one trillion soms per month).[9] The Bank has also decided on providing commercial banks with 2.6 trillion soms of additional liquid resources by relieving requirements for mandatory reserves. The Bank has also introduced a special mechanism to provide liquidity to commercial banks for up to three years in the amount of up to two trillion soms. It was decided to allocate revolving loans to replenish the working capital provided to private enterprises and to fill the consumer market with the most necessary goods.[10]

Social support measures

With the introduction of quarantine measures due to the coronavirus pandemic in Uzbekistan, the main focus fell on measures of social support for the population. First of all, Uzbekistan took action to prevent a decrease in the income of the population, sustain employment, and prevent unemployment. Specifically, it was noted that employers can transfer employees, especially pregnant women, the elderly, people with disabilities and chronic diseases, with their consent, to the convenient work schedule or to home-based work. During the suspension of the activities of preschool education institutions and secondary schools, one of the parents of primary school students were granted annual leave regardless of their annual leave schedule (including persons who have worked for less than six months).[11] It was envisaged to ensure the timely payment of salaries to 1.04 million employees of pre-school, general, secondary special and higher education institutions, sports and cultural institutions, which ceased their activities. Parents placed in quarantine, as well as persons caring for their children, are paid temporary disability benefits in the amount of 100 per cent of the average monthly salary. Employers are prohibited to terminate employment contracts with the employees infected with coronavirus infection or quarantined, as well as with parents of a child under the age of 14. The amount of tax-free financial assistance has been almost doubled.

Second, measures were taken to support employment in the informal sector and create additional jobs. The reason is that out of 13.5 million people employed in the labour market of Uzbekistan, 7.8 million are considered to be in the informal sector, including 2.6 million labour migrants.[12] 341,300 people cannot work due to the pandemic. At the beginning of 2020, 426,700 people returned from abroad, while 143,400 people could not go abroad to work.[13] For this reason, it is highly relevant for Uzbekistan to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic and the crisis on informal employment. In this context, it is worth noting that support for entrepreneurship is seen as a great opportunity and reserve for creating new jobs, generating demand and supply in the market, and also for ensuring economic growth. With this in mind, the President of Uzbekistan has put forward several important initiatives to prevent a sharp decline in employment and incomes. These include the expansion of the list of activities for self-employed citizens and the provision of permits for all forms of entrepreneurship (85 types of activities) that are not prohibited by law, development of the service sector (delivery of products and goods, organisation of export trade and services), creation of optimal opportunities for providing services to business entities working online, the conditions for those engaged in deliveries.[14] It is also planned to expand lending for the repair of housing, motor vehicles, household appliances, and other goods.

Also, given the fact that the majority of the affected population live in rural areas, close attention has been paid to the broad involvement of the population in seasonal work, taking into account the inaccessibility of rural areas, to the support of agricultural cooperatives, the creation of new areas and additional jobs, the development of withdrawn lands, to the creation of cooperatives, the commissioning of greenhouses in private households, to the establishment of irrigation systems on undeveloped lands, and other initiatives.

The above initiatives envisage the drastic simplification of the system of state registration of the population employed in the informal sector and cancelation of taxing citizens who provide household services to the population.[15] This can be recognised as one of the most effective reforms undertaken to date to develop the labour market. Specifically, this year it is planned to employ 145,000 needy people through the implementation of 7,500 regional projects in the industrial sector. In this context, it is worth to mentioning ample opportunities in agriculture. For example, in the first half of the year it is planned to employ 25,000 people through the development of 38,000 hectares of land, and 45,000 people by the end of the year through the development of additional 51,000 hectares. 20,000 hectares of these lands will be allocated to low-income families. It is also planned to allocate 120,000 hectares of grain-free land for secondary crops and create a source of income for about 300,000 families. The implementation of 107 projects of cotton and textile clusters worth $ 965 million will create more than 28,000 new jobs.[16]

Third, measures were taken to expand the allocation of social benefits and financial assistance. Specifically, in March, the number of recipients of benefits and financial assistance increased by ten per cent, and then, as a result of the automatic extension of appointed benefits and financial assistance, it grew by 1.2 times (increased from 596,000 to 719,000).[17] This May, due to the allocation of 220 billion soms of additional funds, the number of recipients of benefits and financial assistance increased by another ten per cent.[18]

Fourth, measures have been taken to support retirees, single and lonely, and people with disabilities. The most important steps in this direction include the possibility for working pensioners to receive a two-month pension at a time, as well as the free provision of disposable masks, antiseptic and antibacterial fluids to lonely elderly people and persons with disabilities.

Fifth, by the initiative of the President, the Sahovat va Kumak Foundation (Kindness and Support) was established to financially support those in need during the quarantine, temporarily unemployed citizens who have lost their income, to supply everyday goods, medicines and other products. The Foundation and its territorial units have been opened by order of the government without organising a new legal entity but instead operating under the Mahalla Charitable Public Foundation of Uzbekistan and its territorial units, and special accounts were opened in the respective banks.

In this context, it is worth mentioning the widespread and effective practice of involvement of business entities and the mahalla institution in Uzbekistan. A special center with territorial divisions was established to coordinate the joint activities of not only government agencies, but also a large number of volunteers, sponsors, and business entities. A smooth system of receiving assistance was organised in special pavilions storing food and other products in the city of Tashkent and the regions. As of June 10, a total of 194.6 billion soms (£15.2 million) of charitable funds were channeled to the special account of the Sahovat va Kumak Foundation under the Mahalla Foundation.[19] To date, 300,400 needy families have been provided with 119 billion soms of financial assistance. Of these, 67,300 families received 71.1 billion soms of cash (an average of more than 100 USD per family). Also, more than 19,000 citizens in need of social protection each received 2.5 million soms (about £200 ) each according to the lists compiled by municipalities of Andijan, Namangan, Tashkent provinces and the city of Tashkent.

The charitable funds of five million USD were also allocated by Alisher Usmanov. Funds and goods (including services) that are donated to Mahalla, Sahovat va Kumak, or Mercy, and Health of Uzbekistan public foundations, as well as to individuals in need of social support, were exempted from the income tax. Additionally, goods (services) are exempt from VAT and sales tax (for a period up to October 1^st). At the same time, for example, if a manufacturer provides his products as a charity, the entrepreneur does not pay taxes for this product. The individuals receiving free assistance are also exempt from income tax. The benefits stipulate that both parties (providing and receiving) are exempt from all taxes.

Sixth, to prevent food price hikes and reserve the necessary volumes of food products, Uzbekistan has taken appropriate measures. The Committee for State Reserves Management compiled a list and the required volumes of foods to be imported and subject to intervention. Prices for socially important food products in the markets and artificial price increases are monitored and controlled daily to prevent artificial shortages and excessive demand. The Committee for State Reserves Management was entrusted to ensure that food products are sold under contracts or exchange trading in sufficient volumes to keep the market full and stabilise prices for products on the domestic market at free prices. Customs duties and excises (by the end of 2020) on importing 13 types of food products, as well as seven types of hygiene products, have been set at a zero rate. Amid the possibility of the global shortage of food products, there is a need for a mechanism to introduce modern approaches to the use of land to tap resources and opportunities available in agriculture, commission lands and allocate them to the population on favorable terms for growing agricultural products, doubling the number of crops, obtaining high yields, and creating new jobs in the agricultural sector.

Action to Support Entrepreneurship

Phased use of economic sectors, rehabilitation of enterprises, and an increase in exports of finished products have become a pivotal priority during the new coronavirus pandemic. Therefore, Uzbekistan has taken large-scale measures to stimulate economic growth and investment activity, to restore production rates.

First, Uzbekistan took the following organisational measures:

Expanded capacities of remote (online) services for taxpayers to fulfill their tax obligations without visiting state tax authorities by using electronic means of communications starting from simple phones calls to using web portal extensions;
The deadline for submitting a declaration on the total annual income of individuals was extended (from April 1^st to August 1^st);
A moratorium on tax audits has been announced until the end of 2020; and
A moratorium was announced on the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and on the declaration of enterprises experiencing financial difficulties as bankrupt (until October 1^st 2020).

Second, measures were taken to prevent the application of penalties during the period of quarantine measures:

Specifically, taking measures not to calculate fines against legal entities experiencing temporary difficulties for non-payment of property tax, land tax, and tax for the use of water resources and, also, not to enforce collection of tax debt (until October 1^st);
The application of penalties to business entities for overdue receivables from foreign trade operations was suspended (until October 1^st); and
The application of increased property tax and land tax rates for idle production facilities and non-residential premises has been suspended. They were also assigned to suspend the charging of interest and the enforcement of debts. This measure was applied to almost 21,000 enterprises.

Third, measures have been taken to defer payment deadlines. The loan repayment term (total 4.7 trillion soms) for individuals and individual entrepreneurs was extended by six months of 2020. It is established that accrued and overdue interest on loans issued to legal entities and individuals by commercial banks are not included in the total income when calculating income tax for this period.

By December 31^st 2020, micro-enterprises, small enterprises and individual entrepreneurs that have suspended their activity, and their income from the sale of goods (services) decreased by more than 50 per cent against the first quarter of this year, were granted the right to interest-free deferment (installment plan) for turnover tax, property tax, land tax, tax for the use of water resources (hereinafter referred to as 12 months) and social taxes (hereinafter referred to as six months). Entrepreneurs are granted a deferral (installment plan) for six months without charging interest on property tax, land tax, and tax for the use of water resources. The deadline for the payment of property tax and land tax by individuals has been extended (from April 15^th to October 15^th).

Fourth, tax credits were granted. It was established to suspend the calculation of a fixed income tax and social tax levied on individual entrepreneurs who have been forced to cease their activities during the period of quarantine measures. Small businesses have been exempted from:

Property tax and land tax payable for April and May 2020, for which interest-free deferment (installment plan) was provided; and
Penalties and fines for land tax and property tax, as of May 15^th 2020, accrued since January 1^st

These privileges allowed the saving a total of 230 billion soms for almost 4,000 enterprises and using these funds as working capital.

Tax rates and fees have been reduced (for the period from April 1^st to October 1^st):

The minimum monthly amount of social tax for individual entrepreneurs has been reduced twice;
The amount of deductions of enterprises engaged in the wholesale trade in alcoholic beverages has decreased from five to three per cent; and
For catering enterprises, the amount of fees for the right to the retail sale of alcoholic beverages has been reduced by 25 per cent of the established amounts.

In terms of volumes used for irrigation of agricultural land, tax rates for the use of water resources have been reduced by 50 per cent of the established rates. Small businesses, markets, and shopping malls, cinemas, catering, public transport, sports, and fitness facilities, as well as legal entities dealing with passenger transportation, the provision of household services, rental of premises, including those for dinners, have been exempted from property tax and land tax payments (from June 1^st to September 1^st 2020). This has allowed saving 260 billion soms for almost 60,000 enterprises and increasing their working capital.

Fifth, additional benefits were provided for microenterprises and small enterprises. Micro-enterprises and small enterprises have received the right to defer payment of value-added tax for the import of goods (works, services) up to 120 days. For the period from May 1^st to July 1^st of the current year, the social tax rate for micro-firms and small enterprises was reduced from 12 per cent to one per cent. This privilege made it possible for all micro-firms and small enterprises of the republic to freely use 550 billion soms as working capital. To prevent a decrease in the working capital of micro-firms and small enterprises, as of May 15^th 2020, the collection of debts on interest and accrued fines for violation of tax laws was suspended until September 1^st. The State Entrepreneurship Support Fund has begun paying compensation to business entities to reimburse their interest expenses on loans.

Sixth, leasing companies have been provided with rental benefits and some amenities. The calculation and collection of rent for the use of state property by entrepreneurs forced to cease their activities have been suspended. The reduced tax burden on tenants has provided an opportunity to reduce or extend the term of lease payments. Business entities who had to suspend their activities have been entitled to interest-free deferment (up to six months) of payment of personal income tax received from leasing non-residential premises. The amount of accrued and overdue leasing interest income of leasing companies has been exempted from income tax.

Seventh, measures have been taken to support exports. Uzbekistan has promptly introduced the mechanism of customs clearance of imported food products, including by issuing permits before entering the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Republican Commission for Development of Export Potential in the Regions and Sectors has been entitled to independently decide on the provision of subsidies at the expense of the funds allocated to the Export Promotion Agency to reimburse part of transport costs of exporters.

Measures to Support the Most Affected Sectors

First, to support tourism and its directly related industries Uzbekistan has taken measures to preserve hundreds of thousands of jobs and qualified specialists, and maintain their income. Specifically, several privileges have been provided for taxes and fees on tourism-related activities:

Tour operators, travel agents, and hotel service entities, Uzbekistan Airports JSC, Uzbekistan Airways State Unitary Enterprise, and Uzaeronavigatsiya Center SUE have been exempted from property and land taxes (until the end of 2020), and the social tax rate was reduced to one per cent. As a result, it is estimated that the above enterprises will save over 130 billion soms;
It was established that tour operators, travel agents, and accommodation facilities will pay only half (50 per cent) of income tax by the end of 2020;
The right to postpone losses without limiting their sizes based on the results of 2020 and 2021 is granted to tour operators, travel agents, and accommodation facilities, as provided for by the Tax Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan;
The calculation and payment of tourist fees has been suspended until January 1^st 2021; and
Accommodation facilities have been allowed to pay the local fee for the right to retail sales of alcohol products in installments for 12 months.

Also, to support this area, their organisational and economic sources have been identified:

For the tourism sector, it is planned to allocate more than 20 billion soms from the Anti-Crisis Fund;
At the expense of the Tourism Support Fund, it is planned to allocate one-time targeted interest-free loans for 12 months;
5 billion soms have been allocated to support start-up projects, innovative business ideas, information programs, and services in the tourism sector;
It is envisaged to grant up to 100 million soms for projects on organising foreign cuisines, thematic food outlets, as well as food and souvenir delivery services;
To develop and promote new tourism products and destinations, it is planned to allocate five million som grants for the guides, and 10 million som grants for tour operators;
For the period from March 1^st to June 1^st 2020, interest expenses on previously received loans for the construction of accommodation facilities will be reimbursed;
From June 1^st 2020 to January 1^st 2022, a part of the interest expenses up to ten percentage points will be covered on previously obtained loans for the construction of accommodation facilities;
Up to ten percentage points of expenses will be covered on the loans granted to coordinate tourism facilities with new sanitary and hygiene requirements;
Up to ten percentage points will be repaid on the loans received by tourism entities to replenish working capital;
Until December 31^st 2021, a ten per cent subsidy of the cost of hotel services will be allocated;
Tour operators and travel agents will receive 15 USD as stimulating subsidies for each foreign tourist, whom they have delivered to the republic and rendered services;
If a tour operator organises a tour in Uzbekistan for a group of foreign tourists of at least ten people, 30 per cent of the cost of air and train tickets will be subsidised for this operator;
By June 1^st 2021, it is planned to allocate from five to 15 million soms for each room, depending on the category of hotel, to purchase or upgrade its category, as part of the renovation, reconstruction, and strengthening of the logistical capacity of hotels’
To build accommodation facilities, the main debt on previously issued loans will be extended from October 1^st 2020, ranging from 18 months to 24 months; and
Equipment, disinfection devices, their components and spare parts, equipment for contactless control, odorless disinfectants are exempted from customs payments until January 1^st

Second, Uzbekistan approved an integrated action plan to mitigate the negative impact of the COVID-19 related global economic crisis on the development of its textile and clothing industry. In pursuance of the plan:

To further support textile enterprises and clusters, increase the competitiveness of products, the republic transited to international exchange prices, which made it possible to reduce raw material prices by ten per cent; and
64 types of imported raw materials essential for the textile industry have been exempted from customs duties (until January 1^st 2022).

Uzbekistan has introduced a simplified procedure (until December 31^st 2020), which provides for a full refund of value-added tax on products exported by textile enterprises. That is, as the products of textile enterprises leave the republic, the value-added tax will be fully refunded. It also envisioned drastically scaling up exports of finished products, establishing up-to-date large textile and sewing clusters under the international brand, employing at least a thousand people. Due to timely action, the activity of enterprises has been resumed in Uzbekistan, all jobs have been saved, and production and export volumes continue to grow.

Conclusion

Due to abovementioned timely and comprehensive actions in four main areas, the implementation of anti-crisis measures in Uzbekistan to mitigate the negative impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on the socio-economic situation in the country have allowed to maintain the stability of the national economy, producing positive results in major areas since the second half of April 2020. They included as follows:

The gradual lifting of quarantine measures in construction and transport industries has led to a relative revival in demand for construction materials and highly liquid products;
Following the raise of business activity, public and commercial banks have also began to recover. In particular, the overall bank transfers increased by 44 per cent to 4.9 trillion soms by the end of April;[20]
The volume of trades on the “UZEX” – Commodity Exchange Market of the Republic of Uzbekistan have increased from 9.4 per cent to 39.7 per cent by May 1^st 2020;
In addition, the flow of cross-border remittances has also been recovering, which, in turn, has had a positive impact on the consumption of the population. In particular, the volume of remittances in the end of April increased by $234 million and reached $484 million;
It should be noted that from the beginning of the global COVID-19 pandemic the leadership of Uzbekistan demonstrated its commitment to prioritise regional cooperation in Central Asia and took the initiative to coordinate regional efforts; and
In the very beginning of the pandemic in the region, the President of Uzbekistan held telephone conversations with all leaders of Central Asian region, and organised humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, calling them to collaborate against coronavirus. In turn, governments of all Central Asian countries have commended the benefits of regional cooperation and supported Uzbekistan’s foreign policy activities.

Eldor Tulyakov is currently an Executive Director at the Development Strategy Centre, an Uzbekistan based think tank. He has a B.A. (Hons.), from the University of Westminster (2008) and an LL.M. from the Institute for Law and Finance (2011). The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not reflect the view of the state.

[1] Ministry of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Current state and expected trends in the economy of the republic, April 2020, http://mineconomy.uz/uz/news/view/3144

[2] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, On priority measures to mitigate the negative impact on the sectors of the economy of the coronavirus pandemic and global crisis, March 2020, Lex.UZ, https://lex.uz/docs/4770763; Telegra, Package of Economic Measures. Main initiatives, March 2020, https://telegra.ph/Paket-EHkonomicheskih-mer-Glavnye-iniciativy-03-19-2; Ministry of Finance, Introduced measures to support the population, economic sectors and business entities during the coronavirus pandemic, Telegram, April 2020, https://t.me/minfinuzb/1684

[3] Telegra, Uzbekistan’s experience in mitigating the socio-economic impact of the global pandemic and developing national integrated financing mechanisms, May 2020, https://telegra.ph/Uzbekistans-experience-in-mitigating-the-socio-economic-impact-of-the-global-pandemic-and-developing-national-integrated-financi-05-29

[4] Ministry of Finance, Information on the expenses of the Anti-Crisis Fund under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Ministry News, June 2020, https://www.mf.uz/ru/news-mf-jx/item/659-659.html

[5] Personal subsistence plots – the labor activity of the population related to the cultivation of agricultural products for free trade and family needs on their land plots. Personal subsidiary plots are not an entrepreneurial activity, and state registration of personal subsidiary plots is not required. A person working in a personal subsidiary plots may register his activity as self-employed.

[6] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, On measures to attract external assistance funds to support the population, budget, basic infrastructure and business entities during the coronavirus pandemic, April 2020, Lex.UZ, https://lex.uz/docs/4797098

[7] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, On measures to ensure stability of the state budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan and timely financing of priority measures during the coronavirus pandemic, April 2020, Lex.UZ, https://lex.uz/docs/4788647

[8] Cabinet Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan decision, On additional measures to ensure the sustainability of the state budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2020 and the approval of expenditures, April 2020, Lex.UZ, https://lex.uz/docs/4789708

[9] Cbu.uz, By a decision of the Central Bank’s Board of April 14, 2020, the basic rate was reduced by 1 percentage point and set at 15% per annum, April 2020, http://www.cbu.uz/ru/press_center/releases/214556/

[10] Ibid 3.

[11] The Minister of Employment and Labour Relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan Command, During the period of quarantine measures, when pre-school educational institutions and general education institutions are closed, it is time to grant annual leave to parents of pupils and students of primary educational institutions, Lex.UZ, March 2020, https://lex.uz/docs/4776261

[12] Mehnat.uz, What is the unemployment rate in Uzbekistan in 2019?, April 2020, https://mehnat.uz/uz/news/2019-yilda-uzbekistonning-ishsizlik-darazhasi-qancha

[13] Uza.uz, What is the benefit of allocating unconditional financial assistance from the state budget to the needy?, May 2020, http://uza.uz/oz/society/yerdamga-mu-tozh-a-oli-atlamiga-davlat-byudzhetidan-be-araz–22-05-2020

[14] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, On measures to simplify state regulation of entrepreneurial activity and self-employment, Lex.UZ, June 2020, https://lex.uz/docs/4849605

[15] Ibid.

[16] Aktam Haitov, Next measures: Increase the number of self-employed activities, xs.uz, June 2020, http://xs.uz/uzkr/post/navbatdagi-chora-tadbirlar-ozini-ozi-band-qiluvchi-faoliyat-turlari-soni-kopajtirildi

[17] Ibid 3.; Telegra, Uzbekistan introduces new measures to support population and economy, April 2020, https://telegra.ph/Uzbekistan-introduces-new-measures-to-support-population-and-economy-04-01

[18] Ministry of Finance, Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan ‘On Next Measures to Support the Population and Entrepreneurship during the Coronavirus Pandemic’, Telegram, May 2020, https://t.me/minfinuzb/1911

[19] Ministry of Mahalla and Family Support, Briefing on donations and donations received by sponsors and organisations to Charity and Assiatnce Foundation, Telegram, June 2020, https://t.me/mahallavaoilainfo/755

[20] Cbu.uz, The Board of the Central Bank did not change the basic rate of the Central Bank at 15% per annum, June 2020, https://cbu.uz/ru/press_center/news/292132/

Topics

Covid-19

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Uzbekistan

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COVID-19: Actions taken in Uzbekistan

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