State Transformation and Authoritarian Governance: The Emergence of Participatory Authoritarianism?
Article by
Dr Catherine Owen
September 14, 2018
It is commonly assumed that authoritarian governments do not wish to involve citizens in questions of governance or public administration. Instead, conventional wisdom has it that the leaders of such states seek to disengage and depoliticise their citizens and, when ‘mobilization’ is required, ‘the masses’ are either ‘coerced’ on threat of violence or ‘co-opted’ with rewards and bribes. While this may have been true of mid-twentieth Century authoritarianism, recent research by country specialists has revealed an abundance of local, voluntary, participatory mechanisms proliferating across well-established non-democratic states, such as Russia and China. Although national elections in these states are either heavily managed or entirely absent, press freedom is strongly curtailed and those who speak out against the regime are severely targeted, citizens in both countries can freely choose to join civic groups that provide welfare services, engage in participatory budgeting, give feedback on local government performance and debate policy proposals.
In Russia, for example, since the early 2000s new government-organised participatory mechanisms have been developed and implemented throughout the country. First, consultative forums have proliferated at federal, regional and municipal levels. Known as public chambers and public councils, these forums enable certain citizens to engage directly with policy-makers to debate proposals and raise issues of local concern.[1] Second, the category of ‘socially oriented NGO’ was adopted in 2010 to regulate the activities of ‘apolitical’, mostly welfare-providing non-profit organisations, which carry out activities in the sphere of conservation, historical preservation, sports, education and health care.[2] Third, various participatory budgeting schemes, which enable local residents to have a say in the allocation of municipal budgets, have been implemented across Russia, involving both the World Bank and local, independent initiatives.[3]
In China, municipal and regional level governance has always been the object of experimentation; hence, there exists wide variation in practices of governance across the country. Yet, since 2000, local authorities in various provinces have been employing a number of strategies to open up the policy-making process to citizens. In Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, citizens may provide evaluations of government performance across 117 branches of local government activity in a project called the ‘evaluations and examinations system’, which in 2012 had already involved over 15,000 citizens. Likewise, citizens of Hangzhou may debate policy proposals with local officials in a consultative forum known as the ‘Red House Consultations’.[4] Participatory budgeting is also spreading around the country, with thousands of initiatives in place at the village level.[5] And the number of public organisations in China has exploded in recent years, with around 675,000 formally registered with the authorities (and a further estimated 3 million unregistered), leading some to call it an ‘associational revolution’.[6]
One of the main drivers behind the emergence of this new form of participatory authoritarianism has been the marketisation of state bureaucracies, which began in the UK, the USA and New Zealand during the late 1970s and early 1980s and rapidly spread around the world. To varying extents, national governments began to introduce mechanisms drawn from the private sector into domestic public sectors in an ensemble of norms that came to be known as New Public Management (NPM). This included the privatisation of state-owned assets, the devolution of executive power to the provincial or municipal levels, the outsourcing of government functions to businesses and charitable organisations, and the monetisation and means-testing of welfare. The result was a shift in domestic state architecture away from the so-called ‘command and control’ states of the twentieth Century, which provided goods and services directly to citizens, and towards types of regulatory states, which engage in practices of ‘arms’ length governance’. In regulatory states, governments are no longer the primary source of the knowledge and resources required for the effective formulation and delivery of public policy and, consequently, they must establish mechanisms that allow them to access this knowledge and resources in order to manage and oversee the policy process. In authoritarian regimes, such consultative mechanisms are all the more important since other feedback channels, such as a free press and fair elections, are either corrupted or fully absent.
In regulatory states, a new kind of citizen is required: one who actively engages in policy-making processes, assists local authorities in social campaigns and gives constructive feedback on government proposals. However, non-democratic regimes face the additional challenge of fomenting active citizens who are aware of and keep within the boundaries to their participation. And indeed, authoritarian governments are finding increasingly innovative ways to do just that. In Russia and China, leaders are increasingly calling on citizens to become active in areas formerly the preserve of government. In 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the 12 core values of socialism in order to invigorate the ideology, and in 2013, introduced the ‘Chinese Dream’ as a means by which individual citizens can link their personal goals to those of the state. In Russia, increased civic participation has been a key theme of President Vladimir Putin’s speeches since his first term in power, in which he has repeatedly called upon the population to shake off its Soviet-era passivity and help the development of the nation by becoming active citizens. However, the fostering of such initiatives comes alongside increasingly draconian crackdowns in both countries on dissenting voices elsewhere in the public sphere. A full exposition of the growing levels of censorship in Russia and China is beyond the scope of this article – hence, a couple of examples will suffice for illustration. In Russia, one can be imprisoned for ‘offending religious feelings’ and anti-systemic opposition and human rights activists are regularly silenced through imprisonment or house arrest. In China, those who speak out publicly against the regime are frequently imprisoned, or ‘disappear’. In both states, the authorities enact ever closer internet surveillance for ‘subversive’ materials.[7] The message to citizens appears to be thus: constructive input on specific policies through approved fora is encouraged, but independent criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, the Russian Orthodox Church or other pillars of these regimes, is not.
Nevertheless, studies in each country suggest that consultative fora do exercise a certain amount of influence on policy outcomes. In Russia, public consultations are likely to have an effect on those areas not seen to pertain to areas of national or strategic importance. Examples of successful lobbying via consultative structures include the introduction of courts of appeal, improvements in prison conditions, changing the law on military service to exempt PhD students from conscription, conservation of city architecture, monitoring of the local government budget and work on the liberalization of the NGO law in 2009.[8] In China, less data is available on precisely which policies have been influenced through these mechanisms, but scholars of China frequently cite the responsive nature of local authorities as a key feature of Chinese governance.[9]
These developments have profound consequences for the way in which we view authoritarian regimes. First, instead of seeing authoritarianism solely as an elite-led project, voluntary practices of civic participation suggest that authoritarian regimes can be deeply embedded at the local level and enjoy grassroots legitimation and support. Citizens are not coerced into participatory activities but act out of a desire to improve their local community through the mechanisms available. Second, rather than seeing authoritarian regimes as the conceptual and logical opposite to democracies, the existence of civic participation in authoritarian settings is a reminder that all states are constituted by combinations of practices that include both ‘democratic’ practices of participation, accountability and justice and ‘authoritarian’ practices of coercion, co-optation and arbitrariness, which are enacted simultaneously by different sections of state apparatus, and whose dynamics are constantly interacting and evolving. Finally, a focus on the globalisation of governance norms shows how ostensibly liberal discourses and practices, such as civic participation in local governance, can be used to sustain illiberal rule at the national level.
[1] These forums have been the subject of much research. See Catherine Owen (2016) ‘A Genealogy of Kontrol’ in Russia: From Leninist to Neoliberal Governance’, Slavic Review, 75 (2): 331–53; James Richter (2009) ‘Putin and the Public Chamber’, Post-Soviet Affairs 25 (1): 39–65; James Richter (2009) ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chambers in the Regions’, Problems of Post-Communism, 56 (6): 7–20; Kirsti Stuvøy (2014) ‘Power and Public Chambers in the Development of Civil Society in Russia’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47: 409–19.
[2] Rossiiskaya Gazeta (2010), ‘Federal’nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 5 aprelya 2010g No. 40 F2: O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii po voprosu podderzhki sotsial’no oriyentirovannykh nekommercheskikh organizatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 April, www.rg.ru/2010/04/07/nko-dok.html
[4] Jane Duckett & Hua Wang (2013) Extending political participation in China: new opportunities for citizens in the policy process, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 6:3, 263-276; For discussion of village level deliberative mechansisms see:
[5] Baogang He (2011) Civic Engagement Through Participatory Budgeting in China: Three Different Logics at Work’, Public Administration and Development 31: 122-133.
[6] Carolyn Hsu, Fang-Yu Chen, Jamie P. Horsley, and Rachel Stern (2016) ‘The State of NGOs in China Today, Brookings Institution, 15 December 2016. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/12/15/the-state-of-ngos-in-china-today/; Jessica Teets (2014) Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[8] Catherine Owen and Eleanor Bindman (2017) ‘Civic Participation in a Hybrid Regime: Limited Pluralism in Policymaking and Delivery in Contemporary Russia’, Government and Opposition. Online First.
[9] Kevin O’Brien Kevin and Lianjiang Li (2006) Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press); Wenfang Tang (2016) Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability (New York, NY: Oxford University Press); Baogang He and Mark E. Warren (2011) ‘Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development’, Perspectives on Politics 9 (2): 269-289.
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Is Brexit just a choice between the Chequers deal or a ‘hard Brexit’? Supporters of ‘associate citizenship’ believe there is not. The proposed associate citizenship would allow individuals to enjoy some of the benefits of EU citizenship in return for a (likely substantial) fee. While this would undoubtedly bring benefits to those able to take up associate citizenship, it would also have a transformative effect on the concept of citizenship itself, exacerbating existing trends towards transnational forms of citizenship and a reduced role for nation states.
Associate citizenship of the EU will enable UK citizens to ‘buy in’ to EU citizenship.[1] Associate citizens would enjoy access to the same rights as EU citizens but will be required to pay-in to the EU.[2] This proposal has much to recommend it, yet it is likely to prove politically controversial because it will substantially alter the relationship between the individual and the state.
The proposal has been endorsed by Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament’s lead on Brexit negotiations and is referred to in the Parliament’s resolution on Brexit,[3] and obtained significant civil society support in the UK. For example, over 300 000 people have signed petitions calling for the inclusion of associate citizenship in Brexit negotiations.[4]
Opponents of associate citizenship argue that it will undermine the Brexit process. For Andrew Bridgen, a Conservative MP and Leave campaigner, it will create “two classes of EU citizen”.[5] Bridgen’s analysis, however, is the wrong way around. Associate citizenship will leave EU citizenship substantively unchanged. Yet it will create two classes of British citizenship: those who enjoy rights in the EU and those who do not. This will alter the nature of national citizenship, establishing a precedent for a form of citizenship that transcends nation-states. This will empower individuals and cities in relation to national governments. The benefits of the proposal are, however, likely to be limited to more affluent urban elites, exacerbating existing social divisions in the UK. This article offers a brief overview of the most significant barriers and likely impacts of associate citizenship, and an assessment of the proposal’s likelihood of success.
What is Associate Citizenship?
The precise nature of associate citizenship is unclear. Any proposal would, in any case, be subject to intensive negotiation before it could be approved. It is possible, however, to identify a few key features likely to be included in any negotiation of a form of associate citizenship. Associate citizens would enjoy a bundle of certain rights and duties. A ‘thick’ form of associate citizenship could include enjoyment of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons) and other EU rights subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This would likely ease the process of travel from the UK to the EU and provide associate citizens with easier access to EU markets and institutions from the UK. It could also include the right to vote in certain EU elections (although this would require the creation of transnational MEPs, which would require some considerable changes to the current European Parliament’s structures). This would likely come at the cost of a substantial financial contribution by associate citizens. The EU27 are unlikely to grant UK citizens rights in the EU without this. ‘Thinner’ forms of associate citizenship would include some, but not all, of the above but are still likely to come at a significant financial cost.
Associate citizens will likely enjoy a number of political, social, and (perhaps) economic benefits. Access to the four freedoms and other rights will enable associate citizens to travel in the EU, take part in EU political discourse and elections, and interact more directly with their fellow EU citizens. Increased access to EU markets would offer associate citizens economic opportunities not available to those who enjoy only British citizenship. The extent of the benefit enjoyed as a result of associate citizenship would, of course, depend on the thickness of the version of associate citizenship ultimately adopted.
Legal Hurdles
Critics of associate citizenship argue that it is legally impossible.[6] Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for EU citizenship as ‘co-citizenship’.[7] While national citizenship remains pre-eminent, the individual is a citizen of both their own state and the EU. This is not, however, an insurmountable barrier. It is conceivable that associate citizens would retain their British citizenship as well as their EU citizenship: remaining co-citizens of the UK and EU.[8] A more significant challenge is the likely necessity of treaty change. EU law must be based on the powers conferred in the EU treaties. Article 20 does not, prima facie, appear to confer the power to create associate citizens. A treaty change requires the consent of all member states. It may, however, be argued that the required power is implicit. Article 20 does not rule out associate citizenship, it is merely silent on the matter, meanwhile Article 77 of the treaty empowers the Commission to confer EU passports[9] and Articles 223 to 234 and 314 confer legislative initiative on the Commission and the Parliament.[10] The combination of these powers could form a basis for the argument that the EU already has the power to create associate citizens through its existing legislative processes.[11]
A Challenge to the Nature of Citizenship
Nation states are traditionally the arbiter of citizenship. The state decides who is, and who is not, a citizen, as well as the rights and duties that come with citizenship. [12] This is part of a state’s cultural, social, and political legitimacy.[13] Citizenship and individual identity are interlinked.[14] Our perception of our own identity is heavily influenced by our citizenship because we reflexively understand ourselves as members of a particular group with a particular history.[15] Our membership of these groups is often by our citizenship status. As the ultimate arbiter of citizenship, the state thus plays a role in the formation and re-formation of individual self-understanding. The state is therefore vital to individuals in a social, cultural, and political sense.
As John Urry puts it:
“The concept of society has been central to western notions of what it is to be a human. To be human has meant that one is unambiguously a member of a particular society. Historically and conceptually there has been a strong connection between the idea of humanness and that of membership of a society. Society involves an ordering through a nation-state, clear territorial and citizenship boundaries and a system of governance over its particular citizens.”[16]
Since, at least, 1989 the state’s monopoly on the determination of citizenship has eroded. Social, commercial, and cultural relationships are increasingly transnational.[17] This creates space for informal alternative citizenships. Individuals increasingly self-identify with communities beyond the nation-state.[18] Some national leaders see this as eroding the role of the state and, by extension, their own authority. In her 2016 Conference speech Theresa May attacked those who embrace alternative citizenship identities, arguing that “if you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere”.[19]
EU associate citizenship would represent a quantum change in the nature of citizenship. It would formalise, and further legitimise, alternative citizenship identities. The state would no longer be the ultimate arbiter of citizenship. Individuals would be able to formally elect an alternative form of citizenship that transcends the nation state. The bundle of rights and duties that come with citizenship would no longer be conferred solely by the state. The individual would have the option of additional rights and duties and to formally identify with socio-cultural and, crucially, political communities beyond the nation state. The individual would thus become a co-equal arbiter of citizenship. Associate citizenship would therefore alter the relationship between the individual and the state.
The impacts of associate citizenship
Globalisation
Associate citizenship would empower individuals to interact with a supra-national organisation and with their fellow EU citizens in a manner that transcends the nation state (albeit to a greater or lesser extent depending on whether a ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ version of associate citizenship is adopted). If associate citizenship is taken up by significant numbers of individuals, this will accelerate the transnationalisation of individual relations that has occurred as a result of globalisation.[20] It will consequently erode the status of states at the global level by dispersing the (formerly exclusive) power to confer citizenship status from states to individuals. ‘Globalisation’ is often used in a pejorative sense yet, in empowering individuals and facilitating relationships and identity building beyond the confines of the nation state, associate citizenship will likely have a positive impact.
Cities
Cities play an increasingly prominent global economic and political role.[21] Economic growth tends to be focused in cities and, in the UK, increased devolution has empowered cities to elect their own leaders exercising broad policy making powers.[22] Cities increasingly cooperate transnationally, such as through the C40 initiative on climate change.[23]
In the UK, associate citizenship will further empower cities at the expense of the national government. Cities like London, Manchester, and Birmingham[24] tend to be richer[25] and more pro-EU than rural areas or smaller cities.[26] They thus have both greater means and inclination to benefit from associate citizenship. Associate citizens are therefore likely to be concentrated in major cities. This will incentivise mayors to pursue closer relationships with the EU than those pursued by national government. For the EU’s part, city governments will become an important point of intercession with associate citizens. Cities will thus become increasingly transnational and the role of the national government correspondingly marginalised. Cities are unlikely to participate in EU institutions in the same way as states unless those institutions undergo substantial changes. Their informal role, however, as key intercessors between large concentrations of associate citizens and the EU, combined with a more outward-looking approach to the EU, will give cities an enhanced substantive role.
Social tension
This will exacerbate the existing social and economic divisions in the UK. The economic benefits of associate citizenship will accrue to those who have both the means and inclination to take advantage: wealthier liberals who tend to live in cities. Secondary impacts are likely to be concentrated in cities as well. Urban dwellers already tend to be wealthier than those in rural areas or provincial towns[27] and wealth correlates with likelihood of voting for Brexit and being suspicious about immigration.[28]
Associate citizenship will increase the economic, cultural, and social opportunities of associate citizens, increasing the cosmopolitan attitudes and economic advantages enjoyed by the urban middle class. By contrast, those outside this group, who were already likely to be poorer (and thus unable to afford the – likely – substantial financial cost of associate citizenship) and more anti-European, will be denied these opportunities. The impression will be of one group enjoying special privilege while the other is neglected. This will harden existing scepticism towards globalisation and supra-national bodies like the EU. Associate citizenship is thus likely to further entrench the UKs existing political and socio-economic divides.
The Fatal Flaw: Political Will
While the legal barriers to associate citizenship are not insurmountable, it is likely the project will fail for lack of political will. Those conducting the negotiations have no incentive to advance a project that will marginalise national governments. On the UK side, the national government faces a situation in which the cities most likely to benefit from associate citizenship are either controlled by a hostile political party or an independent minded mayor. On the EU side, Brexit negotiations are overseen by the Council, the body that represents the nation states. While the immediate impacts of associate citizenship will only be felt in the UK, the project as a whole establishes a worrying precedent from the perspective of nation states. It demonstrates that the nation state is no longer necessary as the sole arbiter of citizenship. This exacerbates a trend in which nation states are losing the pre-eminence as both international and domestic actors. There is therefore likely to be little real enthusiasm for the project around the Brexit negotiating table.
Conclusions
The practical barriers to associate citizenship are not insurmountable. The political issues, however, require more careful consideration. The project would undoubtedly empower individuals and cities and, for this reason, has much to recommend it. While it will likely exacerbate existing economic and social divisions in the UK, the root cause of these lies elsewhere. These problems should be addressed, but they will not be solved by opposing associate citizenship. Yet, the projects greatest advantage, that it will redefine the relationship between the individual and the state, is also its greatest political weakness. Those charged with negotiating Brexit stand to lose from associate citizenship. The project is therefore likely to fail for a lack of political will.
[7] European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, Art. 20(1)
[8] This would be unprecedented – a concept of co-citizenship with a non-member state does not exist in EU law. Yet Brexit is, itself, unprecedented. It is not unreasonable to assume that the process will require precedent-setting solutions in some areas.
[17] Akira Iriye, The Making of A Transnational World, in Iriye (ed), Global Interdependence: The World After 1945, (London; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 679-847
[18] Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton UP, 2006), pp. 219-233
[24] See, for example, JLL, Greater Birmingham: An Economic Renaissance? September 2014
[25] See, for example, Danny Dorling and John Pritchard, The Geography of Poverty, Inequality and Wealth in the UK and Abroad: Because Enough is Never Enough, 3 Appl. Spatial Anlysis 81 (2010), pp. 81-106
[28] See Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills, and lack of opportunities, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, (31st August 2016)
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How UK foreign policy benefits from EU membership, and the pitfalls of Brexit
Article by
Jacqueline Hale
August 31, 2018
As the UK faces the uncertainty of Brexit, this article examines how its policies towards third countries including enlargement, trade, migration, development and energy policies have been mediated through the EU membership. It demonstrates how the UK has used the EU to amplify power, to protect UK interests and security, and to pursue its foreign policy priorities and interests. Finally, it offers some thoughts as to the risks to the UK’s foreign policy influence following Brexit.
A power amplifier
The UK has had a successful history in normatively influencing the EU through its membership. The impact of the UK and the FCO over the last 40 years in ensuring that its ideas are transmitted via a 28-member bloc and its networks across the world should not be underestimated. Some of the EU’s most enduring policies testify to British ideas at the heart of EU decision-making: From Churchill’s European vision which led to the founding of the European movement, to the widening (as opposed to deepening) of the union via its enlargement and neighbourhood policies the UK has been a thought leader on EU foreign policy. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 to admit 10 new members radically altered the centre of gravity and emphasis of the union to Whitehall’s liking[1]. In recent years, the EU has been more Anglo-Saxon than ever in its interactions beyond its borders – and not just because the language of its business is English. EU Free Trade Agreements – often negotiated by UK trade lawyers – draw the interest of trading giants, such as latterly, Canada, the US[2] and Japan. In a number of foreign policy areas, from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which enables the EU to speak with one voice on political affairs in relation to third countries and articulate EU common interests and values, to policies ranging from border control to energy and climate change to development – the EU amplifies British soft power.
Safeguarding UK interests
The EU has played a key role in safeguarding UK interests ranging from sanctions to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy. On the bigger foreign policy questions, including sanctions on third countries following abuses of power and violations of international norms, the UK has been able to draw on collective bloc decisions which favour its position and avoid being singled-out to face negative political and economic consequences, such as export bans on arms/equipment. The EU is also one of the only mechanisms by which Britain can successfully push its pro-sanctions position (notably on Russia and Syria) since sanctions are frequently rendered impossible via the UN route due to Russian and Chinese veto at the UNSC. The departure of the UK has led some allies (notably Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) to express concern about a possible shift of the balance of power within the EU on EU-Russia policy. It may make the EU common position more susceptible to pressure from Austria, Italy and other governments to weaken the sanctions policy.
The EU has also offered the UK a useful ‘’bad cop’’ in situations where UK bilateral policy is to appease rather than sanction a third country: The June 2018 EU sanctions on Myanmar generals as a result of suspected crimes against humanity against the Rohingya were tacitly supported by the UK as a means of applying pressure for accountability, whilst allowing the UK, the former colonial power, to pursue a pragmatic, pro-engagement bilateral policy toward Aung San Suu Kyi’s Government. In the case of Libya in 2011, the UK benefited from the unanimous endorsement of EU sanctions, which went further than UNSCR 1970 as well as asset freezing[3]. These coordinated moves by EU member states provided political space for more concerted action by the EU’s two military and diplomatic powers, UK and France – even taking into account Germany’s abstention at the UN Security Council.
In contexts where individual EU member states such as the UK are considered partial, the EU is also able to achieve outcomes as an honest broker – notably in the success of the European External Action Service on the Iran deal, and in current mediation efforts by the EU High Representative in the Western Balkans. Through its work on conflict prevention and civilian crisis management, the EU is doing more on the ground than other conflict prevention formats in which the UK has a stake in the Eastern and Southern European neighbourhood: OSCE, NATO, UN or G20. EU civilian crisis management policy is able to do more in Moldova and Georgia than the OSCE (which remains hobbled by Russia) or NATO for whom the region is too politically sensitive to enter. EU Operation Sofia, in the Mediterranean, for all the challenges of its mandate, mounted a serious smuggling prevention operation.
There is great complementarity and burden sharing opportunities for larger EU member states, such as the UK: The EU mission in Libya on border security supports the UK intervention as well as UK national security concerns, just as by analogy the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali supports France. The multinational pool of expertise for EU deployments to these missions supports wider knowledge sharing and transfer. EU civilian crisis management missions provide an outlet for UK policing ideas via their personnel, whereas in other contexts where the UK has a stake but less cultural reach and expertise (for example Armenia and Moldova), experts from Central and Eastern European states do that job. The EU is also effectively providing a security guarantee for Georgia. Despite the UK’s tough stance on Russia, it is not clear that the UK has the geopolitical capital or financial resources to deploy a mission on the scale of, for example, the 200-strong EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia and would not consider doing so alone. The EUMM complements the FCO’s dedicated bilateral funding ‘niche’, supporting conflict-prevention NGOs in the South Caucasus region.[4]
Free-riding on Home Affairs
The EU has also expanded UK influence in relations with partners – at a limited material cost to the UK. The Enlargement process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy and its successor in the East, the Eastern Partnership, have carried weight in partner countries for whom association with the EU means clean water, safe transport, travel opportunities through easier access to Europe, via budget airlines, and the potential to sell goods to a market of, currently, 500 million people.
This leverage has allowed the EU to demand reforms on migration and asylum in exchange for visas for the Schengen area, such as justice reforms or anti-corruption measures in public procurement which, when implemented by neighbouring countries, also benefit the UK down the line. The obligation on partner countries to cooperate with Eurojust and Europol protects the UK. In the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, five out of six countries have signed or are negotiating visa facilitation agreements have been obliged to adopt readmission agreements.[5] Since the visa facilitation agreements apply only to Schengen the UK has valid readmission agreements without giving up anything materially. Other EU member states have borne the cost of the reduction from 60 Euros to 35 Euros for a single-entry Schengen visa[6], or for the free visas offered to an extended list of categories, ranging from students to journalists. With its decision to leave the EU, the UK faces the prospect of concluding bilateral readmission negotiations with each of these third countries which may cost it more in concessions on visa. At the same time, it is not clear that Britain alone would have the leverage to negotiate the accompanying reforms, whose implementation is also supported through pooled EU funding, and trade incentives (see below).
Large trading market
The EU as a trading bloc with a single-market has more clout in a partner country than any single EU member state. Britain has long embraced this vision. In the neighbourhood, as elsewhere in the world, the EU facilitates market access and investment opportunities for British companies through its Common Commercial policy. For many countries outside Europe, the EU collectively is the largest trading partner: In 2015 – EU trade with Ukraine was worth 31 billion USD whereas Britain’s trade with Ukraine was 2.1 billion USD[7]. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), negotiated with Eastern neighbours, and considered for the Southern neighbours, are modelled on the successful accession process and aim to increase exports and investment through opening new markets. Because standards are high they also protect the EU’s member states including Britain against dumping. Through ensuring that neighbouring countries align their legislation with EU standards, the EU not only opens but transforms markets. DCFTAs aim at transforming societies on the EU’s periphery by demanding reforms in areas ranging from customs practices to taxation to product standards, with broad implications for the fight against corruption and good governance.
As well as the benefits for British companies, Britain can afford to be clear that regulation is both necessary and useful for its foreign policy, both in strengthening the EU internal market in key geo-strategic areas such as energy – see below – and raising standards among neighbours. Britain alone would be less likely to achieve this level of convergence with its legislation, nor be able to offer sweeteners on the scale of the €12.8 billion offered by the EU to support the reform process in Ukraine[8]. This is a political as well as a technical question in a country like Ukraine, where the EU is its largest trading partner and – together with Russia – accounts for 50% of Ukraine’s trade.
Likewise, the size of the EU energy market gives it real clout in the sector. The EU has taken the lead on negotiating MoUs to establish gas pipelines of strategic importance to the EU27, notably the Southern Energy Corridor. The transnational nature of the issue, as well as the scale of collective EU energy demand, means that the EU Commissioner for Energy has more leverage than a single member state. At the same time, EU energy policy, including the Energy Union and particularly the Energy Security Strategy (2014) links the liberalisation of the internal energy market to the achievement of reduced dependence on particular external actors in a way that national policy could not. By launching an anti-trust case against Gazprom in September 2012, the European Commission’s DG Competition has been fighting the corner for British business and British strategic interest through challenging Gazprom’s monopoly[9]. This is an example of where EU single market rules and regulations in competition policy act in the British interest. Further, the EU has established an Energy Community –which is expanding the EU acquis on the security of supply, energy efficiency, oil, renewable energy and statistics to countries ranging from the Western Balkans to Ukraine, creating reliable markets for British companies.
Global development
In development policy, the UK – as a top bilateral development donor, as well as a net contributor to the EU development budget – leverage the EU’s funding, networks and delegations. The EU, together with its member states, is the world’s largest development donor. Much of EU development and humanitarian policy thinking has been shaped by the UK. The Department for International Development (DFID) has used its own leverage as a top donor historically to shape the EU’s development policy focus on health and education in development and prioritisation of the the Least Developed Countries, as well as funding modalities pursued by the EU’s humanitarian assistance department (ECHO), most recently on cash-programming. DFID often works in Joint Actions with the EU, notably in West Africa. EU and UK ‘super grants’ are fostering development outcomes on a greater scale on issues such as infant nutrition, in Bangladesh[10]. With the UK contributing up to 15% of the EU’s Development Fund annually[11] and ‘paying to play’ in setting the EU’s priorities through the fund, the challenge for the UK (and the EU) post-Brexit, will be to make less funding go further in transforming lives and buying change.
Losing out from the divorce
Whether the EU can continue to exercise the power of attraction at the same level without UK membership is an open question. The Union faces a number of political challenges aside from Brexit, including open challenges to its own values from existing members, most notably ins Hungary and Poland[12]. The new long-term budget of the EU is likely to shrink directly as a result of Brexit, and indirectly as other countries seek to use funding leverage to articulate demands[13].
Yet, all the signs are that challenges for Britain as a result of Brexit will be arguably greater. In an increasingly multipolar world, one which belongs to regional trading blocs and bigger countries, it is unclear what advantages can be derived from the UK’s ‘Global Britain’ policy. A pivot to an Asia-Pacific strategy and a rekindling of colonial ties could prove costly, given that the majority of the UK’s trading partners are next door. The EU accounted for 90% of the UK’s trading in 2017, considering that it was the destination for 44% of UK’s exports, with 53% of the UK’s imports coming from the other 27 EU member states[14]. This market of 500 million people allows the UK to enjoy some 50 trade agreements with countries and regions across the world[15]. It follows that post-Brexit bilateral deals struck for a UK market of 66 million people will be harder to come by, and will take time, during which the UK will be subject to high tariffs under basic WTO rules.
A diminished economic power will also face diminishing returns in foreign policy: With Britain on the sidelines – at best being permitted to observe foreign policy ministerial decisions by the EU27 – there will be less potential to influence EU-bloc decisions that are taken into multilateral fora, from the WTO to the Human Rights Council. Although it cannot yet be quantified, the loss of UK influence in Brussels foreign policy decision-making during the Brexit process indicates worst to come. Put simply, the UK risks losing normative and soft power through exiting the club that it has so successfully shaped.
[1] The fact that the 2004 enlargement arguably was a fact in sowing the seeds of Brexit has more to do with successive UK governments’ poor handling of the migration debate than the policies of the new EU members
[2] The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has so far failed to come to fruition, but negotiations are quietly ongoing and would see the US submit to EU standards whilst uniting the two markets to form the world’s largest trading bloc.
[8] For an overview of macro-financial assistance from foreign partners to Ukraine see http://www.aalep.eu/financial-assistance-ukraine
[9] The case was concluded in May 2018 without fines to Gazprom, but with a deal outlining significant concessions by the company designed to break its monopoly, including on price-setting and removal of contractual constraints that had prevented clients from reselling gas
[11] The UK is the third biggest contributor to the European Development Fund, behind France and Germany. See UK Parliament: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/1680/168005.htm.
[12] The electoral victory for Matteo Salvini in Italy, and an increasingly right-leaning Austria are a sign of a growing populist challenge to the EU across its member states.
[13] Matteo Salvini has invoked the methods of Donald Trump in threatening to withhold Italy’s annual contribution to the EU budget unless the other Member States enact burdensharing arrangements for the reception of migrants and refugees. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/24/eu-dismisses-italys-threats-in-migration-ship-row-suspend-budget-payments
Armenia – further changes and challenges ahead in 2018
Article by
Craig Oliphant OBE
August 7, 2018
Current developments in Armenia, following the April 2018 revolution (‘Velvet Revolution’) and advent to power of Nikol Pashinian, seem to prompt a mix of optimism and caution. On the upside, while what unfolded in April was dramatic and unexpected, it was peaceful change, and literally without a single shot being fired. As things stand, there is a lot of goodwill towards Nikol Pashinian and his new coalition government. And local popular support for him personally is genuine.
There is certainly a need for significant change in the country – and in particular for urban renewal. There is a need to modernise the agricultural sector – and to diversify energy supplies. There are opportunity areas within the country (R&D ‘hub’ in Yerevan) – and a space to watch is what happens or continues to happen with talented Armenian youth abroad. To what extent are those who left the country looking to return?
On the other hand, there is a massive amount of work to be done. And challenges to be faced, including key vested interests to he grappled with. And Armenia is not going to get the kind of trade and investment it requires unless there is clarity on reforms going forward.
Also on the sobering side, the new government (the Cabinet line-up formed in mid-May 2018) has come to power without much preparation. The new Armenian Government is a coalition made up of members of the ‘Civil Contract Party’ and the ‘Way Out’ bloc (Yelik); plus Dashnaktsutyun and ‘Prosperous Armenia’. The new Foreign Minister (Zohrab Mnatsakanyan) and Defence Minister (David Tononyan) are two well-regarded professional officials who have both previously served as deputy ministers in their respective ministries. These and other ministries have to contend, though, with severe shortages in civil service personnel and funding.
The new government faces a very complex situation. It inherits a legacy where nearly 30% of the country’s population live below the poverty line. Armenia is not in a great position security-wise or from the economic standpoint. But expectations are now high – and time is not necessarily on the side of the new government. So it is constrained too to look for tangible outcomes..
One aspect of ‘tangible outcomes’ is that some eye-catching arrests are starting to happen, despite the early pledge when Pashinian took over power that there would be ‘no vendettas’. The most notable of the arrests was that of former president Robert Kocharyan who was remanded in custody for 2 months from 27 July. That is in connection with the brutal clampdown against protesters on 1st March 2008, as part of a 20-day state of emergency declared in that period to tackle large-scale unrest and demonstrations against the elections that brought Serzh Sargsyan to power. This arrest, along with a similar move against (among others) the former Chief of Staff of the Armenian armed forces, General Yuriy Khachaturov, who is the Secretary General of the CSTO, has prompted an expectedly jaundiced reaction in Moscow. In public remarks at the beginning of August, Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov said this “looks like a vendetta”, pointedly using the word for actions that Pashinian a few months ago had pledged to steer clear of (EADaily, 1st August 2018). The reaction of Russia to recent changes in Armenia has thus far been subdued – but it will be a key space to watch in the coming weeks as the tone of commentaries sharpen on the ‘Kocharyan affair’ – ‘Delo Kocharyana’. (See also below on Russian reactions).
New elections?
The current expectation is that snap elections are likely to be called at the end of 2018 or by Spring 2019. In that sense the situation is already one of a ‘pre-election’ buildup. Nikol Pashinian has a tight-rope to negotiate. He naturally wants to demonstrate some tangible outcomes. But he is is also keen to avoid making clear-cut decisions one way or the other so as not to (unnecessarily) alienate the electorate.
On forthcoming elections, a Commission has been formed – in a welcome move – including main political groups & parties in the parliament to discuss possible changes in legislative provisions and the electoral law. Agreement has already been reached to put forward a proposal removing the ‘majoritarian’ system or component (for individual candidates in a first-past-the-post system) which favoured the previous ruling RPA (Republican Party of Armenia) – and replace it entirely with proportional (party) lists alone. Other key issues are still under discussion, including the vexed question of party funding or ‘charitable’ donations which was an ‘open sesame’ for oligarchs to “buy” and control things in the past. The problem area here is that “Prosperous Armenia” – and its tycoon leader Gagik Tsariukian – is part of the current coalition and his automatic approach is one of continuing to engage in familiar practices of buying support locally through largesse and other ‘charitable’ initiatives. So that is likely to be one point of tension within the coalition looking ahead.. But, overall, a key marker on the near-term horizon for domestic politics is going to be the substance and amendments to the Election Law.
Initial achievements:
Among some of the initial achievements – and these are still early days – the new political leadership is taking measures to tackle corruption in many areas – taxation, customs, police, education, health. Oligarchs have been “invited” to pay the taxes they avoided in the past, partly through cosy agreements made with the Sargsyan regime. [In the first 2-3 months since the April Revolution, more than $40mn USD were raised additionally into the budget through this drive on unpaid taxes]. Also, criminal cases have been opened against Sargsyan acolytes including his extended family on a range of charges of embezzlement, corruption.
The medium to longer term challenges are considerable. And the demands of the immediate term, as alluded, constrain room for manoeuvre. But expectations remain high. The medium/longer term demands, once the euphoria fades away, centre on maintaining and further building trust among the wider public towards the government, including ministries, agencies and other structures. The old adage remains as true as ever: ‘trust takes months & years to build but can be lost in a moment’. As part of this there is the slow, incremental process of ensuring that policies are the result of politics and technocratic competence rather than oligarchic rule. In a nutshell, the key long-term challenge will be “regaining” a state which over the past 2 decades or more was treated by the RPA and the oligarchs linked to it as their private property or private ‘network state’ – and without adversely affecting the country’s defence capability.
The situation is likely to continue being very fluid for the months ahead as it has been since the early part of the year. In one sense, it can be said that the ‘Revolution’ has already morphed through 4 shifting phases or objectives: -Get rid of Serzh Sargsyan; -Get rid of the RPA; – Hold Free & Fair elections; and (now, looking ahead) -Win those free & fair elections.
Regional context – more of the same?
On foreign policy and regional implications, Nikol Pashinian has sought to convey since coming to power that internal changes in Armenia do not affect geopolitics i.e. the substance of the country’s external relations remains as is. Despite saying different things in opposition, he has underlined that Armenia will remain in the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Union (EES), Customs Union and CIS. His first visit abroad after becoming prime minister was to Russia (the EES summit in Sochi) in mid-May. And then to Moscow in mid-June for a bilateral meeting with President Putin. In mid-July he was in Brussels, partly to attend the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) at summit level as part of the NATO Summit on 11th/12th July. The main message he delivered in Brussels is that Armenia is no longer a corrupt, oligarchic, undemocratic state failing to represent the will of the people. And his strong card in his approach is the ‘legitimacy’ factor. He has enough support from the people who will stand behind him, at least in the short to medium term as he charts the waters ahead.
Russia’s approach:
As mentioned above, Moscow’s stance over the coming months is going to be a very important factor – and a crucial space to watch. Thus far, until the arrest and detention in custody of Robert Kocharyan, the approach had been fairly restrained. But it is clearly looking for a number of assurances behind the scenes. And the ‘levers’ that Moscow has at its disposal are many, whether in the energy sphere, ‘strategic assets’, and the whole issue of arms supplies. One overarching concern that persists comes back to the familiar mindset of Kremlin views: namely, that street protests do not or should not ultimately be seen to win out . In that connection, former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili’s reported remarks on 2 August [Mediamax.am], in which he reiterated an earlier claim from April taking some credit for the revolution in Armenia, are (at best) unhelpful in this connection, and really only serve to aggravate perceptions and stir sharp reactions. There are those furthermore who might, for example, draw comparisons between Nikol Pashinian and the Russian opposition activist Aleksandr Navalny. While there are more differences than similarities, nevertheless some uncomfortable (for Moscow) general parallels do exist in terms of two anti-corruption campaigners, who spent time in prison, and resonate with the public mood..
NK prospects:
Finally, on Nagorno Karabakh (NK), the conventional wisdom given regional constraints is there is unlikely to be any read-across or opening from changes in Armenia for the NK situation. On the one hand Nikol Pashinian has made two important statements in recent weeks: Firstly, that he is ready to talk peace with Azerbaijan on Armenia’s behalf, not NK’s simply because he does not represent the people living there who have their own institutions. And, secondly, that there should be peaceful messages and signals coming from Baku in order to consider a compromise settlement or resolution. That is because the current militaristic approach will only constitute a broader threat to peace in the region.. However, President Ilham Aliev made Baku’s position clear in remarks on 2 August. He was dismissive of the idea of a new initiative of talks, involving Stepanakert. He said Baku wants peace – but it also wants its territory back. And until that territory is returned “there will be no peace” (Turan, 2 August 2018).
Based on that stance, and the limited room for manoeuvre for the new government in Yerevan ahead of expected elections, it is hard to see any early prospect for progress in talks. But it may not be beyond the realms of feasibility to achieve at least some easing in the aggressive rhetoric and a ratcheting down in militaristic pressure (from Baku). An area that could or should be explored is the scope for reinstating a senior-level ‘hotline’ between Baku and Yerevan. That might be something to watch, and not least perhaps in the context of President Aliev’s visit to Moscow, scheduled for 1st September. Then again, there is always the disconnect between ‘western’ analysis of what should or might happen – and local patterns of behaviour in the Caucasus which do not always conform to what might seem a desirable or logical way forward.
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At first sight, EU relations with Switzerland might seem a ‘niche’ topic for a British observer. But in fact current developments are rather important in understanding potential models for the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU, as well as providing insights into some of the difficulties in structuring bilateral relations.
After all, both countries are already highly integrated economically with the EU; at the same time they also grapple with a balance between this and national sovereignty. The Swiss rejected an initiative to begin EU accession negotiations in 2001 by a large majority in a referendum, having earlier rejected (by a hair’s breadth) membership of the European Economic Area in 1992 – issues of national sovereignty are strongly emphasised by Swiss voters and politicians alike, with a strong tendency for discussion of technical matters to become issues of principle. At the heart of the complications in the Swiss relationship are the constitutional provisions for referendums on legislative proposals – allowing the Swiss to retain the sovereignty to conduct such referendums is clearly at odds with the EU’s desire for a common legislative and regulatory framework where single market access is desired. It is easy to see parallels with the UK’s expressed desire for the ability to make its own laws and avoid direct European Court of Justice jurisdiction, while at the same time wishing to maintain the benefits of single market access. Swiss negotiators, too, have noticed that Brexit has heightened interest in whatever deal they are able to strike.
We should not downplay the extent to which Switzerland already co-operates with the EU. It is a member of the Schengen agreement (although that is not without its challenges), allowing free movement without border checks with EU countries. Unlike other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Switzerland does not enjoy full access to the Single Market (in return for full acceptance of EU law), and instead there is a series of bilateral agreements governing Swiss-EU trade relations. There are two areas in which these are perceived to be inadequate at present. From the Swiss perspective, first, there are areas in which Switzerland would like to see integration with the EU go further (for instance, around equity markets). Secondly, seven Swiss bilateral agreements with the EU are currently affected by a ‘guillotine’, under which if one agreement falls, then, like a house of cards, all agreements cease to apply within six months. This is extremely risky for both parties in a circumstance where Swiss domestic politics may assert itself through a referendum. The EU, too, wants to see change: ever since the Swiss rejected EU accession, EU leaders have urged them to reach an agreement on institutional questions, such as how to update bilateral agreements according to the evolution of EU law (to what extent changes are automatically adopted, for example), and how disputes can be resolved.
The FDP, a centre-right, pro-market political party, which is part of the government and whose member Ignazio Cassis heads the Foreign Ministry, has put forward proposals to break the deadlock that have now been broadly endorsed by the national government. Specifically, Switzerland would agree, in principle, to adopt new EU law provided it had greater influence on EU legislative decisions. These would need to be adopted domestically in Switzerland (with such provisions still having the potential to be defeated by a referendum). If that happened, then there would be a negotiation on compensatory measures between the two countries, and if agreement could not be reached there, an independent court of arbitration would take the final decision. These proposals have received a cautious welcome from Brussels – if adopted, they could perhaps provide a way through the UK’s conundrum of how to reconcile sufficient regulatory alignment to allow an acceptable measure of co-operation and single market access, with ‘red lines’ around national sovereignty and ECJ jurisdiction.
There are further lessons that can be learned from recent Swiss interactions with the EU. First, Brussels has a tendency to become impatient and intolerant of the peculiarities of domestic political processes. A perception of heavy-handedness was generated when it only granted a year’s mutual recognition to Swiss equity traders, rather than the expected ongoing agreement.
Secondly, in both Switzerland and the UK (but increasingly beyond), domestic and foreign policy are become intertwined. This can lead to a certain volatility – for instance, Switzerland’s membership of the Schengen zone has been placed in jeopardy by proposed new measures on handguns (the country might face a referendum on this issue from shooting clubs, and failure to adopt the new Schengen rules would force it out of the zone).
Thirdly, Brexit has complicated the picture for the EU’s relations with third countries. Cassis, when appointed Foreign Minister, decided to spend his first hundred days ‘taking stock’ of the situation. That posed a dilemma for Switzerland – whether to seek to conclude a new agreement with the EU before Brexit or to delay: by going early the Swiss would potentially miss out on concessions that might flow by precedent from a bespoke EU-UK deal and shaped by the UK market’s greater significance; equally, they might avoid unwelcome precedents if the UK ends up with a ‘hard Brexit’. In the end, the country has opted to try to get an institutional agreement with the EU in advance of Brexit (which says something about Bern’s perception of progress on the Brexit negotiations).
Fourth, the Swiss and indeed the UK’s situations are an important reminder that the relations of both EU member states and third countries are driven very much by issues of principle, not just hard economic interests. If only the latter were relevant, Brexit would not have happened, and Switzerland would have compromised on issues of its sovereignty a long time ago.
So we contend that it is important for London’s negotiators to keep looking towards Bern and its dealings with Brussels – there could well be some important tips in how to handle thorny issues of regulatory convergence in areas where single market access is being sought. At the same time, dealings with Switzerland should perhaps give the EU pause for thought about whether it is sometimes rather high-handed in its rejection of concerns about national sovereignty. And both cases prompt us to consider domestic foibles, as well as economic rationalities, when looking to understand relationships with the EU.
Ed Turner is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Aston University and a Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre. Anna Wartmann works for the FDP in Bern. Both write in a personal capacity and the contents of this piece represent their own views.
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This publication examines the growing influence of illiberal, anti-Western and socially conservative civil society groups, popular movements and political forces in five post-Soviet states: Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. It finds that illiberal social attitudes remain prevalent across the region, particularly in relation to LGBTI rights, and that they are increasingly being used as opportunities for political mobilisation within these societies. While there have been attempts to create illiberal civil society groups that mirror pro-Western/liberal NGOs or think-tanks, they remain significantly less influential than the institutions and groups linked to the dominant religious organisations in these countries such as the Orthodox Church, or political factions with influence over state resources.
What is clear, however, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, is that there has been a significant rise in far-right and nationalist street movements, alongside smaller but active homophobic gangs. These ‘uncivil rights movements’ still lack broad public support but their political energy and rate of growth is influencing the wider politics of the region. It is clear that illiberal civil society is on the rise in these five countries but it is growing in its own way rather than simply aping its liberal counterparts.
Russia has an important role in the rise of illiberal civil society across the region, in particular, the way it has disseminated and promoted the concept of ‘traditional values’; however it is important to recognise that while some groups have direct or indirect contact with Russia, many do not and that the primary drivers of such activity are to be found in the local societies of the countries at hand. The Russians are being increasingly joined by US evangelical groups who see opportunities to promote a shared traditionalist agenda in the region. Attempts by the EU and other international actors to encourage or require countries to implement measures on anti-discrimination or tackling domestic violence have been used effectively by illiberal civil society groups, religious institutions and political factions as a rallying point for illiberal opposition.
The publication argues that there is a need to more robustly tackle corruption and malpractice by politicians who may be notionally liberal or pro-European but who are bringing these concepts into disrepute. Civil society should work to identify the ‘moveable middle’ groups in society who are currently skeptical about liberal social values but are not passionate in their opposition to them and who might be open to engagement and persuasion.
The publication makes a number of recommendations:
The Governments of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan should:
• Take urgent measures to tackle corruption and improve transparency;
• Investigate attacks on minorities and scrap any partnerships with nationalist groups involved;
• Protect the ability of liberal civil society groups to operate freely without intimidation;
• Disband any armed militias affiliated with political parties or extremist groups.
The international community should:
• Increase political pressure and sanctions on the activities of ostensible ‘pro-European’ or ‘liberal’ allies whose corruption or malpractice brings such principles into disrepute;
• Insist on action to tackle hate crimes and offer greater support and resources to do so if political willingness to act can be ensured;
• Look for opportunities for diplomatic dialogue with the dominant religious institutions;
• Continue to refine and improve ‘myth-busting’ and anti-propaganda responses;
• Support efforts to improve survey and research data about illiberal civil society attitudes;
• Work with liberal-minded NGOs to find new ways to engage the ‘movable middle’.
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From Trump to Duterte, from Orbán to Erdogan, from Putin to PiS, socially conservative, nationalist and populist political forces are on the rise across the globe. The claim that we are living through a crisis for liberal democracy seems less hyperbolic by the day. After almost two decades which saw the advance of liberal democracy in the wake of the cold war, the period since the 2008 financial crisis undermined faith in and the perceived inevitability of the ‘Western model’, just as Russia (actively) and China (somewhat more passively) are displaying alternative economic and political models. It is a time of uncertainty fuelled not only by political instability but increasing concerns over rapid economic, technological and social change. It is this latter dimension – the pace of social change and reactions to it – that are at the heart of this publication which examines the extent of the counter-reaction.
This publication assesses the growing influence of illiberal, anti-Western and socially conservative civil society groups, popular movements and political forces in five post-Soviet states – Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova – looking at who they are and what they are seeking to achieve and trying to understand why. These countries have been selected as they remain the five freest societies in the region that are not already part of the European Union (the Baltic States), and they are the sites of geopolitical competition for influence between the ‘West’ (predominantly the EU but also the historically the US) and Russia. As societies at the more open end of the regional spectrum, they all have the ability for groups of citizens to come together to advocate for political change in relative freedom. These countries also have well established ‘liberal’ non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that often receive funding from international donors including western nations and institutions, as well as private philanthropy such as the Open Society Foundations, the supporters of this publication.
This research is primarily focused on the activity of four, often overlapping, types of group:
NGOs, think tanks and other research institutes that promote socially conservative values, both in relation to domestic policy and as a reason for closer ties with Russia, but whose form and function ostensibly mirrors that of liberal civil society
Socially conservative pressure or campaigning groups
Far-right or radical nationalist groups
Groups linked to religious institutions (which may well include a number of the above)
Social attitudes: the power of religion and tradition
All of the five societies under examination in this publication can be defined as broadly retaining socially conservative social values and traditions, despite their varying degrees of openness to engagement with the West. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these countries have been developing – both rediscovering and creating – their national identity. In the context of emerging national identity and the desire for stability in the wake of the political and economic upheavals of the early 90s, it can become easy for individual rights to be seen as a threat to social cohesion (as well as entrenched power structures), something that is particularly pointed in the context of four of these five countries having either an active or unresolved territorial conflict.
Furthermore since the collapse of Soviet atheism religious identification and observance has boomed, with faith returning to the public square in a significant way. The identity of the dominant faith group has been used as a tool to define national identity across the region, either formally with special provisions in constitutions such as in Georgia and Armenia for the dominant church, or informally with politicians using religion as a way to define the identity of the nation, notably in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova.
The dominant religious organisations are the most trusted institutions in the five countries examined, with trust levels far exceeding those of civil society and secular politicians. For example, 70% of Georgians rather or fully trust their religious institution;[1] despite having one of the most established and active NGO sectors in the region, the comparable figure for NGOs is only 23%.[2]
In Georgia and Armenia, the churches are independent institutions. While the Georgian Church leadership is more pro-Russian than the country as a whole, has good relations with the Russian Orthodox Church and shares a distaste for Western social liberalism, it operates on its own terms and has become an extremely powerful force for social mobilisation and political influence. While the Armenian Church has traditionally been a less proactive and more passive part of the previously ruling elite, it stakes a claim to be the keeper of Armenian identity, a role it played for centuries after the destruction of the Armenian state of antiquity. Neither church has a dependent relationship with its Russian counterpart: the Georgian Church is autocephalous (self-governing) within Eastern Orthodoxy, and Armenia’s Apostolic Church is part of the separate Oriental Orthodox church family. This is unlike the situation in Moldova and Ukraine where the largest branches of the Orthodox Church are branches of the Russian Orthodox Church, though in Ukraine its dominance is being challenged by the rival Kiev Patriarchate. In Kyrgyzstan, Islam remains dominated by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, a centralised Muftiate with close relations to the state.
As this publication makes clear, these religious institutions are the most-powerful non-governmental actors[3]in their societies and there are clear links with pressure groups on conservative social issues. While overall levels of religious identification and practice have risen, this rise in religious sentiment dovetails with longer-standing cultural attitudes prevalent in these societies, helping to provide a firm foundation for a cultural backlash against liberalising legislation often encouraged by ‘outside powers’, such as the EU through its Eastern Partnership processes.
Persistent hostility to LGBTI rights has been a common feature across the region. In Moldova, 87% of people in 2016 saw homosexuality as not being justified, up from 85% in 2008.[4] Similarly, the 2014 World Values survey showed that 86% of Georgians, 95% of Armenians and 68.5% of Kyrgyzstanis believed homosexuality was never justifiable.[5] There is also data in a number of countries suggesting that there are not the dramatic variations in views by age seen in Western societies (where young people are dramatically more liberal), with Eric McGlinchey’s essay highlighting that levels of homophobia in Kyrgyzstan are broadly static across the age spectrum and data suggesting that examples of extreme homophobia may be higher amongst young Georgians than the older generations.[6] Both Georgia and Kyrgyzstan[7] have taken steps explicitly to outlaw gay marriage in their constitutions.
The one bright spot in the data has been the significant improvement in Ukrainian attitudes on LGBTI rights in the wake of pro-European reorientation brought about by the Maidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity, despite the clear rise in far-right pressure discussed in this publication. Research by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) shows that in 2017 56% of Ukrainians supported equal rights protections for LGBTI people while only 21% were opposed, with 59% supporting workplace discrimination laws to protect them.[8] Ten years earlier only 34% of Ukrainians were willing to support equal rights protections for LGBTI people.[9]
Despite its legality during most of the Soviet-era, there are signs that cultural acceptance of abortion remains far from certain. 67% of Georgians believed that ‘an abortion can never be justified’[10] while in Moldova the similar figure was 53%.[11]The essay contributions in this collection show how women’s health issues, issues around sex education, domestic violence, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan bride kidnapping and polygamy, are being used as wedge issues by conservative and religious groups. The term ‘gender’ has been adapted by illiberal actors as a shorthand conflate a range of liberalising measures from attempts to promote gender equality to LGBTI rights as something to resist.[12]
Local politics andexternal actors
The ‘traditional values’ debate is one rooted in power and influence. Given that illiberal social attitudes towards LGBTI rights, immigration and women’s role in society have significant domestic support, it is far from unusual that political figures would seek to harness such forces, in some cases out of genuine support and often for more cynical motives to provide a compelling narrative to distract from state capture and corruption. A number of our authors highlight how leading figures of notionally pro-European governments have been seen to utilise illiberal forces to achieve their political ends, including the close relationship between Georgian Dream and the Georgian Church, Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov’s relationships with far-right militias, and the murky relationship in Moldova between pro-European government power broker and oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc and the socially conservative, pro-Russian President Igor Dodon.
The nature of and tools for Russian influence in promoting illiberal values in the post-Soviet Space have been addressed in detail in the previous Foreign Policy Centre publications Sharing Worst Practice and The Information Battle.[13] These publications show how Russia has tried to promote a ‘traditional values’ agenda that places the Russian political model as a guide for emulation by those in the region wary about the pace of social change, supportive of the Orthodox Church, opposed to LGTBI rights and sympathetic to a vision of a male-headed nuclear family. It disseminates these messages through its media, both domestic television rebroadcast across the region and targeted tools such as the Sputnik News Agency, whose messages are then adapted and repeated by local channels and websites. Media penetration is buttressed by the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church and a series of soft-power foundations and organisations that promote Russian values abroad, such as the state-backed Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation and the private initiatives of oligarchs close to the Kremlin.
When starting this project one of its goals was to seek to analyse the extent of Russian involvement in orchestrating local activities by traditionalist groups. Given the opaque nature of the funding structures of many of the groups analysed,[14] it has been difficult to definitively map direct Russian involvement; however the essay contributions identify a number of groups which are seen to have close ties (in some cases a direct financial relationship) with the Russian government and Russian institutions. For the most part, however, the approach by local groups is emulation or imitation rather than direct control, with a few examples of movements as ‘franchises’, such as the operationally separate but closely related ‘Occupy Paedophilia’ organisations.
As Kristina Stoeckl shows in her essay about the World Congress of Families, Russian influence is increasingly dovetailing with the efforts of a number of radical US evangelical groups that are seeking to form a common front against the spread of liberal values, particularly on LGBTI rights and abortion. [15] Work by Melissa Hooper in previous FPC publications[16] and others such as Chris Stroop[17] and Casey Michel[18], highlight this evolving collaboration to promote illiberalism in the post-Soviet space and across Europe, trends that predate but are magnified by the impact of the Trump presidency on the relationship between the US right and Russia.
The Five Countries: Georgia
In this collection, our three Georgian authors clearly set out the web of interlocking personalities and organisations that have developed a series of illiberal NGOs and institutes. This is the clearest example of mimicking the form of liberal civil society from all five case studies, perhaps unsurprising given Georgia’s comparatively well-established and active NGO sector providing a model for emulation.
The authors confirm the analysis clearly expressed in past Foreign Policy Centre publications that the Georgian Orthodox Church is the most powerful illiberal force within Georgian society.[19] It is clearly the most proactively influential of the religious institutions within the five countries assessed in this publication, and it is probably fair to see it as being the most influential non-state[20] actor within an individual society from across the five countries assessed.
As in Ukraine, the issue of direct Russian involvement in Georgian society is particularly fraught, with the wounds of the 2008 conflict still raw. However, there has been a limited thawing in relations, in part led by contact between the Georgian Church and its Russian counterparts, despite Georgia’s continued steps towards the European Union. Research in 2015 by Nata Dzvelishvili, [21] which is expanded upon in her contribution to this collection, by the Media Development Initiative in 2017[22] and Transparency International Georgia in 2018[23] have helped map some of the potential links between an intertwined set of Georgian organisations and donors and partners in Russia. Some Georgian groups do directly advocate improving ties with Russia; however, it is clear that analysts believe there remain links between Russia and organisations that promote opposition to liberal values who frame such activity as ‘pro-Georgian’ rather than ‘pro-Russian’. This is seen as an attempt in the short term to undermine Western influence, an approach that has a greater potential audience than explicitly pro-Russian activity.
Of particular concern is that the three Georgian authors clearly identify a growing presence on the street of burgeoning nationalist, far-right movements that pose a major challenge to the promotion of liberal values in Georgia. These groups are building on the momentum of past protests by the Church and its allies against the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHOT)[24] but they have been broadening out their attacks to a wider selection of liberal targets from nightclubs to vegan restaurants. [25] There seems some evidence of links between members of the emerging nationalist protest groups and Russian groups, just at a time when Russia has cracked down on its domestic far-right movements.[26]
Ukraine
The debate over the extent of the involvement of the Ukrainian far-right in the Maidan movement, the Revolution of Dignity and its aftermath can be a painful one. This is in part because of the narrative, projected to the (physical) exclusion of all others to the citizens of Crimea and Donbass, by the Russian government, intelligence service and media outlets, was the ludicrous and slanderous narrative that ‘the fascists have taken Kiev’. It is also due to the deep emotional investment in the Maidan Movement from across large sections of Ukrainian society, particularly amongst liberal civil society. In this context, the analysis provided by Volodymyr Ishchenko here and elsewhere[27], which argues that the far-right had a greater involvement than some observers are willing to recognise, can be challenging for those who see the Maidan as a decisive national moment for liberal social change.
While the extent of its involvement is clearly a matter of heated debate, Ukrainian far-right groups were clearly disproportionately involved in the physical confrontation elements of the protest movement, notably at the denouement when Yanukovych’s security forces ended up shooting protestors – the act that led to his ouster. Furthermore, from the example of protest movements elsewhere in the world, it can be argued that organised groups with clear agendas, structures and experienced members tend to have an outsized role in the coordination of protest action, irrespective of their size relative to the overall number of people ultimately participating in the protest or movement. [28] As a result they may come into contact with new recruits and more broadly their influence may, as a result of their attachment to a popular cause particularly over time, shape the mainstream debate in their direction. This ability to influence the wider political environment is particularly relevant in a society where political parties are primarily personality-led rather than built on firm ideology and organisational structures. Such analysis should be tempered by the recognition that the coalition of forces that came together to support the Maidan was extremely broad, from LGBTI Rights activists to Catholic and Kiev Patriarchate Orthodox priests, while many of the public faces of the movement tended to be a mix of mainstream pro-European politicians and more liberal activists.
What is undoubtedly true is that, while the power and presence of the far-right were strengthened by involvement in the revolution, the outbreak of conflict and the far right’s direct participation in leading pro-government militias, both inside and outside official Ukrainian government structures, has dramatically enhanced their position. Volodymyr Ishchenko’s essay analyses in detail the rise of the three largest organisations:
the Azov Battalion and its affiliated organisations (including the National Corps political party and a vigilante group)[29] which are seen as having ties to the current Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov
the Right Sector far-right coalition (including its Tryzub –Trident- militia, whose members see themselves as heirs of World War II guerrilla movement the Ukrainian Insurgent Army)[30]
the Svoboda (Freedom) party a far-right populist, socially conservative party and organisation, whose influence has somewhat waned with the rise of Azov.[31]
Not only are such groups and their affiliates active on the battlefield in Donbass, but they are seeking to play a role domestically too. For example, despite the Azov-affiliated vigilante group National Druzhyna being involved in intimidation and violence against civil society groups and minorities as noted below, it is seeking under provisions of the law ‘On the participation of citizens in protection of public order and the state border’ to involve 600 of its activists in a legally sanctioned ‘civic formation’ that would seek to shadow the police and notionally assist them in tackling anti-social behaviour and public order issues.[32]
There is also c14, a group often accused of being neo-Nazis, whose structures mirror Azov and which recruits actively amongst football club ‘ultras’, formerly had been affiliated with Svoboda. Its primary focus has been on targeting Russians and institutions seen as pro-Russian, since its time leading street battles against pro-Yanukovych gangs at the time of Maidan.[33] It has been listed by the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium as a domestic terrorist group,[34] been involved in attacks on Roma camps across Ukraine[35] and yet it has also been the recipient of government funding from the Youth and Sports Ministry for ‘national-patriotic’ education projects.[36]
As with other countries in the region, there are a number of Ukrainian organisations that seek to copy the model of the Russian Occupy Paedophilia movement such as the White Lions, Heritage and perhaps the most notable group Fashion Verdict.[37]These groups deal in entrapment, public humiliation and violence against LGBTI individuals and groups. [38]
Efforts to promote the rehabilitation and promotion of nationalist groups from Ukraine’s past, such as the World War II nationalist movement the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that fought against both the Soviets and the Nazis, has been supported by more mainstream organisations such as the government-funded ‘Ukrainian Institute of National Memory’.[39]
Despite the substantive improvement in public attitudes towards LGBTI rights and some legislative progress in the post-Maidan period, these anti-LGBTI groups and the larger far-right groups are becoming increasingly brazen in their attacks on LGBTI people and on organisations working with them. Incidents have included an attack on the international human rights groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in a Kiev incident in May 2018[40] and the disruption in April of a Freedom House event in Poltava by the National Corps.[41] As Vyacheslav Likhachev puts it, while these groups are unlikely to achieve direct political power for themselves, they are, however, aggressively trying to impose their agenda on Ukrainian society, including by using force against those with opposite political and cultural views. They are a real physical threat to left-wing, feminist, liberal, and LGBT activists, human rights defenders, as well as ethnic and religious minorities.’[42]
In addition to these violent extremists, a number of non-violent anti-LGBTI groups and movements such as the All Together-for a family! The movement led by evangelical activist Ruslan Kukharchuk are emerging.[43]The All Together for a Family 2017 two-day festival claimed an attendance of 30,000,[44] with musicians, clowns and other family-friendly entertainment to complement the religious preaching and anti-LGBTI activism. There is also the Orthodox conservative group Katehon, relatively small but heavily engaged in homophobic protests in Ukraine and with alleged ties to the much larger conservative group in Russia with the same name. There is also the Orthodox conservative group Katehon, relatively small but heavily engaged in homophobic protests in Ukraine and with alleged ties to the much larger conservative group in Russia with the same name.
The mainstream religious institutions in Ukraine have been somewhat more muted in their attacks on LGBTI rights than their counterparts elsewhere. However, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO), the umbrella body comprising most of the church groups in the country, does actively promote an annual All-Ukrainian March for the protection of the rights of children and families.[46] Of the major institutions however, it is only really the Moscow Patriarchate which has institutionally spoken out actively against the Equality March and taken a more proactive position.[47]
Given the understandable sensitivities around anything to do with Russia, despite emulating some of the rhetoric and behaviours of the Russian-inspired ‘traditional values agenda’, Ukrainian conservative and religious groups are often looking towards a concept of ‘traditional European values’ that they seek to return to as the country reorients westwards, as opposed to the liberalising tendencies of the EU as in institution. It is worth noting of course that tensions over language rights and historic territorial sensitivities may be limiting the potential for collaboration with the emerging European illiberal forces in Hungary and Poland, a position that may evolve in a more collaborative direction over time.
As Andrew Wilson of ECFR has pointed out, at time of writing in summer 2018, the post-Maidan political environment looks pretty bleak.[48] Continuing political dominance by oligarchs and their supporters has provided fertile ground for anti-elite populists who may seek to fuse their anti-corruption messages to other less savoury populist causes. Such a febrile political environment can only encourage the radical groups identified here to further expand their memberships and influence.
Moldova
Of the five countries under analysis Moldova is the country where the tensions between Russian and Western influence, liberal and illiberal social and political forces are most delicately balanced. What at first glance may seem like a standoff between a pro-Russian President and a pro-European Government with their respective outriders in civil society, is, in fact, a good deal murkier.
The geopolitical fault lines are real and significant, although they are sometimes exaggerated and often used cynically by the ruling elites of both factions to preserve a political system that concentrates their hold on power and access to resources and in ‘rents’. The ingrained anger against corruption in the ruling government, including forces close to it such as former PM Vlad Filat being involved in a $1 billion bank fraud, has helped to undermine the credibility of pro-European forces in Moldova.
At time of writing the EU has frozen a €100m euro aid package as a result of the Moldovan Supreme Court’s decision to nullify the election of a pro-European Mayor of Chisinau who narrowly beat the candidate of President Dodon’s pro-Russian socialist party. The court decision is seen to have been influenced by forces close to billionaire power broker Vladimir Plahotniuc[49] , of whom would be Mayor-elect Andrei Nastase is a longstanding critic. While the power behind Prime Minister Pavel Filip’s Democrat Party and the Deputy President of the Socialist International, many Moldovan observers argue that Plahotniuc has close ties with President Dodon, a ‘binomial’: Plahotniuc-Dodon has become a short hand for the oligarchic nature of the ruling elites.[50]
The EU’s decision is part of a somewhat belated shift in taking concerns about malpractice by its notional allies in the ‘pro-European’ Moldovan government increasingly seriously, given that claims of corruption against the government have been used successfully to undermine support for Europeanisation by both pro-Russian political forces and illiberal civil society actors alike. However it is worth noting that the largest EU political grouping, the centre-right European People’s Party (not always on the side of the angels when it comes to democratic values in the region), has taken as new observer members the two main pro-European but ‘anti-system’ opposition parties, 2016 Presidential Candidate Maia Sandu’s Action and Solidarity Platform and Nastase’s Dignity and Truth platform. Subsequently, EPP President Joseph Daul has been vocal in criticism of the government and in particular the decision to overturn Nastase’s Mayoral win. [51]
EU-required legislation and reforms have provided some of the main cultural flashpoints for the mobilisation of illiberal civil society, most notably the 2014 Anti-Discrimination Law. In their essays both Mihaela Ajder and Dumitru Sliusarenco look at the ways in which illiberal political organisations, civil society groups and the Moldovan Orthodox Church have actively challenged efforts to bring in equalities legislation and pushed back against groups pushing for LGBTI and women’s rights.
Armenia
While, as set out above, Armenian social attitudes remain deeply conservative, the debates on LGBTI issues or women’s rights have been somewhat more muted than in some of their neighbouring countries, lacking the passionate intensity of the debate in Georgia or the sharp geopolitical divides of Moldova. The Armenian Apostolic church, traditionally close to past Armenian governments and its oligarchic elite, has so far not shown concerted efforts to dominate debates over social policy, pursuing a more ‘quietist’ approach, in part with one eye on how its actions be would be seen by US- and French-based diaspora donors.
There is a reasonably small sector of research institutes whose work is often focused directly at internally to government or to an international audience (notably the diaspora) with limited levels of public engagement in their own country.[52] Armenia has also an array of more nationalist organisations either focused on Nagorno-Karabakh and others, such as Aragats Akhoyan’s Return Foundation looking west to Turkey, operating with support both from the state and the diaspora.
It is clear that until now the state has been the dominant institution in promoting nationalist and sometimes socially conservative positions. Anna Pambukhchyan’s essay shows how the state sought to directly engineer popular mobilisation behind its ‘nation army’ concept, bringing together government institutions and agencies with the backing of the church to push a controversial values agenda. Perhaps the longstanding co-option of nationalist positions and rhetoric by the state has somewhat closed the political space for the emergence of street-based far-right organisations along the lines seen in Ukraine and Georgia.
Like elsewhere in the region there have been cases where internationally supported equalities legislation received a backlash from illiberal campaign groups. In autumn 2017 conservative groups targeted the Armenian government’s attempt to pass legislation against domestic violence. Perhaps unsurprisingly the legislation was attached to the conditions for the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed on 24th November 2017. These protests [53] were led by the For the Sake of Sovereignty Restoration organisation headed Hayk Nahapetyan and the Pan Armenian Parental Committee headed by Arman Boshyan[54], a group that was active the 2013 ‘Anti Gender Protests’[55] and has a Facebook following of over 18,000 likes. Boshyan is also President of the pro-Russian Yerevan Geopolitical Club.[56]Arman Gukasyan, leader of a small NGO called International Humanitarian Development, also used the protests against the law as a way of getting public attention, having previously gained notoriety in 2015 claiming that Western-funded NGOs were fomenting a ‘colour’ revolution[57] and became the editor of the ‘Stop-G7’ website dedicated to attacking LGBTI rights and their supporters including the EU and Western donors. [58]
In the wake of the 2018 Velvet Revolution that brought liberal opposition politician Nikol Pashinyan from the streets to the office of Prime Minister, it is clear that Russia will be reconsidering the extent of its soft-power engagement in Armenia. Given Armenia’s security dependency on Russia, Russian control of leading companies and, until recently, a broadly Russia-sympathetic political elite whose governance style followed a similar model, Moscow has not engaged particularly intensively or effectively in promoting its values agenda in the country. Leading Armenian policy analyst Richard Giragosian has described Russia’s soft power in Armenia as ‘neither soft nor powerful’ and that Moscow was taking its dominant position in Armenia for granted[59], particular given the 2015 public protests against the Russian owned energy monopoly (the Electric Yerevan Movement) and over the killing of an Armenian Family by a Russian solider.
However, the sudden collapse of Serzh Sargsyan’s government, in a botched attempt to replicate Putin’s 2008 switch from President to the role of Prime Minister, and his government’s replacement by a reformist group with cautiously pro-Western inclinations has shifted the terms of the debate.
The change in Armenia has not gone unnoticed in Azerbaijan, which has been strengthening its relationship with Moscow in recent years as its engagement with the West suffered setbacks over human rights, with some Russian politicians arguing that Azerbaijan should supplant Armenia as Russia’s primary partner in the South Caucasus.[60] While new Prime Minister Nikol Pashayan shows no sign of wanting to radically shift Armenia’s geostrategic position, going out of his way to reassure Russia about the strength of their partnership and his narrow focus on domestic reform, Yerevan-based analysts are confident that Russian interests may start to play a more active role in Armenian civil society to hedge against future overtures to the West. Particularly given that the anti-corruption crackdown on the business elite close to the formerly ruling Republican Party is likely to lead to resentment against the new government from the groups being targeted it is an open question as to how such forces might choose to retaliate by challenging the popularity of Pashayan’s administration. There are already signs that nationalist activists such as Arthur Danielyan, Narek Malyan, Narek Samsonyan who were involved in the ‘Army Propaganda Team’ to support the nation army concept and with connections to ex-defence minister Vigen Sargsyan are now mobilising to attack the new government as being too liberal (and LGBTI friendly) and not patriotic enough through a new online channel called Adekvad (Relevant).[61] Any snap parliamentary elections may provide an opportunity to assess how both Russia and the old elite are responding to the new political environment.
Kyrgyzstan
The one Central Asian state under examination in this collection displays a number of shared characteristics. As set out in the essay contributions by Rsykeldi Satke and Eric McGlinchey, new nationalist movements have emerged in the last decade, most notably Kalys (Justice), Erkin El and Kyrk-Choro (Forty Knights). Kalys, led by Jenishbek Moldokmatov, staged protests in favour of an anti-gay propaganda law, publically challenged Western funded NGOs and burning a photo of a Ukrainian blogger who they claimed was an LGBTI activist. Erkin El, led by Mavlyan Askarbekov, protested against sex education leaflets, claiming they were ‘destructive brochures that ruin the minds of youth.[62] Kyrk-Choro, the most eye catching (in their traditional felt kalpak hats and often riding on horses echoing the forty knights of the Epic of Manas – the mythological tale after which they are named), has been active in attacking ethnic minority groups, such as ethnic Uzbeks, Uyghurs and Chinese migrant workers[63], as well as those seen as promoting LGBTI or women’s rights. ‘Patriot’ groups linked to Kyrk-Choro have been involved in attacking Kyrgyz women perceived to be dating foreigners – particularly when they are working in Russia as migrant workers. They also claim inspiration in their recent actions from the Ukrainian Right Sector.[64]
These overt nationalist groups are seen as a ‘lunatic fringe’[65]; while we live in times when groups and personalities can move swiftly from the fringe to mainstream, at present these are not the primary non-governmental actors in reinforcing conservative attitudes. As elsewhere in the region it is religious institutions (including their popular social support networks) and clerics, particularly in South Kyrgyzstan, that are the driving force for such change. Both the Grand Mufti Maksat Hajji Toktomushev and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan have issued Fatwas against same-sex relations, with the Mufti challenging Human Rights Watch and other NGOs by calling on the authorities “to pay special attention to the activities of some public organizations that disseminate social discord while using humanistic ideas.” [66]
With some similarities to Georgia, there is some evidence to suggest that levels of religiosity and conservative social attitudes are higher among young people than older generations who lived through Communist-era official atheism. A 2015 USAID study argued that ‘older people tend to view religion, particularly Islam, with suspicion, and are concerned about the spread of more austere forms of Islam into the Kyrgyz Republic. Younger people, on the other hand, seem to be identifying more with religion. In UNDP’s analysis of young people, 68% of respondents identified themselves first as Muslims and second as citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic’.[67]
As part of the drawdown from Afghanistan the US closed Manas air force base in 2014 under pressure from both former President Atambayev and the Russians. Since that period Western influence has been seen to decline in comparison to Russian and Chinese economic and political influence. There are limited political tools to change this situation, particularly as the country falls outside the range of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative.
What our authors say:
Nata Dzvelishvili discusses how a pro-Russian narrative has been renamed as ‘pro-Georgian’, yet its objective still implies a discrediting of the West and stimulating euroscepticism. Some pro-Russian NGOs have stopped functioning, though the number of media organizations remains unchanged. However, there is an apparent increase in the number of Facebook pages that promote anti-Western sentiments, focusing on the cultivation of nationalist ideas and using the fear of losing national values and traditions to distribute anti-Western information, which is mostly homophobic, xenophobic or misinformation. The growth of nationalist aspirations has affected public attitudes and driven legislative changes. The State Security Service has recognized the peril of Russian propaganda, but hasn’t specified the exact responsibly for the distribution of anti-Western or nihilistic sentiments in the country which has dramatically increased.
Eka Chitanava and Katie Sartania examine the rise of socially conservative, illiberal groups in Georgia, who have recently become increasingly active in public spaces, media and social networks. These groups try to shape the modern concept of Georgian nationalism. Chitanava and Sartania attempt to start mapping urban and digital frontiers of social hostilities and put the events in social and political contexts. Their essay briefly provides general profiles of those involved, their demands and targets of their physical and verbal violence. Extremism against liberal groups is not a new phenomenon in Georgia and there are some ideological and institutional affiliations with the Georgian Orthodox Church. The frontline of the conflict between social groups is a public space which embodies political power and cultural hegemony. The article employs the concept of a ‘revanchist city’, where who wins the public space, has his or her national identity reaffirmed.
Mariam Ubari argues that Georgia has witnessed a significant rise in violence and aggression towards liberal groups since 2017. The rise of Neo-Nazi groups has been consolidated as a protest in response to the government’s migration policies or as need to protect national identify from the emerging threats in Georgia. Some ultra-right groups have Russian backing, whilst within others with an openly fascist ideology- no direct Russian links can be established. The Georgian Orthodox Church officially supports the Euro- Atlantic aspiration of the Georgian state, but the behaviour of its clergy and Church policies sometimes suggest otherwise.
Volodymyr Ishchenko’s essay looks at the Ukrainian far right, meaning a range of Ukrainian ultranationalists including parties, organizations and informal groups committed to the ideology of radical Ukrainian nationalism, who see the nation as of absolute value and the nation-state as a tool to realize the nation’s will. Contrary to the position of moderate Ukrainian national-democrats, the radical nationalists see liberal-democratic values as a danger to Ukraine rather than embracing them. Pro-Russian ultranationalists did exist in Ukraine, however, they used to be by far weaker even before Maidan uprising and has become completely irrelevant after the start of the war in Donbass in 2014, with exception of in the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. Instead, Ishchenko argues that the strength and political impact of Ukrainian radical nationalists has been systematically underestimated, even as they are significantly contributing to the fragility of the post-Maidan political settlement and have become a real threat to political freedoms and human rights in Ukraine.
Mihaela Ajder‘s contribution catalogues and analyses the range of different groups that seek to challenge liberalism in Moldova. These include far-right organisations and conservative pressure groups that have been building a following in Moldova, often through attacks on and pressure against LGBTI groups and other minorities. However, the most powerful group active on conservative issues remains the very influential Moldovan Orthodox Church. Ajder places these players in the context of a Moldovan political environment lacking in trust due to years of corruption and mismanagement that breeds the societal resentment in which reactionary groups can thrive.
Dumitru Sliusarenco and Ion Foltea write that the Republic of Moldova is a former Soviet Union country facing many difficulties in its transition to democracy. One of the important causes of these is the growing influence of illiberal and conservative groups, which promote an anti-Western values agenda. They are linked in particular with the two largest socially conservative forces in Moldovan society: the Socialist Party and the Moldovan Orthodox Church. The values pursued by these organisations and ‘illiberal civil society groups’ with ties to them can be seen as endangering human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Anna Pambukhchyan’s essay provides a short introduction to the ‘nation-army’ concept, a nationalist education and social mobilisation project that was introduced to the Armenian public in October 2016. The concept which despite being the core of the Armenian defence agenda for one and a half years was never down written on paper. This led to misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the concept. This paper analyses the essence of the concept and argues that rather than being natural ideology it was an artificially created top-to-bottom propaganda tool that was spread through society to deflect criticism over the former Governments’ failure to tackle corruption in the military.
Dr Eric McGlinchey writes that Kyrgyzstan, the only democratic-leaning post-Soviet Central Asian state, has seen periodic upticks in uncivil society. Extreme ethno-nationalism, anti-LGBT rhetoric, and militant Islam have all found a voice among elements of the Kyrgyz polity. One shared driver is behind each of these forms of illiberalism: competitive politics. Illiberalism sells in Kyrgyzstan, just as illiberalism is now popular in Europe and the United States. Kyrgyzstan, along with its European and North American counterparts, demonstrates that democracy is no sure guarantee against illiberalism. Only through sustained and local advocacy for human rights and civil liberties can competitive polities offer enduring safeguards for civil society.
Ryskeldi Satke argues that in these challenging times of transition in a politically unstable region, the rights of women in Central Asia can no longer be ignored as the women’s rights movement picks up speed elsewhere around the globe. He suggests that the international community and donor states that are providing crucial aid and political support to Kyrgyzstan must address the blatant disregard of the rights of women. It is important for policymakers in the West and international development organizations to implement proactive policies on gender equality and women’s rights in Kyrgyz Republic and the wider region.
Kristina Stoekl examines the development of the World Congress of Families looking at the way radical US evangelicals are developing partnerships with conservatives from Russia and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space to promote illiberal values and push back against LGBTI rights and other liberalising social measures. She charts the development of the organisation and looks at the preparations for the meeting in September 2018 in Chisinau.
[5]Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six – Country-Pooled Datafile Version: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp The figure in Kyrgyzstan was notably lower because respondents gave less intense negative answers rather than a significant positive score, with only 4.9% of Kyrgyz respondents saying homosexuality could be to some extent justifiable.
[11]Ovidiu Voicu, Jennifer Cash and Victoria Cojocariu, Church and State in the Republic of Moldova, The Center for Public Innovation and Soros Foundation Moldova, 2017,
[13] Adam Hug (ed.), Sharing worst practice: How countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union help create legal tools of repression, Foreign Policy Centre, May 2016, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/sharingworstpractice/ and Adam Hug (ed.), The information battle: How governments in the former Soviet Union promote their agendas & attack their opponents abroad, Foreign Policy Centre, March 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/infobattle/
[14] While NGO donor transparency is desirable care needs to be taken to avoid encouraging requirements that would echo Russian ‘Foreign Agents’ laws.
[19] Adam Hug (Ed.)Traditional religion and political power: Examining the role of the church in Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, Foreign Policy Centre, October 2015, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/orthodox/
[20] While there is much debate about the closeness of church and state in Georgia, the perception is not that the state controls the church but there are concerns around the extent of the Church’s influence over the state.
[24]JAM News, Georgian ultra-rightists promise to prevent Tbilisi from celebrating International Day Against Homophobia, May 2018, https://jam-news.net/?p=102509
[26] Mariya Petkova, The death of the Russian far right, Al Jazeera, November 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/11/death-russian-171123102640298.html
[28]For example in a UK context you could note the disproportionate influence of small far and radical left groups in organised protests in the UK. The Socialist Workers Party for example is a tiny organisation, yet their placards are a major feature of all most any left-leaning public demonstration because they are well organised and turn up to each protest with huge numbers of posters and placards with their name and slogans on that are handed to any rally attendee who will take them. Similarly such small groups can play dominant roles in the coordination or executive bodies of ‘popular front’ organisations with a notionally much broader reach and remit.
[29] Open Democracy, The rise of Azov, Denys Gorbach and Oles Petik, February 2016
[35] Halya Coynash, Ukrainian neo-Nazi C14 vigilantes drive out Roma families, burn their camp, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, April 2018, http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1524441220
The 2018 State Security Service of Georgia report[1]set out for the first time, the major objectives of ‘foreign intelligence services’ in Georgia:
to encourage anti-Western sentiments in Georgian society;
to damage Georgia’s image as a reliable partner at an international level;
to stimulate distrust, uncertainty, hopelessness and nihilism in society;
to create the grounds for destabilization on ethnic and religious grounds, with the aim to cultivate disintegration processes throughout the country and to promote the polarization of Georgian society.
The State Security Service report suggested that a ‘propagandist media campaign and the disinformation components’ are some of the tools for the implementation of those goals, and added ‘foreign intelligence services attempt to establish expert scientific-research centers and agencies, to affect public opinion and disseminate disinformation’.
A comprehensive list of these centers and media organizations were revealed in a study[2] published in 2015. Two organizations, the Eurasian Institute and Eurasian Choice, were the main pro-Russian organizations in Georgia. The founders of these organizations are also in charge of other organizations. The aforementioned organizations pursued their activity in two directions. The Eurasian Institute is mainly engaged in an analytical activity and the organization of conferences and seminars, whereas Eurasian Choice carries out more proactive activities by holding various rallies and demonstrations in support of the membership of the Eurasian Union. Both of them portray Russia as a partner and friend.
But today, the pro-Russian narrative has been rebranded as ‘pro-Georgian’, yet its objective still discredits the West and stimulates Euroscepticism. Some pro-Russian NGOs stopped functioning, while the number of media organizations remains unchanged. However, there is an apparent increase in Facebook pages that promote anti-Western sentiment, focusing on the cultivation of nationalist ideas and using the fear of losing national values and traditions to distribute anti-Western information, which is mostly groundless homophobic and xenophobic misinformation. However, the growth of nationalist aspirations has affected public attitudes and driven legislative changes.
NGOs
Throughout the years the Eurasian Institute has been a popular pro-Russian NGO, expressing a positive attitude towards Russia and discussing the improvement of Russian-Georgian relations. There are also many other organizations such as Global Research Center, Club of Young Political Scientists, and Center for Globalization Issues which are associated with Eurasian Institute and participated in the joint conferences and organized study tours in Russia, as well as some other activities. However, they have not succeeded in becoming stronger and gaining influence. Moreover, some of these organisations have stopped functioning, while the rest have not engaged in public activities with other civil society members for a long time.
The information published by Eurasian Institute on its website, on December 21 2017, stated that the management of the Institute and its regional representatives decided to suspend the active work of the institution. Head of Eurasian Institute, Gulbaat Rtskhiladze, expressed dissatisfaction with the inactivity on the Russian side, particularly with the functioning of the Russian World Foundation (Russky Mir), the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Support Foundation, Yevgeny Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Center and Sputnik Georgia. He said that Russian World could not go beyond Russian language courses,and called the activity of the Gorchakov Fund ‘beating the air’, as the Fund had spent considerable funds sending anti-Russian Georgian-based journalists on a trip to Russia including Moscow and Grozny, but only received mocking articles and reports in return[3].
Overall, Eurasian Institute has failed to raise funds, while its members have neither participated in expert debates nor invited to comment on issues by the media. That became the reason for the suspension of its activities. In 2018 there has been no public activity on the part of other pro-Russian organizations associated with Eurasian Institute, such as the Global Research Center, the Club of Young Political Scientists, and the Center for Globalization Issues.
2. Russian foundations in Georgia
As with the Eurasian Institute, the pro-Russian website Saqinform.ge has also published materials criticizing Russian foundations as well, saying that ‘Russian soft power doesn’t actually exist, as the efficiency of the virtual activity of those organizations in Georgia is near zero’. Even though these Russian-funded organizations have essentially ceased functioning, the activity of Russian foundations persists in Georgia implementing various small-scale projects.
Russky Mir is one of the major foundations, still active in Georgia, set up[4] in 2007 by order of the President of the Russian Federation to popularize the Russian language ‘as Russian national heritage and an important cultural element of the world’. Russky Mir has been financing Russian language courses for many years in Georgia and continues to be active in the cultural field. For instance, it sponsored an essay contest for the Russia-Georgia Youth Organization, founded by Irakli (Merab) Kipiani in 2017. Kipiani is a former member of Eurasian Institute known for his pro-Russian statements. The winner of the essay contest could win a visit to Moscow. This organization was going to import chocolate with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s image. According to Irakli Kipiani, he supported Vladimir Putin in the March 18th 2018 elections, and the chocolate portraying the Russian leader symbolized that support[5]. However, the chocolates didn’t make it to the Georgian market. The other activity of the organization remains unknown to the public, except for commemorating the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier with flowers. Their social network page has 600 likes and shows little activity.
Another organizations supported by Russky Mir is the Cultural and Educational Union called the Russian Club. Founded in 2003, it has been organizing cultural evenings over the years in an effort to establish friendly relations between Russia and Georgia[6]. The Russian Club is headed by Nikoloz Sventitsky, who is also the director of the Griboedov Theatre in Tbilisi and chairman of the Coordination Council of the Russian Compatriots’ Organization. During his press conference Sventitsky told the audience about possibilities for Georgian applicants to get free education at Russian universities[7] and other opportunities. Russky Mir conducts Dictation contest in partnership with this organization. The event is aimed at enhancing the knowledge of Russian language. In 2018, only 50 applicants participated in the contest, which is significantly smaller compared to over 100 participants in 2017[8].
Lika (Anzhelika) Zakharova who represents various organizations also collaborates with Russky Mir. The most active of these organizations is the National Congress of Slavic People, which holds discussions about the Russian language. This organization arranged on May 9th 2018 the march of the Immortal Regiment in honor of the victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War (World War II) in various cities of Georgia, using the officially banned Soviet symbols during the rally, which resulted in conflict with the locals. It was Lika Zakharova whom the editor of pro-Russian Saqinform, Arno Khidirbegishvili, accused of hampering ‘the spread of propaganda’, and called ‘Muscovites and their Georgian partners corrupted thieves that steal funds destined for Russian propaganda’[9].
Another Russian foundation which works in Georgia is The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. It was founded in 2010 by decree of the former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The fund’s board of trustees embraces Russian politicians and businessmen. Similar to other foundations, the Gorchakov Fund has not stepped up the scale of its activity. Its main partner in Georgia is the Yevgeny Primakov Russian-Georgian Public Center which was founded in 2013, initially called the Russian- Georgian Public Center. In November 2017 Dimitri Lortkipanidze became the new head of the organization. Lortkipanidze a politician from the Democratic Movement[10] known for his anti-Western narrative, and is associated with Georgian March-an organization expressing fascist and nationalistic rhetoric. The Russian-Georgian Public Center is basically engaged in a limited number of activities. For instance, it offered free Russian language courses to young people, hosted war veterans on May 9, delivered a series of lectures on ‘Russian-Georgian relations in the context of the US and Europe’, the Karabakh conflict, tourism, investment policy, etc. These lectures have not reached any significant scale.
Media
Studies show that Georgian-language media is the main distributor of anti-Western narratives in the country[11], as Russian-language media lacks popularity in Georgia, parallel to the declining demand for foreign language media in general[12]. As in the case of NGOs, recent years have not seen the appearance of new media outlets linked to Russian foundations on expressing Russian narrative. Russian propaganda in Georgia is mainly associated with boosting anti-Western sentiments. This is the reason why media outlets that essentially use hate speech against the Western world and foreigners concur with the Russian narrative. Such media outlets inherently try to spread hate speech, misinformation and manipulative materials.
The websites that are seen to use profuse Euroscepticism and hate speech (geworld.ge, saqinform.ge SAQINFORM.GE, RU.SAQINFORM.GE, GRUZINFORM.GE, RU.GRUZINFORM.GE) have not made progress in terms of popularity[13]. Judging by the absence of ad banners, they generate no income from advertisement. All domains, including geworld.ge are registered to head of the Historical Heritage NGO Taras Gagnidze. Also, political scientist Alexander Chachia has been a member of the Public Council of the National Heritage since the day of its foundation. In 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev awarded Chachia with an order for “his great contribution to strengthening friendship and cooperation with the Russian Federation”.
The size of the Russian news agency Sputnik’s audience has not grown significantly in recent years. It only functions as an online media platform spreading Russian propaganda. The Georgian version (sputnik-georgia.com) ranks 160th among the websites in Georgia, with its Russian language version (sputnik-georgia.ru) in 109th place[14].
Since 2015, a few other homophobic and xenophobic websites have been established. For instance, TB24.ge and marshalpress.ge, whose founders were journalists that had worked for news portal Info9.ge that belonged to Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream. The founder of marshalpress.ge, Oto Stephanishvili, was also a campaigner for Georgian Dream. The founder of TB24, Gocha Nachkebia, is a member of the board of Public Monitoring Center along with Vladimir Bedukadze that took the spotlight after disclosing footage of inmate tortures in prison[15]. TB24 got an authorization for broadcasting but failed to start broadcasting. According to the data of the regulatory commission, the company did not have any income. As for broadcasters, Obiektivi TV which is founded by members of the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia party remains as a homophobic and xenophobic media outlet with pro-Russian narrative[16].
Facebook pages of neo-Nazi and fascist forces
The failure of NGOs and media outlets to make progress has led to those promoting illiberal values increasingly using Facebook to get their message across with their Facebook pages seeing a rapidly growing number of likes. And even though the content distributed by those pages do not portray Russia as a positive power, describing it as an enemy (a sensible tactic given the lingering resentment following the 2008 war), their basic narrative nonetheless complies with the primary messages of Russian propaganda- that the West tries to destroy national identity. Consequently, recent cases witness the transformation of anti-Western sentiments into a nationalist narrative, with the appearance of groups generally organized through social networks and trying to discredit the West with their content, accusing it of assaulting national values, traditions and identity, and striving to impose homosexuality. This is why they promote racist, xenophobic and homophobic sentiments.
The protest rallies following the police crackdown on nightclubs on May 12th 2018 and May 17thInternational Day against Homophobia and Transphobia have consolidated the country’s neo-Nazi and fascist forces. They have joined forces and organized a counter-rally to stave off so-called ‘LGBT propaganda’ and protect ‘nationality’, fear of which was given by police as the reason for preventing a subsequent rally by liberal opponents of the polices behaviour and supporters of drug liberalisation. The Interior Minister informed the organizers of this rally of the government’s inability to stop the counter-effort of fascist and neo-Nazi forces and asked them to cancel the rally in order to prevent further clashes. They were then taken away by police-escorted buses from the location, which was later taken over by the neo-Nazi and fascist forces.
A few days later the activists were unable to celebrate International Day against Homophobia on May 17, as they had no security guarantees from the authorities. As a result, neo-Nazi and fascist forces once again managed to occupy Rustaveli Avenue. The groups actively employ dozens of pages on social networks mostly created after 2017. These pages are used for spreading their particular narrative and for organizing rallies, as well as for sharing videos and arrangement of events. Currently, their content has thousands of views. The pages often stress their goal to win the information war for against, the liberally thinking society. Some pages manage to increase the number of likes by 2-3 thousand a month.
These pages were banned by Facebook administrators in May 2018. Soon they re-opened
Neo-Nazi forces start to show up in Georgia since 2015 with the appearance of Georgian Power, followed by the creation of Georgian March, which has been an active organization since 2017. Both staged protests with xenophobic appeals. Georgian Power is a more ideology-oriented entity backed up by the youth, while Georgian March is ruled by former politicians and individuals expressing pro-Russian views (Dimitri Lortkipanidze, Sandro Bregadze, Guram Palavandishvili). They have good relations with Levan Vasadze, a businessman with a Russian background who is also lashing out at the so-called LGBT propaganda.
Though the narrative of the nationalist powers comply with Russian propaganda, it’s difficult to prove that they are funded by the Kremlin. However, it’s evident that Georgian March is similar to the xenophobic marches in Ukraine, Russian and Moldova, therefore it is obvious that they have similar agendas. And the fact of its leadership being comprised of former politicians with obvious pro-Russian views confirms these doubts.
As for Georgian Power, its leader is Nikoloz Burnadze, a US citizen living in the USA, which criticizes Georgian March, saying that pro-Russian people manage this organization, which is unacceptable to him.
A fascist organization Georgian National Unity popped up in 2016, and has already managed to conduct a number of demonstrations with xenophobic messages. Regardless of the differences, all three groups (Georgian March, Georgian Power and Georgian National Unity have consolidated under a national idea of ‘fighting against LGBT propaganda’. They engaged dozens of their Facebook pages to organize their protests.
The page Iberian Unity was created in 2017 and became proactive in 2018. It promotes neo-Nazi ideas and claims that users with pro-Russian or pro-Turkey ideas will be blocked. The page shares posts of other anti-liberal pages, supports demonstrations against LGBT people.
Another Facebook large page, the Anti-Liberal Club, appeared in 2015 and has approximately 44K followers posting homophobic and xenophobic’ statuses’ using disinformation and manipulation. The administrator of the page is Shota Martinenko, who also owns web site altinfo.com, which is used for distributing anti- liberal opinions. Its articles are shared by above-mentioned pages.
Georgian Idea is the Facebook page of a political party with the same title founded in 2014 and participated in 2016 parliamentary elections. The leader is Levan Chachua, who was arrested after a fight at TV Kavkasia in 2010. 3 years later he was released as a political prisoner. Georgian Idea cooperates with Georgian March and other neo Nazi groups, participating in homophobic and xenophobic demonstrations.
Change of popular sentiments and legislative regulations
The new ‘pro-Georgian’ narrative basically relies on the fear of losing traditions and national identity, and has manifested itself in two directions- an increasingly negative attitude for foreigners and the ‘protection of families’ from LGBT propaganda. Both issues have translated into particular activities and have also affected the policies of decision makers. Moreover, an entry appeared in the constitution in 2017 defining agricultural land as a resource of special importance that can only be owned by a Georgian citizen, thus precluding foreigners from the acquisition of land in the country. Another entry defined the marriage as a union between man and woman, and being the only kind of union that entitles to marriage-related civil rights. These restrictions did not exist in the Georgian constitution until 2017.[17]
NGOs, media outlets and neo Nazi forces discussed support both, for the protection of Georgian land and the consolidation of heterosexual families. The sharp increase in negative popular attitude for foreigners can be clearly seen in corresponding studies. Period between 2015 and 2017 saw the increase of people dissatisfied with foreigners staying in Georgia over three months from 5 to 16 percent[18], and the number considering Georgian land exclusive property of Georgian citizens, regardless of the type of use, increased from 41 to 64 percent[19].
The Orthodox Church of Georgia has also contributed to the protection of Georgian national values in the fight against LGBT propaganda by declaring May 17, commonly associated with International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia, as the International Family Sanctity Day. The decision was preceded by violent actions by Orthodox believers and clergy against LGBT rights defenders. May 17 has never been celebrated without incidents in Georgia. The already high number (71 percent) of people believing that the proper citizen must protect traditions has increased by 5 percent[20].
The overall increase of negative attitude against foreign citizens and the growing fear of losing traditions, which in turn boosts reluctance towards the Western world, also revealed itself in 2017 data suggesting an increase in the number of people opposing Georgia’s accession to the EU. The number dropped in 2018 and stopped at 15 percent and one of the main reason for 14% is the fear of losing national identity.
Unlike in other post-Soviet countries, it’s very difficult to create an image of ‘saviour’ from Russia, as it had occupied 20 percent of Georgian territory. This is why explicitly pro-Russian organizations and media outlets have failed as ‘shapers’ of popular opinion, having instead turned into marginal groups. The main objective – slurring the West and boosting Euroscepticism- now implements a new strategy, emphasizing the negativity of Europe and America, rather than Russia’s positivity.
This particular narrative is a conveyor of xenophobic and anti-liberal content that seemingly protects national identity, while in fact promoting anti-Western sentiments, which naturally implies resistance to European membership, claiming the West to be the main power that wants to strip national values and traditions. The State Security Service has recognized the peril of Russian propaganda, but has not specified the exact responsibility for the distribution of anti-Western or nihilistic sentiments in the country which has dramatically increased[21]. These organizations have clearly made certain progress in their mission. In these conditions the government’s action plan to respond the looming threats of Russian propaganda becomes ever more important.
The government and donor organizations should have common strategic view for countering propaganda and anti-western narratives. Georgian high quality media needs support, increasing their accessibility especially in the regions near the border and the occupied territories is crucial. The government should create relevant legislation to bolster media pluralism. As the main source of funding for independent high quality media is donor organizations their strategy should be renewed support and engagement. There remains a need for investment in the institutional development and sustainability of media companies and also in promoting media literacy amongst society to reduce vulnerability to media manipulation and disinformation.
Author : Nata Dzvelishvili is the executive director of Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics. Prior to this, Nata worked on media issues for NGO Institute for Development Freedom of Information (IDFI). She also was one of the authors of media criticism portal mediachecker.ge and the project coordinator of the Training Center for Liberalism. Both projects were implemented by the Charter. From 2010-2014 Nata worked as a journalist for www.media.ge website. She is the author of several papers and studies
[15] Bedukadze served at No.8 establishment of the penitentiary department and recorded inmate tortures, and was also accused of participating in the violence. He was later released on plea bargain, as he noticeably contributed to the victory of Georgian Dream by releasing the so-called prison footage in the pre-election period.
Public Space: The battleground in the Revanchist City
Article by
Eka Chitanava and Katie Sartania
On May 13th 2018, the space encompassing the Parliament building, Kashueti church and Freedom Square, ‘Les Lieux de Mémoire’[1] in Tbilisi for the most of Georgians, was physically and symbolically divided between at first glance two social groups: citizens standing for freedom of expression and self-declared fascist[2] organization members and their supporters. The latter, led by the group Nationalist-Socialist Movement and Georgian National Unity, gave Nazi salutes and chanted “glory to the nation – death to the enemies”. Space was split up by the lines of police barricades and yellow buses. It was a peculiar event for many reasons. Far-right groups had thronged Tbilisi’s streets showcasing Nazi symbols before, however their protests were more spontaneous and physically isolated from their ideological adversaries. This time, two separate wide-scale demonstrations were taking place within the same spatial and temporal boundaries[3]. This experience echoed recent traumatic events of May 17th 2013, when peaceful pro-LGBTQI demonstrators were violently dispersed by the Orthodox clergy and lay citizens, reportedly around 20,000 people[4].
Georgian National Unity was founded in 2016, as a non-governmental organization. According to its founding statutes, the organization’s aim is to prioritise a ‘Georgian mentality and worldview.’ Among its goals are listed the: ‘Annulment of the President’s Institute; reforming the education system according to national traditional values; abrogating the anti-discrimination laws; banning the sale of lands to foreigners’ etc. According to internal rules of the organization, ‘racial mingling’, same-sex marriages, converting to certain religions are strictly prohibited[5]. Organization’s symbol is black, while the Nazi swastika is replaced by the Borjgali (sun symbol)[6] and a cross.
“We will get involved in the battle. We will use irons, forks and everything at our disposal.” – said the head of Georgian National Unity, Giorgi Chelidze[7] on May 13 2018 promising to be “brutal” against his opponents.
Later this quote gave an inspiration to netizens create memes[8], ridiculing Chelidze and his supporters. Irony might be a smart way to confront, however, recent years have shown that extremist groups have become quite active and visible in public spaces, media and social networks.
Who are the actors and what do they want?
They are organized groups and individuals, leaders and followers. The group of actors at first glance is homogeneous, but if we examine more closely, it is quite diverse. While zooming out, they still gather around the same values and the ways of articulation of their protest are similar – verbal and physical violence.
Transparency International Georgia’s report lists some of the organizations (Georgian March, the Agreement of National Powers, the ‘Nationals’ movement, Georgia’s National Unity, Civil Solidarity Movement, Social-Political Movement, Georgian Mission and a number of other individuals) that are interconnected as well as financially and politically linked to Russia[9]. For instance, one of the leaders of the Agreement of National Powers, Dimitri Lortkipanidze, was appointed director of the Y.M. Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Centre. The Centre was founded in 2013 by the International Relations Institute and Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Support Fund established by Russia’s former President, Dmitry Medvedev.
One of the prominent groups is Georgian March, the union of illiberal, neo-Nazi organizations, led by a former deputy minister under the current government, Sandro Bregadze. Georgian March held their first big demonstration of around 2000 people in 2017, in one of Tbilisi’s main avenues in the Middle Eastern retail district, an area largely built by German settlers and architects. They called for an end to Muslim immigration, changing state policy regarding foreigners and banning overseas funding to civil society organizations[10]. In 2018, Bregadze announced his plans to run in the presidential elections and, in his own words, on a “Marine Le Pen”-style platform.
Some individuals and organizations are also associated with Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC)[11] or splinter civil groups of the church who were rarely, if ever, publicly condemned for intolerance by the Patriarchate. Empirical evidence in Georgia suggests that far-right, fascist, pro-Russian civil and political groups, active Orthodox clergy, the ones formally and/or informally affiliated with the GOC, allegedly acted in concert. At the same time, these ideas often accord with the policies of the Russian government, creating strongholds of soft power[12].
Comparatively, Giorgi Gabedava, a leading member of the Nationals Movement was one of the active organizers of violent dispersal of anti-homophobia rally in Tbilisi on May 17th 2013. Gabedava and several other extremists were released as political prisoners in 2012, under the current government. They had previously been jailed for storming TV Kavkasia in 2010 when the attackers had physically abused a number of employees, guests, as well as the head of the TV company during live broadcasting of a program, dedicated to the book Saidumlo Siroba (Holy Crap) by young Georgian writer, Erekle Deisadze.[13] These individuals are also associated with religious extremist organizations, the Orthodox Parents’ Union and the People’s Orthodox Union. Notably, two days after the incident at TV Kavkasia, the Patriarch Ilia II awarded Archpriest David Isakadze, the spiritual leader of these religious extremist organizations, with an embellished cross and the right to wear a mitre[14]. Isakadze and his supporters are notorious for their intolerant and xenophobic sentiments. For instance, they protested the arrival of the Pope Francis in Georgia in 2016. They met the Pope in Tbilisi airport with banners declaring, ‘The Pope is a heretic’ or ‘Antichrist!’[15]
The Union of Orthodox Flock (commonly known as the People’s Orthodox Union) named after St. King David the Builder is an unregistered organization, ‘based on volunteerism’. “One of the key goals of the Union is to defend Orthodox Church from dissidence, to fight against the introducers or instigators of the split.”[16] The organization is known for its conservative views and physical attacks on citizens of different values and positions. Members of the Union of Orthodox Flock, together with another organization with a similar name, the Orthodox Parents’ Union were involved in demonstrations against JK Rowling’s Harry Potter books in 2002[17] and the film the Da Vinci Code in 2010[18], an attack on a Halloween party in 2008, demonstrations against the book Saidumlo Siroba (Holy Crap) in 2009 in front of Ilia State University[19] and the Kavkasia TV incident[20] in 2010 mentioned above, an attack on citizens marking anti-homophobia day (second IDAHOTB) on May 17th 2012[21] and so on.
Illiberal political and civil groups use the GOC for their political legitimacy, as well as GOC’s requests are articulated by the same groups. For instance, the Orthodox clergy from time to time directly or covertly request administrative/criminal charges[22] for ‘insulting religious feelings.’ In 2013, GOC openly backed the law put forward by then-Deputy Interior Minister Levan Izoria; In 2016, Zviad Tomaradze, the head of Demographic Society XXI was the author of the bill, proposed by a Georgian MP from the ruling Georgian Dream coalition;[23] In 2018, Emzar Kvitsiani, a member of Parliamentary party, Alliance of Patriots put forward the bill. To be noted, in 2018 Kvitsiani publicly admitted that in 2006-2012 he had been collaborating with the Russian security services[24], spreading Russian propaganda. The bill’s author again was Zviad Tomaradze. Furthermore, along with Sandro Bregadze, the former minister under the current government and currently the most prominent face of Georgian March, Tomaradze was a member of the initiative group that in 2016 requested holding a referendum on defining marriage as union of a man and a woman. The same idea had been put forward by some Orthodox clergy, including David Isakadze[25].
Tomaradze works for another influential actor, Levan Vasadze, founder of the Georgian Demographic Society XXI, a Georgian businessman who accrued his wealth in Russia (1998-2006)[26]. Vasadze is widely known for his homophobic rhetoric and allegiance to the GOC. On May 15-17th2016 he hosted the World Congress of Families’ event in Tbilisi[27], dedicated to Family Purity Day, pronounced by the GOC to counter the symbolism of the May 17 anniversary of the mob attack on LGBTQI supporters[28].
The World Congress of Families is a U.S.-based organization founded in the mid-1990s as an international umbrella organization for groups supporting conservative social values. The WCF also has close links to Konstantin Malofeyev and Vladimir Yakunin, oligarchs with close ties to the Russia’s government. Another person affiliated with the WCF is Alexander Dugin, the founder of the Eurasianist movement and ultranationalist philosopher, who promotes Russian territorial and ideological expansion. “Together with our Russian friends, we got rid of and defeated first fascism and then communism, both of which came from the West,” Vasadze said at an event in Tbilisi[29].
There are other examples of collaboration between the Orthodox clergy and self-declared pro-Russian organizations, such as the Alliance of Eurasia, the Institute of Eurasia, Eurasian Choice, the Erekle II Society, etc. According to the Georgian Institute of Politics[30], the leaders of these respective organizations admit cooperating with Orthodox priests and some representatives of the GOC are actively involved in their activities.
Who and what do they target?
Mainly in the fight against liberal values, modernism, democracy and the concept of human rights these groups use distorted narratives of Georgian traditions and symbols to prove the West is undermining the authentic Georgian identity. They also use the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) for legitimacy in their fight against different minority social groups, non-Orthodox religious entities and LGBTQI; crackdown on so called ‘illegal migrants’ (foreigners of Asian and African descent); request that the State ban the sale of land to non-Georgians; prohibit foreigners settling in Georgia; they request the government to outlaw NGOs[31] and international organizations, especially the Open Society Foundation, as traitors of the nation; they fight against freedom of expression[32], nightclubs, art, literature and films. The targets change according to the current political, social and cultural context. Usually, the aggression is directed towards those who manifest their existence and the rights in a public space. Offenders often say, “They can do whatever they want in their bedrooms, as long as they do not take it outside”[33]This formulation demonstrates that non-dominant group have to respect specific boundaries set for them in order to be tolerated and remain subordinated to the majority. The frontline of this conflict is a public space which embodies political power and cultural hegemony. Imagining society as a homogeneous social group, excludes the concepts of individual rights and liberties.
The political and religious context of social hostilities
83.4 percent[34] of Georgian citizens identify as Orthodox Christians. While their trust in state institutions remains low, dominant religious organization, like the Georgian Orthodox Church (GoC), preserves its clout[35]. Understanding the role and the influence of the church is essential to deconstruct how illiberal groups operate.
The post-Soviet history of Georgia can be construed according to the forms of nationalism and political transitions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tenure of Georgia’s first President Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s (1991) was characterised by ethnic[36] or ecstatic nationalism[37]. Whilst the second President and former Soviet high-ranking official Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2003) shifted politics to a system of elite-mediated liberalism. During Shevardnadze’s tenure, ‘nationalism turned into an ‘institute’, which he used as a framework to talk about conciliation and the importance of an alliance with Europe”[38]. President Mikheil Saakashvili’s tenure (2003-2013) is defined by some scholars as a period of civic or ‘revolutionary nationalism’. The State, on the levels of both policy and official discourse, stopped differentiating between its citizens according to their ethnic backgrounds and defined citizenship as a main marker of Georgian identity[39]. According to Georgian philosopher and sociologist Giga Zedania, the new narrative was inclusive, not exclusive. ‘But this trait could not—and did not—take away its revolutionary character.’
The government started protecting the rights of minorities and punishing extremists for hate crimes, however, they did not stop using the church for political legitimacy. Consequently, it was not difficult to observe the rise of religious nationalism, the ideology which makes religious affiliation to Orthodoxy an essential factor in determining national identity. In this case, any challenge to church dominance is seen as a challenge to Georgian nationhood.[40] Living under this paradigm, non-Orthodox, especially, Georgian Muslims are being constantly reproached for their religious identities and their ‘Georgianness’ is often questioned. Eventually, the GOC constructed ‘political Orthodoxy’, ‘through which Georgians would satisfy their patriotic passion by condemning the West’.[41]
As for the current ruling political party, Georgian Dream, there is enough empirical evidence to conclude that the government is particularly loyal to the GOC and neglectful of the offenses committed on the grounds of intolerance against religious minorities and LGBTQI (Assaults on Muslims in Tsintskaro (2012), Nigvziani (2012)[42] and Samtatskaro villages (2013)[43]; forceful removal of the minaret in Chela village (2013)[44]; nailing a pig’s head to the Muslim boarding school in Kobuleti (2014)[45]; physical abuse of Muslims in Mokhe village (2014)[46], and IDAHOTB on May 17, 2013). None of these cases have been fully investigated and alleged perpetrators have not been punished, and some representatives of law enforcement bodies has supposedly verbally and physically abused Muslims[47]. These events, clustered in the first 18 months of the initial Georgian Dream government look symptomatic, rather than coincidental. The high-ranking politicians and MPs regularly demonstrate their discriminatory and biased approaches. Taken into consideration, the GOC’s open support of Georgian Dream in the 2012 Parliamentary elections, the new government knew whom to thank, which later revealed in impunity of the Orthodox clergy, legislative initiatives examined below, and generally, in church-government ideological convergence. Public defence of the GOC became an imperative for many politicians, just as loyalty to the communist faith was decades ago[48].
In Georgia, members of the GOC regularly fight against fundamental human rights, pluralism and cultural diversity. For instance, the majority of Orthodox clergy were against adopting the law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination in 2014. This was also a result of an EU-Georgia visa liberalization agreement, in which Georgia agreed to increase its efforts to eliminate various forms of discrimination. Anti-discrimination bill was considered by some clergy as “propaganda and legalisation” of a “deadly sin”, because it included “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination[49].
These groups periodically request that the State limit freedom of expression in traditional media, social networks and art. Some Orthodox priests allegedly physically abuse civil rights activists[50]. Other priests condemn writers, journalists and human rights organizations from the pulpits. Official press of the GOC is saturated with homophobic, intolerant and insulting statements against people of different religious identities.
Taking into consideration rapidly accumulated wealth and documented corruption within the church, some scholars argue, that real motivation of the Orthodox clergy is far from fundamentalist doctrine and there is predominantly an economic interest behind their religious requests to the Georgian government. In other words, the church is bargaining with the State.
Religious extremism and attacks on minority members is not a new phenomenon in Georgia. In the beginning of the 1990’s, radical groups within Orthodox Church started continuous persecution of non-Orthodox[51]. Despite hundreds of documented physical attacks on members of religious minorities, predominantly Jehovah’s Witnesses, including people being hospitalised, and places of worship and religious literature being destroyed, the alleged attackers were not punished[52]. The State not only neglected hate crimes but also acted in collusion with offenders. At this time serving clergy of the Patriarchate and affiliated groups personally organized and participated in violent physical attacks on the non-Orthodox and human rights activists[53]. The impunity with which such actions were treated encouraged further social hostilities. Later the protests swirled up against books, paintings, theatre plays, films, universities, and media, everything that questioned dominant narratives and established frameworks of thinking. Illiberal sentiments were fostered by the most respected religious authority, the Patriarch Ilia II himself. In his sermons, he condemned what he called ‘extreme liberalism’[54].
Modern-day digital actors
Initially illiberal, socially conservative groups were represented in physical public spaces and later various groups with different digital profiles emerged. This is related to the increasing popularity of the internet and social networks. In a country with a population of 3,907,131, there are 2,100,000 Facebook subscribers[55].
Illiberal digital groups shape the modern Georgian discourse of nationalism. Central topics are religion and history, namely, the authority of religious and historical persons used for social mobilisation – pictures of saints, kings and writers, quotations or videos are the main tools used to keep users involved and active[56].
The flow of information from these Facebook pages is well targeted, fills up the ideological vacuum and strikes a chord with ultra-nationalist sentiments, which makes it easier to maintain and even increase the audience. Information is spread by public Facebook pages, as well as semi-closed Facebook groups (e.g. Georgian National Awaking, Nationalists, Georgians, National self-consciousness, Nationalistic Legion). They are divided into thematic categories such as nationalists, Georgia and/or Georgians, News, World and others. For instance, the group of Emigrant’s personal page with 18 000 members, is a very active group. Accounts with individual names or news web-pages spread information, share links of their own or other agencies on topics, such as gender, political parties, poems, advertisements, religious news or current issues. Besides their online activity, they often go to streets, hold public demonstrations or small gatherings around the city centre to mark some historic dates or protest new legislative initiatives.
Summary
Observation of the emergent violent groups suggests, that they construct their identities in opposition to imagined enemies. The difference is a sign of threat – cultural ‘others’, religious minorities, immigrants, LGBTQI and organizations that ‘plant’ liberal values. Religious extremists, socially conservative populists and neo-fascist groups and individuals endeavour to acquire dominance on urban public spaces. Who wins the space, his/her ‘Georgianness’ is reaffirmed. Revanchist City, the concept of Neil Smith[57] might be applicable in Georgian case. He suggests, that revanchist anti-urbanism represents a reaction against the supposed “theft of the city, desperate defense of a challenged phalanx of privileges, cloaked in the populist language of civic morality, family values and neighborhood security. […] it portends a vicious reaction against minorities, the working class, homeless people, the unemployed, women, gays and lesbians, immigrants’’. The whole process is about rediscovery of the enemy within, rather than fathoming real external threats.
Counter -demonstrations, producing Facebook pages and other digital content, shows that they fight for physical and digital public spaces but only when these spaces are busy /occupied by so-called liberal groups. From a very short observation it can be assumed that these groups need demonstrations against homophobia, ‘clubbers’ gathering against police raids, public events of religious minorities, or Halloween party to reassert their existence. These groups also have political aspirations. The leader of Georgian March, Sandro Bregadze, named as the Presidential candidate for October 2018 elections, recently stated: “I will not be the candidate of the Americans or Russians. I will be the presidential candidate of the Georgians”.[58] Based on the increased activities in public, as well as in online spaces, it can be assumed that these groups have become more proactive, instrumentalizing twisted notions of Georgian nationalism. As for motivating factors of the followers/supporters, they might be various – pragmatic, as well as a continuum of ideological, social and psychological factors, identification of which, requires a particular examination.
Taking into consideration the rise of the far-right in European states, the image of Europe and the West is seen through different lenses: Europe N1 is a place of LGBTQI, infidels, people against family and ‘traditional values’ and the Europe N2 with far-right, ultranationalist, patriot groups who defend ‘traditional values’ (Hungry, Poland, Germany, etc.). Basically, this paradigm is seen in the light of the contradiction of tradition and modernity, the old and the new, conservative and liberal. This binary is beneficial for those groups who are in search of enemies to maintain their own image and justify their existence
Moreover, these groups capitalise on the growing discontent and concerns of Georgian citizens due to economic problems, unemployment, growing inequality and the unresolved issue of territorial integrity to buttress their xenophobic agendas and scepticism towards the EU-integration process and democratic institutions in general.
Authors: Ekaterine Chitanava is a human rights activist and the director of a non-governmental organization, Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), based in Tbilisi, Georgia. Her work is focused on freedom of religion and belief as well as minority rights. The organization is providing free legal aid to people experiencing discrimination on religious, ethnic and/or racial grounds in Georgia, as well as conducting various educational activities, state policy research, legal analysis and sociological studies. From 2009 to 2011 Ms. Chitanava, as a journalist was regularly writing for Georgian analytical magazines and international outlets. She was also producing short documentaries about religious and ethnic minorities in Georgia for the Tolerance Centre under the auspices of Public Defender. Currently she is contributing to Forum 18, different international media outlets and academic journals.
Katie Sartania graduated from the faculty of social and political sciences of Tbilisi State University, she holds a BA degree in sociology. Her research interest includes the minority groups, post-soviet space and social media. Since 2014 she has been involved in research of different social groups, concentrated on minorities (religious; ethnic; IDP groups) in Georgia. She has authored a number of articles on social issues. Currently she is an independent researcher based in Tbilisi.
[1] Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire.” Representations, no. 26 (1989): 7-24. doi: 10.2307/2928520. A ‘lieu de mémoire’ is any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community. It may refer to any place, object or concept vested with historical significance in the popular collective memory, such as a monument, a museum, an event, a symbol like a flag or even a colour vested with historical memory.
[3] Drug raids in two leading clubs in Tbilisi in the early hours of 12 May, 2018 and the police’s heavy-handed tactics, caused an outcry among the youth and drug policy activists, prompting calls for the resignation of the Prime Minister and Interior Minister. In response to the large-scale rally in front of the Parliament building, self-declared fascist, Nationalist-Socialist organization members and Georgian March organized counter-demonstrations. The endeavor to win the public space by human rights activists and the youth protesting the takeover of freedom of expression was finally unsuccessful. With the argument that they were unable to protect the demonstrators from aggressors, State officials asked the organizers to stop the rally and promised them to revise the punitive policies on drug use.
[4] Conservatives attack gay activists at rally in Tbilisi, BBC news, May 2013, https://bbc.in/2kXB3WP
[6] Georgian symbol of the sun, It consists of an ancient, seven-winged solar wheel, often shown rising from a symbolic tree of life. http://symboldictionary.net/?p=984
[7] We will use irons, forks and everything that will be in our hands to protect our homeland and the nation” – Giorgi Chelidze “Free space” (in Georgian language), Iberia TV, May 2018, https://goo.gl/RaSQDf
[12] Dmitri Trenin, Demands on Russian Foreign Policy and Its Drivers: Looking out Five Years, Carnegie Moscow Center, August 2017, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/72799
[35] Although According to the polls of National Democratic Institute (NDI) in 2018, the church’s favorability has significantly dropped to 56 percent from almost 80 percent in 2015. The reason for this decline could be an active media coverage of the corruption inside the GOC and the scandal around the alleged poisoning of Patriarch Ilia II.
[54] Jones, Stephen F. 2013. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. London: I.B Tauris.
[55] Internet World Stats, Asia Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population Statistics and Facebook Subscribers, 2,100,000 Facebook subscribers in Dec 2017, 53.7% penetration, https://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm#ge
[56] To be noted, national narratives are often distorted, the attitudes of Georgian historical figures, including the Orthodox clergy, regarding the West and tolerance towards cultural minorities are misconstrued.
[57] Smith, Neil. 2005. The New Urban Frontier. London: Routledge.
Rise of the illiberal civil society in Georgia and its organisation
Article by
Mariam Uberi
Aggression and violence towards liberal groups have risen significantly in Georgia since 2017. The rise of Neo-Nazi groups has been partly consolidated as a protest in response to the government’s migration policies and as a need to protect national identity from emerging ‘threats’. Noting the emergence of some of these groups and their likely backing from the Russian Federation, local politicians and business people are possible in some instances. However the identification of many of these group is not easy as they often belong to informal entities, which makes it equally difficult to trace their source of funding.
The Georgian authorities have officially identified Russian propaganda as a threat and committed to tackle it through number of ways. The Orthodox church has officially asserted their support to Georgia’s aspiration to join the EU-Atlantic family, however, there are number of cases, when preaching of some radical clergymen support the aggressive narrative against ‘foreign settlers’[1] or seek to justify Russian aggression.[2] Research lists a number of the most prominent ultra-right groups, their objectives, whether they have tacit backing from the Church, or whether state authorities are effective in counteracting Russian soft power, threats and identify possible ways out.
Georgian March
Georgian March is an informal union that comprises several ultra- right groups. The organisation came into public view in 2017 under the name of Georgian March as they galvanised a protest against the incident related to an Iranian national. Whilst a foreign national faced criminal charges, their demands were grossly political, demanding to curb immigration, expel illegal immigrants and implement a more restrictive immigration law, as well as introducing a ban on foreign funding of civil society organisations.[3] Under the aegis of Georgian March, its members launched number of offensive rallies and protests, ranging from burning down the LGBTI flag, ambushing a TV journalist for insulting religious sentiments to making rape comments and organising rallies in front of the offices of the Open Society Foundation Georgia.[4]
In their bid to identify unlawful activity by foreigners, Georgian March announced completion of citizen patrols alongside with the units of the Ministry of Interior. The purpose of the patrol was to create an alternative citizen unit, an idea that did not come to fruition as it was ignored by the authorities.[5]After the incident with the TV journalist for insulting religious feelings of followers of the Orthodox Church and refusing to apologize, some members of the Georgian March ambushed his car but were later arrested. However, the current members of the Georgian Parliament, from the pro- Russian Party Alliance of Patriots acted as bail guarantors. Prominent members of the Georgian March include members of the government office and the parliament, with the most recognisable members being Sandro Bregadze, a former Deputy Minister of Diaspora Affairs known for his homophobic statements and Dimitri Lortkipanidze, a former MP and former Head of the Human Rights Committee at the Georgian Parliament. It also includes members of another pro- Russian political party, Nino Burjanaze’s Democratic Movement,[6]Guram Palavandishvili[7] a host of the ‘With Palavandishvili’ show on Palitra TV News and Zviad Tomaradze an author of controversial draft laws proposing punishment for insulting religious feelings, the prohibition of activities of civil society organisations and banning abortion.[8] A number of NGOs launched a complaint against this particular host with a demand to investigate the violation of the Code of Conduct for Broadcasters on hate speech and discrimination.[9]Some members of ultra-right groups are also heads of other NGOs, created with the purpose of safeguarding national religious institutes, demographic society, national values and other related issues. These organisations that are chaired by Z. Tomaradze include the National Religious Institute, Georgia’s Demographic Society 21 and Nation and State. The chairperson of the board is Tamar Chiburadnize-Lomtadze, who at the same time is the chairperson of the board of ‘Georgian Demographic Revival Fund’. This fund, in turn, is under the patronage of businessman Levan Vasadze, a close associate of the Patriarch and critic of liberal European values.
According to the report by Transparency International supporters of the Georgian Demographic State are Shio Mujiri (Patriarch’s co-regent), businessmen Lasha Papashvili, Mamuka Khazaradze, Badri Japaridze, Zaza Nishniadze, a member of the ruling Georgian Dream party Dimitri Khundadze, alongside former chairman of the Parliament’s Healthcare and Social Issues Committee and one of the founders of Palitra Media Goga Tevdorashvili. Bidzina Ivanishvili, the former Prime-Minister, is believed to have provided support to the Fund.[10]
Other movements linked to the Georgian March
There are other movements that are either founded by the leaders of the Georgian March or are united under more or less similar values of protecting Georgian traditions, nationalism and religion. A ‘Civil Solidarity Movement’ is registered at the home address of one of the leaders of the Georgian March. Its board members include a businessman and a former prosecutor, freed from prison as a political prisoner. The purpose of the movement is to restore ‘justice’ and monitor whether promises made by Bidzina Ivanishvili’s team had been met. Its members are largely businessmen and political prisoners who suffered damages during the United National Movement rule. Another socio-political movement known as Georgian Mission called for the respect to citizens of all ethnic backgrounds and called upon everyone to work together towards united and strong state. One of the individuals who showed up and gave speech at a Georgian Mission rally in 2016 is a current member of the board of the Public Broadcaster.[11] The ‘’Georgian Idea’’ is another unit, who actively participated in promoting a protest of organised by Georgian March in July 2017. In 2015 it was registered as a political party that organised a press conference in international press centre of Russian news agency RIA Novosti in Tbilisi. The political party ran for the 2016 Parliamentary elections. The party list submitted to the Central Electoral Committee listed Sandro (Aleksandre) Bregadze as a candidate for the majoritarian election.
The Georgian National Unity
Georgian National Unity was established in 2016 with a view to carry out ‘peaceful and united policy, and protect Georgian mentality and its values’.[12] According to the Public Registry, they have a Chairman and a Royal Chancellor. Georgian National Unity vowed to protect Georgian traditions and respect foreign nationals, as long as, they do not insult the Georgian worldview. He does not explain what the Georgian worldview means but it is mainly related to Georgian traditional values and conservatism. It also falls short of the European liberal views. The leader of National Unity in an interview with the press spoke with pride about being called a ‘Nazi’, organisation members wear arm bands similar to the Nazi swastika, and they greet each other with Nazi salutes. The organisation rules its members have to adhere to, including tough physical test and a ban on marrying anyone non-white. The leader also claimed that its members have a license to carry weapons. He admitted that during protests, they rely on the help of their ‘striker squads’ to ensure order during protests.[13]The leader of the party studied towards his master degree in International relations in Belarus and was later refused an internship at the Ministry of Foreign affairs.[14] It has to be noted that a similar Russia-based organisation called the Russian National Unity had been an active supporter of the Russian government and took part in armed conflict in Chechnya in 1994 and then in Donetsk in Ukraine.[15]
May 2018
On 11-13 May of 2018 Georgian special forces and law enforcement agents raided Tbilisi night clubs on the stated grounds of tackling drug dealing, resorting to excessive use of force. This sparked protests of clubbers and other young people, adding a demand for a more humane drug policy in Georgia. At least two ultra-right groups, Georgian National Unity and Georgian Idea, staged a counter demonstration with a demand to stop ‘LGBTI propaganda’ and a protest against ‘drug dealers’.[16]The Georgian National Unity members marched towards the protesters some wearing masks and arm bands in burgundy similar to the Nazi swastika. Its leader also threatened that they will be very “brutal” against any mistakes protesters can make-as they held church candles and announced the creation of a “national guard army to protect [the] motherland.”[17]In another bid to avoid confrontation between the protesters, the police prevented these groups from approaching the Parliament building and arrested another leader who threatened the demonstrators and attempted to breach the cordon. Some cases of violence and assault have been reported as members of the groups called for breaking up the rally, while some counter-protesters managed to break through and physically assault the pro-night club protesters. According to the Public Defender’s’ office the police cordon between the protesters and the neo-Nazi groups had significantly decreased the risk of escalation. Nevertheless the Minister of Interior told the peaceful protesters to disperse, since they could not guarantee their safety. In another attempt to gear up against LGBT propaganda and a so-called ‘drug dealers’, Georgian March created the ‘Agreement of National Powers’ that called for the protest rallies on 14 and 17 May. These rallies were later postponed.[18]
Funding
The existence of links between Russia and the funding of ultra-right groups are highly possible. One of the leaders of Georgian March, Dimitri Lortkipanidze had left the party, only to be appointed as the head of the Y.M.Primakov Georgian Russian Public Center two months later. The Center was founded in 2013 by the International Relations Institute and Gorchakov Diplomacy Support Fund in Russia. The Fund, which was established in 2012 by the order of the then President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev is believed to be one of the ways Russia is able to channel its soft power.[19]The Primakov Centre finances-free Russian language courses in Georgia and supports the development of economic, charitable, social and cultural ties. Under the aegis of Gorchakov Fund, Russian business people and journalists met with Georgian wine makers,[20]organised sports tournaments with the participation of Russian and Georgian tennis players and hosted Russian art academy students in Georgia. It also aims to create a favourable public opinion on Russia abroad. In its recent statements, the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned that the Georgian-Russian relationship has increased significantly, air-plane flights have been resumed and restrictions on visas had been removed. The spokesperson also mentioned improved contact in the sphere of public, cultural and scientific ties. Moreover the appointment of one of the leaders of the Georgian March as a head of the Primakov Fund suggested that the increase of Neo-Nazi activities may fall within the interests of Russia.[21]
Role of the Orthodox Church
Georgian Orthodox church enjoyed great trust from public and has unequivocal support from the Georgian state authorities too. It has a constitutional recognition of the “Special role of the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia”[22]and its relationship with the state is governed by the 2002 Concordat marking a separation between the Church and the State. According to the 2017 survey of the Public Opinion, the church enjoys 84% of approval from the population.[23] However, as suggested by the Kremlin Influence index 2017[24] that measures Russia’s influence of the information on the state, propaganda is often channelled through Georgian Orthodox Church and is evident in cases of anti-western propaganda.[25]The Patriarch of Orthodox Church Ilia II repeatedly confirmed its support for Georgia’s integration into the European Union and NATO. The Church however, leads isolationist policies towards the Western Christian organisations where in separate cases, its anti-Western statements of its clergy suggested indirect influence of the Russian Church.[26]In addition, the ‘traditionalism, conservatism, national values and the idea of unity’ greatly valued by the ultra-right groups are largely propagated by the Church.[27]In the most recent move, the Georgian Orthodox Church decided to dispatch a priest from the Russian church with a view to serve the Russian parish in Georgia. This information had been agreed by the Russian synod with the Georgian Church.
In an apparent bid to step up the response against anti-western propaganda, the EU and NATO information centre organised a high level meeting of the Orthodox Church representatives in Brussels in 2017.[28]The EU Global Strategy document marked the event to be successful and thought it to be a good example that helped a shift towards more positive public attitudes about the EU and its values.[29] On the ground, however, it did not necessarily stop other clergymen from delivering messages in support of the aggressive Russian narratives. On 13 May 2018, in an ill formed attempt to de-escalate tense confrontation between two groups of protesters, the Patriarchate claimed that youth protesters had brought a “negative vibe” which had in turn provided the grounds for the counter-protest.[30]Through this statement, the Patriarchate had chosen to take sides and justify the violence perpetrated by right wing groups.
Recognition of Russian soft power and its responses.
In 2016 Georgia had reaffirmed its aspiration towards joining the Euro-Atlantic family through a unanimously adopted resolution by the Georgian Parliament. It further stated that it will continue a rational and principled policy towards Russia, to mitigate the foreign policy threat with a view to maintain ‘stability in the region’.[31]The Georgian authorities first mentioned Russian propaganda in political documents in the beginning of 2017. As a result of long lobbying on the part of civil society, the Georgian government approved a document naming the propaganda as a threat to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and the strengthening pro-Russian and anti-Western forces.[32]It also mentioned that ‘soft power’ aimed at weakening state institutions including the Ministry of Defence. In relation to EU and NATO integration policy, the document aimed at adopting messages after a detailed review of opinion polls analysis of target groups, principle misperceptions and information gaps in society. Its annual report on activities produced to address these objectives. However, it was criticised by the coalition for Euro- Atlantic Partnership on issues of strategic communication around Georgia’s aspirations for membership of the EU and NATO. The coalition found the action plan failed to respond to ‘hybrid challenges, including the information warfare’ and found it be incoherent. It also dubbed the activities conducted ranging from ‘waste management training’ to ‘tree planting events’ and ‘hour of garden birds’ to be missing the main target. It then offered its readiness to cooperate with the authorities and highlighted the need to establish mechanisms for strategic communication and enhancing the political will to make it work.[33]
The National Cyber Security Strategy of Georgia for 2017-2018 named cyberattacks and cyber-crimes organised by the Russian Federation as a major threat. The documents also stated that Russia’s actions aimed to hinder Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structure and identified a need for further legislative changes and enhanced international cooperation to tackle Russian cyber-attacks.[34] Yet, another report from the State Security services, for the first time, cited threats stemming from the foreign intelligence services-as they attempted to stir up anti-Western sentiment in the Georgian society, damaging Georgia’s image as a reliable partner.[35]Alongside this document, in 2014 Georgia supported the Council of Europe Resolution on counteracting neo-Nazism and right wing extremism. It recognised a sophisticated nature of the past symbols and structures ‘including party logos reminiscent of swastika’ and highlighted a need of an early intervention including manifestation of neo- Nazism, disrespectful of their violent or nonviolent nature.[36] Prior to this Georgia adopted a Freedom Charter law banning totalitarian and Nazi symbols and propaganda. The law, however, does not specifically define these symbols, lacks an effective enforcement mechanism, and has an inefficient commission responsible for identifying these symbols, making it cumbersome. Nevertheless, the authorities have not been prompt in mitigating threats by the Neo-Nazi march using hate speech in central Tbilisi. The Prime Minister later mentioned that the law is not effective in fighting against neo-Nazi groups but according to the Minister of Interior, it did not hinder authorities to react on the breaches perpetrated by the members of the counter rally.[37]The National Ombudsman identified number of alleged criminal law violations committed by the counter protestors and urged the authorities to conduct an effective investigation into these violations.
The members of the counter-protest were charged under the Code of Administrative Offences on hooliganism and disobedience to the police and were subsequently fined.[38]There has been no information on criminal charges, except for one charge officially stated on the site of the Ministry of Interior.[39] The Ministry of Interior stated that that there were criminal investigations underway on members of the counter-rally. Finally, the removal by bus of peaceful protesters to protect them from the counter rally by the Georgian authorities was met with some discontent. A leader of the civil society organisation[40] and a political party-agreed on the opinion that the authorities gave similar responses to both groups. This was previously echoed by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2015 decision against Georgia, where it stated that the right to counter-demonstrate cannot ‘‘extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate.’’ The whole situation has echoes of a similar incident of 2012, where Georgian authorities removed the members of the flash mob on the International Day against Homophobia to protect them against the threats from the counter rally. On this occasion, the ECtHR held that members had a right to hold a demonstration without having to ‘‘fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents’’ or facing repercussions for holding opinions on ‘highly controversial issues affecting the community’.[41]
Finally, Georgia in 2014 signed a European Association Agreement with the European Union and took a commitment to enhance rule of law and good governance. A 2017 joint communique initiated by Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova on rethinking Eastern Partnership highlighted a need to increase efforts for stronger resilience towards Russian hybrid challenges and threats. The joint Communique then thought to hold special hearing in EU Parliament on hybrid challenges and acts of aggression by Russia and increase individual resilience through more robust democratic reforms and vibrant societies and credible state institutions.[42]
Ways forward
This essay shows that Georgia has been effective in identifying threats posed by the Russian propaganda. Its responses, however, have not been effective or proficient. Georgia needs to make the communication strategy and its activities under its action plan more consistent and well-coordinated between cross sectoral agencies. It also showed that some strategies contained a more detailed vision on how to address these challenges including improved legislative framework and a better international co-operation. Further analysis showed that Russian meddling can be seen within some ultra-right groups, whilst there is no direct link with others. To this end, it is important for the State to identify these organisations, inform the general public about its threats and tackle the myths on ‘threats to identity and a statehood’ through clearly communicated counter narratives.
As shown, civil society in Georgia has been active in advising a government on strategic communication. Establishment of a Coalition for Euro-Atlantic Georgia by leading NGOs is thought to be a good example. The Georgian authorities, however, need to show more openness towards cooperation, making its interaction more substantial and consistent. This essay further identified a need to amend the law for it to tackle the challenges of neo Nazi groups.
On a more general level, Georgia needs to follow its obligations under the PACE resolution on raising awareness through education at an early age. It needs to provide cross- sectoral strategies to prevent and combat neo-Nazi ideology with a view to reduce breeding grounds for its ideology.
About the author: Mariam has worked as a researcher with Democracy Reporting International on polarization and populism in Georgia. Prior to this she researched issues related to ill treatment and discrimination in prisons and health care settings taking cases before regional human rights courts. During her work as a strategic litigation lawyer in Georgia, she reviewed cases related to violations occurring during and after the Georgian-Russian armed conflict. Mariam holds an LLM in international Human Rights Law from University of Essex and an MA in Political Science from Central European University. She was greatly assisted by Mamuka Andguladze from Transparency International Georgia.
[2]As an example, The Kremlin influence index 2017 cited a newspaper article in one of church editions in which Ruis Urbnisi metropolitan, episcope Iobi assessed Russian bombs during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war as punishment sent from heaven. Experts noted that “separate religious servant are distinguished for their aggressive obedience to narratives of the Russian Orthodox Church.”
[6] A former member of the Party: Burjanadze-Democrats.
[7] His narratives contained included homophobic and xenophobic expressions. Non-governmental organizations addressed self-regulation body of the Palitra News with a complaint. The Georgian National Communications Commission ruled that there was a violation of the independence principle, use of hate speech and discrimination.
[20]Russian Journalists and Businessmen are meeting Georgian Wine Makers.https://sputnik-georgia.com/economy/20170427/235770365/rusi-biznesmenebi-da-jurnalistebi-megvineebs-shexvdebian.html.
[32]Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Communication Strategy on Georgia’s Membership to the EU and NATO for 2017-2020, April 2017,
[36] Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly: Counteraction to manifestations of neo-Nazism and right-wing extremism.http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=21219&lang=en.2014. The European Convention on Human Rights in Vrona versus Hungary, it stated that participants of the political party that worn armbands quite similar to those of offers of the Arrow cross (responsible for the reign of terror in Hungary in 1944/45). It took the view that marches with participants that were dressed in this way were objectively capable of wounding “historical sensitivities” and also the according to the court, the verbal and visual demonstration of power alone amounted to an infringement of then Hungarian law, in the light of historical experience.
[40] Interview with Giorgi Mshvenieradze, Georgian Democracy Initiative (GDI) and Tamar Kordzaia, former MP and a Political Secretary of the Republican Party July 2018.
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