These events have largely confirmed previously stated suspicions on Russia’s intentions within the former Soviet Union: Moscow continues to view Europe’s Association Agreements within ‘its near abroad’ almost exclusively in hard-realist geo-strategic terms. Accordingly, while the Eurasian Union may not be an effort the reconstruct the Soviet Union per se, it does fit into a broader attempt by Putin and his Siloviki entourage to limit, and, where possible, reverse the effects of the ‘geo-political catastrophe’ that was the collapse of their former empire: Russia must rise again, and, in the zero-sum realist logic of its leaders, this means regaining control over its historical ‘sphere of exclusive interest’, albeit in novel form.

Russia’s project is, of course, mostly presented through the economistic language of neo-liberal rationality, combined with references to a common history and shared culture. No twenty-first century state could openly use geo-political argumentations to foist top-down integration projects onto its neighbours. In the post-colonial, post-Cold War political vocabulary, the concepts of ‘empire’ and ‘hierarchy’ remain anathema. Disciplinary measures are therefore cloaked in, and neutralised through the language of technocratic instrumentality or the rule of law. Implausible allegations of ‘genocide’ thus accompanied the Kremlin’s humanitarian justifications for its 2008 intervention in Georgia; Moldovan wines similarly tend to lose their fitness for human consumption as easily as Georgian mandarins regain them, depending on the political requirements of the day.

This instrumentalisation of technocratic and legalistic language goes further than mere wine and confectionary. It underlies a broader attempt, by the Kremlin, to present the Eurasian Union as something it is not: the European Union’s equivalent (or, in some cases, its superior), a functionalist integration project driven by the wishes of its members and potential members, rather than a top-down imposition by a fallen superpower whose elite clearly still frames Europe in terms of out-dated ‘spheres of influence’ and geostrategic gamesmanship. This is, ultimately, the reason for Brussels’ inability to counter Moscow’s sticks-and-carrots approach in its former dominions. Europe’s project is driven by a soft-power logic, led by a cumbersome civilian bureaucracy, and co-ordinated among 28 member states with at times diverging interests. Moscow’s, on the other hand, is very much based on hard-power rationality, driven by an elite many of whose members were formerly associated with those institutions of a single power best versed in the arts of coercion, of deterrence and compellence (coercive diplomacy).

As a result, the interaction between Brussels and Moscow surrounding the Eastern Partnership has become something of a dialogue of the deaf and the blind; put differently, Europe speaks Kant, while Russia speaks Machiavelli, and both these languages seem mutually incomprehensible. Stuck in between this cacophony are the former Soviet states, attracted Westward but very much aware of the power and motivation of their Eastern/Northern neighbour, and the inability of ‘Europe’ to counter this particular type of power with an effective riposte. In a confrontation between Kant and Machiavelli, the former does not stand a chance, especially when the latter has the advantage in both capabilities and motivation, and is moreover ruled by a Siloviki elite that emerged from some of the most ruthless power structures of the modern era.

In terms of capabilities, the various former Soviet states’ vulnerabilities to Russian pressure were pointed out extensively in a previous post. But capabilities and interests are always fundamentally intertwined, and in terms of their motivations, the EU and Russia present dramatically different pictures. For the European Union, the Eastern Partnership is clearly more about creating a zone of stability in its immediate environs rather than providing a direct stepping-stone to membership; while desirable, the process remains optional, and certainly not central to its purpose or identity. The European Union is currently confronting multiple internal crises; but save for some embarrassment, an end to the Easter Partnership would not be seen as presenting it with a direct existential threat.

This is not the case for Russia, and ‘its’ Eurasian Union. ‘Offensive realist’ theorists of International Relations – like Mearsheimer – have already argued that the country has a greater sensitivity to territoriality because of its status as a ‘continental’ great power; except for a small, and now-marginalised ultra-liberal fringe, Russia’s post-Cold War elites have themselves always seen their state in a dominant leadership role within the former Soviet Union. To the Kremlin, the Ukraine is not just another Eastern European Association candidate with a remote, long-term chance of membership – as it is for Brussels; it is the place where the very idea of Russia was born, as the Kievan Rus, in the 10th century CE. The Caucasus and Central Asia are not merely geographic concepts; they are regions that have been part of a Russian-led state since the early 19th century. Perhaps more to the point, they are also sources and conduits of Russia’s most important contemporary source of hard power: hydrocarbons.

Moscow holds the advantage in hard-power terms, while the European Union has very little leverage as it stands. It can’t really ‘boycott’ Russian exports – oil, natural gas – without hurting itself. Moscow’s motivation to bring the former Soviet Union under its control also exceeds that of the EU’s. As it stands, the odds are thus stacked massively against the EaP, partly because Brussels has yet to learn the language of power-politics spoken in the Kremlin, partly because of a lack of political will emerging from a relatively lower level of prioritisation against the centrality of Russia’s re-integration drive.

Fortunately, it is reasonable to assume Russia’s interests do not go beyond the ‘Near abroad’. In any case, the current EU boundary coincides with NATO’s, presenting a solid red line which Moscow would not want to cross. But in combination with the imbalances in both power and motivation, this must make the remaining Association Agreement candidates anxious of their possible abandonment by the EU in the face of unrelenting Russian pressure, and not without reason.

Europe stands before a choice: learn to counter realist geo-politics with realist geo-politics, or continue its fatalistic reliance on soft power alone. Considering its institutional character, and its continuing energy dependence on Russia, a shift towards the former would seem unlikely in the short term. The alternative is to rely on the European idea’s powers of attraction, which have, incidentally, driven hundreds of thousands to rally on the streets of cities throughout the Ukraine, and beyond, during the past week. There is, however, a reason why ‘soft power’ is called ‘soft’, and attraction alone may very well not suffice to save the Europe’s floundering Eastern strategy.

As final preparations for the 23rd Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) on 15th-17th November 2013 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, this FPC Briefing by Gilberto Algar-Faria examines the challenges Sri Lanka faces dealing with the aftermath of its civil war and recent attempts to facilitate regional autonomy through the Northern Provincial Council (NPC). It explores the tensions faced by the international community in balancing the need for reconciliation and calls for action on human rights issues.

FPC Research Associate Alexander Jackson examines the background of Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili’s proposed resignation and explores what this might mean for the future of politics and civil society in Georgia.

On 23 June a confrontation in a playground in the town’s Maj housing estate turned into an altercation amongst adults. Shortly after the incident a Facebook page protesting against ‘inadaptable citizens’ (a popular media code for the Roma minority) appeared. Maj is the largest housing estate in Ceske Budejovice, home to some 22,000 people, and one of the town’s poorest neighbourhoods. There are some 400 Roma living in Maj, and tensions between the Roma and majority communities have never been as high as in other parts of the country, notably northern Bohemia.
So it was all the more surprising when, on Saturday 29 June, a gathering of approximately 500 neo-Nazis assembled in the main square determined to march to the Maj estate. Although major violence was prevented, the marchers did indeed get to Maj, and senior police officers were criticised by the mayor of Ceske Budejovice as well as by civil society groups for their inadequate state of readiness. Specifically they failed to use their legal power to disperse the gathering when the crowd started to chant racist slogans. There were further neo-Nazi gatherings in Ceske Budejovice over the next two weekends, during which the police succeeded in preventing the demonstrators from reaching Maj, and were generally commended for their overall control of the situation. Over the whole course of the protests, dozens of arrests were made though there were relatively few injuries.
Ceske Budejovice was only one of several towns to witness racial tension leading to social unrest this summer. The season of anti-Roma marches culminated in simultaneous protests in eight Czech towns on 24 August; according to police estimates some 1500 extremists took part altogether, and there were just over 100 arrests. Twenty one police officers were injured as well as a handful of extremists. The most violent confrontations took place in the large Silesian city of Ostrava, where police prevented neo-Nazis from attempting a pogrom against the local Roma community. Though there were few injuries a number of experienced commentators have warned against complacency in the current climate of high tension, suggesting that a full-scale pogrom might be too close for comfort. For example, in interviews for the ROMEA public affairs NGO, the prominent human rights lawyer and one-time candidate for the Constitutional Court Klara Samkova stated that she expects deaths on either side and the journalist and Roma affairs specialist Sasa Uhlova believes that the heavy police presence has been the only barrier to full-scale pogroms breaking out. And according to a recent report BIS, the Czech internal security service, view growing anti-Roma feelings amongst ordinary people as a greater security threat than the activities of the relatively small and fragmented groups of far-right activists.
The latest wave of ethnic tension comes in a climate of economic stagnation, (interestingly the number and intensity of neo-Nazi marches increased markedly after the financial crisis began five years ago) as well as widespread disillusionment with a political elite that increasing numbers of Czechs dismiss as corrupt and out of touch. In recent years the country has seen austerity policies as harsh as anywhere on the continent backfire disastrously, . Under these circumstances it is neither entirely surprising nor without historical precedent that the Roma community should be singled out for scapegoating amongst increasingly frustrated sections of the majority population.
The Roma minority in the Czech Republic number between (out of a total population of just over ten million) and have for centuries been a marginalised community, experiencing extreme persecution at various intervals, including during the Nazi Holocaust. To this day the Roma face severe discrimination in the labour market, in the education system and in access to housing . A survey conducted by the Perfect Crowd market research agency for the University of New York in Prague showed that well over 60% of the population harbour negative, or extremely negative, feelings towards the Roma – more than for any other single ethnic group, well above the levels of hostility felt towards Russians, Ukrainians and the Vietnamese minority. There are numerous popular myths about the Roma minority, perhaps the most widespread being that they are workshy, and that they receive preferential treatment in the social security system; in reality benefits are distributed without any reference of recording of the claimants’ ethnicity – the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has had to issue multiple press releases explaining this to the public. In an attempt to set the record straight, the Czech President, Milos Zeman, a fierce critic of the far right, in a recent address to the nation drew attention to the corruption of ‘white mafia’ businessmen using political connections in local government to provide housing at exorbitant non-market rates to homeless Roma families, thereby becoming the ultimate beneficiaries of housing benefit payments.
In the University of New York in Prague survey, 31.7% of respondents perceived the Roma as being biologically different from the rest of the population; 76.8% perceived the Roma as living a parasitic lifestyle and 92.5% believed the Roma to be abusing the Czech welfare state. Some 47% respondents believed that Roma emigrants, particularly to the UK and Canada, were actively harming the reputation of the country abroad, revealing hints of a conspiracy theory.
Moreover negative portrayal of the Roma is prevalent in the Czech media. The most egregious recent example involved a local newspaper in a small town taking a photograph of Chinese football hooligans from an Asian news server and superimposing a Roma face onto one of the offenders. This incident was condemned by the Czech Journalists’ Syndicate as well as the government Commissioner for Human Rights, whose office is investigating the possibility of a criminal prosecution. However, such open displays of racial prejudice in the Czech media are relatively rare (which is sadly not the case for discussion boards in online editions of newspapers, a veritable paradise for racist trolls), where more subtle varieties of hate-speech are the norm. In an upcoming paper Tess Slavickova and Peter Zvagulis have suggest that the concept of new racism would be an appropriate term in explaining media attitudes to the Roma – overtly racist and derogatory language is avoided and lip service is paid to cultural diversity, whilst manifestations of prejudice take more subtle forms: “New racism implicates, and overstates the role of minorities in social ‘deficiencies’, such as welfare dependency, aggressive behaviour, drug and alcohol abuse or failings in education. … the over-representation of heroes and villains, the absence of minority voices in public discourse, and the silencing of counter-hegemonic witnesses to events.” Members of the Roma (and Vietnamese) communities hardly ever appear as newsmakers in the media, except in crime stories, and their views and perspectives are rarely given air space. The term ‘inadaptable’ is frequently used by reporters and politicians as a code for the Roma, indeed it has been used so often that it has taken the form of a crude dog whistle in mainstream political discourse.
Despite these discouraging signals from survey data and analysis of media and political discourse, there are also a number of reasons to be hopeful about the future of community relations in the Czech Republic. Whilst anti-Roma sentiment remains prevalent in Czech society, there is little evidence of generally racist attitudes towards other groups except, and to a much lesser degree, the Vietnamese minority. Collective prejudice, disturbing as it is, is not supported by an underlying narrative of imagined injustice, or a sense of historical grievance, as has been the case in many outbreaks of mass violence around the world.
Moreover parties of the far right have not had a history of electoral success in the Czech Republic and are not expected to perform well in the general election in October. However, the vast majority of politicians across the political spectrum have preferred to remain silent in the face of the recent rise of aggressive neo-Nazi activities. The police have proved to be robust in their determination to prevent violence from breaking out during neo-Nazi parades. The courts have also shown a willingness to hand down tough sentences in cases of racist violence, notably in the case of an arson attack in 2009 in the town of Vitkov, which left a two-year-old child with life-threatening burns on most of her body.
Perhaps most encouraging has been the growing resolve of civil society organisations, which have become increasingly well-coordinated in the past months. Organisations such as Konexe and Blokujeme are determined to monitor and to obstruct neo-Nazis in action, and an umbrella anti-racist movement is emerging. It is becoming increasingly common for far-right marchers to be matched in numbers or outnumbered by anti-racist protesters. Attempts at encouraging dialogue between different communities are also starting to bear fruit. In early July, in the Maj housing estate in Ceske Budejovice, whilst police were busy keeping the far right away, a spontaneous gathering of around 400 inhabitants from both the majority and Roma communities began discussing various local issues and areas of concern. Whilst the debates were frank and sometimes harsh, the atmosphere was non-violent and the meeting helped to reduce tension. Less than a month later a similar gathering accompanied by musical performances took place in the town of Vitkov, the scene of the notorious 2009 arson attack, at the same time as a neo-Nazi march was taking place elsewhere in the town.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to making progress towards both improving the social conditions of the Roma minority and reducing tensions is the current political culture in the Czech Republic, characterised by a lack of willingness on the part of senior politicians to invest political capital in solving problems of ethnic tension and by policy-making processes that remain weak. Genuine progress will require empowering Roma communities on all levels, bringing them into decision-making processes in meaningful ways as well as political will to address the deeper social causes of the tensions which have resurfaced in the past few years. In other words the situation is crying out for joined-up policy-making.

October 2013

The author is grateful to ROMEA, an award winning media NGO, funded in part by the Czech government and the European Union, and to Gwendolyn Albert for supplying facts and data related to the recent neo-Nazi marches in the Czech Republic.

While there are also many other human rights violations taking place in the country, citizens’ ability to exercise their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association have been severely restricted by a regime that has demonstrated a fundamental unwillingness to allow the expression of opinions and ideas that contrast the official position, or access to and exchange of information that could be used to undermine its power.

The rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association are vital components of democratic society. Respect for and protection of these rights takes on even greater importance during election periods, as all candidates must be able to campaign unfettered, to get their messages out to the population, and to engage in robust public debate on matters of policy. Citizens must be able to access a wide and diverse range of information, to be exposed to a variety of political views, and to make informed decisions in electing their representatives.

Given the extensive nature of the on-going restriction of these rights in Azerbaijan, there is little hope that the upcoming presidential election will meet international standards for democratic elections. Even if there are technical improvements in election-day conduct, the underlying climate has rendered a fair and free competition virtually impossible.

Several of the main human rights concerns in the run-up to Azerbaijan’s presidential election are outlined below.

Political prisoners
Perhaps the most pressing human rights issue in Azerbaijan at present is the abundance of cases of political prisoners. Less than a month before the election, according to the Baku-based Human Rights Club more than 100 persons remain in detention or prison on politically motivated charges. Among these are journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, civic and political activists, and religious followers, many arrested in connection with the exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, assembly or association.

One political prisoner is would-be Republican Alternative (REAL) movement presidential candidate Ilgar Mammadov, whose registration was , which claimed that 4,982 of the 41,247 signatures in support of his candidacy were invalid (40,000 are required). Mammadov appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals, which rejected the appeal after experts from the Ministry of Justice examined around 4,500 of the signatures in question, and claimed they were indeed invalid. Mammadov, who has been in detention since 4 February, faces up to 12 years in jail on charges of organising violent protests in the city of Ismayilli. Activists believe the charges to be politically motivated and Amnesty International has declared him to be a prisoner of conscience.

A group of seven members of the N!DA civic movement remain in detention, along with a member of the Azad Genclik (Free Youth) organisation, Ilkin Rustemzade, on a variety of charges related to drug and weapon possession and hooliganism believed to be politically motivated. The N!DA activists have been in detention since March, and Rustemzade since May. On 13 September, were levied against the eight activists, who are now accused of organising violent protests and face up to 12 years in jail. These activists are also considered by Amnesty International to be .

Nine journalists, one blogger, and two human rights defenders are also among Azerbaijan’s political prisoners, in detention or in prison in connection with exercising their right to freedom of expression.

Restrictions on freedom of expression
Beyond politically motivated arrest, critical individuals and organisations in Azerbaijan are targeted through a range of tactics. Violence against journalists is a serious problem, with more than 200 cases documented by the Baku-based Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (IRFS) since the March 2005 murder of editor Elmar Huseynov, including a second murder, of journalist and writer Rafig Tagi in November 2011. that in the first half of 2013 alone, there were 26 cases of violence against journalists. In virtually none of these hundreds of cases have the true perpetrators been identified and prosecuted.

Critical journalists also face blackmail and other forms of pressure. Outspoken Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty investigative reporter Khadija Ismayilova has been subjected to a series of particularly nasty personal attacks, having twice had sex videos of her taken by hidden camera posted online – one in August, as well as a fake pornographic video purporting to depict her, and other threats and forms of pressure against her.

The existence of criminal defamation provisions has recently re-emerged as a pre-eminent freedom of expression concern. On 30 July, controversial new legislation took effect that to the Internet. As a result, Azerbaijanis could now face up to three years in prison for their online postings. This move is likely to have a serious chilling effect on freedom of expression online, adding to the already widespread practice of self-censorship in the country.

Restrictions on freedom of assembly
Although the Azerbaijani Constitution and law provide for the right to peaceful freedom of assembly, in practice, this right is severely restricted. While only advance notice of demonstrations is required by law, authorities continue to interpret this as a requirement for groups to obtain permission. Demonstrations are only allowed in approved locations, all of which are distant from the city centre, and many of which are unsuitable for a variety of other reasons, such as being difficult to access or situated in areas under construction.

Authorities respond harshly to unsanctioned protests, using violence to disperse protesters and carrying out widespread arrests of protest organisers and participants. At one in response to the deaths of soldiers in non-combat situations, authorities used water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets against peaceful protesters, and even brought out – but refrained from using – a Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), a device that has controversially been used for crowd-control purposes, referred to as a “sound cannon”, as it can emit sounds reaching decibels of up to 162.

Recent amendments to the law on freedom of assembly the fines for organising or participating in unsanctioned protests, which has already begun to have a chilling effect on freedom of assembly in the country as few individuals and organisations could afford to pay the steep fines. The maximum period of administrative detention has also been increased, meaning that participants in unsanctioned protests could now find themselves in detention for up to 60 days.

Restrictions on freedom of association
Critical organisations and individuals affiliated with them face a range of pressures in Azerbaijan, particularly opposition political parties, and NGOs working on issues related to human rights or democracy. The registration of NGOs remains politicised, with critical organisations disproportionately being denied registration by the state. A series of pieces of have recently been adopted, restricting the ability of independent NGOs to operate, and making it easier for the authorities to shut down unwelcome organisations. Human rights lawyers have also been subjected to growing pressures, such as disbarment and threats.

Opposition candidates and their supporters face difficulties in attempting to conduct even routine party activities in Azerbaijan’s regions. Earlier this year, Musavat Party Chairman Isa Gambar (who is not running as a candidate, but is now supporting the united opposition National Council candidate, Jamil Hasanli), had his convoy when he attempted to travel to the southern region of Lankaran. As a result, nine of the party activists travelling with him were injured. REAL movement leader Ilgar Mammadov after travelling to the Ismayilli region to investigate the causes of the then-on-going protests.

The issues described here are only a few examples of the many on-going systematic and widespread human rights violations taking place in Azerbaijan. In the absence of significant international pressure on the Azerbaijani government to cease such violations and take concrete steps to fulfil its international human rights obligations, such violations seem likely to continue, and worsen, in the run-up to the 9 October election and beyond.

Thus, in spring 2012 Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan gave a well-publicized interview to Russian daily ‘Kommersant’, in which he stated unequivocally that Armenia is not interested in the Customs Union since it does not have a common border with the members of the block, though he conceded that Armenia might be interested in some kind of a with that organization. This March in a press conference televised by all major channels President Serzh Sargsyan said that no one was expecting Armenia in the Customs Union and dismissed any talk of the Russian pressure as unfounded. Finally, only several days before Sargsyan’s visit to Moscow, in an interview to the ArmNews channel the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister ruled out Armenia’s joining the Customs Union, adding that there is no precedent of a country joining a customs union with countries that do not share a common border. Moreover, many pro-government media outlets and commentators had been engaged during recent months in a media campaign praising Armenia’s rapprochement with the European Union.

However, all these statements seem to have been forgotten as after Sargsyan’s return from Moscow as senior government figures started to praise Armenia’s potential benefits from joining the Customs Union. To make matters worse, some Armenian government figures attempted to spin Sargsyan’s announcement by saying that Armenia will continue to aim for the Association agreement, thus prompting unequivocal denial from the EU side. After a series of statements of varying degrees of clarity from several EU sources, came unusually direct statements, which left little room for doubt. Thus, in apparent response to Armenian officials’ statements, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said on September 9th that European Union has no plans to finalize an Association Agreement with Armenia at an upcoming EU summit in Lithuania, adding that .

EU officials also talked of the Russian pressure on Armenian authorities. Many commentators tend to believe that the security argument was used by Russia, who is Armenia’s main security partner and the leading force in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), of which Armenia is a member. Armenia is locked in a conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, so it is particularly vulnerable to such pressures. However, given the internal political situation in Armenia, there might have been other leverages, which could have been used by Russia to influence Armenian government. The current government is still struggling with the lack of democratic legitimacy, which came as a result of the long history of disputed elections and heavy-handed treatment of protesters. Particularly, the events of March 1st2008, when 10 people were killed as the government cracked down on post-election protests in Yerevan, are still haunting Armenia’s internal politics. The latest presidential election in 2013 did not help to mitigate the lack of legitimacy, and probably even made the matters worse: though Serzh Sargsyan was announced the winner, opposition leader Raffi Hovannisian refused to accept the official results, and started a campaign of protests, which however were smaller in scale than those in 2008 and gradually died out after Sargsyan’s inauguration.

Sargsyan’s announcement probably also came as a surprise for Armenian civil society. Numerous Armenian NGOs have been involved in various projects connected with the European integration and the reforms that were expected within its framework. The announcement made in Moscow became a cause for worry since Armenian government commitment to the Association Agreement was perceived as a certain guarantee that the authoritarian tendencies, which already exist in the country would be kept in check. Now, some NGO figures argue, the Armenian government will be judged against the standards that exist in the countries of the Customs Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) which can be described as anything but democratic. In the days preceding the announcement and immediately after it several attacks took place, aimed at civic activists, who had participated in anti-government protests. . Whether it was a coincidence or not, many in the civil society perceived these attacks as a sign that the Armenian government’s authoritarian tendencies are getting stronger within the new geopolitical context.

Against this background, fears that by joining the Customs Union may mean creation of “a new USSR” and will lead to ceding a part of Armenia’s sovereignty became quite visible in Armenia. Some even feared that Armenia, which had acquired independence from Russia only around 22 years ago, might be reduced to a status of a client-state of Russia. Over a hundred activists protested Sargsyan’s announcement September 4th in front of the President’s residence and on September 5th outside of the ruling party headquarters. The scale of the protests however remains relatively small, mostly confined to politically active youth and civil society representatives. As for the main political forces, they seem to be reluctant to spoil relations with Russian authorities by opposing the union too harshly. Thus the opposition Armenian National Congress (ANC/HAK) criticized the government for squandering Armenia’s international credibility as a result of its U-turn, but refrained from commenting on whether Customs Union membership would beneficial for Armenia or not. Moreover, ANC leader Ter-Petrosyan warned his party members against ‘resorting to anti-Russianism’ in the criticism of the government. This careful stance is shared by most other political forces represented in the parliament. As for the larger public, the ‘Russian’ option still remains quite popular among many Armenians, especially among the middle aged and older citizens, who tend to have a nostalgia for the Soviet times, and who do not seem to understand the intricacies of European integration.

Mikayel Zolyan is historian and political analyst from Yerevan (Armenia). Currently, he teaches at several universities in Yerevan and works at Yerevan Press Club NGO in Yerevan.

September 2013

In this FPC briefing Gilberto Algar-Faria examines what conditions might lead to effective peace negotiations in Afghanistan. He explores the motivations of different stakeholders, examines the role of ‘spoilers’ and looks at comparisons with the resolution of other armed conflicts.

This reality may now be under acute threat. Moscow has already managed to ‘turn’ the weakest link in Europe’s Eastern ‘chain’, Armenia: considering its extreme strategic-military dependence on Russia, forcing, coaxing or, depending on who you believe, persuading its president into an unexpected about-turn during last week’s ‘working visit’ to Moscow was relatively uncomplicated. But indications are that this nasty surprise – for both observers in Brussels and analysts farther afield – was just the beginning of a broader Russian movement to reclaim exclusive authority over ‘its’ sphere of influence through its integration into a ‘Eurasian Union’, with implications for both the countries involved, and the European Union’s future relations with Russia.

For Armenia, the consequences of his 179-degree turn – the government insists this isn’t the end of its hopes for European integration – could be dramatic, not least in terms of its fragile democratisation. With the mitigating influence of Europe removed, and constitutional reforms on the political agenda, repression and democratic rollback could very well become more brazen and complete. The fact that two prominent civil-society activists were viciously assaulted only days after Sargsyan’s about-face could be an indicator of worse to come in terms of the harassment of more liberally-minded independent groups and individuals. Unencumbered by EU conditionalities, Yerevan might also use upcoming constitutional reform – ostensibly aimed at transforming the country from a presidential into a parliamentary republic – to unilaterally push through legislative amendments weakening the protection of fundamental rights and checks and balances. Those concerned with Armenia’s democratic development would have to be alert to these possible scenarios: for Armenia as for other post-Soviet states, a move towards the Eurasian Union may very well entail a move towards the Russian, Belorussian and Kazakh political models, as the pressure to democratise disappears.

From broader regional perspective, Armenia’s plight might be a premonition of worse to come in the Ukraine and Moldova, two countries that have already been targets for various pressures on the part of Russia. Till now, these pressures have been cloaked in the language of market mechanisms and public health; but the remarks of one high-ranking Kremlin official – as to how unfortunate it would be for Moldovans to ‘freeze’ in the winter – leave little to one’s imagination. Both the Ukraine and Moldova remain highly dependent on Moscow for their energy supplies, and Moscow could decide to cut off their flow as a punitive measure for their European aspirations, quite literally, at the turn of a few valves. As a last resort, ‘unfortunate incidents’ could even lead to unrest in Ukraine’s Russian-speaking East, and the Crimea, as well as in Moldova’s separatist Trans-Dniestria region. While such a course of events would still seem highly unlikely, much depends on the level of Moscow’s determination to prevent the continuation of its Western neighbours’ European adventures; considering recent developments, it would, however, be prudent to closely monitor these pressure-points, which Russia has used in the not-so-distant past.

With Armenia now safely in Moscow’s orbit, the Kremlin may also turn its attention to its two rather more recalcitrant Caucasus neighbours, Georgia and Azerbaijan. While Georgia is certainly the most openly pro-Western of all post-Soviet states, and public opinion would most likely not countenance membership of a Russian-led entity, the country also offers Moscow a raft of potentially useful vulnerabilities. Especially after the upcoming presidential elections, any maintenance of the recent thaw in trade relations with Russia might come to depend on a more pliant attitude on the part of the Georgian administration; the stability of the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Javakheti would also have to be closely monitored for unexpected, ‘coincidental’ complications. Baku’s initial Schadenfreude at Sargsyan’s public humiliation may prove short-lived indeed, as Russia could come to use the Karabakh issue, and the Armenian-Azeri rivalry around it, to now focus pressures on Baku by throwing its weight behind Yerevan; a revival of ethnic Lezgin activism in the north, or of possible anti-regime activities by wealthy members of Russia’s ethnic Azeri diaspora would also be potential pressure points to look out for, in a continuation of Russia’s long-standing carrots-and-sticks/divide-and-rule approach.

Much of the above depends on Moscow’s – and Putin’s – determination to bring the states of the former Soviet Union back into a ‘Eurasian’ fold; but Russia’s president has already demonstrated his considerable skills as a master of a new form of regional realpolitik, based on adroitly using dependencies and complications inherited from Soviet times to Moscow’s advantage, putting other players before consecutive faits accomplis. Armenia could be only the first in a longer list of targets; every fallen domino would, no doubt, increase momentum towards Putin’s Eurasian Union. The EU would therefore either have to learn to play this game, desist, or prepare for being put in front of rather uncomfortable faits accomplis in the not-so-distant future. In view of its presently dubious ability to provide relief from many of the potential pressures enumerated above, some hard-nosed strategic deliberation and hypothetical scenario building would appear to be called for.

FPC Research Associate Andrew Southam examines the recent record of Turkey in relation to international judicial cooperation. He looks at the development of domestic legislation and practices and how they impact on working with other nations on issues including extradition, terrorism and money laundering.